NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 
1917-1919 


MAJOR-GENERAL  CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS 


rNEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

^  1917-1919  X 

A  HISTORY  OF  THE 
TWENTY-SIXTH  DIVISION  U.S.A. 

BY 
EMERSON  GIFFORD  TAltXOR 

MAJOR,  INFANTRY,  26TH  DIVISION  tj.  S.  A. 
ACTING  ASSISTANT  CHIEF  OF  STAFF 

With  Maps  and  Illustrations 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(Cbe  lliljeritfibe  presi«i  Cambcibijc 
1920 


> 


COPYRIGHT,    1920,    BY   EMEKSON   GIFFORD   TAYLOR 


ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 


TO 

AMAURY  DU  BOISROUVRAY 

AND 

THE  OFFICERS  OF  THE  FRENCH  MILITARY  MISSION 


CONTENTS 

I.  Origins  1 

II.  Organizing  the  Division  12 

III.  Overseas  25 

IV.  Settling  Down  in  France  34 
V.  The  Chemin  des  Dames  63 

VI.  On  the  March  86 

VII.  The  La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector  96 

VIII.  The  Fights  at  Bois  Brule  and  Seicheprey  110 

IX,  Day  by  Day  in  the  La  Reine  Sector  134 

X.  The  Affairs  of  May  and  June  144 

XL  To  the  Champagne-Marne  Defensive  158 

XII.  The  Aisne-Marne  Offensive  —  First  Phase  168 

XIII.  The  Aisne-Marne  Offensive  —  Epieds  and 

Trugny  185 

XIV.  The  Aisne-Marne  Offensive  —  Afterwards  203 
XV.  The  Saint-Mihiel  Offensive  213 

XVI.  In  the  Meuse-Argonne  Offensive  —  Marche- 

VILLE  232 

XVII.  In  the  Meuse-Argonne  Offensive  —  Verdun  242 

XVIII.  Before  the  Armistice  and  After  264 

XIX.  Reconstruction  —  The  Montigny-le-Roi  Area  280 

XX.  Homeward  —  The  Last  Days  292 

Index  307 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

]\L\jor-General  Clarence  R.  Edwards  Frontispiece 

Remieres  Trench  and  Remieres  Wood  124 

Photograph  by  U.S.  Air  Service,  Photographic  Section 

Vaux  164 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

Photograph  taken  at  4.30  a.m.,  July  18,  1918,  showing 
members  of  the  103d  Infantry  jumping  off  176 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

Pill-Box,  Saint-Remy  Wood  220 

Photograph  by  U.S.  Air  Service,  Photographic  Section 

No  Man's  Land  over  which  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division 
advanced  near  Les  Eparges  224 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

Hill  south  of  Ormont  Wood  252 

Photograph  by  U.S.  Air  Service,  Photographic  Section 

Major-General  Harry  C.  Hale  282 

Photograph  taken  in  France  by  Mr.  Frtink  P.  Sibley 

MAPS 

Neufchateau  Area  34 

Chemin  des  Dames  Sector  66 

La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector  106 

Advance  of  26th  Division,  Aisne-Marne  Offensive  168 

Saint-Mihiel  Offensive  216 

Meuse-Argonne  Offensive  246 


NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

1917-1919 

• 

CHAPTER  I 
ORIGINS 

ANY  account  of  an  American  combat  division  partici- 
pating in  the  late  European  war,  written  while  the 
color  of  its  life  under  fire  is  yet  undimmed,  inevitably  must 
incur  the  danger  of  lapsing  into  mere  reminiscence.  One 
who  has  shared  the  life  of  a  body  of  fighting  troops  in  the 
field  is  like  to  record  concerning  it  matters  which  are  less 
the  facts  of  history  than  the  bases  of  the  writer's  own 
enthusiasm  or  prejudice. 

But  there  is  vitality  in  a  tale  of  events,  the  echoes  of 
which  are  still  sounding.  There  exists  a  certain  value,  for 
the  historian  of  a  later  generation,  in  the  fresh  recollections 
and  impressions  of  the  men  who  played  an  active  part  in 
tfuose  events.  And  so,  if  only  for  these  reasons,  it  may  not 
be  amiss  to  set  down,  at  this  time,  the  annals  of  such  a 
division  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  as  the 
Twenty-Sixth,  which  fought  in  France  throughout  the 
entire  period  of  American  participation  in  the  World  War, 
in  1918. 

For  the  record  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  is  particularly  in- 
teresting. The  circumstances  of  its  organization,  its  per- 
sonnel, its  record  as  a  fighting  unit,  are  all  singularly  rich 
as  reflecting  not  only  national  and  sectional  character- 
istics, but  also  the  typical  traits  of  American  fighting 
troops  in  the  field,  on  the  march,  in  billets,  or  in  the  heat 
of  battle.  The  story  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  is  of  American 
citizens,   non-professional   soldiery,   who  volunteered   to 


2  NEW  ENGLx\ND  IN  FRANCE 

take  up  arms  in  defense  of  their  country's  cause,  and  of 
the  manner  in  which  American  citizens  do  bear  themselves 
in  action.  And  it  is  in  this  hght,  possibly,  that  the  following 
pages  may  be  read  with  clearest  understanding. 

To  one  unacquainted  with  military  matters,  it  appears 
perhaps  unnecessary,  oftentimes,  to  take  such  careful  ac- 
count, as  must  the  military  historian,  of  elements  in  an 
organization  which  appear  not  directly  related  to  its  char- 
acter as  a  body  of  troops  equipped  and  trained  for  giving 
battle.  Numerical  strength,  the  commander  and  his  staff, 
proficiency,  fighting  spirit,  physical  condition,  equipment 
and  supplies,  are,  like  the  weather  and  the  state  of  the 
roads,  obviously  important  to  consider  in  reviewing  the 
work  of  any  unit  in  action.  But  almost  equally  important, 
it  may  be  said,  for  a  clear  understanding  of  an  armed 
force's  operations  in  the  field,  are  such  matters  as  its  or- 
igin, character  and  identity  of  its  personnel,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances of  its  creation.  To  understand  the  nature  of 
the  French  defense  of  Verdun  in  1916,  or  that  of  the 
British  retreat  from  Mons  prior  to  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
in  1914,  one  must  accurately  appraise  the  character  of  the 
forces  engaged.  Similarly,  one  cannot  get  a  true  approx- 
imation of  the  work  of  the  subject  of  this  history,  with- 
out showing  what  kind  of  men  were  brought  together  to 
form  the  Twenty -Sixth  Division,  from  what  environment 
they  sprang,  and  under  what  circumstances  they  were 
organized. 

In  accordance  with  plans  for  the  organization  of  the 
national  defense  perfected  after  the  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war,  April  6,  1917,  the  Twenty-Sixth  Di- 
vision of  the  United  States  Army  was  created  by  a  con- 
sohdation  and  reorganization  of  the  state  troops  of  Maine, 
New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island, 
and  Connecticut.'  A  territorial  scheme  for  the  organization 

*  Numerical  designations  of  divisions  in  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States, 
created  for  participation  in  the  European  War  in  1917,  were  assigned  according 


ORIGINS  3 

of  divisions  of  the  new  army  already  projected  was  being 
put  into  operation  quite  generally.  Admirable  in  its  con- 
ception, it  was  valuable  as  contributing  to  establish  an 
esprit  de  corps  among  the  troops  to  a  degree  perhaps  not 
always  appreciated  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force's  activities  in  France.  Under  its  provisions,  New 
England  men  brought  into  service  under  the  selective 
draft  were  grouped  together  in  the  Seventy-Sixth  Division; 
in  the  State  of  New  York  were  raised  the  Twenty-Seventh 
(National  Guard)  and  Seventy -Seventh  (National  Army) 
Divisions;  and  elsewhere,  throughout  the  country,  the 
effort  was  made  to  combine  in  divisions,  with  local  terri- 
torial affiliations,  state  troops  or  the  drafted  men  of  the 
several  States  or  neighboring  localities.  A  notable  excep- 
tion to  this  rule  was  the  creation  of  the  Forty-Second  Di- 
vision out  of  National  Guard  troops  from  all  sections  of 
the  country,  for  the  purpose  of  emphasizing  at  the  outset 
the  national  character  of  the  new  American  armies. 

The  New  England  National  Guard  of  1917  meant,  as  a 
fighting  force,  much  or  little  according  to  the  angle  from 
which  it  was  considered.  A  system  by  which  troops  re- 
cruited, organized,  officered,  and  maintained  under  the 
authority  of  the  State,  were  at  the  same  time  equipped 
and  trained  under  the  supervision  and  direction  of  the  War 
Department,  which  were  partly  dependent  on  the  financial 
support  of  the  State  and  partly  on  that  of  the  federal 
authorities,  was  not  calculated  to  produce  uniformly  good 
results  as  to  discipline  and  proficiency.  The  danger  of  a 

to  the  following  plan:  To  divisions  of  the  Regular  Army  were  given  the  numbers 
One  to  Twenty-Five  inclusive;  to  divisions  formed  from  the  National  Guard 
(state  troops  in  federal  service),  the  numbers  Twenty-Six  to  Seventy-Five  in- 
clusive; to  divisions  of  the  National  Army  (composed  of  men  inducted  into  the 
army  under  the  Selective  Service  Act),  the  numbers  Seventy-Six  to  One  Hun- 
dred inclusive.  Numerical  designations  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  engineer  units 
with  the  National  Guard  and  National  Army  divisions  commenced,  by  an  exten- 
sion of  this  system,  with  101  to  101  for  infantry  regiments  in  the  Twenty-Sixth 
Division,  101  to  103  for  artillery  regiments,  101  for  the  engineer  regiment.  Simi- 
larly, the  infantry  regiments  of  the  Seventy-Sixth  Division,  for  example,  were 
numbered  301  to  304  inclusive. 


4  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

clash  between  the  controlHng  authorities  was  always 
present.  On  the  one  side,  the  War  Department,  properly 
intent  on  exercising  such  close  control  as  it  deemed  vitally 
important  in  order  to  train  and  equip  the  state  troops  as 
effective  fighting  units  of  a  national  army,  tended  con- 
stantly to  extend  and  impose  its  own  regulations;  on  the 
other  side,  the  States,  appropriating  large  sums  annually 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  state  forces,  and  jealous  of 
federal  control  even  while  acknowledging  its  necessity, 
inclined  inevitably  to  interpret  the  requirements  of  the 
War  Department  in  accordance  with  local  conditions  or 
local  military  traditions.  That  the  system  did  not  break 
down  is  largely  due  to  recognition  by  state  authorities  of 
the  practical  advantages  to  be  derived  from  strict  con- 
formity with  federal  requirements  regarding  drill,  dis- 
cipline, and  instruction  if  the  troops  were  to  be  properly 
trained  for  active  service.  It  became  a  point  of  pride  in  all 
the  state  military  organizations  to  pass  creditably  the 
periodical  inspections  of  the  federal  officers;  hard  and 
conscientious  work  was  done  at  the  prescribed  drills,  at 
the  summer  camps  of  instruction,  and  in  the  schools  for 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  In  general,  good 
care  was  taken  that  the  arms  and  equipment  issued  by  the 
War  Department  were  maintained  in  serviceable  condi- 
tion. Standards  varied,  even  in  companies  of  the  same 
regiment,  but  a  great  amount  of  military  knowledge  was 
taught  and  learned.  Good  was  accomplished  furthermore 
by  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  Reg- 
ular Army  who  were  detailed  to  the  several  States  for  duty 
as  Inspector-Instructors.  They  brought  to  the  state  troops 
the  best  ideals  of  the  "old  army"  respecting  discipline, 
training,  care  of  property,  and  efficiency  in  the  field;  they 
were  able  to  transmit  to  the  federal  authorities  through 
the  Militia  Bureau,  along  with  their  routine  reports,  an 
accurate  and  intelligent  interpretation  of  the  spirit,  quali- 
fications of  officers,  and  the  general  attitude  of  both  officers 


ORIGINS  5 

and  men  constituting  the  state  units,  which  was  of  im- 
mense value.  The  work  of  these  inspectors,  extending 
through  a  period  of  years  preceding  the  call  of  the  state 
troops  into  federal  service,  was  further  of  very  great  im- 
portance as  interpreting  the  Regular  Army  and  the  New 
England  National  Guard  to  one  another. 

But  the  conscientious  work  of  those  responsible  for  the 
efficiency  of  the  local  military  units  could  not  accomplish 
more  than  an  approximation  of  the  ideal  of  perfection. 
The  too  brief  weekly  drill  periods,  the  annual  field  instruc- 
tion of  but  six  days'  duration,  the  impossibility  of  enforc- 
ing a  uniform  standard  of  discipline  and  proficiency  for 
officers,  were  only  a  few  of  the  difficulties  against  which 
headway  had  to  be  made  under  the  existing  system. 
Wrong  in  principle  (in  the  light  of  present-day  require- 
ments), exposed  to  all  the  dangers  of  a  dual  and  divided 
control,  admittedly  faulty  hy  many  in  the  National  Guard 
service  itself,  regarded  as  a  most  unsatisfactory  makeshift 
by  all  those  forces  intent  on  building  up,  under  federal 
control,  a  strong  reserve  for  the  Regular  Army,  it  is  sur- 
prising that  the  system  did  not  break  down  altogether.  To 
its  opponents,  it  appeared  incredible  that  the  system  was 
able  to  produce  troops  who,  in  the  spring  of  1917,  were 
even  approximately  fit  for  consideration  as  the  basis  of 
a  field  force  for  active  operations  against  the  enemy. 

For  other  elements  than  the  inherent  defects  of  the 
National  Guard  system  had  tended  for  months  to  reduce 
the  effectiveness  of  the  New  England  troops.  The  period 
following  their  hard  field  service  and  training  on  the  Mexi- 
can Border  in  1916  was  one  of  disintegration.  Scores  of 
officers  resigned  their  commissions  in  the  autumn  of  that 
year;  hundreds  of  enlisted  men,  as  their  terms  expired, 
left  the  service  at  once.  New  enlistments  were  very  rare. 
Throughout  the  winter  of  1916-17  the  effective  force  of 
units  was  reduced  to  a  minimum ;  military  interest  was  at 
a  low  ebb.  The  prospect,  furthermore,  of  securing  com- 


6  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

missions  in  the  OflBcers'  Reserve  Corps  by  a  three  months' 
course  of  intensive  study  and  work  at  Plattsburg  or  another 
of  the  newly  estabhshed  War  Department  training-camps, 
attracted  away  from  the  Guard  organizations  a  large 
number  of  valuable  junior  company  officers  and  sergeants. 
The  determined  drive  made  at  this  time  to  replace  the 
existing  system  of  national  defense,  such  as  it  was,  by 
another  soundly  based  on  the  principle  of  universal  serv- 
ice, militated  strongly  against  the  efficiency  of  the  state 
troops.  The  federal  inspections  of  the  Guard,  held  in  the 
late  winter  months,  were  far  from  being  universally  satis- 
factory. 

Judged  by  ordinary  standards,  viewed  from  the  angle 
by  which  a  fighting  force  is  ordinarily  estimated  as  effi- 
cient or  the  reverse  in  proportion  as  it  can  show  numbers, 
discipline,  long  training,  and  high  morale,  the  New  Eng- 
land National  Guard,  in  the  spring  of  1917,  could  not  have 
presented  a  very  reassuring  sight  to  those  who  were  anx- 
iously weighing  the  potential  fighting  value  of  each  organ- 
ized unit  of  the  meager  national  establishment.  But  ele- 
ments not  appearing  on  the  surface,  qualities  which  only 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  state  troops  could  discern,  were 
present  to  lend  strength,  soHdarity,  a  spirit  of  patriotism, 
and  a  foundation  on  which  to  build  a  division  of  fighting 
men,  which  are  worth  study.  What  was  there,  latent,  in 
the  ranks  of  the  little  companies  and  batteries,  what  in  the 
headquarters  of  the  regiments  and  brigades,  which,  under 
the  red  sun  of  war,  came  into  bloom  like  unsuspected 
flowers? 

In  the  first  place,  the  men  who  were  to  compose  the 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  as  they  assembled  in  their  camps 
for  mobilization,  were  all  volunteers,  from  highest  ranking 
officer  to  lowliest  raw  recruit.  They  wanted  to  fight.  Not  a 
man  who  enlisted  after  January,  1917,  but  felt,  clearly 
enough,  the  imminence  of  the  call  to  active  service,  with 
all  that  service  in  the  war  then  raging  must  mean.  Hun- 


ORIGINS  7 

dreds  joined  the  New  England  troops  that  spring  because 
they  felt,  quite  simply,  that  to  enHst  was  their  duty  as 
good  citizens;  hundreds  were  touched  by  the  spirit  of  the 
Great  Adventure;  other  hundreds  desired  ardently  to  re- 
join the  colors,  now  that  real  action  was  in  sight  instead 
of  a  round  of  armory  drills.  The  rumor  that  the  National 
Guard  would  be  first  overseas  after  the  Regulars  was  the 
spur  that  pricked  forward  an  ardent  thousand;  the  fact 
that  one's  friends  were  going  in  the  home-town  company, 
proud  of  their  new  distinction,  brought  forward  a  thou- 
sand more.  Young  men  of  foreign  blood  enlisted  for  the 
sake  of  aiding  their  brothers  already  in  the  fight  on  the 
Allied  side.  Whatever  the  spring  that  gave  the  impetus, 
the  young  fellows  who  filled  the  ranks  of  the  old  regiments 
during  the  late  spring  and  summer  enlisted  because  they 
wished  to  be  counted  with  the  foremost.  And  that  spirit  — 
the  spirit  of  the  patriotic  volunteer  —  was  as  gold  in  the 
crucible.  It  was  the  element  which  gave  a  precious  value 
to  the  whole  alloy. 

Another  important  contribution  to  the  strength  of  the 
Guard  regiments  was  the  local  affection  and  support  which 
they  all  commanded.  Units  of  the  New  England  militia 
had  had  a  long  history.  Many  of  them  dated  their  organiza- 
tion back  to  the  days  of  the  Revolution  or  even  earlier; 
they  were  hneal  descendants  of  Colonial  train-bands  or 
of  Washington's  brigades.  Many  had  played  a  gallant 
part  in  previous  wars  of  the  Nation.  The  fathers  and  grand- 
fathers of  not  a  few  company  officers  had  been  captains 
or  lieutenants  in  the  same  company  a  generation  or  two 
before.  For  years  the  whole  military  spirit  of  a  town  had 
been  expressed  in  the  local  company,  troop,  or  battalion. 
A  score  of  cities  and  towns,  all  over  the  area,  had,  each 
in  its  warm  heart's  care,  the  well-being  and  creditable 
record  of  a  group  of  its  own  "boys."  It  is  quite  true  that 
there  had  come  periods  when  this  community  interest  was 
lukewarm.  Only  a  few  short  months  before  the  declaration 


8  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

of  war,  as  has  been  said,  this  interest  was  languid  to  the 
point  of  inanition.  But  once  the  imagination  was  touched, 
once  active  service  was  imminent,  the  heart  of  the  com- 
munity overflowed  in  affection  and  practical  assistance. 
Even  obscurely,  it  was  felt  that  the  soldier  could  only  be 
helped  by  knowing  that  his  town  was  backing  him.  And 
what  enormous  value  to  morale  this  feeling  was  proved 
to  possess,  those  can  bear  witness  who  knew,  from  inti- 
mate association,  what  the  New  England  soldier  was  hke 
in  the  field.  Volunteers  for  war  service,  who  feel  them- 
selves sure  of  the  support  and  love  of  their  fellow  towns- 
men, who  feel  responsible  for  the  good  name  of  their  home- 
grown regiment,  make  good  fighting  material. 

A  further  asset  on  the  side  of  esprit  de  corps  w^as  that 
the  troops  of  every  New  England  State  were  employed 
in  making  up  the  new  organization.  Not  only  was  there 
a  healthy  rivalry  between  local  units;  but  further,  it  soon 
became  evident  that  the  New  Englanders,  as  a  group, 
felt  placed  on  their  mettle  to  outshine  the  divisions  from 
other  parts  of  the  country.  From  the  very  outset,  a  soli- 
darity was  present,  in  the  germ.  It  was  a  spirit  which  was 
of  the  greatest  value  when,  in  the  active  competition  of 
the  training  areas  in  France  and  in  the  days  of  field  serv- 
ice, the  Twenty-Sixth  found  itself  being  judged  by  the 
same  standards  as  the  best  divisions  in  the  army,  old  and 
new. 

It  will  be  asked:  What  military  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence did  these  troops  possess.'*  This  varied  greatly.  The 
flood  of  recruits  poured  in  larger  measure  into  some  regi- 
ments than  others;  the  discharge  of  old  men  who  had  de- 
pendent relatives,  or  were  of  alien  enemy  parentage  or 
birth,  took  from  some  a  large  proportion,  while  other 
units  suffered  only  a  little  in  this  respect.  The  changing 
policy  of  the  W^ar  Department  in  the  spring  of  1917,  by 
which  recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  was  ordered, 
then  stopped,  then  ordered  to  be  resumed  with  new  energy. 


ORIGINS  9 

had  the  general  effect  of  chiHing  enthusiasm  in  all  quar- 
ters for  that  branch  of  the  service.  Drill  and  instruction 
were  taken  up  with  intelligent  energy,  however,  from  the 
moment  the  Guard  units  were  called  into  federal  service 
(at  various  dates  following  March  20).  At  once  scattered 
as  a  protection  against  enemy  sabotage  on  lines  of  com- 
munication and  transportation,  at  centers  of  the  produc- 
tion of  munitions  and  supplies,  and  around  public  util- 
ities, the  new  men  all  obtained  experience  in  guard  duty, 
close-order  drill,  military  courtesy,  sanitation,  care  of 
government  property,  and  a  taste  of  life  under  conditions 
of  active  service.  It  was  a  duty  of  value  in  developing 
non-commissioned  officers;  it  taught  battalion  and  com- 
pany officers  a  great  deal  regarding  the  handling  and 
supply  of  an  organization  the  units  of  which  are  widely 
scattered.  Of  the  older  men  the  great  majority  had  had 
months  of  field  service  in  1916  on  the  Border.  The  Guard 
included  also  an  exceptionally  large  number  of  officers, 
both  staff  and  line,  who  had  been  in  the  military  service 
for  years,  for  sheer  love  of  it.  Many  of  these  had  been  in 
the  Spanish  War;  they  included  scores  of  well-qualified 
rifle  and  pistol  instructors;  there  were  many  experienced 
adjutants,  ordnance  officers,  and  quartermasters;  the  med- 
ical personnel  was  very  strong.  The  officers  knew  the  book, 
and  they  knew  the  men  under  their  command.  This  last 
is  worth  emphasizing.  Not  only  had  the  company,  battal- 
ion, and  regimental  leaders  successfully  passed  all  the  War 
Department  efficiency  tests;  but  also  they  were  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  characters,  worth,  and  personality  of 
the  individuals  over  whom  they  had  control.  They  came 
from  the  same  town  as  their  men;  they  often  had  brothers 
in  the  ranks.  Now  this  may  be  objected  to  in  a  military 
organization.  Indeed,  it  had  been  a  favorite  charge  against 
the  National  Guard  system  that  company  officers  were 
usually  elected  by  the  enlisted  personnel.  Higher  authority 
might  appoint  them;  but  the  designation  to  lead  came 


10  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

from  below,  in  most  cases.  It  was  argued  that  an  oflScer 
so  selected  was  hampered  in  his  application  of  discipline, 
was  apt  to  play  favorites,  could  secure  his  start  by  meth- 
ods of  the  small  politician.  Troops  should  obey  the  orders 
of  any  officer.  All  this  can  hardly  be  denied ;  but  the  fluent 
criticism  failed  oftentimes  to  take  into  account  the  many 
checks  and  balances  which  federal  and  state  regulations 
placed  about  the  elective  system.  And  it  was  a  fact  that, 
even  when  a  man  had  started  on  his  commissioned  career 
by  methods  not  of  the  best,  he  was  like  to  develop,  under 
the  pressure  of  new  responsibi  ities,  quite  beyond  expec- 
tation. It  is  also  true  that,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases, 
the  National  Guard  officers  in  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division 
were  such  as  any  authority  would  have  been  glad  to  com- 
mission. It  was  one  of  the  many  paradoxes  of  the  system  — 
the  thing  worked,  in  spite  of  the  many  obvious  reasons 
why  it  should  not.  A  point,  moreover,  most  important 
to  observe,  is  that  these  National  Guard  officers  appear  to 
have  done  admirably  in  laboring  to  insure  the  comfort  and 
well-being  of  the  enlisted  men.  In  procuring  food,  shelter, 
and  clothing  for  their  troops  they  were  assiduous  and  effi- 
cient; they  defended  the  rights  and  privileges  of  their 
fellows  most  tenaciously.  If  there  was  any  danger  to  dis- 
cipline, in  that  officers  of  such  habits  should  get  into  the 
way  of  babying  their  men,  or  of  seeking  popularity  by  a 
cheap  and  easy  means  —  which  was  a  charge  easier  to 
draw  than  to  prove  —  it  is  sure  that  this  danger,  if  it  ex- 
isted, was  more  than  balanced  by  an  increased  devotion 
and  a  closer  bond  of  mutual  understanding. 

Such,  then,  were  the  men  who  made  up  the  Yankee 
Division  as  first  constituted.  Excellent  material  physically; 
with  a  large  proportion  of  men  who  had  been  in  mili- 
tary service  more  than  a  year;  with  thousands  of  recruits 
who  were  still  to  learn  the  feel  of  a  rifle  against  the  shoulder ; 
with  remarkable  solidarity  and  high  morale;  representing 
every  class  of  the  New  England  social  order;  every  man 


ORIGINS  11 

a  volunteer;  every  unit  backed  solidly  by  the  personal 
interest  of  its  community;  with  a  very  large  number  of 
skilled  mechanics  and  office  men  in  the  ranks,  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  the  force  in  being,  whatever  its  limi- 
tations of  training,  was  one  which  afforded  great  promise 
of  development  into  a  representative  combat  unit  of  the 
highest  type. 


CHAPTER  II 

ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION 

LET  us  trace  the  successive  steps  of  the  process  by 
which  these  soldiers  were  brought  together  into  an 
organization.  Weeks  were  to  pass  before  they  were  fused 
and  welded  and  shaped  into  a  finished  machine;  months 
were  required  to  effect  the  magical  change  from  a  machine 
to  a  living  organism  with  a  soul  and  a  character  all  its  own. 
For  the  moment,  during  the  anxious  days  of  the  summer, 
the  men  and  oflScers  were  assembled,  counted,  and  tested, 
as  if  they  were  so  many  elements  intended  for  the  melting 
furnace  and  the  mould. 

Toward  the  end  of  July,  withdrawn  from  guard  duty, 
the  troops  were  concentrated  in  the  state  camps  of  mobili- 
zation and  training,  or  in  other  camps  erected  for  the  pur- 
pose.^ Intensive  battle  training  commenced  at  once.  Pa- 
rades and  reviews  fostered  soldierly  pride  and  smartness; 
incessant  drill  was  held  in  close  and  extended  order,  with 
detailed  instruction  in  camp  and  personal  hygiene,  first- 
aid  methods,  and  care  of  equipment,  together  with  con- 
siderable target  practice  for  the  riflemen.  There  were 
applied  to  all  ranks  a  series  of  most  searching  tests,  w^ith 
purpose  to  insure  a  force  as  physically  fit  as  possible.  Other 
boards  of  medical  officers  examined  for  weaknesses  of 
heart  and  lungs;  venereal  inspections  were  made  weekly; 
slight  physical  deficiencies,  which  were  no  bar  to  service 

-  Units  were  assembled  as  follows:  In  Boston,  Massachusetts,  Headquarters 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  Headquarters  Troop,  101st  Engineers,  101st  Field  Sig- 
nal Battalion,  at  Framingham,  Massachusetts,  Headquarters  51st  Infantry 
Brigade,  101st  Infantry,  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion;  at  Boxford,  Massachu- 
setts, Headquarters  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade,  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
complete;  at  WestOeld,  Massachusetts,  Headquarters  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  52d 
Infantry  Brigade  complete;  101st  Ammunition  Train;  at  New  Haven,  Connecti- 
cut, 102d  Infantry;  at  Niantic,  Connecticut,  101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion;  at 
Quonset  Point,  Ehode  Island,  103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion. 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION  13 

on  a  peace-time  basis,  now  sufficed  to  discharge  or  trans- 
fer a  man  immediately.  Severe,  too,  were  the  examina- 
tions of  all  officers'  capacity.  The  whole  effort  was  in  the 
direction  of  weeding  out  the  incompetent,  the  dead 
wood,  the  man  who  did  not  appear  capable  of  pulling  his 
weight.  Unfair  rejections  were  made;  but  they  were  in- 
evitable under  the  conditions.  And  the  net  result  was  to 
include  in  the  new  Division  only  those  who  were  unques- 
tionably able  to  endure  the  strain  of  field  service,  judged 
from  the  angle  of  physical  condition. 

Those  officers  and  men  of  the  New  England  National 
Guard  who  were  not  included  in  the  Division  at  the  time 
of  its  organization,  or  were  subsequently  transferred  from 
it,  were  grouped  together  in  a  Depot  Brigade,  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-General  E.  L.  Sweetser,  of  Massa- 
chusetts.^ To  the  skeleton  regiments  of  this  organization 
were  sent  many  whom  it  was  desired  to  retain  in  the  serv- 
ice, even  though  they  could  not  be  numbered  with  the 
Twenty-Sixth.  Reorganized  later,  after  concentration  in 
southern  camps,  into  corps  and  army  troops,  a  large  pro- 
portion of  these  units  found  their  way  overseas  as  pioneer 
regiments  and  special  service  units;  their  original  disap- 
pointment was  largely  compensated  by  the  fine  service 
they  rendered  to  the  common  cause  in  other  ways. 

It  was  a  period  of  the  greatest  nervous  tension.  Just 
what  was  in  store,  even  a  day  ahead,  nobody  knew.  \Mien 
would  the  state  troops  be  finally  organized  into  a  division? 
When  would  the  command  of  the  new  units  be  announced.'^ 
\Mio  would  be  left  behind.'*  Would  proper  equipment  be 

*  Under  G.O.  No.  3,  Headquarters  Twenty -Sixth  Division,  August  30,  1917, 
the  Depot  Brigade  was  created  and  the  following  units  assigned  to  it:  1st  N.H. 
Infantry  (35  officers,  59G  men);  1st  Vt.  Infantry  (^9  officers,  284  men);  5th 
Mass.  Infantry  (37  officers,  503  men);  Cth  Mass.  Infantry  (18  officers,  3G0  men); 
8th  Mass.  Infantry  (28  ofiicers,  406  men);  1st  Conn.  Infantry  (20  officers,  365 
men);  1st  Maine  Heavy  Artillery  (40  officers,  776  men);  Co.  IJ,  N.H.  F.S.  Troops 
(3  officers,  02  men);  Co.  A,  Conn.  F.S.  Troops  (3  officers,  C4  men);  1st  Separate 
Co.,  Conn.  Infantry  (1  officer,  109  men);  1st  Separate  Co.,  Mass.  Imaulry  (3 
officers,  149  men). 


14  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

forthcoming?  That  comprised  one  set  of  thoughts;  and 
the  other  could  be  summed  up  in  the  question  cried  by 
every  unit  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  when 
compelled  to  remain  more  than  forty-eight  hours  in  one 
place:  "When  do  we  go?" 

On  August  5  the  troops  were  drafted  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States.  Already  they  had  been  mustered  into 
it  as  organizations,  immediately  upon  response  to  the  call 
of  the  President  on  and  after  March  20.  But  the  drafting 
process  changed  the  soldier's  status  considerably.  He  was 
now  individually  in  the  United  States  Army,  instead  of 
being  a  member  of  a  state  organization  temporarily  in  fed- 
eral service.  His  allegiance  was  pledged  to  the  Nation;  his 
pay,  subsistence,  and  control  were  now  regulated  wholly 
by  the  War  Department.  His  collar  ornament  was  a  bronze 
"U.S."  in  place  of  the  famihar  abbreviation  of  his  State's 
name.  The  "U.S."  of  the  officers  was  surcharged  with  the 
initials  "N.G."  (National  Guard),  for  the  purpose  of  dif- 
ferentiating, in  outward  signs  at  least,  the  non-profes- 
sional soldier  from  his  Regular  brother.  Later,  a  single 
device  was  prescribed  for  all  officers,  whatever  their 
military  antecedents;  but  numbers  of  old  National  Guard 
officers  had  come  by  that  time  to  feel  a  quaint  pride  in  re- 
taining the  badges  which  proclaimed  their  non-professional 
origin. 

The  exact  strength  in  men,  animals,  and  material  of  a 
combat  division  was  still  a  matter  which  the  authorities 
w^ere  working  out  in  detail.  They  had  enjoyed  the  advan- 
tage of  the  advice  of  French  and  British  experts,  and  the 
opinions  of  the  staff  officers  sent  overseas  as  observers 
earlier  in  the  year;  but,  even  so,  there  were  many  difficul- 
ties to  be  settled  beforq  a  scheme  could  be  elaborated  for 
an  American  divisional  organization  suitable  for  trench 
warfare  (the  war  of  position),  yet  easily  adaptable  for  the 
needs  of  the  warfare  of  movement.  The  secret  Tables  of 
Organization  of  August,  1917,  were  marked  "Provisional." 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION  15 

Radical  indeed  were  the  changes.  One  saw,  for  instance, 
the  infantry  regiment  expanded  from  a  war  strength  of 
2061  to  about  3600  all  ranks;  its  machine-gun  equipment 
was  increased  from  four  guns  to  sixteen;  its  traditional 
rifle  was  supplemented  by  light  mortars,  rifle  and  hand 
grenades,  one-pounder  field  pieces  (37-millimeter  quick- 
firers),  and  automatic  rifles.  The  supply,  ammunition,  and 
engineer  trains  were  to  operate  a  veritable  fleet  of  trucks. 
The  machine-gun  strength  of  the  division,  excluding  that 
of  the  infantry  regiments,  now  included  ten  companies, 
each  of  175  men  and  16  guns,  grouped  into  three  battal- 
ions. Changes  in  the  artillery  were  also  far-reaching,  due 
to  the  abandonment  of  the  American  guns,  light  or  heavy, 
and  the  adoption  of  the  French  (the  75-millimeter  field  piece 
for  two  regiments,  the  155-minimeter  howitzer  for  one  re- 
giment). A  battery  of  trench  mortars  was  another  novel 
divisional  unit.  More  than  one  old-timer,  after  he  had  read 
down  the  page,  breathed  a  sigh  of  relief  on  discovering 
that  the  authorities  had  found  no  substitute  for  the  escort 
wagon  and  the  army  mule,  without  which,  he  believed,  no 
truly  American  fighting  force  could  legally  be  substituted. 
Into  this  force  were  to  be  consolidated  the  infantry, 
cavalry,  artillery,  and  machine-gun  units  of  the  state 
troops.  The  task  would  appear  to  have  been  difficult.  For 
not  only  was  the  numerical  strength  of  each  unit  a  factor 
in  the  problem,  but  its  record  of  efficiency,  geographical 
location,  and  kind  of  training,  had  also  to  be  considered 
in  determining  which  regiments  should  constitute  basic 
units,  intact,  and  which  should  be  broken  up  to  complete 
the  new  organizations.  But  actually  the  tentative  plans 
drawn  by  the  Militia  Bureau  were  found  easy  of  applica- 
tion; and,  with  only  such  slight  modifications  as  the  con- 
ditions of  the  moment  necessitated,  they  were  immedi- 
ately put  in  execution.  Telegraphic  instructions  of  the 
War  Department,  dated  August  13,  gave  the  necessary 
authority  and  impetus,  and  organization  of  the  Twenty- 


16  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Sixth  Division  ''from  units  of  the  New  England  National 
Guard"  proceeded  forthwith.  As  leader  of  what  was  soon 
to  be  called  the  "Yankee  Division,"  there  was  designated 
Major- General  Clarence  R.  Edwards,  at  the  time  Com- 
manding General  of  the  Northeastern  Department.^  On 
August  22,  by  General  Orders  Numbers  One  and  Two, 
under  which  the  newly  appointed  leader  assumed  com- 
mand and  announced  his  Staff,  ^  together  with  the  com- 
position of  the  new  units,  there  was  inaugurated  that  re- 
lationship between  the  General  and  his  troops  which,  from 
the  very  beginning,  was  destined,  as  time  went  on,  to  take 
on  a  character  far  wider  and  deeper  than  the  merely  offi- 
cial. The  make-up  of  the  individual  organizations  of  the 
Division  is  shown  by  the  accompanying  table: 

Unit  and  Commander  Composition 

Headquarters  Troop  Troop  B.  Mass.  Cavalry. 

Captain  Oliver  Wolcott 
51st  Infantry  Brigade  Hdqrs. 
Brig.-Gen.  Peter  E.  Traub 
101st  Infantry  9th    Mass.    Infantry;    1400    en- 

Colonel  Edward  L.  Logan  listed  men,  5th  Mass.  Infantry; 

175  enlisted  men,  6th  Mass.  In- 
fantry. 
102d  Infantry'  2d   Conn.   Infantry;   35   oflBcers, 

Colonel  Ernest  L.  Isbell  1582  enlisted  men,  1st  Conn.  In- 

fantry; 100  enlisted  men,  6th 
Mass.  Infantry;  50  enlisted  men, 
1st  Vt.  Infantry. 

1  Assigned  by  G.O.  38,  W.D.,  April  2.  1917. 

2  The  stafiE  included  the  following  oflBcers  at  first :  Aide-de-camp  —  Captain 
John  W.  Hyatt,  Infantry;  Aide-de-camp  —  Lieutenant  N.  S.  Simpkins,  101st 
Field  Artillery;  Chief  of  Staff  —  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  H.  Shelton,  General 
Staff;  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  —  Major  A.  A.  Maybach,  General  Staff;  Adjutant 

—  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  S.  Simonds,  Infantry,  National  Army;  Inspector 

—  Lieutenant-Colonel  Horace  P.  Hobbs,  Infantry,  National  Army;  Quarter- 
master —  Lieutenant-Colonel  Joseph  W.  Beacham,  Jr.,  Infantry,  National 
Army;  Surgeon  —  Lieutenant-Colonel  James  L.  Bevans,  Medical  Corps;  Judge 
Advocate  —  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  M.  Dowell;  Ordnance  Officer  —  Major  E.  E. 
Phillips;  Signal  Officer  —  Major  H.  G.  Chase,  Signal  Corps  (Massachusetts); 
Chief  of  Artillery  —  Brigadier-General  W.  Lassiter,  Field  Artillery,  National 
Army;  Chief  of  Engineers  —  Colonel  George  W.  Bunnell,  Engineering  Corps 
(Massachusetts). 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION 


17 


Unit  and  Commander 
52d  Infantry  Brigade  Hdqrs. 

Brig.-Gen.  Charles  H.  Cole 
103d  Infantry 

Colonel  Frank  M.  Hume 


104th  Infantry 
Colonel  William  C.  Hayes 


51st  F.A.  Brigade  Hdqrs. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  Lassiter 
101st  Field  .\rtillery 

Colonel  John  H.  Sherburne 

102d  Field  Artillery 

Colonel  Morris  E.  Locke 

103d  Field  Artillery 
Colonel  Emery  T.  Smith 


101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion 
Major  James  L.  Howard 

102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion 
Major  John  Perrius,  Jr. 

103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion 
Major  W.  G.  Gatchell 


101st  Trench  Mortar  Battery 
Captain  Roger  A.  Greene 

101st  Engineers 
Colonel  George  W.  Bunnell 


101st  Field  Signal  Battalion 
Major  Harry  G.  Chase 

101st  Train  Headquarters  and  Mil- 
itary Police 
Colonel  Warren  M.  Sweetser 


Composition 


2d  Maine  Infantry;  1630  en- 
listed men,  1st  N.H.  Infantry; 
detachments  from  Cos.  F,  H,  K, 
M,  8th  Mass.  Infantry. 
2d  Mass.  Infantry;  12  officers, 
800  enlisted  men,  Cth  Mass.  In- 
fantry; 12  officers,  800  enlisted 
men,  8th  Mass.  Infantry;  detach- 
ments Cos.  F,  H,  K,  M,  8th 
Mass.  Infantry. 


1st  Mass.  Field  Artillery;  180  en- 
listed men.  New  England  Coast 
Artillery. 

2d  Mass.  Field  Artillery;  150  en- 
listed men.  New  England  Coast 
Artillery. 

Battery  A,  N.H.  Field  Artillery; 
3  Batteries  R.I.  Field  Artillery; 
2  Batteries  Conn.  Field  Artillery; 
Troop  M,  R.I.  Cavalry;  detach- 
ment New  England  Coast  Artil- 
lery. 

Squadron  Conn.  Cavalry;  196 
enlisted  men,  1st  Vt.  Infantry. 
Squadron  Mass.  Cavalry,  less 
Troop  B;  3  officers,  213  enlisted 
men,  1st  Vt.  Infantry. 
Squadron  R.I.  Cavalry,  less 
Troops  B  and  M;  N.H.  Machine- 
Gun  Troop;  detachment  1st  Vt. 
Infantry. 

Detachment  1st  Maine  Heavy 
Field  Artillery. 

1st    Mass.    Engineers;    100    en- 
listed   men,    1st    Maine    Heavy 
Field  Artillery;  479  enlisted  men. 
New  England  Coast  Artillery. 
1st  Mass.  Field  Signal  Battalion. 

320  enlisted  men,  Cth  Mass.  In- 
fantry. 


18 


NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 


Unit  and  Commander 
101st  ximmunition  Train 
Lieut.-Col.  William  J.  Keville 

101st  Supply  Train 

Captain  Davis  G.  Arnold 


101st  Engineer  Train 
1st  Lieut.  S.  K.  Waller 

101st  Sanitary  Train 
Lt.-CoL  J.  L.  Bevans,  M.C 


Composition 
13  officers,  700  enlisted  men,  1st 
Vt.  Infantry;  6  officers,  234  en- 
listed men,  Mass.  Coast  Artillery. 
Troop  B,  R.I.  Cavalry;  5  officers, 
359  enlisted  men,  8th  Mass.  In- 
fantry; 62  enlisted  men,  Co.  M. 
Gth  Mass.  Infantry. 
82  enlisted  men,  Cth  Mass.  In- 
fantry. 

1st,  2d  Mass.  Ambulance  Cos. 
1st,  2d  Mass.  Field  Hospitals; 
1st  Conn.  Ambulance  Co.;  1st 
Conn.  Field  Hospital;  1st  R.I. 
Ambulance  Co.;  1st  N.H.  Field 
Hospital. 

Minor  changes  in  some  of  the  transfers  took  place  — 
indeed,  they  were  still  in  progress  while  the  units  were 
under  orders  to  proceed  to  the  embarkation  port;  addi- 
tions both  of  officers  and  men  were  made  as  needed;  but 
deviations  from  the  above  table  were  inconsiderable.  The 
composite  nature  of  the  divisional  units  is  interesting. 
Every  State  in  New  England  was  represented;  many  of 
the  units  included  troops  from  localities  widely  separated. 
Sorrow  there  was  in  the  state  regiments  which  were  broken 
up  to  fill  in  the  numerical  strength  of  the  fortunate  ones 
which  had  been  retained  intact;  there  was  required  both 
tact  and  generosity  on  the  part  of  all  groups  thus  thrown 
together  before  the  first  jealousies  and  inevitable  heart- 
burnings were  quenched  in  a  new  spirit  of  service.  But  it 
is  a  fact  well  worth  recording  that,  in  a  time  far  shorter 
than  was  expected,  the  old  resentments,  the  ancient  local 
rivalries,  began  to  be  forgotten;  the  new  division  went 
overseas  not  as  a  loose  aggregation,  but  a  closely  welded 
whole. 

What  of  the  men  who  had  been  chosen  by  higher  author- 
ity to  lead  the  Twenty-Sixth  in  battle  .^^  So  much  of  the 
history  of  any  organization  is  intimately  bound  up  with 
the  personality  of  its  leaders,  so  curiously  close,  in  the  case 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION  19 

of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  was  the  connection  between 
the  character  of  any  single  unit  and  that  of  its  commander, 
that  no  record  of  the  Division's  origins  and  organization 
would  be  complete  that  omitted  a  somewhat  detailed  refer- 
ence to  the  principal  ofiBcers  of  the  staff  and  the  line. 

The  assignment  of  Major-General  Edwards  to  command 
insured  that  the  new  organization  would  benefit  by  the 
leadership  of  a  Regular  officer  of  long  and  varied  experi- 
ence, both  in  administrative,  staff,  and  line  branches.  Born 
in  Cleveland,  Ohio,  in  1860,  he  was  graduated  from  the 
United  States  Military  Academy  in  1883.  With  his  pro- 
motion to  a  captaincy  in  the  Regular  service  in  1898, 
large  responsibilities  and  rapid  advancement  fell  to  his 
lot.  As  Major  (Assistant  Adjutant-General)  and  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel of  Volunteers  (47th  Infantry),  from  1899 
to  1901,  he  performed  duty  as  Adjutant-General  to  General 
Lawton  in  active  field  service  in  the  Philippine  Islands, 
whither,  in  1905,  he  accompanied  Secretary  of  War  Wil- 
liam H.  Taft  on  the  occasion  of  the  latter's  famous  journey. 
Appointed  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  in  1902 
he  was  promoted  to  the  grade  of  Brigadier-General  in 
1906;  he  was  transferred  to  the  line  in  1912,  and  com- 
manded brigades  on  the  Mexican  Border  (6th  Brigade, 
Second  Division)  and  in  Hawaii  (1st  Hawaiian  Brigade), 
until  sent  to  the  command  of  American  troops  in  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Zone  in  1915.  From  this  duty  he  was  transferred 
(on  April  2,  1917)  to  the  command  of  the  newly  created 
Northeastern  Department,  with  Headquarters  in  Boston, 
Massachusetts,  in  April,  1917,  and  attained  the  rank  of 
IVIajor-General  in  August  of  the  same  year.  Thirty-four 
years  of  active  and  varied  service,  in  all  grades,  meant 
that  the  new  division  commander  was  intimately  ac- 
c{uainted  with  army  men  and  methods,  had  been  trained 
in  accordance  with  army  traditions,  and  shared  the  honor- 
able ideals  of  duty  with  which  the  Regular  establishment 
has  always  been  credited.  Beyond  the  lot  of  the  vast  ma- 


20  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

jority  of  army  officers,  however,  General  Edwards  had 
been  fortunate  in  possessing  a  wide  knowledge  of  men  and 
events  outside  the  army  horizon;  the  bars  which  his  life 
and  duty,  under  our  system,  erect  inevitably  between  the 
average  Regular  Officer  and  other  classes  in  the  American 
democracy,  sharply  limiting  his  experience  and  tending 
unhappily  to  segregate  him  from  contact  with  the  thought 
of  his  generation,  were,  in  the  case  of  General  Edwards, 
early  broken  down.  He  enjoyed  personal  contact  with  men 
of  many  classes;  from  his  varied  activities  he  had  become 
one  of  the  most  prominent  figures  of  the  army  then  in  the 
public  eye.  From  the  day  of  his  assumption  of  the  duties 
of  Department  Commander,  in  Boston,  his  immediate 
hold  on  the  imagination  and  esteem  of  the  people  at  large 
was  as  marked  as  was  the  energy  of  his  administration. 
His  choice,  as  leader  of  the  New  England  Division,  was 
felicitous  indeed,  considering  the  excellent  effect  the  selec- 
tion would  have  on  the  public  from  whose  sons  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  was  recruited. 

As  Chief  of  Staff,  Lieutenant-Colonel  (later  Brigadier- 
General)  George  H.  Shelton  brought  to  his  duties  twenty 
years  of  experience  as  an  infantry  officer  of  the  Regular 
Army,  the  advantage  of  Connecticut  birth  and  parentage, 
and  the  prestige  of  his  position  as  a  member  for  two  years 
(1906-08)  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army.  In  military 
circles  he  had  won  a  wide  reputation  for  fearless  expres- 
sion of  opinion  and  progressiveness  through  his  editorship 
of  the  ''Infantry  Journal,"  perhaps  the  most  influential 
of  the  various  service  magazines.  Throughout  the  whole 
course  of  the  Division's  history,  in  which  he  served  in  va- 
rious capacities,  no  officer  carried  away  a  more  perfect 
record  for  steely  efficiency,  broad  human-kindness,  and 
those  qualities  of  humor,  sympathy,  and  force  (combined 
so  rarely)  which  go  to  make  up  an  ideal  leader  of  troops 
in  the  field. 

The  military  record  of  the  infantry  brigade  commanders, 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION  21 

Brigadier-Generals  Peter  E.  Traub  (51st  Infantry  Bri- 
gade) and  Charles  H.  Cole  (52d  Infantry  Brigade),  pre- 
sented a  most  interesting  contrast.  On  the  one  side.  Gen- 
eral Traub  was  a  Regular  of  the  Regulars,  in  education, 
experience,  and  point  of  view.  Graduated  from  West  Point 
in  1886  into  the  cavalry  arm,  he  became  a  Major  in  1911, 
and  in  1914  Assistant  Chief  of  Philippine  Constabulary 
with  rank  of  Colonel.  A  colonelcy  in  the  Regular  Army 
came  in  1916;  on  August  5,  1917,  he  became  a  Brigadier 
in  the  National  Army.  For  several  years  following  1904, 
he  was  professor  of  languages  at  West  Point  and  in  the 
Army  Signal  School;  his  duty  with  troops  as  a  young  oflS- 
cer  of  cavalry  had  gained  him  experience  in  Indian  fight- 
ing. A  man  of  indomitable  energy  and  a  keen  student  of 
warfare.  General  Traub  proved  a  great  strength  to  the 
Division  through  the  early  period  of  training  in  France, 
gaining  the  confidence  of  all  those  under  his  command. 

Similar  natural  qualities  of  leadership  —  such  as  en- 
ergy, inspiration,  devotion  to  duty,  and  resourcefulness  — 
were  possessed  by  General  Cole;  but  his  military  training 
had  been  received  wholly  in  the  service  of  his  State  (Massa- 
chusetts). An  enlisted  man  and  ofiicer  of  the  First  Corps 
Cadets  between  1890  and  1910  (Major  of  the  battaHon 
in  the  latter  year),  he  was  appointed  Adjutant-General 
of  the  State  of  Massachusetts  in  1914,  retiring  as  Briga- 
dier-General in  1910;  he  served  for  several  years,  also,  as 
a  member  of  the  National  Board  for  the  Promotion  of 
Rifle  Practice.  All  precedents  to  the  contrary,  General 
Cole  vividly  exemplified  the  fact  that  it  is  possible  for  an 
active  politician  to  be  a  good  soldier.  He  brought  to  his 
new  duties  in  the  Division  a  long  experience  in  handling 
men,  and  the  utmost  energy  in  the  performance  of  his 
work,  coupled  with  a  patriotism  as  ardent  as  it  was  sus- 
tained. At  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  war,  he  was  out  of  the  service;  but  he  promptly  en- 
listed as  a  private  in  Headquarters  Company,  9th  Massa- 


22  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

chusetts  Infantry,  and  presently,  because  of  long  previous 
service,  knowledge  of  conditions,  and  established  reputa- 
tion as  an  organizer  and  administrator,  he  was  rapidly  ad- 
vanced to  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General  in  the  state  forces, 
with  command  of  a  brigade.  Considered  invaluable  in  any 
National  Guard  organization,  as  representing  its  best 
traditions,  he  was  retained  in  his  high  rank  by  the  War 
Department  and  given  the  command  of  a  brigade  of  in- 
fantry in  the  new  division.  This,  be  it  said,  was  contrary 
to  the  prevailing  custom  of  the  War  Department,  which 
relegated  most  of  the  state  general  officers  to  command 
of  units  not  taken  overseas,  their  place  being  taken  by 
officers  of  the  Regular  establishment.^ 

The  command  of  the  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade  went 
to  Brigadier-General  William  Lassiter,  an  acknowledged 
artillery  expert  of  distinction,  who  brought  to  his  branch  of 
the  Division's  forces  the  very  highest  professional  stand- 
ards, and  who  remained  long  enough  with  the  brigade  to 
impress  it  with  abiding  ideals  of  efficiency.  At  the  time  of 
his  assignment  to  the  Division,  General  Lassiter  was  per- 
forming duty  as  military  attache  at  the  United  States 
Embassy  in  London. ^ 

Of  the  nine  regimental  commanders  (four  of  infantry; 
three  of  artillery;  one  of  engineers;  one  of  the  trains  and 
military  police),  the  majority  were  officers  of  the  Maine, 
Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut  National  Guard.  Colonel 
George  W.  Bunnell,  101st  Engineers,  had  had  the  benefit 
of  a  West  Point  education ;  others  had  been  long  identified 
with  state  troops  and  with  their  own  units,  serving  in  all 

^  Another  case  of  an  officer's  resigning  high  command  in  his  state  troops, 
merely  for  the  sake  of  taking  an  active  part  in  service  overseas,  was  that  of 
Brigadier-General  Albert  Greenlaw,  of  Maine.  At  the  very  outset,  when  the 
Maine  troops  were  called  into  service,  he  resigned  as  Adjutant-General,  to  accept 
appointment  as  Captain  and  Supply  OflScer  of  a  Maine  infantry  regiment  (later 
103d  Infantry),  going  abroad  in  that  capacity,  and  later  being  promoted  to  the 
Division  Staff  (General  Staff  Section,  G-1). 

2  Colonel  M.  E.  Locke  was  in  command  of  51st  F.A.  Brigade  for  some  time 
after  arrival  in  France.  General  Lassiter  joined  at  Coetquidan,  upon  terminating 
his  duty  as  military  attache. 


ORGANIZING  THE  DIVISION  23 

grades.  Chosen  from  all  the  regimental  commanders  in  the 
New  England  Guard,  they  represented,  in  the  judgment  of 
the  War  Department,  the  best  material  available  for  the 
positions  they  occupied.  For,  apart  from  their  military 
experience,  there  existed  another  set  of  considerations  re- 
specting the  fitness  of  these  regimental  commanders  to 
take  their  men  overseas,  which  not  only  possessed  con- 
siderable interest,  from  various  points  of  view,  at  the  time 
of  their  selection,  but  was  also  to  play  a  part,  later,  in  de- 
termining the  value  of  certain  regiments  as  fighting  units. 
In  a  peculiar  sense  the  regimental  commanders  were  looked 
upon  by  the  thousands  of  good  men  and  women  whose 
boys  were  with  the  troops  as  the  guardians  and  friends  of 
those  lads  as  well  as  their  leaders  in  battle.  In  every  case 
they  were  daily  subjected  to  a  very  heavy  and  continual 
pressure,  in  the  form  of  direct  personal  appeals,  from  their 
own  intimate  friends,  from  men  of  high  position  and  in- 
fluence, as  well  as  from  pathetic  hundreds  of  anxious, 
proud  fathers  and  mothers,  "to  look  out  for  my  boy," 
"to  bring  Joe  home  safe,"  "to  see  that  he  behaves  him- 
self," "to  give  Bill  a  chance,"  and  so  on.  Whether  they  so 
willed  or  not,  these  colonels  of  local,  territorial  regiments 
were  made  to  occupy  a  place  in  which  they  were  compelled 
to  carry  the  weight  of  a  feeling  of  personal  responsibility, 
not  only  for  the  military  training,  good  discipline,  physical 
condition,  and  fighting  edge  of  their  regiments,  but  also  for 
the  happiness  and  safety  of  hundreds  of  the  individuals 
composing  them.  They  were  forced,  moreover,  by  conditions 
to  assume  a  position  of  responsibility  to  the  community 
which  was  the  home  of  their  respective  regiments,  for  their 
commands' creditable  behavior  and  honorable  achievement. 
A  colonel  was  told,  directly  and  emphatically,  that  he  was 
expected  to  bring  glory  and  renown  to  his  home  town;  he 
was  reminded  of  the  competition  he  would  meet;  he  was 
showered  with  gifts  to  be  held  bj'  him  in  trust  for  "the 
boys"  —  gifts  in  the  shape  of  funds  presented  by  veteran 


24  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

members  of  the  organization  or  other  groups  of  friends, 
reaching  to  very  large  amounts;  he  was  importuned  by 
rehef  and  patriotic  societies,  chambers  of  commerce,  and 
scores  of  individuals,  to  express  a  wish  for  any  conceivable 
article  for  the  men's  comfort  or  happiness,  so  that  it  might 
be  provided  at  once.  Encouraged,  flattered,  strengthened, 
heartened  by  the  most  prodigal  expressions  of  devotion, 
actively  supported  in  his  work  by  the  confidence  of  thou- 
sands of  people  in  his  own  home  town,  the  regimental  com- 
mander was  made  to  feel,  at  the  same  time,  that  he  could 
not  afford  to  let  matters  go  wrong  with  his  organization, 
if  he  cared  for  his  future;  that  he  had  a  very  real  duty  to- 
ward the  parents  and  friends  of  the  lads  over  whom  he  ex- 
ercised control.  On  the  face  of  it,  the  colonelcy  of  these 
community  regiments  afforded  a  great  temptation  in  the 
direction  of  business,  social,  or  political  preferment.  It 
is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  certain  pressure  was  ex- 
ercised to  award  these  colonelcies  to  oflScers  of  the  Regular 
Army,  who,  because  of  their  training  and  purely  profes- 
sional attitude,  would  not  be,  people  assumed,  influenced 
by  conditions  tending  to  impair  the  value  of  the  National 
Guard  commanders.  But  as  the  debate  proceeded,  the 
question  was  decided  in  favor  of  the  officers  already  in 
charge.  The  appointments  were  made;  the  Division  was 
committed  at  the  start  to  a  character  bearing  birthmarks 
of  its  strictly  community  origin.  For  better,  for  worse,  it 
was  to  be  a  militia  organization.  And  such,  through  all  the 
vicissitudes  of  its  history,  it  remained;  as  such  it  must  be 
always  judged,  with  what  verdict  it  will  be  interesting  to 
discover. 


F 


CHAPTER  III 
OVERSEAS 

EVERISHLY  active  were  the  times  to  follow.  The 
new  Division  Staff  was  hard-pressed.^  The  question 
of  enlisted  or  commissioned  strength  would  be  paramount 
one  day,  only  to  be  jostled  aside  by  demands  for  equip- 
ment and  clothing.  Now  field  inspections  must  be  held; 
transfers  and  discharges  must  be  expedited;  training  sched- 
ules must  be  prepared.  The  desire  animated  all  ranks  to 
be  first  overseas.  There  was  eager  speculation  as  to  the 
progress  in  preparation  for  service  of  the  Forty-Second 
("Rainbow")  Division,  then  mobilizing  on  Long  Island, 
New  York,  and  quite  publicly  heralded  as  destined  to  be 
the  first  division  of  the  citizen-army  to  go  abroad.  To  ob- 
tain equipment  and  clothing,  every  agency  was  called  on, 
from  state  authorities  to  private  individuals,  from  gov- 
ernment arsenals  to  manufacturers'  stocks  —  the  work 
proceeding  on  the  basis  that  all  artillery,  machine-gun, 
and  other  ordnance  material  of  special  application,  to- 

^  At  various  dates  subsequent  to  the  organization  of  the  Division  and  prior  to 
departure  overseas,  the  following  ofEcers  were  added  to  the  Staff  in  special  or- 
ders: Assistants  to  Division  Surgeon,  Captain  J.  Glass,  M.C.,  Captain  K.  B. 
Bailey,  M.C.,  Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  P.  Williams,  M.C.;  Assistants  to  Division 
Quartermaster,  Major  G.  E.  Cole,  Captain  C.  E.  Scorer,  Captain  O.  G.  Lager- 
quist.  Captain  E.  II.  Tandy,  Captain  H.  II.  Wheelock;  Assi'^fant  to  Division  In- 
spector, Major  R.  P.  Ilarbold;  Assistants  to  Division  Adjutant,  Major  L.  W.  Cass, 
Major  C.  A.  Stevens;  Division  Ordnance  Officer,  Major  E.  T.  Weisel;  Assistant 
Ordnance  Officer,  Captain  Aiken  Simons;  Aide-de-camj),  Captain  A.  L.  Pendleton, 
Jr.;  Interpreter,  Lieutenant  J.  P.  King. 

Of  these  officers  a  large  majority  remained  with  the  Division  throughout  its 
period  of  service  abroad,  a  fact  which  contributed  vastly  to  the  smooth  running 
of  the  staff  machinery.  Friendship  and  mutual  understanding,  together  with 
devotion  to  the  common  cause  of  .serving  the  troops,  accomplished  more  than 
any  set  of  staff  regulations.  While  frequent  changes  in  the  personnel  of  the 
General  Staff  sections  sometimes  affected  temporarily  their  effectiveness,  the 
Quartermaster,  Adjutant's,  Ordnance,  and  Medical  Staffs  made  continuous 
and  notable  records  for  helpful  service  of  the  Division,  from  beginning  to  end. 


26  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

gether  with  motor  transport,  animals,  and  much  of  the 
required  quartermaster  property,  would  be  issued  on  ar- 
rival in  France.  In  the  matter  of  numerical  strength,  when 
it  was  found  that  discharges  and  transfers  to  the  Depot 
Brigade  were  going  to  reduce  it,  for  certain  units,  below 
what  was  prescribed,  recourse  was  had  to  such  other  troops 
as  were  available  in  New  England.  From  the  New  England 
Coast  Artillery  (National  Guard  in  federal  service),  some 
hundreds  were  transferred  into  places  where  they  were 
most  needed;  ^  of  the  newly  drafted  men  of  the  Seventy- 

^  The  following  telegram  from  the  Adjutant-General  and  the  reply  of  the  Di- 
vision Commander  illustrate  the  necessarily  summary  methods  employed,  and 
the  local  conditions  contended  against,  in  the  organization  of  the  Division: 

(a)  "Washington,  D.C.,  Aug.  30.  Maj.-Gen.  C.  R.  Edwards,  U.S.  Army,  Bos- 
ton, Mass.  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  neither  Regular  Coast  Artillery  nor 
Coast  Artillery  of  the  National  Guard  in  service  of  United  States  shall,  without 
special  permission  from  the  War  Department  in  each  case,  be  considered  as 
available  for  use  in  organization  of  new  mobile  army  units  of  National  Guard 
and  National  Army  for  service  abroad.  McCain."  (6)  "Aug.  31,  1917.  Adjutant- 
General,  Washington,  D.C.  Number  115.  Reference  your  telegram  August  30th 
directing  that  no  Coast  Artillery  be  considered  available  for  use  in  reorganization 
of  National  Guard  without  special  permission  of  War  Department.  I  report  that 
in  the  reorganization  of  the  26th  Division  I  transferred  from  the  National  Guard 
Coast  Artillery  of  this  Department  the  following  personnel:  To  the  51st  Field 
Artillery  Brigade,  9  officers  and  846  enlisted  men;  to  the  101st  Engineers,  3  offi- 
cers and  379  men;  to  the  101st  Ammunition  Train,  7  officers  and  234  men,  in  all  a 
total  of  19  officers  and  1459  enlisted  men.  This  personnel  has  been  absorbed  into 
the  new  organizations  and  equipped,  and  the  organizations  are  ready  for  service. 
Under  my  orders  for  the  reorganization  of  the  26th  Division  .  .  .  the  necessity  of 
hastening  the  reorganization  and  utilizing  everything  of  the  National  Guard 
available  here  for  the  purpose  appeared  paramount  and  authorized.  It  was  im- 
possible to  complete  the  organization  of  the  units  named  above  from  the  person- 
nel available  in  this  Division  without  using  some  of  the  Coast  Artillery.  I  used  no 
more  than  was  absolutely  necessary  and  used  these  only  after  consultation  with 
the  District  Artillery  commanders  who  stated  that  these  troops  could  be  spared 
and  that  those  selected  desired  the  transfer.  .  .  .  Furthermore,  as  precedents  for 
my  action,  the  use  of  Coast  Artillery  in  the  organization  of  the  trench  mortar 
battery  was  in  the  plan  of  reorganization  suggested  to  me  by  the  Militia  Bureau 
and  handed  to  Colonel  Shelton  before  he  left  Washington;  and  my  earlier  in- 
structions, when  it  was  contemplated  to  use  New  England  units  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  composite  42d  Division,  directed  me  to  furnish  the  Headquarters 
Train  and  Military  Police  for  that  Division  from  the  New  England  Coast  Artil- 
lery. I  request,  therefore,  that  my  action  in  this  respect  be  approved.  To  transfer 
these  men  back  now  to  the  Coast  Artillery  would  interfere  seriously  with  the 
organization  and  efficiency  of  my  command,  and  create  dissatisfaction  among  all 
concerned.  Notwithstanding  the  few  popular  and  political  protests  that  have 
been  made  against  the  reorganization  effected  by  me,  I  have  been  able  to  pre- 


OVERSEAS  27 

Sixth  Division,  then  assembling  at  Camp  Devens,  Massa- 
chusetts, somewhat  less  than  1000  enlisted  men  were  util- 
ized, at  the  last  moment,  as  replacements  in  the  infantry. 
From  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  were  drawn  about  179 
lieutenants,  who  were  distributed  to  units  of  all  arms. 

It  was  commonly  rumored  that,  following  the  Division 
Commander's  notification  that  organization  had  been  ef- 
fected, the  Division  would  be  sent  to  Camp  Greene,  North 
Carolina,  for  training.  Indeed,  the  arrangements  for  that 
movement  progressed  so  far  that  a  detail  of  enlisted  men 
was  sent  to  Camp  Greene  to  prepare  a  Division  Head- 
quarters; and  up  to  the  very  last  this  impression  was  al- 
low^ed  to  prevail. 

Over  the  preparations  for  actual  departure  overseas  was 
hung  a  thick  curtain  of  mystery.  Such  secrets  as  possible 
sailing  dates,  destinations,  or  possible  routes,  precious  for 
the  enemy  to  ascertain,  were  carefully  guarded.  The  cen- 
sorship regarding  news  of  war  preparations,  self-imposed 
by  the  New  England  press,  was  honorably  observed;  the 
news  which  every  village  in  the  region  was  most  anxious 
to  hear  was  never  published.  The  departure  of  a  unit,  when 
it  did  occur,  was  unheralded  and  unattended.  A  battahon 
would  be  at  drill  of  an  afternoon;  the  next  morning  would 
find  its  camp  empty  and  the  troops  vanished,  nobody  of 
the  general  public  knew  whither,  and  of  those  in  the  secret 
nobody  would  tell.  But  one  by  one  the  regiments  and  trains 
began  to  disappear,  early  in  September.  Their  animal 
transport  was  packed  off,  under  cover  of  darkness,  to  New- 
port News.  Their  equipment  and  baggage  were  slightly 
different  from  those  to  which  they  had  been  used,  for  the 
wall  and  pyramidal  tents,  the  mosquito  bars,  and  the  cot- 
ton uniforms,  long  familiar  to  veterans  of  American  camps 

serve  generally  an  excellent  spirit,  and  to  develop,  both  within  and  without  the 
Division,  a  willingness  to  make  the  sacrifice  of  i)ride  and  tradition  involved  by 
the  reorganization.  The  use  of  some  Coast  Artillery  has  helped  largely  to  obtain 
this  result.  To  change  the  ac(omj)lishcd  fact  now  would,  I  fear,  react  upon  us  and 
acouise  new  opposition  to  the  rcorguuizalion.  Euwauds." 


28  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

and  campaigns,  were  left  behind.  Artillery  and  machine- 
gun  material  had  long  before  been  turned  in.  There  was  a 
great  shortage  of  rifles,  packs,  carriers,  pistols,  and  mess 
equipment,  but  such  an  abundance  of  articles  provided  by 
the  relief  agencies,  from  safety  razors  to  knitted  helmets, 
that  not  till  months  later  was  the  balance  between  field 
kit  and  comfort  kit  contemplated  by  regulations  even  par- 
tially restored. 

The  movement  of  the  troops  to  the  ports  of  embarka- 
tion at  Hoboken  and  Montreal  was  regulated  by  a  two- 
fold consideration  —  available  tonnage  and  readiness  of 
the  units.  From  the  moment  of  organization  it  had  been 
the  naturally  ardent  desire  that  the  Twenty-Sixth  should 
be  the  first  complete  American  Division  overseas.  The 
prospect  of  having  to  undergo  a  long  wait  at  a  southern 
camp  was  not  alluring;  it  made  a  far  less  insistent  call  on 
patriotism  than  did  immediate  service  abroad.  Local  pride 
was  touched  to  the  quick  by  reports  of  the  readiness  of  the 
Forty-Second  Division;  it  spurred  to  the  very  greatest 
efforts  all  persons,  military  and  civilian,  on  whom  fell  the 
duties  of  organizing  and  equipping  the  various  units.  As 
a  result  of  ceaseless  labor  this  task  was  accomplished  by 
the  first  of  September;  but  the  successful  issue  of  the  enter- 
prise —  the  actual  embarkation  of  the  troops  —  was  only 
accomplished  after  the  expenditure  of  an  equal  amount 
of  effort  and  ingenuity.  While  the  initiative  of  the  Di- 
vision Commander  accomplished  much,  credit  for  the 
Division's  winning  the  final  lap  of  the  race  with  its  gen- 
erous rival  and  friend  the  Forty-Second,  was  largely  due 
to  Captain  A.  L.  Pendleton,  of  the  Division  Commander's 
personal  staff.  Assigned  to  the  task  of  securing  the  first 
available  transportation  for  the  Division,  this  officer  never 
rested  till  he  accomplished  his  difficult  mission.  Upon  in- 
formation on  a  certain  date  that  four  ships  would  be  avail- 
able within  the  next  four  days,  and  that  the  units  for  whom 
they  were  destined  were  not  ready,  it  was  less  than  an  hour 


0\^RSEAS  29 

after  Captain  Pendleton  wired  the  news  to  Division  Head- 
quarters before  the  Chief  of  Staff  replied  with  the  list  of 
assignments,  and  the  start  was  made.  Because  of  priority 
schedules,  however,  which  exactly  prescribed  the  order  in 
which  all  the  American  troops  were  to  be  embarked,  there 
was  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  shipping  officers  to 
allot  to  the  Twenty-Sixth  all  the  tonnage  as  it  became 
available;  but  nothing  was  left  undone  to  insure  that  the 
Division  should  have  every  chance.  Again  a  list  of  ships 
available  in  the  near  future,  with  their  passenger  and 
cargo  space,  came  into  the  hands  of  the  indefatigable  Pen- 
dleton, who  promptly  prepared  complete  embarkation 
assignments  of  troop  units  from  the  Division,  showing  how 
they  could  be  shipped  with  most  economy  and  least  delay. 
This  he  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  embarkation  author- 
ities with  such  good  results  that,  when  this  next  convoy 
was  assem])led,  and  the  units  officially  scheduled  to  take 
it  were  again  reported  as  not  ready  to  go  abroad,  the  units 
of  the  Twenty-Sixth  once  more  received  the  preference, 
both  at  the  port  of  Hoboken,  New  Jersey,  and  at  Mon- 
treal, from  which  latter  port,  by  arrangement  with  the 
Canadian  Government,  American  troops  also  sailed.  In 
convoys  (usually  collected  at  Halifax),  or  by  single  steam- 
ers, in  ships  of  all  sorts  from  first-class  Atlantic  liners  like 
the  Adriatic,  Celtic,  or  Saxonia,  down  to  hastily  impressed 
coastwise  fruit  boats,  the  troops  made  the  journey.  Civil- 
ian passengers,  in  many  cases,  were  on  the  same  ship  with 
the  troops;  the  service  of  transport,  afterwards  so  per- 
fected through  experience,  was  still  in  embryo.  But  what- 
ever the  minor  discomforts  or  occasional  hardships  of  the 
voyage,  happiness  reigned  in  every  heart,  for  at  length  the 
Division  was  on  its  way  to  the  Great  Adventure.  And  com- 
placency was  added  when  presently  it  became  known  that 
of  all  the  combat  forces  in  the  United  States,  Regulars, 
National  Guard,  or  National  Army,  the  Twenty-Sixth 
Division  was  the  first  to  be  organized,  fitted  out,  and  sent 


30 


NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 


abroad  as  a  division.  It  is  true  that  the  splendid  First  Di- 
vision had  preceded  it  by  some  weeks,  but  this  was  lacking 
in  many  of  its  prescribed  units,  and  it  went  in  detachments. 
Other  troops  also,  such  as  some  Marine,  engineer,  or  quar- 
termaster detachments,  and  the  14th  Railway  Engineers, 
were  also  on  the  other  side  by  September  1,  engaged  in 
organizing,  policing,  and  construction  work  around  the 
base  ports,  travel  routes,  and  principal  headquarters.  ^  But 
of  the  citizen-army's  combat  divisions,  the  Twenty-Sixth 
had  unquestionably  the  good  fortune  to  be  the  first  ready 
and  the  first  across  the  water.  It  even  preceded  all  combat 
troops  of  the  Regular  Army,  but  the  units  named  above. ^ 

^  The  first  American  unit  landed  in  France  on  June  25,  1917. 
2  The  sailing  and  arrival  list  is  here  appended:  An  advance  party  of  17  ofBcera 
sailed  from  New  York  August  25,  and  arrived  at  Liverpool  September  15: 
Unit  Departed  from  U.S.  Arrived 

1.  51st  Inf.  Brig.  Hdqrs September    7,  1917  September  21,  1917 

2.  101st  Infantry September    7  September  21 

3.  101st  Ambulance  Co September    7  September  20 

4.  101st  Field  Hospital September    7  September  20 

5.  101st  Field  Artillery September    9  September  23 

6.  103d  Ambulance  Co September  16  October        2 

7.  103d  Field  Hospital September  16  October        2 

8.  102d  Infantry September  19  October         9 

9.  104th  Field  Hospital September  22  October        7 

10.  51st  F.A.  Brig.  Hdqrs September  23  October  5 

11.  102d  Field  Artillery September  23  October  5 

12.  101st  Signal  Battalion September  23  October  5 

13.  102d  Machine-Gun  Btn September  23  October  5 

14.  103d  Infantry September  25  October  17 

15.  101st  Supply  Train September  25  October  9 

16.  101st  Engineers September  26  October  9 

17.  102d  Ambulance  Co September  26  October  17 

18.  104th  Ambulance  Co September  26  October  17 

19.  52d  Inf.  Brig.  Hdqrs September  27  October  17 

20.  104th  Infantry September  27  October  10 

21.  101st  Ammunition  Train October         3  October  17 

22.  103d  Machine-Gun  Btn October         3  October  17 

23.  102d  Field  Hospital October         4  October  17 

24.  Division  Headquarters October        9  October  23 

25.  Headquarters  Troop October         9  October  23 

26.  101st  Machine-Gun  Btn October        9  October  23 

27.  101st  Tn.  Hq.  and  Military 

Police October        9  October      24 

28.  103d  Field  Artillery October        9  October       23 

29.  101st  Trench  Mortar October        9  October       23 


OVERSEAS  SI 

The  only  untoward  incident  of  the  movement  of  the 
Division  overseas  was  that  occurring  on  the  voyage  of  the 
2d  BattaKon,  102d  Infantry.  And  this  is  worth  recording 
only  as  illustrating  the  remarkable  good  fortune  attending 
the  convoys,  at  a  time  when  German  submarine  activity 
was  very  marked  and  provisions  for  the  protection  of 
troops  on  Atlantic  passages  not  yet  perfected.  Embarked 
September  23  on  S.S.  Lenape,  the  troops  had  accomplished 
some  three  hundred  miles  of  the  voyage,  when  the  break- 
ing of  a  piston  pinion,  during  rough  weather,  compelled 
the  return  of  the  ship  to  New  York  for  repairs.  Until 
October  27,  the  battalion  encamped  at  Fort  Totten,  New 
York,  on  which  date  it  sailed  on  S.S.  Adriatic,  in  convoy, 
arriving  at  Liverpool  November  9. 

From  the  incidents  of  the  voyages  of  the  several  regi- 
ments, battalions,  and  other  units,  of  their  arrival  on  for- 
eign soil,  and  of  their  transportation  to  ultimate  desti- 
nations, one  impression  was  outstanding  in  the  minds  of 
officers  and  men  alike.  Plain  to  see  it  was,  that  any  division 
was  no  more  than  a  cog  in  the  huge  war-machine.  A  week 
before  embarkation  an  infantry  regiment  had  seemed  an 
enormous  body  of  troops;  to  visualize  a  new  division  of 
27,000  all  ranks  was  difficult  even  for  the  active  imagina- 
tion; a  division  commander  appeared  as  remote  and  all- 
powerful  as  a  demigod.  But  the  jaws  of  the  great  troop- 
movement  machinery  closed  on  the  Twenty-Sixth,  and 
the  Division  wilted.  Strange  British  and  French  staS 
officers,  who  represented  hitherto  unheard-of  powers,  with 
an  efficiency  all  their  own,  and  irritating  because  its  meth- 
ods were  not  at  first  understood,  laid  firm  hands  on  stoutly 
protesting  colonels  and  the  puzzled,  weary  little  staffs  of 
the  brigade  and  division  commanders,  directing  this  and 
that,  insisting  on  the  other,  in  a  manner  which  made  all 
ranks  aware  that  their  beloved  organization  was  no  more 
than  a  trifling  pawn  on  a  gigantic  chessboard.  For  a  while 
the  Division  did  not  function  as  such  at  all.  Battahons 


32  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

moved  separately,  oftentimes;  a  regimental  commander 
was  at  no  time  sure  of  the  location  of  his  units.  The  ex- 
perience of  one  Regimental  Headquarters,  which  crossed 
the  ocean  with  one  battalion  of  the  regiment,  the  supply 
company,  a  strange  company  of  army  bakers,  Canadian 
aviators,  and  civilians,  nurses  and  little  children,  may  be 
taken  as  fairly  typical.  From  Montreal  the  troops  pro- 
ceeded to  Halifax,  where  the  ship  lay  at  anchor  for  a  week 
awaiting  the  rest  of  the  convoy.  The  third  battalion  and 
the  machine-gun  company,  be  it  said,  had  preceded  Head- 
quarters into  the  unknown  by  about  a  week;  the  second 
battalion  was  left  behind  in  camp,  to  follow  nobody  knew 
when.  At  Liverpool,  the  ship  was  boarded  by  American 
staff  officers,  who  informed  the  Colonel  that  they  knew 
nothing,  and  had  no  authority  beyond  collecting  the  per- 
sonnel records  and  passenger  lists.  Everything  governing 
debarkation  and  transportation  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
British.  The  latter  soon  appeared,  with  explicit  orders  that 
the  troops  should  entrain  at  once,  without  rations,  without 
field  ranges,  without  baggage  of  any  description  save  what 
was  in  the  men's  packs.  To  leave  his  rations  and  baggage 
was  something  unheard  of  by  the  American  Colonel;  it 
promised  infinity  of  discomfort  for  his  men;  there  seemed 
only  the  most  dubious  guarantees  that  either  would  ever 
be  forwarded  or  recovered.  He  made  emphatic  representa- 
tions; but  all  to  no  purpose.  Bewildered,  deeply  solicitous 
both  for  his  men  and  for  his  own  good  impression  on  the 
British  authorities,  he  felt  swept  along  on  an  irresistible 
current.  Unknown  forces  took  him  to  Southampton;  some 
remote  power  sent  him  and  his  men  to  a  filthy  camp  of 
flimsy  tentage  and  black,  sticky  mud,  where  the  rain  (for 
which  the  new  arrivals  were  inclined  to  blame  the  British 
Staff)  was  endless  for  five  days;  nobody  apparently  had  the 
authority  to  make  the  men  comfortable;  *'it  was  always 
done  that  way,  and  quite  all  right."  Here  a  pause  was  made 
while  all-powerful,  unseen  hands  prepared  a  ship  to  ferry 


0\^RSEAS  S3 

the  troops  to  La  Havre  across  the  Channel.  One  must  wait; 
one  must  keep  the  men  strictly  in  hand;  one  must  not  seek 
diligently  to  improve  living  conditions. 

It  was  hard  for  commanding  officers  in  those  bleak,  first 
days.  They  laid  down  the  strictest  orders  to  check  any 
tendency  to  stray  away  sight-seeing;  they  were  desper- 
ately anxious  for  their  draggled  men  to  be  at  all  times 
smart,  prompt,  soldierly,  creditable  to  their  country;  they 
were  sick  at  heart  over  the  wretched  condition  of  the  sod- 
den, stinking  camp;  they  were  worried  by  the  lads  who 
overstayed  their  three-hour  leaves,  while  sympathizing 
with  the  spirit  of  adventure  and  curiosity  which  led  the 
youthful  feet  into  byways  of  exploration.  Cut  off  from  all 
connection  with  home,  perfectly  ignorant  of  the  where- 
abouts of  other  parts  of  the  Division,  not  knowing  a  half- 
day  ahead  what  was  in  store,  they  were  truly  unhappy. 
\Miether  at  the  Southampton  camp,  or  the  Oxney  camp 
near  Borden,  in  Saint-Nazaire,  the  La  Havre  rest  camp,  or 
marooned  in  the  slums  of  Liverpool  seeking  baggage  and 
equipage,  the  story  was  quite  the  same.  But  it  was  good 
medicine  —  that  first  bitter,  salutary  taste  of  inferiority 
and  powerlessness.  It  gave  our  officers  a  great  lesson  in 
the  direction  of  subordination  to  authority,  in  patience; 
they  were  taught  to  have  confidence  in  those  impersonal, 
higher  powers,  unseen  and  unknown,  which,  from  an  un- 
guessed  place  at  the  end  of  a  telegraph  wire,  were  directing 
the  destiny  of  the  new  arrivals  behind  the  firing-line. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE 

AFTER  a  very  brief  delay,  in  view  of  the  depleted  con- 
dition of  the  French  railway  rolling  stock,  the  vari- 
ous units  of  the  Division  were  moved  to  the  two  areas  as- 
signed for  their  training.  That  occupied  by  all  elements 
except  the  artillery  and  ammunition  train  lay  adjacent  to 
the  market  town  of  Neufchateau,  along  steep,  wooded 
slopes  and  broad  valleys,  dotted  with  gray,  stone  villages.^ 
It  was  in  Lorraine.  It  was  in  the  heart  of  ancient  France. 
It  was  the  stark,  austere  region  which  had  cradled  Joan 
of  Arc  —  a  land  of  meager,  stony  soil,  under  a  sky  of  dull- 
est gray.  One  wonders  how  many  of  the  new  arrivals  — 
vigorous,  active  lads  —  were  touched  at  all  by  the  spell  of 
the  quaint  old  country.  Surely  to  some  of  them  —  per- 

^  Division  Headquarters  opened  in  Neufchateau  October  31.  Units  of  the 
Division,  less  artillery  and  ammunition  train,  were  billeted  in  the  following 
villages: 

51st  Infantry  Brig.  Headquarters        Rebeuville 

101st  Infantry  Neufchateau  —  Rouceux  —  Circourt  — 

Villars  —  Brechaincourt  — Rebeuville 
102d  Infantry  Landaville  —  Certilleux  —  Rouvres-le- 

Chetive 
103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion  Rebeuville  —  Brechaincourt  —  Rouvres- 

le-Chetive 
52d  Infantry  Brig.  Headquarters  Liffol-le-Grand 

103d  Infantry  Liffol-le-Grand  —  Villouxel 

104th  Infantry  Harreville  —  Pompierre  —  Sartes  —  Cha- 

tenois  —  Giroucourt 
103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion  Liffol-le-Grand  —  Sartes  —  Villouxel 

101st  Engineers  Rolampont   —   Bazoilles   —    Mont-les- 

Neufchateau 
Headquarters  Trains  and  M.P.  Neufchateau 

101st  Field  Signal  Battalion  Noncourt 

101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion  Neufchateau  —  Certilleux 

101st  Supply  Train  Neufchateau  —  Harreville 

101st  Sanitary  Train  Neufchateau  —  Bazoilles  —   Liffol-le- 

Grand 
Railhead  Certilleux 


VaVCOU  LCU-R^ 


Scale  |:  240,0 0 o (Appr ox i mate ly) 
Maik  lioA.©^       


g\<i-ouDn.e.<:.oogT 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  35 

haps  to  more  than  one  would  fancy  —  there  was  an  appeal 
in  the  fact  that  they  were  preparing  for  war  within  sight 
of  the  village  whence  the  Maid  of  Orleans  rode  away  to 
war's  adventures  years  before;  that  here  the  Roman  le- 
gionsiTy,  Gothic  raider,  great  Dukes  of  Burgundy,  mighty 
Prince-Bishops  of  forgotten  sees,  all  with  their  men-at- 
arms,  had  marched  to  battle.  It  was  a  land  dull  and  dreary 
to  the  eye,  but  rich  in  tradition,  populous  with  bygone 
figures  of  French  history.  In  the  days  before  the  war  the 
venerable  towns  in  the  American  area,  like  Langres  with 
its  quaint  dwellings  and  tortuous  streets,  induced  the  vis- 
itor and  student  to  linger  and  return.  But  in  the  autumn 
of  1917  there  was  no  time  and  little  inchnation  to  enjoy 
these  centers  of  old  French  provincial  life.  Pressing  prob- 
lems weighed  on  every  American  commander,  from  highest 
to  the  least  important,  such  as  providing  shelter,  food, 
clothing,  and  arms  for  thousands  of  men.  Imperative  was 
the  necessity  of  fitting  them  for  battle  in  the  shortest  pos- 
sible time,  under  conditions  to  chill  the  heart  and  tax  one's 
greatest  ingenuity. 

The  artillery  brigade  and  the  ammunition  train  were 
sent  to  a  training  area  at  Camp  Coetquidan,  in  Brittany, 
not  far  from  the  French  artillerv  center  at  Rennes,  within 
easy  reach  of  the  famous  school  of  equitation  at  Saumur. 
The  Camp  itself  lay  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  training 
area  —  a  broad,  even,  treeless  moor  which  stretched  away 
for  about  three  miles,  dropped  precipitously  into  a  valley, 
and  rose  again  into  a  series  of  wooded  hills;  a  country 
singularly  appropriate  for  range  purposes,  in  that  it  gave 
almost  every  variety  of  target  that  would  be  likely  to  be 
met  in  actual  warfare.  Beside  the  moor,  the  valley,  and 
the  hills,  there  were  also  roads,  farms,  mills,  and  even  two 
villages,  long  since  abandoned,  the  prey  of  the  practicing 
batteries.  When  the  French  were  informed  that  American 
artillery  was  to  use  Coetquidan,  their  first  move  was  to 
install  some  five  thousand  German  prisoners  along  with 


36  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

their  guard  and  a  regiment  of  French  engineers,  in  order 
to  expand  the  camp  into  something  hke  adequacy  for 
American  uses.  It  was  at  first  designed  for  one  brigade,  but 
hardly  had  the  51st  Brigade  been  installed  when  the  first 
units  of  the  67th  Brigade  of  the  Forty-Second  Division 
began  to  arrive,  and  thereafter  there  was  never  a  time  when 
there  were  not  two  brigades  and  toward  the  end  three 
occupying  the  Camp.  In  large  measure  the  problems  con- 
fronting the  gunners  and  men  of  the  train  were'  identical 
with  those  before  the  other  troops  of  the  Division;  and 
they  were  solved  in  the  same  manner,  by  sheer  grit  and 
ingenuity.  And  since  the  work  done  by  the  Twenty-Sixth 
was  typical  of  what  was  done,  that  first  winter,  by  all 
American  combat  troops  in  France,  it  will  be  profitable  to 
note  its  salient  aspects  in  detail. 

The  task  of  the  pioneer  divisions  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  was  one  of  the  most  interesting,  as  well  as  difficult, 
which  had  ever  fallen  to  American  troops.  To  the  First, 
Twenty-Sixth,  Forty-Second,  and  Second  Divisions,  later 
grouped  into  the  First  Corps,  there  fell  the  good  fortune 
to  act  as  advance  party  of  the  army,  which,  in  the  months 
to  follow,  was  to  flow  into  all  corners  of  France.  On  them 
lay  the  duty  of  creating  that  first  impression  of  American 
troops  in  the  minds  of  both  the  French  military  author- 
ities and  the  civilian  population.  Here  were  two  divisions 
of  the  Regular  Army  (including  a  Marine  brigade)  offered 
as  representative  of  our  professional  soldiery,  but  whose 
traditions  of  efficiency  and  thorough  military  knowledge 
were  hard  to  impress  on  the  average  onlooker  because  of 
thousands  of  recruits  untouched  by  the  Regular  Army 
spirit,  whose  company  oflBcers  included  scores  of  lieuten- 
ants fresh  from  civilian  training-camps.  Here  again  were 
two  divisions  of  the  citizen-army.  Their  enlisted  per- 
sonnel averaged  better  than  that  of  the  Regular  divisions; 
they  included  a  good  many  Regular  officers  on  their  ros- 
ters, mainly  in  staff  and  higher  line  positions;  but  their 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  37 

battalion  and  company  officers  were  entirely  non-profes- 
sional. In  general,  therefore,  while  persons  well  acquainted 
with  the  American  soldier  might  note  some  differences 
between  the  four  first  divisions,  their  outward  appearance, 
discipline,  and  the  saHent  characteristics  of  both  officers 
and  men  showed  no  distinguishing  marks  whatever  to  the 
stranger. 

And  just  as  the  general  impression  they  made  was  the 
same,  practically,  so  all  had  the  same  tasks  to  do  immedi- 
ately on  reaching  France.  What  the  Twenty-Sixth  Divi- 
sion did  in  the  way  of  training  and  work,  and  in  making  the 
French  acquainted  with  Americans,  was  precisely  that 
which  was  accomplished  or  attempted,  neglected  or  per- 
fected, by  their  very  good  friends  and  rivals,  the  First  and 
the  Forty-Second.  And  as  the  work  progressed,  as  the 
divisions  drank  deep  of  the  same  cup  of  experience,  old 
differences  grew  less  evident;  the  common  American  traits 
grew  more  distinct,  a  certain  fellowship  commenced  to 
show  evidence  of  bloom,  in  place  of  that  mutually  sincere 
disparagement  and  jealousy,  which  had  graced  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Regular  and  citizen  soldier,  for  years  before. 

All  accounts  agree  as  to  the  general  impression  produced 
by  our  troops  on  the  French  civilians.  Their  advent  was 
hailed  with  mingled  feelings.  Profoundly  depressed  in  the 
autumn  of  1917  by  the  only  half -successful  and  fearfully 
costly  efforts  their  armies  had  put  forth  in  the  spring  and 
summer,  wishing  nothing  so  much  as  a  quick  conclusion  of 
the  national  agony  of  sorrow,  deprivation,  and  apparently 
futile  effort,  a  large  minority,  seeing  in  ihe  advent  of  the 
Americans  only  a  promise  of  the  war's  prolongation,  was 
much  inclined  to  regret  it.  Tlie  propaganda  of  dejaitisme  — 
"Since  we  cannot  win,  why  fight  further?"  —  had  gained 
many  adherents.  A  people  which  clings  devotedly  to  its 
household  and  lands,  heartily  weary  of  war,  could  only 
sigh  at  the  prospect  of  the  coming  of  more  legions,  how- 
ever friendly,  to  occupy  tlie  land  and  use  it  as  they  saw  fit. 


38  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

The  vast  majority,  on  the  contrary,  welcomed  the  Ameri- 
cans as  saviors.  They  looked  on  our  men  as  crusaders,  who 
had  left  their  homes  to  fight  for  an  ideal,  as  the  force  which 
was  destined  to  cause  the  triumph  of  right  and  justice. 
The  slow-moving,  hard-fisted  Lorraine  peasant  did  not 
commit  himself  as  to  the  wider  aspects  of  the  Americans' 
peaceful  invasion.  He  was  principally  concerned  over  the 
broken  windows  and  farm  tools,  the  unceremonious  clean- 
ing of  his  filthy  villages,  the  lamentable  way  in  which  his 
firewood  was  burned,  the  free-and-easy  fashion  in  which 
the  broad-backed  lads  from  the  West  sprawled  riotously 
over  his  house  and  stables,  as  they  set  up  their  housekeep- 
ing. He  uttered  shrill  wails  over  impending  ruin;  but  he 
stood  ruin  off  by  the  comfortably  large  damages  he  col- 
lected for  every  goose  feather,  handful  of  hay,  or  inch  of 
bark  on  a  fruit-tree  which  he  believed  his  sturdy  lodgers 
had  appropriated  or  destroyed.  But  his  women-folk  liked 
the  Yankees  well.  They  approved  whole-heartedly  of  the 
manner  in  which  they  tossed  about  their  money  in  the 
little  shops  and  dark  cafes.  No  attempt  was  made  to  under- 
stand the  workings  of  the  American  soldier's  mind;  his 
irreverent,  contentious,  patient,  hell-raising,  self-confident, 
insatiably  curious,  oddly  gentle  nature  was  accepted  as  it 
was,  with  a  mixture  of  immense  admiration  and  reluctant 
dismay.  "Zes  Americains  sont  fous"  was  the  formula  that 
summed  up  everything.  They  were  so  young  and  lusty,  so 
buoyant,  so  amazingly  impudent!  Private  Bill  Jones  was 
so  careless  about  breaking  or  spoiling  things  —  and  paid 
for  the  damage  so  royally !  Quarrelsome  in  his  drink,  none 
too  mindful  of  even  the  strictest  orders,  he  was  sturdily 
patient  in  discomfort  and  hardship.  He  ate  enormously. 
He  was  tremendously  energetic  and  direct  in  getting  a 
task  done.  The  people  among  whom  he  came  to  live  had 
seen  their  own  dogged  poilus,  greedy  Russians,  the  black 
Turcos,  and  weather-cock  Italians  —  all  war-weary.  Small 
wonder  that  they  smiled  their  friendship  on  these  boyish, 


SETTLING  D0\^^  IN  FRANCE  39 

eager  fellows,  even  if,  in  some  hearts,  there  lurked  a  shadow 
of  regret  that  their  efforts  and  their  youth  were  doomed, 
as  cried  the  defaitistes,  to  be  thrown  away  in  a  cause  al- 
ready lost. 

The  French  military  authorities  observed  the  Division 
from  another  angle.  And,  observing,  they  were  content. 
They  could  make  soldiers  out  of  material  like  this  —  as- 
sault troops,  reckless,  fierce,  hardy.  "A  day  will  come," 
said  one  of  the  French  instructors  of  the  Twenty-Sixth, 
*'when  your  men  will  forget  that  they  ever  were  civihans. 
They  will  be  warriors!"  and  his  tone,  his  gesture,  evoked 
a  picture  of  such  fighting  men  as  followed  Bonaparte  or 
Marlborough.  "To-day,"  said  another  critic  of  the  Divi- 
sion's men,  "your  fellows  appear  an  enthusiastic  mob.  But 
wait  a  little  — !" 

The  programme  and  detailed  schedules  of  training  were 
prompt  in  making  their  appearance.  Based  on  the  as- 
sumption that  the  Division  was  to  prepare  for  the  warfare 
of  position,  but  was  to  consider  always  the  possibihty  that 
the  dogged  duel  of  the  trenches  must  give  place  to  open 
warfare,  there  was  laid  down  by  the  training  section  of 
the  General  Staff  the  most  carefully  progressive  scheme  of 
instruction  imaginable.  It  was  characteristic  of  the  ability 
and  methods  of  the  men  who,  at  our  own  army's  advanced 
schools,  had  absorbed  the  best  of  the  accepted  theories 
about  warfare,  had  heard  the  ad\^ce  of  the  best  Allied 
commanders,  and  adapted  what  they  learned  to  the  im- 
mediate requirements  of  the  situation,  and  to  the  capabil- 
ities of  the  American  soldier.  True  to  its  conviction  that 
the  American  army  in  the  war  would  not  do  well  to  adopt 
in  their  entirety  either  French  or  British  ideals,  but  must 
retain  the  native,  the  framers  of  the  programme  empha- 
sized those  parts  of  the  training  which,  perfected,  have 
alwavs  marked  our  soldiers.  Skill  with  the  rifle,  initiative, 
adaptability,  nervous  energy,  were  the  good  qualities 
which  the  programme  sought  to  develop.  The  native  faults 


40  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

of  the  American  soldier,  such  as  lack  of  obedience,  untidi- 
ness, waste,  extravagance,  and  casual  attitude,  it  was 
sought  to  suppress  or  reform  by  the  splendidly  framed 
series  of  general  orders  on  conduct,  bearing,  courtesy,  and 
discipline,  published  at  various  dates  between  autumn  and 
spring.  Drill  and  instruction  were  to  be  given  for  thirty- 
six  hours  a  week,  extending  to  March  13 ;  the  field  covered 
was  practically  the  whole  range  of  the  Infantry  Drill  Regu- 
lations, with  supplemental  practice  in  the  novel  infantry 
arms  —  grenade,  Stokes  mortar,  ST-miUimeter  field  gun, 
automatic  rifle.  There  was  to  be  rifle  and  pistol  practice  on 
the  range;  extensive  maneuvers  and  terrain  exercises,  up 
to  include  divisional  problems  of  attack  and  defense,  for 
both  trench  and  open  warfare,  were  prescribed  in  detail. 
It  must  have  given  the  French  and  British  authorities  a 
feeling  of  great  confidence  in  the  knowledge  and  technical 
grasp  of  the  American  Staff  which  produced  so  thorough 
and  well-balanced  a  scheme  of  instruction.  Published 
early  in  November,  the  programme  was  put  into  immediate 
operation  throughout  the  Division's  infantry  and  machine- 
gun  units.  For  the  artillery  brigade  a  similar  set  of  instruc- 
tions was  drawn  up,  applicable  to  its  own  requirements. 
Planned  to  cover  six  weeks,  from  the  first  of  November  to 
the  middle  of  December,  the  artillery  programme  was  ex- 
tended six  weeks  longer,  to  equalize  the  instruction  peri- 
ods of  all  arms.  Officers  and  chosen  non-coms  attended 
schools  in  the  morning  while  the  batteries  had  mounted 
drill,  usually  under  the  First  Sergeant.  In  the  afternoon 
was  target  practice,  in  which  all  took  part,  the  batteries 
and  a  few  officers  in  the  firing  positions,  the  rest  of  the 
officers  at  the  observatories  for  practice  in  conduct  of  fire. 
At  night  the  French  instructors  would  hold  lectures  or 
schools  in  the  regimental  mess  halls,  to  drive  in  what  had 
been  learned  during  the  day  or  to  explain  the  knotty 
points.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  training  the  officers  were 
allowed  to  give  more  time  to  their  commands;  hikes  and 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  41 

cross-country  position  marches  were  indulged  in;  much 
practice  was  had  in  occupying  positions  both  by  day  and 
by  night,  in  haste  and  at  leisure;  and  several  tactical  bri- 
gade problems  were  undertaken,  including  the  firing  of  a 
skeleton  barrage.  In  all  arms  the  regimental  and  battalion 
officers  issued  the  appropriate  orders  to  dovetail  their 
programme's  requirements  into  the  many  other  demands 
which  daily  pressed  for  attention. 

For,  while  it  was  realized  by  officers  and  men  alike  that 
the  more  quickly  they  were  taught,  the  quicker  would 
come  the  coveted  honor  of  entering  the  firing-line,  it  was 
borne  in  upon  them  every  day  that  a  pioneer  division 
must  perform  a  score  of  tasks  other  than  drill  and  maneu- 
ver. Problems  of  food,  shelter,  clothing,  and  sanitation 
had  to  be  solved.  Transport  and  communications  had  to 
be  organized.  Hundreds  of  men  and  dozens  of  officers 
were  busy  from  dawn  to  dusk  on  work  other  than  training 
for  battle.  The  villages  had  to  be  cleaned  and  organized 
as  billets;  where  accommodations  were  lacking,  it  was 
necessary  to  erect  the  so-called  "Adrian"  barracks  —  a 
kind  of  portable,  knock-down  bunk-house,  designed  to 
shelter  about  one  hundred  men.  INIuch  labor  was  required 
to  make  habitable  the  lofts,  stables,  and  outhouses  where 
the  men  were  lodged.  Every  day  large  details  went  to  the 
woods,  under  guidance  of  the  French  forest  service,  to  cut 
firewood;  and  it  was  a  curious  sight  to  see  the  men  come 
in  at  nightfall,  each  carrying  a  long  branch  or  sapling  to  be 
split  into  logs  at  the  company  kitchens.  The  roads  in  the 
area,  hammered  by  the  heavy  traffic  of  the  camions,  had 
begun  to  break  down  a  little,  and  repairs  to  these  vital 
arteries  required  the  service  of  many  hands.  To  store, 
handle,  and  issue  supplies  at  the  congested  railhead  in 
Certilleux  was  task  enough  for  a  company  each  day;  a 
telephone  system  for  the  entire  divisional  area  had  to  be 
organized  and  set  in  operation  independent,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, of  the  existing  French  civilian  sj'stem.  At  Bazoilles, 


42  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

where  a  vast  system  of  hospital  building  was  under  way, 
there  was  need  of  large  details  for  construction  work.  To 
handle  the  increasing  volume  of  correspondence,  reports, 
and  records  at  all  headquarters,  drafts  had  to  be  made  on 
every  unit  to  obtain  competent  clerks,  orderlies,  and  ste- 
nographers. A  considerable  interior  guard  was  required  in 
each  village,  to  watch  the  water-supply,  the  meager  wood- 
pile, the  tempting  cafe,  the  local  storehouse.  Typical  was 
the  experience  of  the  ammunition  train,  which,  in  Novem- 
ber and  December,  had  to  detail  between  750  and  875 
daily  as  labor  troops.  It  needed  the  best  ingenuity  of  com- 
manding officers  and  their  adjutants  to  insure  the  attend- 
ance at  drill  or  instruction,  on  some  days,  of  even  a  min- 
imum enlisted  strength,  so  large  were  the  details  required 
for  other  duties. 

Another  set  of  circumstances  prevented  obtaining  full 
value  from  the  programme  or  strict  conformity  with  its 
requirements.  These  were  the  weather  and  the  phj^sical 
condition  of  the  troops.  Throughout  the  autumn  and  early 
winter  rain  was  continuous.  The  drill  fields  were  ankle- 
deep  in  mud,  the  roads  like  river-beds.  The  dim  November 
and  December  daylight  hardly  sufficed  that  the  troops, 
moving  out  for  drill  at  an  hour  just  after  sunrise,  should 
return  before  the  dusk  of  early  evening.  The  men  were 
always  wet  and  cold;  their  barracks,  mess-houses,  latrines, 
were  all  deep  in  a  miry  clay  which  made  cleanhness  of 
person  or  good  condition  of  arms  and  equipment  an  ideal 
almost  impossible  to  realize.  The  men  had  only  the  most 
scanty  provision  of  light  in  their  poor  lodgings.  No  fires 
were  allowable  in  the  lofts  and  stables,  even  if  stoves  and 
firewood  had  been  attainable.  Their  clothes  were  shock- 
ingly ragged ;  their  shoes  were  fast  giving  way,  since  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  dry,  clean,  or  grease  them;  their  ra- 
tions were  none  too  abundant  or  regular.  It  was  not  long, 
therefore,  before  many  of  the  men  were  rendered  physi- 
cally incapable  of  regular  attendance  at  the  drill  ground 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  43 

or  target  range.  More  than  once  an  entire  platoon  had  to 
be  excused  from  drill  because  of  the  condition  of  its  shoes. 
The  fight  against  vermin  and  the  diseases  resultant  from 
uncleanliness  of  person  took  on  a  somewhat  serious  turn; 
laryngitis  and  an  occasional  pneumonia  made  their  ap- 
pearance. The  inevitable  danger  to  morale  from  home- 
sickness, lack  of  any  amusement  or  diversion,  and  physical 
hardship  was  a  factor  in  the  men's  condition  which  gaA^e 
commanding  officers  some  anxious  hours,  as  they  saw  the 
days  and  weeks  pass  with  the  requirements  of  the  ironclad 
training  programmes  not  fully  carried  out  in  this  or  that 
company  or  battalion. 

No  description  of  the  first  winter  spent  in  France  by  the 
Twenty-Sixth  and  the  other  pioneer  divisions  would  be 
complete  without  a  mention  of  the  immense  difficulty  of 
obtaining  supplies  and  transport.  It  illustrates  vividly  the 
tremendous  tasks  thrust  on  the  various  American  head- 
quarters, whether  at  Chaumont,  Paris,  the  base  ports. 
Tours  (where  the  Service  of  Supply  came  to  be  centered), 
or  at  the  divisions  themselves.  WTiere  an  entire  system  of 
distribution  had  to  be  built  up,  not  only  for  the  few  troops 
already  in  France,  but  for  the  hundreds  of  thousands  still 
to  come;  where  the  main  base  of  supplies  was  three  thou- 
sand miles  away  across  a  sea  not  secure  against  enemy 
marauders;  where  dock  and  warehouse  facilities  were 
meager,  the  railroad  system  already  congested,  and  ocean 
tonnage  scarce;  when  expert  advice  was  divided,  and 
counsels  even  as  to  the  most  advantageous  way  of  em- 
ploying the  American  troops  still  far  from  unanimous; 
where  the  resources  of  the  Allies  in  matters  of  munitions, 
food,  and  forage  were  strictly  limited,  can  it  be  wondered 
that  the  machinery  of  supply  failed  to  work  with  speed 
or  regularity?  The  result,  however,  was  great  hardship. 
It  was  toward  the  end  of  November  that  ordnance  supplies 
for  the  infantry  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  began  to  arrive  in 
any  quantity.  From  French  sources  were  received  Hotch- 


44  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

kiss  machine  guns  (model  1914),  Chauehat  automatic 
rifles,  Vivan-Bessieres  rifle  grenades,  hand  grenades  of  both 
the  offensive  and  defensive  types,  and  gas  masks  which 
later  were  supplanted  by  the  British  "box  respirators." 
Enough  ammunition  was  issued  to  afford  practical  train- 
ing with  the  infantry  weapons;  so  at  length  the  anxiety  of 
the  brigadiers  in  this  regard  was  somewhat  allayed.  But 
delay  in  the  issue  of  these  utilities  seriously  interfered  with 
systematic  instruction;  and  such  minor  but  necessary 
articles  of  equipment  as  trench  knives,  entrenching  tools, 
pistols,  compasses,  wire-cutters,  and  Very  signal  pistols 
were  not  available  until  a  date  considerably  later.  The  ar- 
tillery in  the  Coetquidan  area  was  less  badly  off,  for  the 
brigade  received  its  allotment  of  field  pieces  and  all  neces- 
sary equipment  from  French  sources  at  various  dates  early 
in  October,^ 

The  transport  situation,  to  complete  the  tale  of  woe, 
was,  during  the  first  weeks  after  the  Division  was  settled 
in  its  area,  well-nigh  desperate.  To  send  rations,  forage, 
and  supplies  from  the  railhead  or  quartermaster's  stores- 
house  to  the  various  regimental  distributing  points  by 
truck,  and  thence  to  the  smaller  units  by  wagon,  in  accord- 

1  The  arrangement  by  which  the  American  artillery  was  to  be  armed  with  the 
French  field  piece  assured  that  there  would  be  brought  into  action  on  the  Allied 
lines  a  preponderance  of  the  best  field  artillery  in  existence. 

The  "soixante-quinze,"  or  "75,"  named  from  its  caliber  of  75  millimeters,  de- 
serves in  any  record  of  Allied  endeavor  a  more  than  passing  reference.  Introduced 
in  1898,  often  copied  but  never  equaled,  the  new  weapon  solved  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal problems  of  field  artillery.  By  ingenious  mechanical  devices  which  took  up 
the  shock  of  recoil  and  prevented  any  disarrangement  of  aim,  the  rate  of  fire  was 
enormously  increased.  Previously,  a  field  piece  had  to  be  relaid  after  each  aimed 
shot;  but  this  requirement  was  now  obviated.  Chief  among  the  innovations  was 
that  the  gun  was  not  attached  to  the  axle-tree,  but  to  a  buffer  in  a  cradle  which 
ran  the  gun  back  automatically,  the  recoil  being  taken  up  by  a  cylinder  below 
the  gun,  in  which  there  was  a  secret  combination  of  springs,  compressed  air  of  a 
certain  density,  and  glycerine.  Increased  range  was  secured  by  lengthening  the 
gun  to  nearly  nine  feet,  and  by  giving  it  a  slow-burning  propelling  charge.  Muz- 
zle velocities  were  1739  foot-seconds  (for  16-pound  shrapnel)  and  2050  foot-sec- 
onds (for  12-pound  high-explosive  shell).  The  "75"  was  capable  of  rapid  fire  as 
high  as  twenty-Eve  aimed  shots  a  minute,  and  developed  a  most  extraordinary 
accuracy. 


SETTLING  DOVrS  IN  FRANCE  45 

ance  with  regulations  and  the  prescribed  system,  would 
have  required  the  full  amount  of  supply  material  in  the 
tables  of  organization.  The  Neufehateau  area  covered 
many  square  miles;  the  steep  hills,  slippery  with  mud  and 
ice,  made  hauling  slow  and  diflScult.  But  at  first  there  were 
only  three  trucks  available  for  the  use  of  all  the  troops  in 
the  region.  Later,  eleven  French  camions  were  secured, 
and  then  some  thirty,  from  the  same  source.  Toward  the 
middle  of  November  authority  was  secured  to  make  use 
of  fifty-six  cargo  trucks  which  were  found  available  at 
Saint-Nazaire.  Two  truck  companies  w^ere  sent  from  the 
101st  Supply  Train  to  bring  this  windfall  home  over  the 
road;  and  presently  they  arrived,  loaded  down  with  mis- 
cellaneous quartermaster  and  ordnance  supplies,  from 
canned  tomatoes  to  horseshoes  and  shovels.  How  gleefully 
were  the  trucks  received !  How  great  was  the  sorrow  when 
the  enjoyment  of  these  riches  was  curtailed  a  few  days 
after  their  reception!  But  the  Forty -Second  Division, 
billeted  not  far  away,  was  in  far  worse  condition  than  even 
the  Yankees,  and  so  twenty-eight  of  the  new  trucks  were 
sent  away  to  these  less  fortunate  neighbors,  whose  bar- 
racks had  been  in  part  erected  by  the  101st  Engineers. 
The  First  Division  was  also  in  a  bad  plight,  with  respect 
to  transport,  and  so  one  truck  company  of  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  was  transferred  from  the  101st  Supply  Train  to  the 
First  Division  permanently.  From  the  artillery  also,  away 
by  itself  in  Brittany,  came  similar  reports  of  a  crippling 
shortage  in  power  vehicles  and  animal  transport.  For  a 
long  time  the  101st  Ammunition  Train,  which  was  at- 
tached, for  training,  to  the  artillery,  had  no  trucks  what- 
ever on  which  the  drivers  could  be  instructed.  On  October 
29  twenty  trucks  were  brought  from  Saint-Nazaire  by  a 
detail  from  the  train,  and  were  employed  not  only  for 
demonstration  puri)oses,  but  also  to  haul  supplies  and 
ammunition  for  the  other  troops  at  Coetquidan.  On  De- 
cember 19  the  ammunition  train  of  the  First  Division 


46  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

turned  over  to  tlie  101st  some  twenty  two-ton  trucks,  of 
which  only  three  were  serviceable;  but  Yankee  ingenuity 
was  brought  into  play  with  such  good  effect  that,  with 
only  one  broken-down  French  forge  available  for  repair 
work,  fourteen  trucks  were  rendered  serviceable  within 
three  days.  It  is  not  hard  to  imagine  the  variety  of  uses 
to  which  were  put  the  assorted  passenger  cars  assigned 
to  the  brigade  and  regimental  commanders !  A  motor  am- 
bulance was  kept  as  busy  as  an  interurban  trolley  express 
car. 

November  6  the  first  consignment  of  animals  for  the 
infantry  was  received  at  Rebeuville  —  some  400  French 
draft  horses.  But  these  were  in  such  a  weakened  condition, 
from  disease  and  emaciation,  that  the  great  majority  were 
fit  only  for  the  hospital,  and  many  died  almost  at  once. 
Later  in  the  month,  the  Division  received  from  Saint- 
Nazaire  665  mules  and  230  horses,  American  stock.  These 
animals  were  in  good  condition,  and  ultimately  were  dis- 
tributed to  the  infantry  units,  though  distribution  was 
delayed  somewhat  owing  to  the  prevailing  shortage  of 
trucks  in  which  to  haul  forage.  The  artillery,  at  Coetqui- 
dan,  received  numerous  issues  of  horses  from  the  French 
remount  service,  so  that  by  January  it  had  on  hand  some 
3000  horses  and  200  mules,  mostly  in  poor  condition. 

Mention  is  made  of  these  many  physical  difficulties  with 
which  the  Division  had  to  contend  between  November  and 
February  inclusive,  not  to  paint  any  lurid  tale  of  hard- 
ships. These  matters  are  of  interest  in  a  military  history 
because  they  have  a  direct  bearing  on  morale.  The  soldier 
who  is  cold,  wet,  half-sick,  badly  nourished,  badly  lodged, 
and  short  of  necessary  equipment,  is  by  just  so  much  inca- 
pacitated from  deriving  full  benefit  from  military  training 
and  instruction.  But,  on  the  other  side,  the  discomforts 
and  hardships  of  the  first  winter  in  France  proved  in  more 
ways  than  one  a  decided  benefit.  The  hardships  helped  to 
discover  and  form  the  likely  oflicers  as  nothing  else  could. 


"SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  47 

The  platoon,  company,  or  battalion  officer,  who  worked 
every  day  to  better  the  condition  of  his  men's  billets  and 
general  living  conditions,  who  retained  his  cheeriness  and 
devotion  to  duty  throughout  the  days  of  continual  rain 
and  frost  and  mud,  who  set  an  example  of  patience  and 
grit,  was  the  officer  whom  the  men  trusted,  whose  little 
unit  was  conspicuous  for  good  discipline  and  good  spirit. 
Under  hard  conditions  of  living  and  weather,  the  lazy  and 
incompetent  were  also  quickly  discovered.  Characters 
were  developed.  The  good  and  the  bad  took  on  a  higher 
relief.  The  promising  material  for  the  non-commissioned 
grades  came  quickly  to  the  surface;  the  incompetent  ser- 
geant also  found  his  place  —  usually  two  grades  or  so 
lower  down  the  scale.  Another  positive  advantage  derived 
from  the  experience  was  that  the  troops  were  early  taught 
lessons  on  the  subject  of  making  the  best  of  things.  The 
sum  of  the  hardships  was,  actually,  to  season  and  toughen 
the  Division  very  promptly. 

Two  factors  in  the  generally  rapid  and  satisfactory  prog- 
ress of  the  troops  in  military  knowledge,  at  this  period, 
were  due  to  the  tireless  and  intelligent  assistance  of  the 
French. 

The  first  of  these  was  the  work  of  the  French  INIilitary 
Mission.  This  was  composed  of  a  number  of  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  of  the  French  establishment, 
both  staff  and  line,  selected  for  their  experience  in  warfare, 
their  knowledge  of  English,  exceptional  qualities  of  mind 
and  personal  character.  Their  duties  were  manifold.  At- 
tached to  the  headquarters  of  the  Division,  brigades  and 
regiments,  they  served  as  points  of  contact  between  the 
troops  and  the  French  both  military  and  civilian.  They 
gave  suggestions  and  instruction  in  methods  of  warfare, 
of  administration,  supply,  and  other  staff  work.  They 
opened  all  avenues  by  which  could  be  secured  the  supplies 
required  for  the  equipment  and  comfort  of  the  troops;  they 
contributed  most  painstaking  critiques  on  the  discipline. 


48  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

drill,  and  military  efficiency  of  the  units  to  which  they  were 
accredited;  they  made  frequent  reports  to  the  French 
authorities;  they  assisted  most  effectively  in  smoothing 
•out  difficulties  between  the  civilian  population  and  the 
troops  —  settling  claims,  advising,  interpreting.  Their 
work  in  helping  the  Division  through  its  first  difficult  weeks 
in  France,  and  their  later  skillful  assistance  in  the  field,  is 
part  of  the  Division's  permanent  history.  Long  after  the 
period  of  mere  reminiscence  is  past;  when  all  parts  of  the 
history  will  take  on  their  proper  proportion,  one  believes 
that  an  outstanding,  enduring  fact  of  record  will  be  the 
work  of  these  French  soldiers  in  guiding  the  steps  of  our 
officers  and  men  in  warfare.  At  every  turn  of  the  Divi- 
sion's life  there  is  apparent  the  influence  of  the  French 
adviser;  at  all  crises  the  assistance  and  guidance  of  the 
French,  while  never  obtruded,  were  always  to  be  had  by  3- 
commanding  officer  of  whatever  rank.^ 

A  second  factor  in  the  early  training  of  the  troops  of 
prime  importance  was  the  work  of  Colonel  (later  general 
de  brigade)  Bertrand,  commanding  the  162d  Infantry 
Regiment,  who  in  the  eyes  of  the  admiring  Americans  em- 
bodied all  the  traits  of  the  beau  sabreur  of  romantic  tradi- 
tion. Of  distinguished  reputation  as  a  cavalry  commander 
in  Africa,  alert,  elegant,  a  fearless  leader  in  desperate 
actions,  he  gave  his  very  best  to  aid  in  the  instruction  of 
the  new  American  troops.  His  mere  physical  presence  on 
the  maneuver  field,  his  infectious  high  spirits,  his  soldierly 
courtesy,  and  heavy-handed  discipline  had  an  effect  ab- 
solutely electrical  on  all  those  Americans  with  whom  he 
came  in  contact,  at  this  time  or  later.  From  his  head- 
quarters in  Frebecourt,  a  village  just  to  the  north  of  Neuf- 

1  To  name  those  officers  of  the  mission  militaire  who  were  longest  on  duty  with 
the  Division,  whose  work  was  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous,  one  should  include 
Major  Amaury  du  Boisrouvray,  Captain  Westphalen  Le  Maltre;  Captain  Ma- 
lick  (all  at  Division  Headquarters);  Captain  De  St. -Croix  (51st  Infantry  Bri- 
gade) ;  Captain  Le  Meitour  (52d  Infantry  Brigade) ;  Captain  L.  E.  Ney ;  Lieuten- 
ant L.  Cheippe;  Lieutenant  J.  Toulouse;  Lieutenant  Henriot;  Lieutenant  C.  de 
Benoist  d'Azy  and  Lieutenant  Masselin  (both  with  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade). 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  49 

chateau,  Colonel  Bertrand  directed  daily  a  series  of  dem- 
onstrations by  his  seasoned  veterans  of  the  approved 
French  formations  for  attack  or  defense,  movement  on 
the  field,  the  proper  handling  of  grenades  (of  which  at  the 
time  the  French  were  making  great  use),  the  bayonet,  and 
the  machine  gun.  Beginning  with  demonstrations  by 
squads  of  grenadiers  and  machine-gunners  in  Frebecourt, 
conducted  for  the  benefit  of  regimental  and  battalion 
officers,  the  work  was  soon  greatly  extended.  In  trucks 
provided  by  the  French  a  battalion  of  infantry  at  a  time 
would  be  taken  to  the  drill  ground,  kept  there  for  the  day, 
and  minutely  instructed  by  a  battahon  of  the  162d  in  this 
or  that  tactical  movement  or  method.  Platoon  and  com- 
pany officers  were  shown  how  to  deploy  and  maneuver 
their  commands  to  meet  varying  conditions;  the  relative 
value  and  tactical  worth  of  all  the  infantry  utilities  were 
taught  to  small  groups.  When  it  is  understood  that,  at  this 
time,  not  a  battalion  or  company  officer  in  the  entire  Ex- 
peditionary Force  had  ever  handled  one  of  the  new  weap- 
ons, had  ever  seen  a  modern  company  in  combat  forma- 
tion, and  was  only  beginning  to  receive  copies  of  hastily 
compiled  provisional  drill  manuals  translated  from  the 
French  or  adapted  from  the  British,  it  will  be  appreciated 
how  valuable  were  these  practical  demonstrations  of  the 
veteran  battalions  of  the  162d  in  the  field.  This  regiment 
had  just  been  relieved  from  a  long  tour  of  duty  on  the 
Verdun  front,  where  it  had  suffered  severely.  Of  its  original 
officers  only  two  had  survived  the  three  years  of  continual 
warfare.  Colonel  Bertrand  was  the  fourth  regimental  com- 
mander since  1914,  all  his  predecessors  having  been  battle 
casualties.  As  a  combat  unit  the  lG2d  had  won  an  enviable 
reputation.^  Thus  the  American  troops  were  brought  into 

*  The  complete  battle  record  of  this  splendid  French  regiment  follows.  It  is  of 
interest,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  military  historian,  as  showing  how  continu- 
ously our  French  allies  were  compelled  to  employ  their  units;  the  record  illus- 
trates also  very  vividly  the  devotion  of  the  PVench  poilu  in  the  defense  of  his 
country.  The  lC2d,  before  the  war,  formed  part  of  the  garrison  of  the  Verdun 


50  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

daily  contact  with  battalions  who  did  not  perform  a  drill 
to  illustrate  principles  taught  in  a  book,  but  who  repro- 
duced actual  conditions,  formations,  methods  which  they 
had  experienced  or  employed  time  and  again  in  fierce  at- 
tack and  stubborn  defense.  The  worth  to  the  new  men  was 
consequently  very  great.  Not  only  did  they  learn  meth- 
ods, but  they  learned  what  real  fighting  men,  some  of  the 
toughest  French  infantry,  were  like. 

It  must  not  be  understood,  however,  that  the  Division 
accepted  the  gospel  of  tactics  as  preached  by  the  poilu  and 
his  chiefs  without  reservations.  Yankee  fashion,  the  Amer- 
ican listened,  and  then  made  his  own  decision.  It  was  that 
period  in  the  evolution  of  tactical  theory  —  changed  so 
often  in  the  course  of  the  war  —  when  the  cry  was  all  for 
"specialists."  Almost  the  first  point  upon  which  the  in- 
structors from  the  162d  insisted  was  that  the  American 
companies  should  be  at  once  divided  into  permanent 
groups  of  riflemen,  bombers,  rifle  grenadiers,  automatic 
riflemen,  signalmen,  and  agents  of  liaison.  The  training 
was  all  in  the  direction  of  training  each  group  to  become 
proficient  in  one  branch  only,  and  rather  to  neglect  the 
rifle  in  favor  of  the  other  infantry  weapons.  Protracted 

fortress.  On  August  22,  1914,  it  first  gained  contact  with  the  enemy  in  the  vncin- 
ity  of  Pierrepont,  where  its  stubborn  resistance,  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Trouchand,  cost  700  men  and  30  officers.  During  the  First  Battle  of  the  Marne, 
as  a  unit  of  the  Forty-Second  Division,  it  won  a  victory  at  Soisy-aux-Bois  and 
Saint-Pri.x,  on  September  8,  1914.  From  October  21  till  December  10,  it  was 
posted  in  the  line  along  the  river  Yser;  from  January  2  till  July  15,  1915,  it  was 
continually  in  the  line  in  the  region  of  the  Argonne;  on  September  25,  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Chaudon,  it  attacked,  in  Champagne.  From  March  10  till 
May  23,  1916,  it  assisted  actively  in  the  heroic  defense  of  Verdun.  In  September 
of  the  same  year,  it  participated  in  the  gigantic  battle  on  the  Somme,  under  Col- 
onel de  Mattarel.  In  April,  1917,  on  the  Aisne,  it  gained  a  success  against  the 
fortified  Mauchamp  Farm;  and  then  returned,  in  August,  to  a  position  before 
Verdun,  where  it  fought  in  Caurieres  Wood  and  Chaume  Wood.  Transferred  to 
duty  before  Compiegne,  in  June  of  1918,  it  checked  the  Germ.an  advance  on  the 
Aronde,  thanks  to  a  heroic  resistance  at  Porte  Farm,  in  an  action  which  cost  the 
regiment  some  30  ofiicers  and  1000  men,  casualties  in  four  days  of  desperate 
fighting  (June  10-13).  On  August  2  it  took  part  in  the  relief  of  Soissons;  between 
August  28  and  September  5  it  was  continuously  engaged  in  a  .series  of  savage  at- 
tacks which  drove  back  the  Germans  across  the  heights  near  Crouy  and  the  fa- 
mous Laffaux  Mill,  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames. 


SETTLING  DOW^  IN  FRANCE  51 

trench  warfare  had  caused  reliance  to  be  placed  mainly  on 
weapons  delivering  a  plunging  fire  at  short  range  (the 
grenade)  and  on  the  rapid  fire  of  the  machine  gun  or  auto- 
matic. True,  the  rifleman  of  exceptional  proficiency  was 
accepted  as  valuable  for  long-range  sharpshooting  or  "snip- 
ing"; but  he  was  merely  one  of  still  another  class  of  spe- 
ciaHsts,  requiring  his  own  equipment  (telescopic  sight,  dis- 
guises, shields,  what-not),  together  with  intensive  training 
at  a  special  school.  To  this  theory  of  tactical  organization 
of  the  small  unit  of  infantry  was  opposed  the  well-grounded 
belief  of  American  Headquarters  in  the  value  of  the  Ameri- 
can rifleman  as  such.  It  was  deemed  best  to  adopt  French 
practice  with  such  modifications  as  suited  the  character- 
istic quahties  of  our  troops;  and  this  was  done  in  the 
Twenty-Sixth  Division.  It  was  one  of  the  points  of  train- 
ing on  which  the  Division  Commander  insisted  from  the 
outset.  As  much  range  practice  as  possible,  with  the  piti- 
fully meager  facihties  at  hand,  was  given  to  all  troops 
armed  '^ath  the  rifle;  and  the  effort  was  made  to  acquaint 
all  the  infantry  with  all  the  infantry  utilities,  instead  of 
creating  groups  each  trained  to  be  expert  with  only  a  single 
weapon. 

Other  influences  were  at  work,  moreover,  which  bore 
directly  on  the  Division's  preparation  for  war.  Nor  can  one 
omit  the  schools  at  Bazoilles,  Gondrecourt,  and  Langres, 
to  take  them  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  opened. 

At  Bazoilles  there  was  established  a  school  for  teaching 
selected  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  the  British 
manual  of  the  bayonet  —  at  this  time  judged  the  best,  as 
tested  by  battle.  For,  along  with  the  motions  of  thrust 
and  cut  and  parry,  there  was  instilled  by  the  British  bay- 
onet instructors  a  curiously  vivid  fighting  spirit,  which 
urged  the  soldier  to  get  to  grips  with  his  adversary  and 
kill  him  hand-to-hand.  To  watch  this  instruction  was  like 
witnessing  a  drill  in  murder;  there  was  a  grim  fascination 
in  the  way  the  instructors  spurred  their  pupils  past  the 


52  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

point  of  simulated  ferocity,  to  a  veritable  lust-to-kill, 
which  often  proved  dangerous  enough,  even  at  drill.  Sav- 
age and  primitive,  this  exercise  gave  the  still  easy-going 
lads  a  new  point  of  view;  it  taught  them  what  real  in-fight- 
ing meant.  At  Bazoilles  were  also  taught  the  British  set- 
ting-up and  suppling  drills,  which  had  remarkable  results 
in  teaching  agility,  smartness,  and  good  carriage. 

Gondrecourt,  the  station  of  the  First  Corps  Schools, 
claimed  a  large  and  continuous  attendance  of  officers,  to 
whom  were  taught  modern  infantry  tactics,  in  courses  of 
three  to  six  weeks,  intensively;  and  the  work  was  prose- 
cuted under  such  conditions  of  weather,  inadequate  hous- 
ing, hasty  organization,  and  mud,  as  made  the  discom- 
forts of  the  billeting  area  fade  away.  Here  again,  however, 
as  throughout  the  history  of  all  the  first  American  organi- 
zations in  France,  it  was  grit  and  the  desire  to  play  the 
game,  on  the  part  of  all  concerned,  that  won  the  day.  Ofii- 
cers  were  here  from  all  the  combat  units  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force;  and  here,  too,  as  at  Bazoilles,  instruction 
was  largely  tinctured  with  British  preferences  and  preju- 
dices in  tactical  methods  and  theory.  If  a  certain  confu- 
sion of  mind  resulted,  for  the  student  officer,  who  had 
begun  by  accepting  the  French  doctrine  as  orthodox,  only 
to  be  told  that  the  French,  with  all  their  excellent  warlike 
virtues,  were  not  quite  abreast  of  the  times,  no  great  harm 
was  done.  The  student  simply  endeavored  to  sift  out  from 
both  schools  that  residuum  which  was  plainly  of  use  to  an 
American.  And  it  was  most  desirable  for  our  people,  also, 
to  catch  early  in  their  training  a  reflection  of  British  pluck 
and  recklessness  as  an  offset  to  French  caution  and  strict 
economy  of  forces.  Hastening  back  to  their  platoons  and 
companies,  these  officers  in  turn  became  teachers,  as  did 
those  sent  to  Bazoilles. 

The  personal  teaching  and  example  of  the  Division 
Commander  was  widely  exerted  among  all  ranks.  That  his 
men  should  be  smart  and  alert  under  all  circumstances  — 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  53 

doing  their  best  to  keep  themselves  and  their  equipment 
clean  —  carrying  out  their  orders  briskly  —  with  a  smile 
—  "playing  the  game"  with  a  will  —  these  principles  he 
taught  tirelessly.  Continually  he  visited  battahons,  and 
talked  to  the  men  in  the  most  informal,  personal  manner. 
Pride  in  themselves,  pride  in  the  service,  pride  in  their 
Division,  he  instilled  in  officers  and  men  alike,  with  the 
result  that,  long  before  the  troops  went  to  the  line,  there 
had  grown  up  an  esprit  de  corps,  no  longer  of  individual 
units,  but  of  the  whole  Division,  which  was  to  endure 
rather  remarkably  all  through  the  Division's  history. 

But  one  discordant  note  was  struck  in  the  general  con- 
cert of  earnest  work  and  mutual  dependence.  From  a 
source  quite  impossible  to  discover  at  the  time,  perplexing 
even  now  in  its  obscurity,  there  spread  a  rumor  that  Na- 
tional Guard  troops,  such  as  composed  the  Forty-Second 
and  Twenty-Sixth  Divisions,  were  to  be  made  of  small 
account  in  the  composition  of  the  American  fighting  forces. 
One  heard  parroted  the  insistence  that  our  divisions  must 
be  national,  not  local,  in  character  —  that  it  was  greater 
"to  belong  to  the  Nation  than  to  a  State."  The  charge  was 
even  made  that  a  campaign  of  aspersion,  disparagement, 
and  neglect  had  been  set  in  motion,  under  which  the  Na- 
tional Guard  in  France  would  dwindle  and  disappear. 

These  harmful  rumors  received  wide  circulation  and 
credence.  They  were  rife  at  all  officers'  schools;  they  were 
heard  very  early  in  the  Staff  College  at  Langres.  As  to  the 
truth  of  such  allegations  —  would  it  not  appear  superflu- 
ous to  deny  it?  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  personal 
bearing  of  more  than  a  fev/  officers  of  the  Regular  estab- 
lishment gave  weight  to  a  belief  in  their  ill-will;  and  the 
opposition  of  the  responsible  military  authorities  to  the 
National  Guard  system  was  as  open  and  of  as  long  a  stand- 
ing as  their  rooted  belief  in  the  incompetence  of  the  Guard 
troops.  But  it  would  seem  incredible,  nevertheless,  that 
even  the  dullest  of  the  class  would  countenance  a  delib- 


54  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

erate  sabotage  of  any  regiments  or  divisions,  of  whatever 
origin  or  descent,  when  these  were  in  the  heat  of  prepara- 
tion for  immediate  service  in  the  field. 

But  the  effect  of  these  rumors  was  unfortunate.  A  cer- 
tain rancor  was  aroused  in  a  body  of  oflBcers  who  might 
feel  that  they  were  marked  for  discrimination.  The  great 
majority  accepted  this  as  a  challenge;  they  set  out  to  prove 
that  they  were  apt  to  learn  as  they  were  keen  to  fight;  they 
would  prove  that  they  could  master  the  new  tactics  as 
quickly  as  any  Regular;  they  would  prove  that  they  could 
lead  troops  as  troops  deserve  to  be  led.  Resentment  spurred 
them  to  redoubled  efforts.  An  inconsiderable  number, 
feeling  that,  while  they  would  do  their  duty  loyally,  it  was 
idle  to  expect  any  recognition,  let  their  interest  sag  per- 
ceptibly. And  the  wisest  treatment  was  required  in  the 
months  to  come  before  this  cancer  could  be  eradicated.^ 

On  November  11  the  Division  received  a  visit  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Expeditionary  Force.  With  a 
view  to  inspecting  living  conditions  General  Pershing 
traversed  the  entire  divisional  area,  personally  exploring 
typical  dwelling-places,  kitchens,  horse  lines,  and  head- 
quarters offices.  No  effort  was  made  to  inspect  the  troops, 
who  were  paraded  in  groups  and  detachments  outside 
their  respective  billets  without  equipment.  But  a  thorough 
examination  was  made  of  their  quarters;  many  points  were 
brought  to  the  attention  of  commanding  officers  whereby 
living  conditions  might  be  bettered;  and  the  situation,  as 
known  to  officers  on  the  spot,  was  thoroughly  inquired 
into. 

Of  the  scores  of  officers  and  men  detached  for  study  at 
other  schools  than  those  already  mentioned,  a  brief  word 

1  Later,  when  the  26th,  27th,  28th,  29th,  30th,  32d,  33d,  34th,  35th,  36th,  and 
42d  Divisions,  to  name  the  more  conspicuous  of  the  National  Guard  Divisions  in 
France,  were  being  actively  employed  on  the  smoking  battle  line,  the  citizen- 
soldiers  felt  better.  They  might  have  been  rated  low,  in  years  past,  by  the  effi- 
ciency tests  of  peace-times;  but  when  the  guns  began  to  pound,  the  militia  was 
certainly  entrusted  with  lots  of  room  "up  front." 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  55 

will  suffice.  It  is  enough  to  indicate  the  variety  of  instruc- 
tion by  the  very  best  teachers  which  it  was  the  fortune  of 
the  Division,  like  the  other  pioneer  divisions,  to  enjoy. 
Teaching  which  later  became  a  bit  perfunctory  was  at  first 
most  vigorous  and  alive.  The  effort  put  forth  by  the  in- 
structors was  immense;  and  all  testimony  unites  in  com- 
mending the  keenness  of  the  students.  Even  the  general 
officers  received  a  tour  of  instruction  under  French  or 
British  auspices.  To  the  Division  Commander  (October 
31  to  November  10)  was  demonstrated  the  organization  of 
sectors  and  methods  of  attack,  on  the  British  front  before 
Cambrai  and  on  the  French  front  north  of  Soissons.  The 
brigadiers  and  selected  field  officers  from  the  infantry  also 
made  similar  trips,  each  lasting  ten  days  or  more.  Officers 
and  men  of  the  machine-gun  units  were  sent  to  school  at 
Camiers  or  other  centers;  artillerymen  took  courses  at 
Saumur  or  Fontainebleau ;  the  signalmen  were  taught  the 
intricacies  of  wireless,  earth  telegraphy  (T.P.S.),  blinker 
operation,  or  pigeon  flying,  in  short  courses  at  Gondre- 
court  or  NeufchMeau. 

Of  very  great  importance  for  the  Division  was  the  Army 
General  Staff  College.  The  influence  of  its  teaching  was 
carried  early  and  directly  to  the  Division  Staff's  organiza- 
tion and  operation.  Not  fewer  than  fourteen  officers  per- 
forming duty  on  the  Staff,  at  one  time  or  another,  were 
graduates  of  the  College.  Conducted  by  some  of  the  ablest 
military  students  and  educators  of  the  Regular  estab- 
lishment, with  lecturers  carefully  selected  from  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  Staffs,  with  stiff  courses,  the  College  rises 
inevitably  to  the  notice  of  any  historian  who  attempts 
to  trace  the  life  of  any  division,  corps,  or  army  in  France. 
It  was  the  Division's  good  fortune  to  be  able  to  send  to  the 
College,  as  early  as  November  25,  a  group  of  some  fifteen 
student  officers,  to  be  entered  in  the  first  course  with 
groups  from  the  First,  Forty-Second,  and  Second  Divi- 
sions (including  several  Marine  officers),  and  from  General 


56  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Headquarters.  The  interest  of  the  study  of  General  Staff 
work  itself;  the  keen  competition  for  good  ratings;  the  dog- 
ged, and  often  successful,  efforts  of  officers  newly  from  ci- 
vilian life  to  catch  and  excel  those  of  the  Regular  establish- 
ment, who,  with  a  better  grounding,  might  be  supposed  to 
have  a  start  too  great  to  overcome;  the  inspiring  teaching 
of  the  French  and  British,  headed  by  Colonel  Koechlin- 
Schwartz  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Needham  respectively; 
the  whole  atmosphere  of  efficiency  which  pervaded  the 
first  course  at  Langres,  combined  to  impress  the  student 
officers  very  deeply.  No  effort  was  spared  by  the  college 
authorities  to  make  much  of  the  importance  which,  in 
their  eyes,  should  inhere  in  the  position  of  an  officer  of  the 
General  Staff;  the  student  officers  at  the  College  were  al- 
lowed privileges  w^hich  caused  a  little  discontent  among 
the  officers  attending  other  near-by  schools;  there  was 
danger  that  an  officer  would  acquire  as  much  self-conceit 
as  knowledge  of  staff  duties  —  that  he  would  catch  the 
air  but  not  the  substance  of  authority.  But  on  the  whole 
the  course  was  all  profit.  The  Staff  College  method  and 
technique  was  accepted  as  the  standard  of  all  staff  work  of 
the  Expeditionary  Force.  TMiat  the  War  College  and  Leav- 
enworth  had  been  for  the  Regular  Army,  Langres  was  to 
the  Expeditionary  Force.  The  best  practice  of  the  most 
successful  staffs  in  the  Allied  armies  was  put  at  the  dis- 
posal of  our  men.  Troop  movements  by  rail  or  march  or 
bus;  billeting;  organization  of  a  sector  in  the  line  or  of  a 
rest  area;  supply  in  all  its  aspects;  methods  of  relieving 
troops  in  the  line;  proper  forms  of  orders;  the  service  of 
intelligence;  tactical  employment  of  infantry  and  artillery 
aeroplanes,  tanks,  light  railways;  aerostatics,  road  repair 
—  these  are  only  some  of  the  subjects  given  careful  ex- 
position. There  w^as  constant  emphasis  on  the  cardinal 
qualities  of  a  staff  officer  —  loyalty,  foresight,  tact,  effort 
to  anticipate  the  needs  of  the  troops;  energy.  The  old  mis- 
conception of  a  staff  officer  as  an  "office  man,"  or  a  kind 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  57 

of  ornamental  secretary  to  a  commanding  general,  was 
swept  clean  away.  A  new  respect  was  built  up  for  the  tire- 
less work,  shrewd  intelligence,  and  scientific  method  ex- 
emplified by  the  ofEcers  whom  the  Staff  College  called  as 
instructors.  To  those  who  completed  the  course  in  Febru- 
ary there  was  given  a  further  opportunity  for  receiving 
instruction  of  value.  After  a  three  days'  survey  of  the  or- 
ganization of  General  Headquarters  in  Chaumont,  officers 
were  sent  to  various  French  and  British  corps  and  divi- 
sions, for  personal  observation  of  staff  methods  in  the  field, 
lasting  ten  days  or  two  weeks.  A  course  of  instruction, 
which  tended  later  to  become  conventionalized,  was  for 
the  first  group  of  officers  from  the  earliest  arrived  divisions 
an  illuminating  experience. 

So,  then,  passed  the  early  winter.  Under  daily  instruc- 
tion and  ceaseless  drill  a  steady  improvement  became 
evident.  Shoulders  straightened;  discipline  tightened;  sick- 
ness (never  a  menace)  grew  less  prevalent;  supply,  hous- 
ing, and  transport  (always  serious  problems)  came  to  give 
less  concern.  The  welfare  agencies  (first,  the  Red  Cross) 
began  to  function  a  little;  mail  began  to  be  received  from 
home;  fewer  men  went  absent  without  leave. 

This  last  breach  of  discipline,  a  constant  and  one  of  the 
most  serious  weaknesses  of  the  American  soldier  in  France, 
could  be  profitably  studied  with  relation  to  the  soldier's 
feeling  that  he  was  or  was  not  required  for  fighting.  Let 
him  scent  a  battle  in  the  air  and  he  stayed  with  the  colors; 
let  a  period  of  inaction  or  tedious  routine  of  drill  be  or- 
dered and  promptly  his  youth  and  restless  curiosity  took 
him  far  afield.  Authorized  leaves,  during  the  training 
period,  were  out  of  the  question;  the  daily  grind  was  hard; 
the  fascination  of  the  strange,  new  land  was  irresistible. 
Whatever  the  reason,  there  were  many  American  soldiers 
absent  from  their  station  and  duties  between  October  and 
February,  from  the  Twenty-Sixth  as  from  the  other  di^'i- 
sions.  The  number,  while  never  reaching  the  scandalous 


58  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

proportion  that  absented  itself  during  the  month  following 
the  armistice,  a  year  later,  was  nevertheless  disquieting. 
But  with  the  rumor  that  the  Division  was  to  follow  the 
First  to  a  place  on  the  firing-line  the  men  flocked  back 
and  stayed. 

In  many  other  respects,  too,  one  noticed  a  change  for 
the  better  in  the  look  of  the  Division.  OflScers  gained  in 
authority.  The  habit  of  command  grew  apace.  Earlier  mis- 
givings in  regard  to  the  ability  of  platoon  and  company 
commanders  to  enforce  discipline,  in  view  of  their  militia 
antecedents  or  sketchy,  training-camp  education,  were 
largely  assuaged.  The  eager  spirit  in  which  the  National 
Guard  and  Reserve  officers  had  attacked  and  absorbed 
the  instruction  at  Gondrecourt  or  Camiers  or  Langres  had 
surprised  the  authorities;  they  learned,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
faster  than  the  Regular  student  officer,  and  worked  no 
less  conscientiously.  And  as  much  of  the  knowledge  taught 
was  perfectly  strange  to  all  Americans,  the  initial  gap 
between  the  professional  equipment  of  the  Regular  and 
mijlitia  branches  tended  rapidly  to  close. 

An  awakening  to  a  kind  of  divisional  consciousness  ran 
through  the  scattered  units.  Officers  and  men  got  to  know 
each  other;  common  duties  and  troubles  united  them. 
The  Division  Commander's  presence  daily  with  one  or 
another  of  the  battalions  was  of  great  value  in  pulling 
them  together.  Officers  and  men  got  the  conviction  that, 
while  he  was  exacting,  content  only  with  their  best,  he 
was  always  working  for  their  good.  Remote  as  most  di- 
vision commanders  must  be,  still,  when  the  General  fell 
seriously  ill,  in  November,  his  danger  woke  a  genuine  con- 
cern in  all  corners  of  the  area.  His  insistence  on  the  unity, 
the  special  character,  of  the  "Yankee  Division"  had  an 
undoubted  effect  in  awakening  that  very  quality. 

To  this  end  also  a  contribution  was  made  by  the  work 
performed  by  all  units,  in  building  a  model  system  of 
trenches,  which  by  the  first  of  December  streaked  the 


r 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  59 

stony  plateau  southwest  of  Neufchateau,  west  of  Rebeu- 
ville.  In  large  working  parties,  under  French  supervision, 
the  engineers  and  infantry  laid  out  and  constructed  a  com- 
plete battalion  sector  of  fire,  cover,  and  support  trenches, 
with  communications,  posts  of  command  and  of  observa- 
tion, machine-gun  emplacements,  snipers'  posts,  signal 
system,  shelters,  and  wire.  Enemy  trenches  were  traced 
also.  And  here,  night  after  night  in  the  snow  and  cold  of 
December  and  January,  the  troops  were  led  through  a 
number  of  battalion  maneuvers  —  attack,  defense,  raid, 
patrol.  These  were  made  as  realistic  as  possible;  and  offi- 
cers and  men  profited  enormously.  A  battalion  at  a  time 
would  occupy  this  "Noncourt  Sector,"  so  called,  so  that  all 
had  the  opportunity  of  learning,  not  only  the  details  of 
trench  routine,  but  also  the  main  aspects  of  trench  war- 
fare. Principles  of  the  textbooks  were  abundantly  illus- 
trated by  actual  conditions;  detailed  critiques  by  superior 
officers,  both  American  and  French,  showed  the  regimental 
and  battalion  officers  those  things  which  they  had  done 
rightly  or  wrongly,  on  the  spot.  The  experience  of  the 
"Noncourt  Sector"  had  a  further  value,  in  that  those 
dreary  nights  in  the  trenches  brought  home  to  the  dullest 
lad  in  the  ranks  the  realization  that,  in  all  likelihood,  be- 
fore many  days,  he  would  be  shifted  from  his  post  on  the 
make-believe  fire-step  to  another  overlooking  a  bit  of  the 
real  No  Man's  Land,  where  the  tireless  enemy  was  wait- 
ing. 

The  list  of  changes  among  commanding  officers,  and 
officers  of  the  Division  Staff,  which  occurred  at  intervals 
during  the  period  November  1  to  February  1,  is  rather 
extensive  and,  from  certain  angles,  rather  suggestive.  First 
to  be  relieved  were  two  of  the  original  colonels  together 
with  two  or  three  field  officers.  Their  services  were  re- 
quired by  General  Headquarters  in  another  field  than  the 
field  of  battle;  they  were  chosen  to  assist  in  the  organiza- 
tion and  administration  of  the  Provost  INIarshal's  depart- 


60  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

merit,  of  the  projected  leave  areas  in  the  south  of  France, 
or  elsewhere  in  the  Service  of  Supply.  January  2,  1918, 
Colonel  ^Yilliam  C.  Hayes  was  transferred  from  command 
of  the  104th  Infantry  to  provost  duty,  and  later  was 
allowed  to  resign  and  return  to  the  United  States.  Janu- 
ary 11  Colonel  E.  L.  Isbell,  of  the  102d  Infantry,  was  sent 
to  duty  at  Tours  and  later  to  a  leave  area.  These  officers 
were  succeeded  respectively  by  Colonel  George  H.  Shelton, 
transferred  from  duty  as  the  Division's  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
by  Colonel  John  H.  Parker,  who  had  achieved  a  wide  dis- 
tinction as  an  exponent  of  advanced  ideas  on  the  tactical 
employment  of  machine  guns.  The  assignment  of  these 
two  veteran  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  to  important 
positions  of  command  was,  as  events  turned  out,  of  great 
importance  in  shaping  the  history  of  the  Division  in  its 
field  operations.  To  Major  W.  S.  Gatchell,  103d  Machine- 
Gun  Battalion,  succeeded  Major  A.  Ashworth;  in  the  101st 
Field  Signal  Battalion,  Major  H.  G.  Chase  was  succeeded 
by  Major  O.  S.  Albright  (January  10).  Major  T.  C.  Baker 
took  command  of  the  101st  Supply  Train  on  January  21, 
while  in  Headquarters  Troop  Captain  Wolcott  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Captain  B.  L.  Aslibj^  the  former  becoming  aide- 
de-camp  to  the  Division  Commander.  Field  officers  sent  to 
duty  away  from  the  Division  included  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edwin  E.  Lamb,  to  provost  duty;  Lieutenant-Colonel  T. 
Howe,  102d  Field  Artillery,  to  duty  in  the  postal  service; 
Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  K.  Hale,  101st  Field  Artillery,  to 
duty  at  General  Headquarters;  Major  Harold  Estey,  101st 
Engineers,  to  duty  as  railhead  officer  in  Soissons.  The  list 
is  not  complete,  and  is  set  forth  to  illustrate  how  far  the 
Twenty-Sixth  and  other  pioneer  divisions  in  France  were 
drawn  upon,  from  necessity,  to  furnish  officers  for  a  multi- 
plicity of  duties  away  from  troops.  Officers  were  required 
for  a  great  variety  of  administrative  work  all  over  France 
and  in  England.  The  supj)ly  first  to  hand  was  composed  of 
officers  from  civilian  occupations  and  antecedents,  profes- 


SETTLING  DOWN  IN  FRANCE  61 

sional  or  business.  Quite  unknown  in  army  circles  as  prop- 
erly qualified  regimental  or  battalion  commanders  of  com- 
bat groups,  in  some  cases,  perhaps,  not  giving  an  entirely 
good  impression  when  judged  as  field  officers,  but  possess- 
ing ascertained  good  records  as  men  of  legal  or  business 
ability,  it  was  whollv  natural  to  make  use  of  such  men  in 
ports,  bases  of  supply,  railheads,  or  leave  and  school  areas, 
or  with  the  police,  for  example,  where  they  could  be  very 
useful.  Thus  a  large  number  of  Reserve  and  National 
Guard  officers  of  field  rank  were  transferred  away  from 
combat  divisions  for  this,  if  for  no  other  reason.  Their 
places  were  filled,  more  often  than  not,  by  officers  of  the 
Regular  establishment,  whose  ^Yest  Point  training  or 
years  of  service  as  non-commissioned  officers  appeared  to 
guarantee  their  abiHty  as  troop  leaders. 

In  the  Division  Staff  also  many  changes  took  place  about 
this  time.  To  duty  as  Chief  of  Staff,  in  place  of  Colonel 
Shelton,  there  was  assigned  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  M. 
Dowell,  who  till  then  had  been  the  Division  Judge-Advo- 
cate. Colonel  Beacham,  Division  Quartermaster,  was 
transferred  to  the  Forty-Second  Division,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Captain  (later  Lieutenant-Colonel)  A.  L. 
Pendleton;  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  H.  Simonds  (later  Brig- 
adier-General and  Chief  of  Staff,  Third  Corps)  was  suc- 
ceeded as  Division  Adjutant  by  Major  L.  W.  Cass,  who 
in  turn  gave  place,  upon  transfer  away  from  the  Division, 
to  Major  (later  Lieutenant-Colonel)  Charles  A.  Stevens. 
A  considerable  number  of  company  and  battery  officers 
also  left  the  Division  at  this  time  for  other  duties.  Avia- 
tion, Ordnance,  and  the  Service  of  Supply  took  many  of 
them;  not  a  few  were  retained  at  the  schools  as  instructors 
or  in  administrative  work.  Later,  when  the  artillery  was 
on  the  march  to  relieve  the  gunners  of  the  First  Division, 
with  no  warning  whatsoever,  six  of  the  twelve  light  battery 
commanders  and  twelve  more  of  the  most  valuable  officers 
in  the  brigade  were  summarily  detailed  by  name  to  pro- 


/ 


62  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

ceed  as  instructors  to  various  artillery  centers.  And  as  all 
their  places  could  not  be  filled,  since  the  replacement  sys- 
tem was  not  yet  functioning,  the  various  units  approached 
the  conclusion  of  their  training  somewhat  undermanned 
in  officer  personnel.  The  final  month  of  the  period,  when 
the  instruction  of  the  troops  was  being  rounded  off  and 
perfected,  saw  six  of  the  more  important  units  pass  into 
the  hands  of  new  commanders. 


T 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES 

HE  programme  of  training  prescribed  courses  ex- 
tending into  the  month  of  March.  Late  in  January, 
however,  it  was  decided  by  General  Headquarters,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  expressed  desires  of  the  French  High 
Command,  to  effect  a  change  in  the  scheme  of  preparation 
of  the  troops  for  warfare.  It  appeared  that,  in  spite  of  all 
difficulties,  such  satisfactory  progress  had  been  made  in 
training  as  to  warrant  giving  the  Twenty-Sixth  the  ex- 
perience which  had  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the  First  Division 
in  January.  This  was,  briefly,  to  supplement  the  work 
of  the  drill  and  maneuver  ground,  school,  and  target  range 
with  a  tour  of  duty  in  a  so-called  quiet  sector,  so  as  to  ac- 
custom the  troops  to  the  methods  of  trench  warfare  and 
routine,  and  to  exercise  the  officers  in  the  duties  of  main- 
taining and  administering  a  front-line  trench  system. 
Supervision  and  tactical  control  of  the  troops  would  rest 
with  the  French. 

The  original  plan  appears  to  have  contemplated  sending 
only  two  battalions  of  infantry  at  a  time  for  this  new  duty. 
But  on  the  urgent  representation  of  the  Division  Com- 
mander, this  was  so  far  altered  as  to  permit  the  entire  Divi- 
sion to  proceed  to  the  line  at  one  time.  In  consequence, 
the  artillery  brigade  and  the  ammunition  train,  then  ex- 
pected in  the  Neufchateau  area  from  Coetquidan,  had  its 
destination  changed  to  Soissons.  And  thither  the  gunners 
proceeded,  by  rail,  the  movement  starting  on  January  31 
with  Guer  as  the  entraining  point.  On  the  first  days  of 
February  also  the  other  troops  moved  by  rail  to  their  new 
scene  of  activity. 

Reconnaissance  parties  preceded  their  units  by  a  day  or 


C4  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

two.  For  the  artillery,  Brigadier-General  Lassiter,  accom- 
panied by  his  aides,  the  three  regimental  commanders, 
and  billeting  officers,  made  the  preliminary  arrangements, 
arri\dng  in  Soissons  on  January  31.  To  prepare  the  way 
for  the  infantry  and  other  units  Brigadier-General  Traub 
was  sent  ahead  with  a  suitable  detail.  And  so,  when  the 
troops  began  to  arrive,  it  was  possible  for  them  to  proceed 
without  delay  to  the  posts  which  the  French  had  assigned. 
The  movement  to  a  new  area  followed  close  on  the  re- 
organization of  the  Staff  on  lines  adapted,  in  part,  from 
European  practice.  Hitherto  deficiencies  of  staff  organi- 
zation had  been  marked  in  all  the  wars  of  the  United 
States.  How  fatal  they  were  to  the  proper  working-out 
of  the  plans  of  field  commanders  the  history  of  the  Civil 
War  campaigns  abundantly  proves.  To  insure  for  the 
future,  therefore,  proper  division  of  staff  duties  the  Field 
Service  Regulations  prescribed,  and  Langres  explained,  a 
system  practically  identical  with  that  of  the  French  or 
British  establishments.  This  provided  for  General  Staff 
sections  in  each  army,  corps,  and  division,  consisting  of 
three  departments  ^  each  under  an  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff,  each  with  a  distinct  responsibility  and  duty  in  con- 
nection with  supply  and  administration  (G-1);  intelli- 
gence (G-2);  operations  and  training  (G-3).  The  Adjutant 
became  the  officer  in  charge  of  records  and  personnel; 
staff  departments,  such  as  the  Inspector,  Quartermaster, 
Signals,  Judge-Advocate,  and  Surgeon,  tended  to  be 
brought  under  the  coordinating  and  administrative  First 
Section.  Every  detail  by  which  the  will  of  the  Command- 
ing General  was  worked  out  being  thus  apportioned  to  one 
or  another  of  the  three  General  Staff  Section  heads,  the 
system  was  well  planned  to  simplify  and  energize  all  staff 
work.  Not  that  it  worked  perfectly  from  its  inception. 
The  efficiency  of  a  good  French  staff  was  far  to  seek.  The 

^  In  the  armies,  and  the  army  corps,  other  sections  were  created;  but  the  divi- 
sion organization  included  only  three  sections  at  any  time. 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  65 

whole  conception  was  novel  in  practice  in  the  American 
army.  There  were  misunderstandings,  cross-purposes,  a 
certain  resentment  on  the  part  of  long-estabhshed  staff  de- 
partments at  their  partial  subordination  to  the  new  ad- 
ministrative section.  It  took  time  to  make  the  machine 
"function,"  to  employ  a  term  most  dear  to  all  staff  men. 
But  the  essential  soundness  of  the  system  v/as  abundantly 
proved  in  the  course  of  the  Division's  duty  in  the  field. 
And  it  was  aided  to  perform  its  work  in  great  part  —  as 
must  always  be  the  case  —  by  the  fact  that  the  personnel 
of  the  Division  Staff  was  a  long  time  associated  and  gen- 
erally good  friends.  The  danger  of  the  system  lay,  obvi- 
ously, in  that  an  ambitious  or  over-confident  or  disloyal 
Chief  of  Staff,  or  one  of  his  assistants,  might  be  carried 
away  by  his  special  knowledge  of  a  given  situation  into 
preparing  and  issuing  orders,  in  the  name  of  the  Division 
Commander,  which  the  latter  might  not  approve  or  had 
not  directed.  The  corresponding  advantage,  however,  was 
very  great  —  namely,  that  as  the  heads  of  the  General 
Staff  sections  made  part  of  the  General's  household,  en- 
joyed his  confidence,  and  knew  his  mind,  they  were  able 
to  frame  orders  intelligently,  exactly  expressing  the  com- 
mander's desires,  without  his  being  obliged  to  concern 
himself  with  details.  Later,  when  the  staff  machine  was  in 
steady  operation,  day  and  night,  its  action  was  far  differ- 
ent from  that  of  the  somewhat  creaky  apparatus  which 
piloted  and  pushed  the  Division  away  from  the  Neuf- 
chateau  area  to  the  famous  sector  of  the  Cheniin  des 
Dames  during  the  first  days  of  February,  1918. 

For  it  was  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  some  five  miles 
north  of  Soissons  and  southwest  of  Laon,  that  the  Divi- 
sion received  its  baptism  of  fire.  The  position  had  been 
hotly  contested  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.^  Its  high 
plateaux,  rough,  steep  scarps,  and    ragged    forest    land 

*  Notably  by  llio  British  Second  Corps,  on  September  12-13,  1914;  and  by 
the  Freuch  under  Nivelle  io  April  and  October,  1917. 


66  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

formed  a  veritable  bastion  of  the  German  defensive  line. 
Its  quaint  name  was  derived  from  that  of  an  ancient  high- 
road running  east  and  west  along  its  principal  ridge,  close 
to  the  demolished  fort  of  Malmaison.  The  line  was  com- 
posed of  a  series  of  strong  points  or  centers  of  resistance 
organized  with  machine  guns  or  automatic  rifles  to  pro- 
\'ide  mutually  flanking  fire  in  all  forward  parts  of  the  area. 
Defining  the  front  of  the  position,  separating  the  Allied 
and  German  outpost  lines,  which  ran  on  an  average  about 
five  hundred  yards  apart,  was  an  unfordable  stretch  of 
the  Oise-Aisne  canal,  curving  from  east  to  west  through 
north,  through  the  marshy  valley  of  the  little  Ailette,  to 
which  the  high  ridges  of  the  Chemin  des  Dames  plateau 
descended  by  fairly  easy  slopes.  Of  further  tactical  interest 
were  the  extensive  tract  of  woodland  known  as  the  Foret 
de  Pinon,  which  extended  over  all  the  west,  or  left,  flank, 
and  the  ruined  hamlets  of  Pinon,  Chavignon,  Pargny,  and 
Pargny-Filain  along  the  front  slopes  and  in  the  low  land  of 
the  valley  toward  the  center.  Remarkable  limestone  quar- 
ries were  scattered  through  the  whole  area.  Worked  for 
centuries,  tunneled  out  of  the  chalky  hills  in  vast  galleries 
and  grottoes,  they  constituted  a  series  of  important  tacti- 
cal features,  both  as  affording  places  for  the  concentration 
and  secure  shelter  of  large  bodies  of  troops,  and  as  ad- 
vantageously placed  posts  of  command.  Less  extensive 
surface  cuttings  were  utilized  as  units  in  the  chain  of  strong 
points,  transformed  into  miniature  fortresses,  or  as  shelters 
for  kitchens,  aid  stations,  or  forward  munition  depots.  The 
general  conformation  of  the  ground  can  hardly  be  defined, 
so  irregular  and  confused  was  the  tangle  of  spurs  and  ridges 
branching  off  from  the  principal  Malmaison  plateau  sep- 
arating the  Aisne  valley  on  the  south,  in  the  rear,  from 
that  of  the  Ailette,  along  the  front.  The  entire  terrain  was 
deeply  pitted  with  shell  craters  and  scored  with  sections 
of  abandoned  trenches,  relics  of  the  fierce  contests  of  pre- 
vious years.  The  road  system  was  fairly  extensive,  and  its 


WoHAMPTtVlL 


V^uxAiJ-i-on 


'LAff-A-ii.      W.t, 


C»«trf  Y 


COkLDC  -  3u«, 


^CB-WOUt- 


Cmavahmi.3 


^^-- 


^  VAiitHV 


CouvKcui-t. 


CHLMIK   V)L5  DaML5   5LCT015. 

Scale  I:  153,000  (^Approximatcuy  ) 
TkohT     or     Zi,-!±    BivisiOM  BHiaHH^ 


Cot/«.Ct.L».C.» 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  67 

principal  axes  were  in  fair  repair.  The  villages  of  Jouy, 
Vailly,  Missy-Conde,  and  a  half-dozen  others,  were  uti- 
lized as  assembly  places  for  battalions  in  support  or  re- 
serve, while  the  whole  of  the  rear  area,  along  the  Aisne 
valley  as  far  as  Soissons  (the  railhead)  or  Couvrelles  (the 
location  of  Division  Headquarters),  was  thoroughly  or- 
ganized for  the  service  of  supply  and  evacuation. 

For  the  moment  the  sector  was  quiet.  The  fierce  attacks 
of  the  French  in  the  autumn  of  1917,  supplementing  the 
only  partially  successful  offensive  along  the  Aisne  and  in 
Champagne  during  the  spring  of  the  same  year,  had  been 
followed  by  a  protracted  period  of  stabihzation.  Local 
activities  might  continue  to  the  north  and  east,  as  part  of 
the  wearing-down  of  the  enemy's  manhood  strength;  but 
on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  reigned  a  calm  nearly  as  pro- 
found as  that  along  the  right  of  the  Allied  line  between 
Pont-a-Mousson  and  the  Swiss  border.  A  somewhat  per- 
functory daily  harassing  fire,  occasional  patrols,  a  little 
raid  to  get  prisoners,  comprised  about  the  sum  of  the 
region's  warfare  at  the  time  the  Twenty-Sixth  went  in. 

Hither,  then,  in  accordance  with  arrangements  per- 
fected between  the  French  authorities  and  General  Head- 
quarters, came  the  troops  of  the  Division.  Placed  under 
the  tactical  command  of  the  French  Eleventh  Army  Corps 
(General  de  Maud'huy),  the  Division  was  to  perform  duty 
for  about  thirty  days,  "for  training"  (so  ran  Field  Order 
No.  1)  "in  trench  warfare  of  all  divisional  elements  in 
units  smaller  than  a  brigade."  ^  The  movement  was  made 
by  rail,  the  troops  obtaining  a  new  experience  in  loading 
themselves  and  their  equipage  into  the  standard  French 
military  trains,  each  of  which  was  made  up  of  seventeen 
flat-cars  for  guns  or  vehicles,  thirty  freight  cars  for  enlisted 

*  The  Eleventh  Corps  d'Arm^e  was  one  of  the  original  twenty-one  corps  of 
the  French  regular  establishment,  having  Nantes  as  its  territorial  headquarters. 
At  the  time  that  the  Twenty-vSixth  was  attached  to  it,  the  Eleventh  Cori)s  in- 
cluded three  infantry  divisions  and  attached  divisional  artillery,  together  with 
its  own  heavy  artillery,  trains,  and  other  units. 


68  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

men  or  horses  (each  car  containing  thirty-six  men  or  eight 
horses),  two  coaches  for  officers,  and  one  baggage  van  for 
the  train  crew,  a  total  of  fifty  cars  for  each  infantry  battal- 
ion or  its  equivalent  (1000  men).  Some  things  cannot  be 
taught  in  camp,  among  them  the  art  of  entraining  and  de- 
training. The  experience  of  the  artillery  is  illustrative. 
WTien  the  brigade  left  for  the  front,  between  January  31 
and  February  2,  six  hours  were  allowed  for  each  battery 
to  load,  and  in  some  instances  this  was  scarcely  too  much. 
In  the  neighborhood  of  two  and  one  half  hours  was  the 
best  record  attained  by  any  unit;  and  even  that  time  was 
far  too  fast  for  most.  But  in  the  months  to  come,  when 
moving  as  well  as  fighting  had  become  second  nature,  rec- 
ords for  entraining  —  to  speak  now  only  of  the  artillery  — 
were  made  which  were  remarkable,  indeed.  The  problem 
of  loading  a  battery  consists  of  stowing  four  guns,  twelve 
caissons,  and  many  miscellaneous  vehicles,  together  with 
about  200  men  and  between  160  and  200  horses,  as  well 
as  harness,  food  and  forage,  and  equipment.  This  opera- 
tion was  performed  by  "E"  Battery,  103d  Field  Artillery 
(heavy),  on  one  occasion,  in  fourteen  minutes,  thirty 
seconds.  *'F"  Battery  of  the  same  regiment  made  a  record 
of  twenty-one  minutes,  while  most  of  the  light  batteries 
could  load,  later  in  their  experience,  in  thirty  or  forty 
minutes  at  any  time.  But  how  considerable  even  on  this 
first  entrainment  w^as  the  improvement  of  the  Division 
at  large  in  train  discipline,  as  tested  by  the  smart  hand- 
ling of  baggage,  animals,  and  equipment,  and  control  of 
the  men  by  their  officers,  only  those  can  testify  who  had 
a  hand  in  moving  the  first  American  arrivals  from  the 
base  ports  to  the  training  areas.  The  memory  of  those 
riotous,  cheerful,  enthusiastic  tourist  parties  was  merci- 
fully blotted  out.  The  roadside  raids  at  every  halt,  the  men 
riding  on  the  tops  of  the  cars  and  the  running-boards,  the 
hilarious  disorder,  were  less  and  less  to  be  feared.  Perhaps 
the  men,  even  the  most  thoughtless,  were  sobered  by  the 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  69 

knowledge  that  they  were  really  going  to  the  line.  They 
were  intensely  curious  and  eager,  commenting  on  all  the 
signs  of  war  in  the  countryside;  but  they  were  too  much 
afraid  of  being  left  behind  to  stray  even  a  little;  and  they 
were  very  orderly. 

The  artillery  preceded  the  infantry  by  a  little.  On  Feb- 
ruary 5  all  units  first  to  enter  the  battery  positions  were 
there,  the  guns  having  been  put  in  place  the  night  previous. 
On  the  same  date  Division  Headquarters  was  opened  in 
the  chateau  at  Couvrelles,  in  the  Aisne  valley,  east  of 
Soissons.  Undam.aged  in  spite  of  German  occupancy,  with 
the  swans  still  in  the  moat,  and  the  gardener  at  work,  its 
state  presented  a  marked  contrast  to  that  of  the  country- 
seat  of  the  Prince  de  Monaco,  a  few  miles  away,  at  Pinon. 
Here  a  blasted,  shattered  park,  a  mansion,  stables,  fai- 
sanderie,  and  plaisances,  all  reduced  to  smoke-stained 
ruins,  afforded  the  Americans  a  vi\'id  picture  of  what  war 
had  done  to  a  part  of  the  world's  beauty.  \Miat  the  war 
was  still  to  do  was  borne  in  upon  the  divisional  machine- 
gunners  daily,  in  the  neighborhood  of  that  same  estate; 
if  they  tried  to  draw^  water  from  the  chateau  pond  by  day- 
light, how  quickly  did  they  have  to  dart  to  cover  before 
the  enemy's  sniping  "77s"  would  drop  shells  among  them! 

"The  relief,"  in  the  prosaic  terms  of  the  day's  opera- 
tions report,  "was  accomplished  without  incident."  But 
what  drama  w^as  ever  so  thrilling  for  those  new  troops, 
as  in  little  columns,  groups,  and  by  individuals,  guided 
by  the  veteran  French,  they  felt  their  way,  in  the  black 
night,  along  the  shell-torn  trails  and  zigzag  hoyatix  up 
toward  that  eerie  region  lighted  by  the  white  and  ghostly 
flares!  The  whining,  crescendo  whistle  and  rending  crash 
of  a  shell,  the  distant  tack-a-tack-a-tack  of  a  nervous  ma- 
chine gun,  the  crowded  confusion  of  the  narrow,  muddy 
trenches,  the  final  arrival  in  some  rudely  fortified  quarry, 
half  discerned  in  the  darkness,  or  the  descent  into  a  fetid 
dugout,  where  the  odor  of  death  lingered,  and  the  fat  rats 


70  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

ran  riot  —  to  mention  these  first  impressions,  with  their 
attendant  reflexes  of  awe,  fear,  curiosity,  puzzlement, 
weariness,  resolution,  is  merely  to  chronicle  some  of  the 
influences  which  went  to  make  soldiers  out  of  lads-in- 
khaki. 

The  troops  entered  the  line,  at  the  outset,  in  small 
numbers.  A  platoon  of  each  infantry  regiment  took  over 
a  little  stretch  of  a  sub-sector,  with  French  to  right  and 
left;  a  portion  of  a  battery  or  a  machine-gun  company  re- 
lieved a  corresponding  French  section  or  two.  A  little  later, 
as  the  Americans  learned  the  routine  and  proved  depend- 
able, the  original  platoon  front  was  enlarged  to  a  company 
front;  a  whole  battery  took  over  the  position  and  duties 
of  a  French  unit.  Later  still,  the  Division  was  allowed 
further  responsibility,  whole  battalions  and  regiments 
taking  over  their  appropriate  subdivisions  of  the  general 
line. 

But  before  this  ideal  of  every  unit  commander  could 
be  realized,  before  the  Major  or  the  Colonel  could  be  happy 
in  the  prideful  thought  that  the  defense  of  a  part  of  the 
real  battle  hne  was  his  own,  undivided  responsibility,  there 
was  much  for  him  still  to  learn,  much  for  him  to  teach  his 
men.  Previous  training  had  inculcated  general  principles. 
Now  was  to  begin  a  training  from  a  book  writ  large  on  the 
scarred  and  battered  land,  where  the  punctuation  was 
furnished  by  enemy  shells,  and  comment  by  the  whine  of 
machine-gun  bullets  or  sigh  of  the  gas  shells.  The  mul- 
tiple duties  connected  with  the  repair,  improvement,  and 
extension  of  the  defensive  works  (trench,  wire,  gas  pro- 
tection, shelters)  —  how  best  to  get  supplies  forward  over 
the  shelled  roads  —  methods  of  observing  the  enemy  and 
getting  information  about  him  —  the  practice  of  artillery 
and  machine-gun  fire,  in  all  their  aspects  —  the  tactical 
disposition  and  employment  of  infantry,  from  outposts  to 
the  garrisons  of  the  strong  points  —  defense  of  the  ligne  de 
surveillance  and  the  ligne  de  resistance  principale  —  these 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  71 

and  a  dozen  other  subjects  were  made  a  matter  of  con- 
tinuous study  by  officers  of  all  grades,  section  leaders,  and 
soldiers.  Instruction  was  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  French. 
There  was  assigned  to  the  Division  a  flock  of  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  drawn  from  the  French  divisions 
in  the  Eleventh  Corps;  and  these  were  distributed  among 
all  units  down  to  including  a  platoon  of  infantry  or  a  sec- 
tion of  artillery  and  machine-gunners.  Tirelessly  they 
taught  the  newcomers  all  they  knew  of  the  grim  trade; 
watchfully  they  observed  all  that  the  apprentice  Ameri- 
cans did  and  were,  from  calculating  fire  data  to  burying 
garbage,  from  cookery  to  colonels.  For  a  while  the  com- 
manders and  staffs  of  the  higher  units  practically  lived  at 
the  various  French  headquarters.  The  artillery  staff,  for 
instance,  was  sent  to  the  corps  artillery,  to  be  instructed 
in  the  services  of  information,  signals,  or  munitions;  and 
there  it  remained  for  nearly  two  weeks.  It  was  not  till  Feb- 
ruary 13  that  the  artillery  set  up  its  own  Brigade  Head- 
quarters at  Crouy.  Even  though  the  artillery  commander 
did  not  exercise  control,  it  was  assumed  that  he  did  so,  for 
the  purpose  of  experience ;  and  there  were  given  to  him  and 
his  Staff  all  the  problems  which  naturally  would  arise  in 
organizing  the  artillery  defense  of  the  sector,  the  solutions 
being  subjected  to  painstaking  criticism  by  the  command- 
ers and  staffs  of  the  various  French  artillery  headquarters. 
In  addition  every  American  artillery  staff  officer  spent  two 
days  with  a  battery  in  active  operation  at  the  front. 
Similar  advantages  were  given  to  officers  of  the  infantry, 
machine-gun,  and  medical  units.  The  ammunition  train 
was  attached  to  the  corps  artillery  park,  whose  command- 
ing officer.  Major  de  Bacquencourt,  was  tireless  in  his  in- 
struction. And  so,  interspersed  between  experienced 
French  units,  living  with  the  French  in  closest  intimacy, 
it  was  inevitable  that  the  American  troops  should  learn 
rapidly  and  well. 

To  this  new  duty  they  brought  qualities  and  attributes 


72  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

which  interested  their  teachers  vastly.  Their  recklessness, 
their  ignorance  of  danger,  their  youth,  riiggedness,  intel- 
ligence, and  aptness,  were  all  wonderful  in  the  eyes  of 
the  dogged  but  very  weary  poilus.  Their  still  imperfect 
discipline,  their  carelessness  with  property,  their  often 
slovenly  dress  and  bearing,  all  gave  grounds  for  a  certain 
apprehension.  But  their  rifles  were  clean;  the  spirit  of  the 
men  was  aggressive;  and  it  was  acknowledged,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  that  time  would  bring  about  a  gradual  change  in 
the  direction  of  smartness,  improved  courtesy,  and  disci- 
pline. That  these  newcomers  were  fighting  men  was  evi- 
dent from  the  outset.  They  were  compared  to  the  Cana- 
dians or  Australians. 

On  the  other  side  the  impressions  which  the  Americans 
got  of  their  French  associates  were  equally  varied.  French 
meticulousness  of  method,  infinite  care  for  detail,  slowness 
in  accomplishing  a  stint  of  work,  were  incomprehensible 
to  the  more  rough-and-ready  Yankee,  even  while  he  ad- 
mired French  thoroughness,  tenacity,  and  good  cooking. 
It  was  evident  that  there  were  few  points  in  the  game  of 
war  that  Jacques  Bonhomme  did  not  know;  but  the  Ameri- 
can felt  that,  somehow,  when  his  turn  came  to  play,  he 
would  go  at  the  game  a  little  differently.  It  is  of  importance, 
however,  that  the  men  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  never  felt  or 
assumed  any  air  of  impatience  or  superiority  with  the 
worn  and  stubborn  fellows  in  horizon-blue  —  the  latter 
were  friends  and  companions,  never  "Frogs."  The  point 
is  worth  stressing,  when  one  recalls  the  attitude,  arrogant 
and  patronizing,  of  many  American  troops,  who,  arriving 
in  France  at  later  dates,  never  had  the  honor  and  priv- 
ilege of  seeing  a  "Frog"  in  battle. 

The  exact  extent  of  the  line  held  by  the  Division  during 
its  stay  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  is  difficult  to  reconsti- 
tute in  detail.  Continuous  were  the  changes,  as  sub- 
sectors,  battery  positions,  centers  of  resistance,  or  head- 
quarters, now  occupied  by  the  French,  would  be  taken 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  73 

over  in  constantly  increasing  proportion  by  the  Americans. 
In  general,  however,  the  forward  battalions  of  the  in- 
fantry, from  right  to  left,  occupied  ground  as  follows: 
101st  Infantry,  from  where  the  Oise-Aisne  canal  entered 
the  tunnel  in  the  hill,  at  Les  Vaumaires,  to  Filain  inclusive, 
with  regimental  Headquarters  in  Vailly;  102d  Infantry,  in 
and  about  Pargny-Filain,  Bois  d'Entre  Deux  Monts,  and 
Chavignon,  with  Headquarters  in  a  quarry  above  Aizy; 
103d  Infantry,  next  in  line,  had  Headquarters  at  Vaudes- 
son;  on  the  left,  104th  Infantry  occupied  positions  in 
Quincy  Basse,  Quincy  Wood,  with  Headquarters  near 
Vauxaillon.  Near  Juvigny  was  the  Headquarters  of  the 
52d  Infantry  Brigade.  The  101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion 
had  its  posts  mainly  in  Pinon  Wood;  101st  Engineers, 
with  Headquarters  at  Missy,  could  be  found  at  work,  in 
detachments,  all  over  the  area.  The  artillery  was  disposed 
along  the  reverse  slopes  and  in  the  glens  of  the  southern 
side  of  the  principal  plateau;  the  brigade  machine-gun  bat- 
talions were  interspersed  with  the  infantry  units. 

If  accurate  plotting  of  the  positions  held  by  all  units  pre- 
sents some  difficulty,  so  it  is  hard  to  record  the  dates  which 
mark  the  periods  of  duty  in  line  of  all  troops  of  the  Divi- 
sion. But  certain  initial  dates  appear  exceedingly  interest- 
ing to  note  with  care,  since  they  are  part  of  the  history, 
not  only  of  this  Division,  but  also  of  he  whole  Expedi- 
tionary Force.  Thus:- 

The  first  shot  from  troops  of  the  National  Guard  or 
National  Army  against  the  Germans  was  fired  on  Febru- 
ary 5,  1918,  by  Number  One  piece.  Battery  "A,"  101st 
Field  Artillery,  at  3.45  p.m.  The  shell  case  was  forwarded 
to  the  INIassachusetts  state  authorities,  for  permanent 
preservation. 

The  first  infantry  units  of  the  National  Guard  or  Na- 
tional Army  to  take  a  position  on  the  front  line  was  a 
platoon  of  the  101st  Infantry  (Massachusetts),  on  the 
night  of  February  7-8. 


74  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

The  first  death  from  hostile  fire  in  the  Division  occurred 
on  February  14,  1918  —  Private  Ralph  R.  Spaulding, 
103d  Infantry. 

The  first  German  prisoner  taken  by  troops  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  or  National  Army  was  secured  on  the  night 
of  February  14-15. 

A  few  days  suflSced  to  accustom  the  troops  to  trench 
routine.  They  persisted  in  exposing  themselves,  their  eager 
curiosity  running  ahead  of  their  discretion.  It  would  have 
been  obvious  to  a  far  less  watchful  enemy  than  the  one 
who  crouched  along  the  hillsides  north  of  the  Ailette,  that 
he  had  new  troops  opposite  him.  A  shell  from  the  German 
batteries  had  the  effect  merely  of  bringing  together  a  group 
of  the  Americans  on  the  run,  "to  see  where  she  landed." 
It  was  not  till  sniping  artillery  and  riflemen  had  taken  toll 
of  some  of  the  careless  ones  that  they  learned  to  keep  out 
of  sight  between  dawn  and  dusk.  But  they  learned  how  to 
occupy  a  trench  or  a  machine-gun  post  promptly  and  well; 
the  gunners  won  golden  opinions;  the  supply  and  medical 
services  functioned  in  a  manner  which  was  more  than  sat- 
isfactory;  the  mihtary  police  already  had  won  a  reputation 
for  intelligence  and  efficiency.  In  a  week's  time,  indeed, 
the  French  were  ready  to  commence  a  series  of  lessons  in 
the  more  advanced  chapters  of  trench  lore  and  trench 
warfare. 

First  to  come  was  experience  in  patrolling,  building 
wire  entanglements  and  other  works,  intelligence  and 
liaison  duty.  Then,  on  February  14,  arrangements  were 
made  for  a  patrol  which  should  have  some  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  a  small  raid  on  a  limited  objective.  The  mission 
was  to  reconnoiter  some  new  work  which  the  enemy  had 
been  doing  opposite  the  lines  of  the  104th  Infantry,  but 
not  to  attempt  a  passage  of  the  German  wire.  It  was  a  little 
enterprise  identical  with  scores  of  others  along  the  front 
that  night;  it  would  be  not  worth  noting  were  it  not  for 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  75 

the  fact  that,  for  the  Division,  the  affair  was  a  first  close 
encounter  with  the  enemy.  For  the  twenty  men  selected 
from  the  104th  Infantry  to  go  on  the  expedition,  how  much 
the  night  held  of  mystery,  anxiety,  and  exultation!  When 
volunteers  had  been  asked  for,  a  whole  company  responded 
—  which  was  in  itself  a  satisfaction.  Lieutenant  (later 
Major)  J.  W.  Brown  was  in  command,  but  the  American 
party  as  a  whole  acted  under  the  orders  of  a  French  heu- 
tenant,  who,  with  twenty  of  his  own  men,  was  to  direct 
the  newcomers. 

Taking  the  prescribed  formation,  equipped  with  rifles, 
grenades,  and  pistols  (though  the  French  inclined  to  dis- 
favor the  rifle  on  raiding  parties),  the  group  made  its  way 
across  the  flat  valley  cautiously;  it  reached  the  German 
wire  without  any  untoward  adventures,  in  spite  of  the 
flares  that  lighted  up  the  marshy  waste  of  No  Man's  Land 
in  their  ghostly  fashion;  the  men  completed  their  recon- 
naissance without  interference,  and  then,  on  signal  from 
their  French  leader,  commenced  the  return  trip.  They  had 
not  gone  far,  however,  creeping  over  the  shell  craters,  be- 
fore they  were  brought  to  an  abrupt  halt.  An  unexpected 
sight  had  caught  the  eyes  of  the  advanced  group  —  a 
ghmpse  of  figures  moving  along  the  dim  sky-line  between 
themselves  and  their  own  fines.  Taking  position  in  shell 
holes,  they  awaited  developments,  ready  for  action,  un- 
certain what  to  expect.  But  only  for  an  instant  were  they 
left  in  doubt,  for,  with  a  crackle  and  flash,  the  enemy  rifles 
opened  on  them  briskly.  Instantly  the  fire  was  returned. 
Broken  up  into  small  groups  in  the  darkness  and  because 
of  the  torn-up  ground,  the  Americans  sought  none  the  less 
to  come  to  grips  with  their  opponents,  employing  their 
pistols  and  grenades,  while  the  French  also  moved  up, 
firing  at  the  flashes.  For  a  half-hour  the  duel  continued, 
when  the  Germans  suddenly  drew  off  in  the  darkness. 
Advancing,  the  raiding  party  found  a  wounded  man, 
abandoned,  together  with  a  quantity  of  equipment;  and 


76  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

so,  carrying  their  prisoner,  who  died  soon  after  being 
brought  in,  Brown's  men  reached  their  hnes  in  safety, 
only  to  find,  at  roll-call,  that  Sergeant  L.  Letzing  and  eight 
soldiers  were  missing.  Daylight  was  at  hand.  To  be  caught 
between  the  Hnes  after  dawn  meant  probable  death;  but 
Brown  did  not  hesitate  for  an  instant.  Hardly  had  the 
absence  of  his  men  been  verified  before  he  was  out  again, 
crawling  to  the  scene  of  the  skirmish,  to  recover  them. 
Fired  on  by  enemy  machine  guns  he  persisted  in  his  search, 
but  in  vain.  He  was  on  the  point  of  regretfully  abandoning 
his  quest,  when  quite  by  chance  his  eyes  were  attracted 
to  the  movement  of  a  little  group  crawling  from  one  shell 
crater  to  another,  toward  our  lines;  and  he  guessed  that 
Letzing  had  found  his  way  to  safety  after  all.  This,  indeed, 
proved  to  be  the  case.  Separating  in  the  darkness  from  the 
rest  of  the  patrol  during  the  return  journey,  Letzing  per- 
ceived a  German  just  disappearing  in  the  gloom,  pursued 
him  promptly,  came  to  grips,  and  made  the  fellow  a  pris- 
oner. A  moment  later  the  white  light  of  a  flare  showed  him 
a  group  of  Americans  near  by,  lost  Hke  himself;  and  so, 
taking  command  of  the  party,  he  led  it  with  commendable 
skill  to  a  safe  return,  fetching  in  his  prisoner.  For  their 
behavior  on  this  occasion,  Brown  and  Letzing  were  awarded 
the  Croix  de  Guerre  the  following  day,  being  thus  the  first 
men  of  the  Division  to  receive  that  decoration. 

Four  nights  later  (February  18-19)  the  Germans  at- 
tempted their  first  raid  on  the  American  hnes,  doubtless 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  prisoners.  By  this  means  they 
would  identify  the  troops  in  the  unfamiliar  uniforms  whom 
they  had  noticed  in  the  sector  for  the  week  past.  At  a  dis- 
tance, to  judge  from  their  saucer-like  helmets  and  olive- 
brown  clothing,  they  might  have  been  British  —  and  what 
were  British  units  doing  so  far  from  the  Flanders  front.'^ 
Or  were  newly  arrived  Americans  actually  taking  a  place 
on  the  line,  troops  other  than  the  First  Division,  which 
had  been  identified  through  prisoners  taken  the  November 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  77 

previous?  An  effort  to  solve  these  questions  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  had  been  expected  by  the  French  any  night. 

When  it  came,  the  effort  was  developed  along  lines 
which  were  to  become  familiar  enough  to  the  Twenty- 
Sixth.  A  preliminary  bombardment  of  the  portion  of  the 
lines  to  be  raided,  with  object  to  drive  the  occupants  to 
cover,  stunned  and  disordered,  was  increased  in  intensity 
up  to  the  moment  the  raiding  party  moved  forward;  and 
the  attackers  were  covered,  as  they  advanced,  by  a  moving 
curtain  of  artillery  fire,  which  was  finally  to  box  in  the 
sur\dvors  of  the  preliminary  bombardment,  prevent  their 
reinforcement,  and  make  their  capture  easier. 

The  line  chosen  for  attack  was  held  by  units  of  the  104th 
Infantry  (western  Massachusetts)  —  Company  "D"  and 
the  regiment's  machine-gunners;  but,  however  eagerly 
the  attack  was  delivered,  nothing  was  accomplished 
against  these  troops,  so  new  that  this  was  their  very  first 
night  in  the  fire  trenches.  The  artillery,  on  signal,  laid 
down  an  effective  barrier;  and  the  infantry,  unterrified  by 
the  enemy's  bombardment,  made  such  effective  use  of 
their  rifles  and  machine  guns  that  the  German  advance 
was  stopped  short.  Patrols,  sent  out  immediately  upon 
the  enemy's  withdrawal,  found  eloquent  testimony  of  the 
Americans'  good  shooting  in  the  numerous  dead  and 
wounded  which  the  Germans  had  not  been  able  to  carry 
away. 

Compliments  quickly  followed  from  the  French.  The 
behavior  of  his  men  under  fire  for  the  first  time  might  well 
have  encouraged  the  Division  Commander,  who  had  al- 
waj's  beheved  so  fervently  in  the  quality  of  the  troops 
under  him.  He  telegraphed  an  account  of  the  action  to 
General  Headquarters  which  glowed.  He  intimated  in  the 
same  message  that,  so  content  were  the  French  with  the 
work  of  the  Americans,  that  there  was  every  likelihood  of 
the  Division's  being  allowed  to  take  over  more  of  the  front 
than  hud  been  originally  intended.  The  answer  was  chilling. 


78  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

indeed.  General  Headquarters  admonished  that  there  must 
be  no  deviation  from  the  plan  of  training  already  laid  down, 
and  that,  in  addition,  one  must  not  write  telegrams  which 
dealt  with  more  than  one  subject!  The  great  gulf  between 
the  spirit  animating  one  message  and  the  other  was  deep, 
indeed  —  here,  the  generous  enthusiasm  of  a  field  com- 
mander for  the  good  behavior  of  his  lads  in  action;  there, 
utterly  praiseworthy  resolve  of  the  "brains  of  the  army" 
not  to  deviate  a  hair's  breadth,  for  any  reason,  from  the 
path  to  efficiency  and  the  way  of  good  order,  as  blazed  bj- 
the  T.S.G.S.  So  slight  an  incident  as  this,  however,  was 
not  to  be  without  significance  in  the  development  of  rela- 
tions between  those  principally  concerned,  so  delicate  are 
some  of  the  adjustments  of  the  very  human  machine  that 
makes  war. 

A  few  days  later  the  Germans'  attentions  were  repaid  in 
kind.  It  was  discovered  that  certain  of  their  observation 
posts  were  located  on  the  far  side  of  the  Ailette  stream, 
close  to  the  bank,  not  far  from  where  the  parallel  Oise- 
Aisne  canal  branched  off  to  the  southeast,  to  enter  the  tun- 
nel east  of  Filain.  It  was  decided  to  reconnoiter  and  destroy 
them,  at  the  same  time  making  prisoners,  after  effecting 
a  crossing  of  the  canal  by  means  of  portable  foot-bridges. 
The  raiding  party  was  much  stronger  than  on  the  first  oc- 
casion, being  composed  of  some  twenty-six  men  from  Com- 
panies "E"  and  "H,"  101st  Infantry,  under  Lieutenants 
W.  L.  Koob  and  G.  H.  Davis,  accompanying  a  force  of 
eighty  men  from  the  64th  Infantry  (French)  and  a  detach- 
ment of  French  engineers.  Divided  into  two  groups,  pro- 
tected by  the  dense  and  well-sustained  barrage  of  the  Amer- 
ican artillery  and  machine  guns,  the  raiders  penetrated  the 
German  fines  after  the  engineers  had  coolly  overcome  some 
resistance  to  their  efforts  to  lay  their  bridges.  They  bombed 
dugouts,  inflicted  losses,  and  returned  without  a  scratch 
(so  far  as  the  Americans  were  concerned),  fetching  pris- 
oners with  them.  Noteworthy  in  this  affair  were  the  facts 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  79 

that  for  the  first  time,  so  far  as  is  known,  American  artil- 
lery fired  a  rolling  and  a  box  barrage  to  cover  an  infantry 
advance,  while  a  machine-gun  battalion  laid  down  a  box 
barrage,  employing  indirect  fire.^ 

It  was  next  the  turn  of  the  Connecticut  regiment  (102d 
Infantry)  to  get  involved,  and,  while  the  affair  resulted  in 
one  sense  less  happily  than  had  the  others,  it  demonstrated 
anew  various  things  about  these  troops  which  were  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  ascertain  and  prove.  The  2Sth  was 
the  night  of  a  battalion  relief;  the  second  detachment  of 
this  regiment  to  enter  the  line  was  just  going  to  its  desig- 
nated position.  At  the  same  hour  a  working  party  from 
Company  "A"  of  the  same  regiment,  under  the  command 
of  Lieutenant  R.  Bishop,  comprising  thirty-two  men,  pro- 
ceeded in  the  direction  of  the  canal  from  the  ruined  village 
of  Chavignon,  to  build  entanglements,  each  man  carrying 
a  roll  of  barbed  wire.  Hardly  had  this  party  started  work, 
however,  spread  out  over  a  hundred  yards  of  ground,  with 
French  detachments  guarding  its  flanks,  when  suddenly 
down  dropped  an  enemy  barrage  fire,  directly  on  them. 
The  French  drew  back  at  once;  but  Bishop,  ha\'ing  re- 
ceived no  orders  to  that  effect,  assumed  that  he  was  ex- 
pected to  hold  his  ground  —  and  did  so,  organizing  a  kind 
of  defense  from  the  shell  craters  in  which  he  had  grouped 
his  small  army. 

But  close  behind  the  moving  barrier  came  the  enemy. 
Before  Bishop  could  dispose  his  men  there  stormed  over 
two  large  parties  of  German  infantry,  overcoming  or  ig- 
noring the  resistance  of  the  little  working  party  without 
a  pause  in  their  stride.  Gathering  up  some  ten  or  eleven 
of  Bishop's  men  the  Germans  swept  past  the  remainder 
of  the  party  in  the  darkness,  making  for  the  sandbagged 
breastworks  of  the  Chavignon  ravine.  Here  the  new  battal- 
ion (2d  BattaHon,  102d  Infantry)  was  waiting  for  them, 
just  arrived  in  the  unfamiliar  trenches,  under  fire  for  the 

'  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade;  101st  Macbiue-Gun  Battalion, 


80  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

first  time.  And  the  Germans  could  not  reach  them.  They 
were  stopped  dead.  The  Americans  used  their  rifles,  then 
their  grenades  —  and  when  these  gave  out,  they  hurled 
stones  at  their  assailants;  by  every  kind  of  means,  they 
beat  back  the  raiders  before  these  latter  got  to  the  wire 
entanglements  before  the  trenches,  and  there  a  number  of 
the  Germans  were  found  hanging  next  morning,  dead. 
Retiring,  the  raiders  were  again  covered  by  their  own  pro- 
tective artillery  fire;  to  cut  them  off  the  American  bat- 
teries laid  down  a  curtain  between  the  lines.  And  through 
this  double  rain  of  shell  did  Lieutenant  Bishop  come  and 
go  three  times,  accompanied  by  two  enlisted  men,  search- 
ing for  his  wounded  and  missing. 

Prisoners  were  lost,  which  was  unfortunate,  since  their 
capture  would  identify  the  Division.  But  of  incomparable 
worth  was  the  assurance  that  a  new  set  of  newcomers,  in 
their  baptism  of  fire,  were  steady  and  fierce  in  the  defense 
of  their  positions.  Once  more  was  the  fighting  quality  of 
these  New  England  fellows  firmly  established.  This  was  a 
small  affair,  but  it  had  an  importance  out  of  all  proportion 
to  its  dimensions.  Like  the  little  affairs  in  the  Bois  Quincy 
and  at  Albia,  across  the  canal,  it  helped  teach  war.  All 
were  blows  of  the  hammer  on  the  red-hot  iron,  shaping  it, 
giving  temper  to  the  rough-cast  metal. 

One  week  later  a  detachment  of  the  same  regiment 
undertook  a  raid,  in  conjunction  with  the  French,  of  a 
character  precisely  like  its  predecessors.  But  this  time  the 
French  artillery  support  was  not  effective,  owing  to  a  mis- 
understanding as  to  the  time-table;  it  was  not  possible  to 
lay  the  foot-bridges  across  the  canal  near  the  reservoir, 
as  had  been  planned,  owing  to  machine-gun  fire;  and  the 
party  was  forced  to  return  without  having  accomphshed  its 
mission. 

For  some  days  after  these  exchanges  of  courtesies  the 
sector  was  quiet.  Only  the  daily  harassing  fire  of  the  ar- 
tillery of  both  sides  broke  the  calm.  But  the  troops  were 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  81 

soon  to  undergo  an  uninvited  experience  which  was  pain- 
ful and  costly,  even  though  it  possessed,  like  all  hard  les- 
sons, a  value  as  a  bit  of  education.  On  March  16,  at  6.30 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  suddenly  loosed  a 
storm  of  gas  shells,  mainly  directed  on  the  area  occupied 
by  the  102d  Infantry  in  Pargny-Filain  and  the  quarries 
above  Aizy  and  Jouy  such  as  the  so-called  "Pantheon," 
on  the  battery  positions,  and  over  part  of  the  area,  to  the 
right,  occupied  by  the  101st  Infantry.  For  a  full  twenty- 
four  hours,  the  choking,  burning,  poisonous  rain  descended 
without  a  respite.  All  varieties  of  gas  —  mustard,  phos- 
gene, hyperite  —  were  employed,  and  the  use  of  a  new 
arsenical  preparation  was  suspected,  with  a  mingling  of 
ordinary  high-explosive.  And  the  troops  suffered.  The  gas 
defense  of  the  sector,  like  its  other  accessory  defenses,  had 
been  neglected  by  the  French;  nor  had  the  energetic  and 
constant  work  of  the  Americans  quite  sufficed  to  assure, 
in  all  places,  the  protection  of  dugouts  and  shelters,  by 
means  of  the  approved  blanket  curtains,  ventilator  stops, 
and  vermorel  spraying.  As  a  consequence  the  deadly  fumes, 
loosed  over  the  area  in  vast  volumes,  seeped  quickly  into 
many  of  the  pockets  and  excavations  used  for  company 
kitchens  or  assembly  points  in  the  forward  areas.  Gas 
masks  were  used,  of  course;  but  cases  occurred  where  men, 
half  suffocated  and  choked  by  having  worn  their  masks 
for  hours,  belie\ang  the  danger  to  be  past,  would  remove 
the  respirator  for  a  breath  of  air,  only  to  inhale  a  whiff  that 
seared  their  lungs  or  scorched  their  eyeballs.  Brave  fel- 
lows such  as  runners  or  signal  agents,  tearing  off  their 
masks  to  see  better,  fell  victims  to  the  deadly  fog.  Many 
received  bad  surface  burns  from  accidental  contact  with 
clothing,  tools,  or  equipment,  which  had  been  exposed  to 
the  gas;  the  high-explosive  shells,  moreover,  took  toll  of 
not  a  few  wounded. 

The  character  of  the  bombardment  gave  the  authorities 
much  occasion  for  thought.  Some  20,000  gas  shells  were 


82  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE  ^ 

estimated  by  the  Corps  gas  officer  to  have  been  directed  on 
the  area  occupied  mainly  by  one  regiment  in  twenty-four 
hours  —  an  intense  and  protracted  bombardment  —  which 
gave  the  attack  a  certain  novelty  of  design  and  scope  which 
was  puzzling.  In  retrospect  it  suggests  the  form  of  prepara- 
tion for  attack,  or  one  aspect  of  it,  which  the  Germans 
employed  w^ith  such  success  against  the  British  three  days 
later  at  the  inception  of  their  tremendous  drive  in  Flan- 
ders. But  in  this  case  no  gas  was  thrown  on  the  back  areas 
nor  was  the  attack  followed  up.  The  German  infantry  made 
no  move  whatever.  It  is  possible  that  their  plans  were 
slightly  altered  by  the  violent  counter-battery  work  of 
our  own  artillery,  which  gave  back  to  the  enemy  his  own 
measure  of  gas  heaped  up  and  running  over  throughout 
the  anxious,  painful  day. 

Anxious  the  day  was,  too,  to  the  French  High  Command, 
which  was  aware  of  the  great  German  effort  in  prepara- 
tion—  the  " Kaiserschlacht,^'  the  "battle  without  a  mor- 
row" —  but  was  still  in  doubt  as  to  where  on  the  western 
battle  front  the  blow  would  fall.  The  continuous  demands 
to  be  kept  constantly  informed  of  every  phase  of  the  en- 
emy's activity,  the  minute  care  with  which  the  develop- 
ment of  every  slowly  dragging  hour  was  analyzed  and 
studied,  were  intimation  enough  of  the  concern  felt  over 
the  somewhat  unusual  phenomenon  of  the  gas  bombard- 
ment —  granting  that  it  might  have  some  other  motive 
than  the  intimidation  and  dismay  of  the  new  American 
troops.  Anxious  the  day  was  also  for  the  brigade  and  regi- 
mental commanders,  since  here  was  the  first  extensive  test 
of  their  troops'  discipline  under  gas,  the  first  test  of  their 
own  success  in  providing  for  the  instruction  and  drill  of 
their  units  in  gas  defense.  But  while  the  casualties  were 
considerable,  the  examination  and  analysis  of  all  the  re- 
ports showed  that  death  and  disablement  resulted  either 
from  an  occasional  deliberate  disobedience  of  explicit 
orders  by  individual  soldiers  who  neglected  to  put  their 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  83 

masks  on  when  so  directed,  from  a  few  who  neglected 
precautions  in  order  to  work  faster  and  better  on  signal 
wires  or  in  runners'  relays,  or  from  accidental  body  burns 
against  which  there  was  practically  no  protection  possible. 
And,  like  many  another  mishap  in  war,  this  first  enemy 
gas  concentration,  with  its  resultant  casualties,  taught  to 
the  still  careless  troops  a  stern,  hard  lesson  of  caution  and 
obedience. 

^Yith  the  events  of  Saint  Patrick's  Day  ended  the  ex- 
periences of  the  Division  in  its  first  sector.  The  time  had 
come  for  its  relief.  Originally,  its  stay  on  the  Chemin  des 
Dames  was  scheduled  to  terminate  March  7;  but  now  it 
was  to  move  out,  giving  place  to  the  Twenty-First  Divi- 
sion (French).  The  additional  ten  days  of  sector  work  had 
been  arranged,  partly  to  satisfy  the  French  (who  wished 
the  Division  to  m.ake  an  even  longer  stay,  for  reasons  of 
their  own),  and  also  for  the  sake  of  extending  the  expe- 
rience of  the  regimental  commanders  in  the  exercise  of 
comm.and  over  a  regimental  sector.  But,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  best  qualified  judges,  the  tour  of  instruction  had 
lasted  quite  long  enough.  The  troops  had  acquired  expe- 
rience in  combat ;  officers  had  absorbed  all  the  instruction 
possible  regarding  the  warfare  of  position;  all  ranks  had 
taken  part  in  patrols  and  work;  had  learned  about  infor- 
mation and  signal  duty,  supply  service,  forms  of  reports, 
observation  of  the  enemy,  the  methods  of  making  a  relief 
in  the  line,  regulation  of  ammunition  supply.  Casualties 
had  been  suffered,  prisoners  made,  attacks  repulsed,  raids 
made  handsomely.  Life  in  the  front  line  was  understood. 
Further,  in  the  opinion  of  the  regimental  commanders, 
there  existed  a  possible  source  of  danger  to  the  troops  in 
deriving  from  their  more  experienced  French  associates  a 
certain  slackness  regarding  detail.  The  example  of  some  of 
the  seasoned  old  poilus  was  not  always  the  best,  good 
teachers  though  tliey  were.  There  had  arisen  the  specter 
of  divided  command,  and  consequent  divided  responsi- 


84  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

bility,  which  might  develop  into  a  situation  fraught  with 
peril,  despite  the  unbroken  good-will  and  friendship  of 
the  French  and  American  oflBcers  "up  front."  And  the 
men  needed  rest.  They  needed  new  clothing,  shoes,  addi- 
tional equipment.  They  were  weary  and  dirty  from  weeks 
of  life  in  the  broken-down,  miry  trenches  and  dank  chalk- 
pits of  their  first  sector.^ 

Casualties,  strangely  enough  considering  the  lapse  of 
time  and  steady,  harassing  fire,  had  been  very  few.  Killed 
by  hostile  fire  were  one  ofiicer  and  nine  enlisted  men ;  dead 
by  accident,  two  enlisted  men;  from  disease,  seven  en- 
listed men.  Some  fifty-five  had  been  wounded;  some  three 
hundred  had  been  gassed  (mainly  during  the  attack  of 
March  16-17).  The  sector  had  not  relinquished  its  title  as 
a  quiet  one  —  not  yet,  though  another  week  was  to  see  it 
turned  into  a  hell  indeed.  Of  the  deaths  from  disease,  be 
it  noted,  three  occurred  from  cerebro-spinal  meningitis, 
on  March  5  and  6;  there  existed  a  few  isolated  cases  of 
scarlet  fever;  scabies  had  a  certain  prevalence  in  some 
units;  and  so,  while  there  was  hardly  enough  contagious 
disease  present  in  the  command  to  give  ground  for  any 

^  The  letter  of  compliment  from  the  French  Corps  Commander,  the  first  to  be 
received  by  the  Division,  conveyed  under  its  official  phrases  a  very  real  and  per- 
sonal affectionate  regard.  Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  placed  on  the  mutual 
cordiality  and  esteem  which  from  the  very  beginning  marked  the  relations  of  the 
Division's  officers  and  men  with  their  French  associates.  The  letter  follows: 

Eleventh  Army  Corps,  Staff 
Headquarters,  March  15,  1918 
No.  9114  B-1 
S.C.  No.  4817 
General  Orders  No.  7 

We  regret  that  our  comrades  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  should  leave  us  in 
order  to  fulfill  their  tasks  elsewhere. 

We  have  been  able  to  appreciate  their  bravery,  their  sense  of  duty  and  dis- 
cipline, also  their  frank  comradeship;  they  carry  away  our  unanimous  regrets. 

General  Edwards  has  been  pleased  to  consider  the  Eleventh  Corps  as  god- 
father to  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division.  The  Eleventh  Corps  feels  proud  of  the 
awarded  honor,  being  sure  that,  wherever  he  may  be  sent,  the  godson  shall  do 
credit  to  the  godfather. 

General  de  Maud'huy 
Commanding  Eleventh  Army  Corps 


THE  CHEMIN  DES  DAMES  85 

apprehension  of  an  epidemic,  the  fact  had  weight,  cer- 
tainly, in  deciding  General  Headquarters  to  order  the  re- 
lief of  the  Division  on  March  18. 

Within  three  days  after  that  date,  therefore,  in  accord- 
ance with  orders  issued  by  the  First  Corps,  under  whose 
administrative  command  the  Division  operated,  the  re- 
lief by  units  of  a  French  division  was  completed,  and  the 
schooling  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames 
was  over. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ON  THE  IVIARCH 

NO  change  could  have  benefited  the  Division  more 
than  that  which  followed  its  withdrawal  from  the 
line.  The  inspectors  of  the  First  Corps  and  from  General 
Headquarters,  who  had  kept  watch  of  the  Division  through 
its  tour  of  duty,  may  have  received  an  unfavorable  im- 
pression of  the  men's  physical  condition,  notwithstanding 
their  uniformly  excellent  record  as  fighters.  And  so,  if  only 
for  the  purpose  of  effecting  an  improvement  in  the  former 
respect,  the  four  days'  road  march,  directed  by  General 
Headquarters,  to  follow  the  relief  of  the  Division  from  the 
Chemin  des  Dames,  was  an  ideal  arrangement.  Since  the 
movement  was  begun  by  a  twenty-four  hours'  railroad 
journey  (to  Brienne-le-Chateau  and  Bar-sur-Aube),  ex- 
perience in  troop  handling  under  varying  conditions  was 
afforded  the  General  Staff  sections  at  Division  Head- 
quarters; an  unequaled  opportunity  was  given  command- 
ing oflScers,  from  the  Division  Commander  down,  criti- 
cally to  observe  their  men  with  respect  to  march  disci- 
pline and  condition.  And  if,  as  was  generally  understood, 
the  Division  during  its  march  should  engage  in  maneuver 
problems,  there  would  be  a  chance  for  training  and  testing 
all  officers  in  handling  troops  under  conditions  of  open 
warfare. 

Entraining  was  carried  on  at  Braisne,  a  town  on  the 
Vesle  River  just  above  its  junction  with  the  Aisne,  at 
Mercin-Pommiers,  and  at  Soissons.  Nothing  remained  to 
tell  the  story  of  that  blood-stained  valley  to  the  young 
troops;  but  one  can  fancy  their  interest  had  it  been  pos- 
sible to  remind  them  of  the  fearful  work  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  the  Germans,  which  marked  the  passage  of  the 
sluggish,  marshy  Vesle  by  the  former,  in  the  aftermath  of 


ON  THE  ]\L\B.CH  87 

the  First  Battle  of  the  Marne,  in  September,  1914.  Per- 
haps there  was  needed  no  reminder  of  days  past  to  tell  our 
men  that  they  were  still  in  a  battle  area. 

The  departure  of  the  battalions  was  not  without  in- 
cident, for  the  enemy,  perhaps  advised  of  the  American 
troop  movement  by  its  air  service  which  operated  in  this 
region  with  little  molestation,  took  the  railway  station 
and  yards  under  long-range  artillery  fire,  as  also  Soissons, 
which  was  subjected  to  severe  concentrations  during  the 
time  our  men  were  moving  away.  No  casualties  resulted, 
but  the  loading  and  movement  of  the  trains,  especially  at 
Soissons,  was  a  little  hampered.  The  conduct  of  the  troops, 
under  trying  conditions,  was  admirable;  and  two  officers, 
Major  H.  B.  Estey,  101st  Engineers,  and  Lieutenant  E.  G. 
Hopkins,  101st  Ammunition  Train,  won  the  Croix  de 
Guerre  for  coolness  and  courage  under  heavy  fire,  in  res- 
cuing some  French  soldiers  who  had  been  imprisoned  in  a 
burning  building.  A  couple  of  days  later  the  Division  was 
concentrated  in  the  \dcinity  of  its  detraining  points,  and 
the  march  began. 

The  days  of  the  relief  and  the  rail  movement  were  heavy 
with  interest.  By  night  the  horizon  to  the  northeast  was 
alight  with  the  rosy  glare  of  intense  artillery  fire,  and  in 
more  ways  than  one  even  the  man  in  the  ranks  was  aware 
that  events  of  more  than  slight  importance  were  in  progress 
net  many  miles  away.  But  of  their  real  magnitude  he  had 
no  true  conception;  he  was  merely  puzzled,  intensely  in- 
trigued by  the  fact  that  suddenly  his  own  neighborhood, 
quiet  for  so  long,  had  wakened  to  the  sound  of  the  guns. 
On  the  night  of  March  21  indeed,  the  infernal  fire  and 
thunder  in  the  distant  sky  of  Rheims  and  Champagne  was 
storming  with  tenfold  violence  at  Ypres,  Messines,  Arras, 
La  Bassee,  and  on  the  Somme,  until,  at  five  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  21st  —  that  fateful  day  when  the  enemy  came 
close  to  forcing  a  final  decision  in  his  favor  —  Von  Below, 
under  cover  of  a  heavy  fog,  unleashed  an  assault  wave 


88  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

of  thirty-seven  divisions  backed  by  uncounted  artillery 
against  the  British  in  Picardy.  More  than  one  officer  of  the 
Division  Staff,  or  organization  commander,  halted  his 
motor-car  as  he  sped  through  the  silent  night  along  the 
Chalons-Epernay  road,  to  watch  that  northern  sky,  and 
to  wonder  what  it  might  mean  for  him  and  for  the  lads 
of  his  command,  rumbling  along  light-heartedly  in  their 
troop  trains  to  Brienne.  And  his  hope  was  that  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  might  soon  come  to  grips  with  the  invader,  for  not 
a  lad  of  it  but  knew  that  he  was  better  than  the  Prus- 
sian, man  for  man. 

Brienne-le-Chateau,  with  its  famous  old  school  on  the 
hill,  where  Napoleon  studied  and  dreamed;  Bar-sur-Aube, 
most  lovely  of  ancient  towns,  were  for  the  Division  naught 
but  detraining  points.  One  drew  up  alongside  the  broad 
stone  quay,  usually  in  the  chilly  darkness  that  just  pre- 
cedes the  dawn;  one  debarked  sleepily  the  length  of  the 
long  train,  the  sills  of  which  were  just  level  with  the  sur- 
face of  the  platform;  one  policed  the  "side-door  Pull- 
mans" groping  for  lost  articles  of  equipment  in  the  scanty 
straw,  tugged  and  lifted  at  the  rolling  kitchens,  wagons, 
and  other  horse-drawn  vehicles,  till  they  were  clear,  slung 
equipment  and  rifle,  wondered  when  the  next  meal  would 
be  forthcoming,  and  marched  away  in  column  up  the  road 
out  of  town  under  the  weight  of  one's  heavy  pack.  One 
heard  excited  tales  of  a  train  having  been  bombed  by  an 
aeroplane  —  wished  to  be  in  the  platoon  of  each  company 
designated  to  open  on  an  air-raider  with  its  rifles,  if  at- 
tacked en  route  —  was  glad  that  the  weather  was  clear  — 
enjoyed  seeing  not  only  the  majors,  but  the  brigade  and 
regimental  commanders,  tramping  along  with  a  full  kit, 
just  like  so  many  buck  privates.^  Easterly,  along  smooth 
roads,  through  a  smiling  farm  country  of  rolling  plains 
and  little,  clean  rivers,  with  patches  of  ancient  woodland, 
with  nowhere  a  sign  of  war  and  everywhere  the  signs 

'  Brigadier-General  Peter  E.  Traub,  commanding  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  re- 
quired all  officers  to  make  the  march  afoot,  and  himself  set  the  example. 


ON  THE  IVIARCH  89 

of  tender  spring,  past  sleepy  little  towns  of  venerable  age 
—  Doulevant-le-Chateau,  Soulaines,  Andelot,  Vignory, 
Joinville-sur-Marne,  making  daily  marches  of  no  more 
than  comfortable  length,  the  column  marched,  with 
spirits  ever  rising  as  cramped  muscles  got  stretched  and 
the  warm  sun  sent  down  its  blessing.  It  was  a  good  war, 
just  then,  grinned  the  cheerful  soldiers. 

Faults  of  march  discipline  developed  early,  as  was  to  be 
expected.  There  was  some  straggling  by  individual  in- 
corrigibles.  The  duty  of  staying  in  ranks  with  one's  pla- 
toon under  all  conditions  —  perhaps  the  duty  hammered 
with  most  difBculty  into  all  parts  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  —  had  not  yet  been  learned  by  the  Division's  men. 
Not  till  months  later  did  they  catch  the  idea.  It  seemed 
a  small  thing  to  slip  away,  just  for  an  instant,  as  the  col- 
umn passed  through  a  village,  to  buy  something  to  eat  or 
drink,  to  say  how-d'ye-do  to  the  brown  eyes  that  smiled 
from  a  doorway;  it  seemed  very  easy  to  catch  up  with  the 
column  at  the  next  halt;  it  was  hard  to  keep  up  when  one's 
shoes  hurt  and  the  pack  was  sagging  —  one  would  be  there 
when  the  fighting  began  all  right,  but  this  tramping  along 
the  road  —  nothing  to  it!  So  whispered  the  tempter  to  the 
young,  still  ignorant  soldier.  And  hence  a  provost  guard, 
quick  of  eye  and  firm  of  grip,  was  needed,  to  march  at  the 
tail  of  some  battalions.  Very  difiicult  to  check  —  that  ten- 
dency to  independent  action  of  the  American  soldier,  often 
valuable  in  an  emergency,  often  disastrous  to  the  coherence 
and  strength  of  the  unit.  If  it  could  be  proved  that  it  im- 
paired his  value  as  a  fighting  man,  it  would  be  easier  to  sub- 
due the  weakness ;  but  that  many  a  straggler  on  the  march 
was  quickest  to  get  into  action,  and  longest  to  stay  when  the 
columns  deployed  into  line  of  skirmishers,  was  certainly-  the 
case.  "A  fighting  man  —  yes,"  is  the  answer;  "but  there 
is  a  difference  between  a  fighting  man  and  a  disciplined 
soldier;  and  it  is  the  latter  who  is  needed  to  win  battles." 

All  the  incidents  of  the  march  were  of  the  greatest  value 


90  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

in  point  of  training.  Billeting  methods;  the  dispatch  of  an 
officer  and  detachment  in  advance  of  the  battalion  to  ap- 
portion quarters  in  the  halting-place  for  the  night;  the 
arrival  after  dark,  and  consequent  search  for  the  desig- 
nated lofts  and  garrets,  horse  lines,  wagon  parks,  head- 
quarters, officers'  messes,  place  for  the  kitchens;  posting 
the  guard;  the  departure  in  the  frosty  morning,  with  an 
officer  left  behind  at  the  mairie  to  receive  claims  of  the 
inhabitants  for  damages  done  by  the  troops  (such  remark- 
able claims!)  — all  these  were  new  experiences;  but  they 
had  become  part  of  the  daily  routine  in  the  life  of  each 
battalion  before  the  march  was  over.  And  what  work  for 
the  Division  Staff,  trying  to  remember,  as  it  drafted  the 
daily  march  orders  under  assumed  conditions  of  war,  all 
the  wisdom  of  the  Staff  Manual  regarding  road  spaces, 
traffic  control,  billeting  spaces,  location  for  railhead  and 
distributing  points!  What  a  day  was  that  when  for  hours 
the  supply  train  was  apparently  lost  for  good,  while  the 
regimental  supply  officers  and  their  details  waited  at  the 
designated  place,  in  vain,  for  their  rations  and  forage! 

The  Division  Commander  lived  in  his  motor-car,  tire- 
lessly, up  and  down  the  columns,  a  watchful  eye  out  for 
every  failing,  for  every  point  of  improvement  in  the  lads 
he  had  come  to  trust  and  love,  for  whose  reputation  he 
was  so  loyally  jealous.  The  overloaded  packs  are  hung 
too  low;  some  of  the  men  carry  extra  shoes,  contrary  to 
orders;  overcoats  are  rolled  and  slung  in  accordance  with 
individual  fancy;  slackers  are  stealing  rides  on  the  wagons 
and  rolling  kitchens;  horses  and  mules  are  not  packed  uni- 
formly; too  slow  a  march  cadence  is  being  maintained; 
columns  are  not  always  hugging  the  right  side  of  the  road; 
proper  distance  is  not  observed.  And  all  these  breaches 
of  discipline  or  deficiencies  of  instruction,  unit  command- 
ers were  directed  by  the  Commanding  General  to  remedy, 
"by  correcting  derelictions  on  the  spot."  ^ 

*  Memorandum.  Headquarters  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  25  March,  1918. 


ON  THE  ]VL\RCH  91 

Officers  from  the  Corps  and  from  General  Headquarters, 
who  were  present  during  the  march  from  day  to  day  to 
note  the  Division's  condition  from  all  angles,  appeared 
generally  content.  Not  that  the  battalions  were  thoroughly 
disciplined  yet  —  for  that  was  not  the  case.  There  re- 
mained also  the  problem  of  instilling  the  spirit  of  personal 
responsibility.  There  was  too  much  carelessness  and  waste 
in  handling  equipment  and  property.  One  saw,  too,  about 
this  time,  the  beginning  of  the  feeling,  common  to  the 
majority  of  American  combat  units,  that  only  officers 
and  men  on  the  ground  could  accurately  estimate  condi- 
tions and  regulate  conduct  accordingly.  The  conviction 
never  quite  died  out  in  the  line  organizations  that  the 
Staffs  were  lacking  in  good  sense;  while  the  Staffs,  pre- 
paring plans  with  the  utmost  care  and  full  knowledge  of 
wider  conditions  —  plans  for  the  comfort  as  well  as  the 
efficiency  of  the  troops  —  would  bitterly  complain  (often 
with  justice)  that  their  plans  came  to  naught,  and  the  men 
consequently  suffered  through  an  organization  command- 
er's habit  of  independent  judgment.  Not  that  any  differ- 
ences existed,  in  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  at  least,  re- 
garding matters  of  importance.  That  was  far  from  the  case. 
In  battle,  and  in  times  of  stress,  the  cooperation  of  the 
Staff  and  the  Kne  was  admirable.  But  there  were  differ- 
ences over  minor  matters.  One  recalls,  for  example,  an 
order  respecting  reserve  rations,  which  issued  while  the 
Division  was  in  sector.  The  order  required  that  the  men 
should  carry  the  prescribed  reserve  ration  at  all  times  with 
them  in  the  pack  —  the  idea  being  that,  in  case  of  an 
attack,  or  other  circumstances  that  might  result  in  iso- 
lating the  soldier  for  a  while,  he  would  have  some  food 
with  him,  a  surely  thoughtful  and  provident  idea.  But  it 
happened  that  the  containers  of  the  reserve  ration  were 
of  material  easily  wet  through  and  easily  got  at  by  the  rats, 
or  else  were  so  bulky  that  they  were  exceedingly  difficult 
to  pack  in  any  part  of  the  equipment.  Consequently,  com- 


92  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

pany  commanders  believed  they  were  complying  with  the 
order  if  they  arranged  to  have  reserve  rations  stored  under 
guard  in  the  kitchen  or  other  central  location,  easily  ac- 
cessible for  all  their  men  when  needed.  A  procedure  which 
utterly  annulled  the  usefulness  of  the  order  —  which  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  expression  of  an  entirely  sound  mili- 
tary idea;  and  a  deadlock  resulted  which  took  time  to  re- 
solve. Thus,  again,  on  this  march,  the  colonel  or  major,  di- 
rected sharply  to  take  measures  to  stop  straggling,  felt 
that  his  general  in  a  moment  of  impatience  had  overlooked 
the  fact  that  some  of  the  laggard  lads  were  reputed  to  be 
delayed  gas  cases  ( ! )  just  beginning  to  develop,  or  plain- 
tive sufferers  from  "trench  feet";  he  detailed  his  provost 
guard,  as  ordered,  but  in  sorrow  that  so  ruthless  an  order 
should  issue  from  so  enlightened  a  commander.  Officers 
of  the  Corps  or  from  General  Headquarters,  present  with 
the  Division,  desirous  of  asserting  a  proper  authority,  zeal- 
ous to  hasten  the  Division's  efficiency,  perhaps  made 
caustic  comments  on  what  they  believed  was  a  lack  of 
discipline  should  one  of  their  impeccable  plans  miscarry; 
whereupon  the  Division  tended,  outraged  that  its  excel- 
lence should  be  even  lightly  called  in  question,  to  request 
that  actual  conditions  be  ascertained  before  conclusions 
were  drawn  and  comments  made.  At  no  time,  probably, 
did  any  American  Staff  enjoy  the  authority  of  the  French 
—  perhaps  did  not  deserve  to;  certainly,  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  development  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  and  all 
other  American  divisions,  the  Staffs  were  made  to  demon- 
strate their  practical  efficiency  before  being  accepted  as 
either  guides  or  managers.  But  it  equally  is  the  case  that, 
with  time,  fuller  knowledge,  and  a  more  perfectly  defined 
interdependence,  the  Staff  and  line,  of  the  Twenty-Sixth, 
at  least,  came  to  work  effectively  together  for  the  common 
good. 

Four  or  five  days  of  marching  through  a  countryside 
unscarred  by  war  —  a  multitude  of  minor  happenings. 


ON  THE  MARCH  93 

grave  and  gay,  which  all  went  to  education  —  and  the 
Division  found  itself  between  the  Marne  and  Gondre- 
court,  in  a  training  area  which  touched  the  western  bound- 
ary of  that  which  they  had  inhabited  all  winter.  The 
maneuver  was  abandoned.  It  had  been  planned  to  arrange 
an  encounter  action  with  the  Forty-Second  Division,  the 
Twenty-Sixth  opposing  a  resistance  to  an  enemy  approach- 
ing the  line  of  the  Marne.  The  march,  indeed,  with  respect 
to  its  routes  and  daily  distances,  had  been  planned  to 
effect  the  proper  concentrations  for  this  purpose;  the  in- 
telligence officers  and  the  regimental  commanders  had 
gone  forward  to  reconnoiter  defensive  positions  and  to 
gain  information  of  the  "enemy."  But  presently  it  ap- 
peared that  other  considerations  than  the  benefits  of  a 
maneuver  problem  must  prevail.  The  troops  went  into 
billets  in  villages  roundabout  Grand  and  Reynel,  in  which 
latter  town  Division  Headquarters  was  established  on 
March  26.  All  through  the  regiments  slipped  the  rumor 
that  they  were  in  for  a  period  of  rest  and  refitting.  Rest 
was  the  order  of  the  day.  But  at  more  than  one  head- 
quarters it  was  felt  that  the  leisure  period  was  not  to  be 
for  long. 

Two  happenings  which  occurred  upon  arrival  in  the 
new  area  had  their  importance  as  being  the  first  of  a  scries. 
Toward  the  conclusion  of  the  stay  on  the  Chemin  des 
Dames  orders  were  received  by  each  regimental  and  sep- 
arate battalion  commander  to  select  a  number  of  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  for  return  to  the  United 
States  as  instructors  in  the  training-camps  —  men  who 
had  had  the  benefit  of  a  course  at  Gondrecourt  or  some 
specialists'  school,  as  well  as  front-line  experience,  and 
who  were  otherwise  qualified  by  good  records  and  per- 
sonal character  to  carry  weight  with  the  new  battalions 
forming  at  home.  Did  ever  an  order  produce,  in  those 
called  to  obey  it,  more  contradictory  emotions?  Since  one 
wishes  to  paint  iu  full  color  the  fife  and  soul  of  the  Division, 


94  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

as  representative  of  those  first  in  France,  it  is  worth  while 
to  pause,  in  the  actual  chronicle  of  events,  to  take  note  of 
this  or  that  happening,  rumor,  belief,  emotion  even,  which 
brightened  or  shaded  some  moment  of  the  Division's  ex- 
perience. So  with  this  order  to  send  men  home.  Fancy  the 
state  of  mind  of  the  unit  commander.  On  the  one  hand,  he 
had  toiled  for  months  to  train  and  discipline  his  troops, 
and  for  this  purpose  he  had  leaned   heavily  on  his  lieu- 
tenants and  sergeants  working  away  with  their  platoons 
till  each  little  group  seemed  dependent  for  its  life  and 
value,  in  large  measure,  on  the  personality  of  its  energetic 
leader.  And  now  the  work  of  these  invaluable  assistants 
would  have  to  be  done  all  over  again.  For  a  moment  it 
seemed  as  if  one  were  directed  to  sacrifice  a  unit's  strength 
almost  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  Already,  during  the 
training  period,  good  men  had  been  lost.  They  had  been 
taken  to  recruit  the  permanent  oflScer  personnel  at  schools, 
or  headquarters,  or  services.  The  colonel  saw  his  regi- 
ment's value  seriously  compromised,  at  a  critical  time,  by 
this  latest  order,  and  he  mourned  bitterly.  Then,  on  the 
other  hand,  perhaps  he  perceived  that,  after  all,  the  greater 
interest  must  always  prevail;  perhaps  he  learned  that  les- 
son of  sacrifice  of  self  which  every  commander  has  borne 
in  upon  him  sooner  or  later.  Doubtless,  too,  in  spite  of  the 
loss  to  his  command,  he  was  glad  of  an  opportunity  to 
reward  the  good  services  of  some  officer  or  sergeant  by 
the  gift  of  a  journey  home,  where  promotion  was  prom- 
ised. At  any  rate,  here  was  an  order;  and  it  must  be  carried 
out.  And  so  during  the  last  week  of  march,  the  draft  of 
home-going  officers  and  section  leaders  was  completed, 
and  the  Division,  for  the  moment,  felt  so  much  the  poorer. 
But  the  remedy  for  the  hurt  was  already  at  hand. 
Hardly  had  the  trucks  rumbled  away  with  the  homeward- 
bound  before  there  arrived  a  large  contingent  of  replace- 
ment officers.  From  many  sources  they  were  derived  — 
training-camps  in  the  United  States,  schools  in  France. 


ON  THE  I^IARCH  95 

Of  various  antecedents,  they  ranged  from  grizzled  former 
non-commissioned  officers  of  the  old  Regular  Army  to 
spirited  young  college  lads  of  only  three  months'  training, 
but  quick  intelligence  and  high  ideals;  from  those  who 
sought  to  avoid  the  unpleasantness  of  being  drafted  as 
privates  by  obtaining  a  lieutenant's  commission  via  the 
quick  route  of  a  training-camp,  to  those  who  had  volun- 
teered for  service  from  motives  of  purest  patriotism. 
Welcome,  indeed,  they  were  to  prove  in  the  weeks  that 
followed.  Happy  would  the  Division  have  been  had  the 
replacement  system  ever  been  able,  later,  to  furnish  it  with 
drafts  as  promptly  as  on  this  first  occasion. 


I 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR 

F  all  dreams  are  notoriously  unsubstantial,  the  soldier's 
dream  of  rest,  when  in  the  field,  is  less  than  gossamer. 
Forty-eight  hours  after  arrival  in  the  Rimaucourt  training- 
area,  upon  the  conclusion  of  its  five  days'  march,  the 
Twenty-Sixth  was  on  its  way  to  more  duty  on  the  firing- 
fine. 

Properly  to  understand  this  abrupt  change  of  plan,  it 
will  be  advantageous  to  survey  summarily  the  general 
situation  on  the  Western  Front  during  the  last  week  of 
March.  While  the  Twenty-Sixth  was  quietly  proceeding 
to  its  training-area,  the  long-anticipated  storm  had  broken 
in  all  its  concentrated  fury.  The  enemy  was  dealing  blows 
as  from  a  battering-ram  against  the  lines  in  Picardy.  On 
March  21,  while  feints  in  the  vicinity  of  Arras,  Ypres, 
and  Rheims  had  the  effect  of  pinning  the  Allied  troops  in 
those  regions  in  their  places,  he  attacked  at  dawn,  on  a 
fifty-mile  front,  from  Croisilles  to  Vendeuil,  between  the 
rivers  Scarpe  and  Oise,  along  the  line  of  the  British  Third 
and  Fifth  Armies.  And  by  noon  of  that  desperate  day  he 
had  penetrated  to  the  second  and  third  line  of  defense  in 
more  than  one  locality.^  Shrewdly  taking  advantage  of 
ideal  weather  conditions  to  effect  a  complete  surprise  — 
for  a  heavy  two  days'  fog  masked  his  concentration  and 
approach  and  rendered  impotent  the  British  observation 
and  long-range  artillery  fire  —  he  poured  in  divisions  in 
prodigal  strength,  each  hour  and  day  widening  the  walls 
of  the  initial  salients  and  driving  deeper.  Hopelessly  out- 

^  German  forces  engaged  in  the  initial  stages  qi  the  great  attack  were  the 
XVII  Army  (Von  Below),  of  five  corps  or  twenty-three  divisions;  II  Army  (Von 
der  Marwitz),  of  identical  strength;  XVIII  Army  (Von  Hutier),  of  four  corps.  A 
part  of  the  VII  Army  (Von  Boehn)  was  also  engaged. 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  97 

numbered,  surprised,  with  prepared  defenses  only  in  the 
two  forward  zones,  the  British  were  driven  in  at  vital 
points.  The  gallant  resistance  of  isolated  units  could  avail 
nothing  against  the  relentless  pressure,  the  furious  as- 
saults, and  the  brilliantly  employed  new  tactics  of  the 
Germans,  led  by  some  of  the  greatest  field  commanders 
of  the  war.^  Conceived  by  the  genius  of  Von  Ludendorff, 
taught  sedulously  on  the  quiescent  Russian  front  in  1917, 
the  new  tactics  had  been  used  for  the  first  time  to  assist 
in  accomplishing  the  disastrous  defeat  of  the  Italians  in 
October  of  that  year,  between  Caporetto  and  the  Piave. 
Dependent  for  their  success  upon  high  training  and  per- 
fect coordination  between  all  infantry  utilities  and  the 
artillery,  Ludendorff's  methods  of  attack,  afterwards 
named  "infiltration,"  required  the  use  of  very  superior 
troops.  And  these  he  had.  Two  days  of  sustained  attacks, 
though  Von  Below  was  a  little  behind  his  schedule,  had  ac- 
complished for  the  enemy  a  resounding  success.  He  had 
driven  a  broad  wedge  between  the  two  British  armies  to 
a  depth  of  nine  miles;  his  opponents  were  in  disorderly 
retirement;  he  claimed  to  have  captured  400  guns  and 
25,000  prisoners.  As  if  to  announce  his  victory  he  opened 
fire  that  day  on  Paris,  from  a  distance  of  nearly  seventy 
miles,  with  the  battery  of  8.4-inch  guns,  afterwards  chris- 
tened derisively  "Big  Berthas."  Vainly  did  two  French 
divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  hastily  summoned 
to  stiffen  the  British,  strive  to  stem  the  onward  rush.  The 
next  day  the  Germans  forced  the  crossings  of  the  Somme, 
the  British  Third  Army  falling  back  in  confusion;  on  the 
25th  the  line  of  the  river  south  of  Peronne  was  taken; 
Noyon  and  Nesle  were  captured ;  by  evening  the  Germans 
appeared  to  have  every  prospect  of  separating  not  only 

^  Some  evidence  of  the  weight  of  the  attack  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact 
that  in  tfic  initial  wave  of  assault  alone  there  were  employed  no  less  than  thirty- 
seven  divisions.  In  all,  on  March  21,  some  sixty-four  German  divisions  took 
part  in  the  battle,  a  number  exceeding  the  total  number  of  British  divisions  in 
France  on  that  dale. 


98  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

the  two  British  armies,  but  also  of  effecting  a  breach  be- 
tween the  British  and  the  French,  in  the  vicinity  of  Roye. 
It  was  a  time  of  the  gravest  peril  to  the  Allied  arms.  If  the 
Germans  could  capture  Montdidier,  with  its  vital  railway 
and  road  center,  they  could  probably  prevent,  or  certainly 
hinder,  the  advance  of  the  French  reserves  from  the  south ; 
and  to  this  purpose  the  enemy  bent  his  greatest  efforts. 
On  this  day  Marshal  Foch  was  appointed  to  the  supreme 
command.  On  this  day,  also,  American  engineers  employed 
in  railroad  construction  were  gathered  up  as  part  of  a 
scratch  force  to  help  block  the  road  to  Amiens  —  the  sole 
available  reserves  in  the  region,  and  they  fought  man- 
fully.^ The  next  few  hours  brought  no  reassurance.  Still 
wider  grew  the  gap  between  the  two  British  armies;  and 
the  enemy  showed  great  skill  in  finding  lesser  gaps  in  the 
line,  of  which  he  took  full  advantage.  Time  and  again 
British  rear-guard  detachments  had  to  fight  their  way 
through  German  parties  who,  slipping  through  every 
opening,  were  in  their  rear  before  they  knew  it.  Lassigny 
fell  to  Von  Hutier;  on  March  28  the  Germans  were  in 
position  for  a  direct  attack  on  all-important  Amiens  and 
tlie  heights  of  the  Avre,  possession  of  which  would  go  far 
toward  a  complete  realization  of  the  general  strategic 
plan.  Could  he  cut  the  Paris-Amiens  line,  either  at  Mont- 
didier, or  better  still  by  obtaining  possession  of  Amiens 
itself,  whose  heights  dominated  all  rail  connections  be- 
tween the  French  and  British,  Von  Hutier  could  hold  the 
Allies  apart  and  beat  the  reeling  British  in  detail.  Time 
was  the  important  element.  He  must  make  good  his  initial 
gains  without  delay  or  his  difficulties  would  increase  every 
hour  as  the  troop  trains  brought  the  French  nearer.  But 
on  March  28,  a  week  after  the  opening  of  the  gigantic 
struggle,  the  German  captains  seemed  very  like  to  realize 
their  fondest  hopes. 

*  A  battalion  of  United  States  Engineers  were  also  engaged  on  March  28,  on 
the  Avre. 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  99 

To  meet  this  imminent  peril  Marshal  Foch  was  collect- 
ing troops  from  every  source  as  a  "mass  of  maneuver"  — 
available  for  use  in  any  part  of  the  battle-field.  The  First 
Division  (U.S.)  was  summoned  to  the  active  battle  front 
from  the  sector  it  had  been  occupying.  And  that  is  why  the 
Twenty-Sixth  did  not  enjoy  its  hoped-for  rest,  but  went 
straight  back  to  work,  as  its  brothers  of  the  First  were 
hurried  to  a  task  which  was  to  prove  stern  indeed.  Its 
friends  of  the  Forty-Second  Division,  at  this  same  time, 
were  placed  in  the  Baccarat  Sector,  northeast  of  Nancy, 
relieving  a  French  division  for  duty  in  the  west.^ 

The  part  of  the  line  which  the  Division  was  about  to 
enter  was  an  interesting  one.  At  the  risk  of  again  diverg- 
ing momentarily  from  the  chronicle  of  events,  it  may  be 
well  to  consider  the  principal  characteristics  of  the  terrain, 
and  the  main  points  in  the  history  of  the  contest  which 
had  left  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  so-called  Saint- 
Mihiel  salient.  For  it  was  on  the  southeasterly  face  of  this 
famous  triangle  that  the  Twenty-Sixth  was  posted  at  this 
time. 

Like  all  salients  this  was  the  relic  of  an  unsuccessful 
offensive.  In  1914,  at  the  time  of  the  general  German  ad- 
vance which  was  checked  definitely  at  the  First  Battle  of 
the  Marne,  the  plan  of  the  invaders  had  included  an  en- 
veloping movement  by  way  of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse. 
Following  an  advance  across  the  plain  of  the  Woevre, 
between  Pont-a-Mousson  and  Verdun,  it  was  intended 
to  pierce  the  line  of  the  Toul-Verdun  barrier  forts  which 
covered  the  Meuse  line  on  the  east,  and  effect  a  junction 

^  The  communiques  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  War  Department  on 
these  movements  read: 

"March  27,  1918.  Twenty-Sixth  and  Forty-Second  divisions,  which  have  just 
completed  a  month's  tour  at  the  front,  are  being  returned  to  the  trenches  to  as- 
sist in  present  emergency.  .  .  .  This  puts  all  four  combat  divisions  now  here  in 
the  line." 

"March  28,  1918.  Have  made  all  our  resources  availaljle  and  our  divisions  will 
be  used  if  and  when  needed.  Twenty-Sixth  and  Forty-Second  are  to  relieve 
French  divisions  in  Lorraine." 


100  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

with  the  forces  (under  the  Imperial  Crown  Prince)  oper- 
ating in  the  vicinity  of  Vienne,  Varennes,  and  Sainte- 
Menehould.  But  the  movement  was  not  pressed  to  its  con- 
chision.  The  eastern  crests  of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse 
about  Combres,  Les  Eparges,  Hattonchatel,  and  the  Gap 
of  Spada  were  secured;  a  murderous  thrust  was  made  at 
Fort  Troyon,  midway  of  the  Toul- Verdun  hne,  but  was 
not  followed  up.  By  occupying  Camp  des  Romains,  a 
strong  bridgehead  was  created  at  Saint-Mihiel  on  the 
Meuse,  and  thence  the  German  line  stretched  away  north- 
easterly, past  the  forest  land  of  xApremont,  and  along  the 
valley  of  the  Rupt  de  Mad,  to  a  point  on  the  Moselle  north 
of  Pont-a-Mousson.  Deficient  in  interior  communications, 
the  salient  still  served  a  useful  purpose  offensively,  by 
erecting  a  perpetual  threat  to  Verdun  in  reverse  and 
greatly  hampering  communication  to  that  fortress  and 
entrenched  camp  (by  securing  the  Meuse,  the  Meuse  canal, 
and  the  Saint-Mihiel- Verdun  railway).  It  also  threat- 
ened Toul  and  hence  the  whole  right  of  the  Allied  line. 
Defensively  the  salient  was  of  value  to  the  Germans,  in 
that  it  assisted  in  covering  Metz,  the  Briey  iron  mines, 
and  the  important  Montmedy-Mezieres  line  of  rail 
communications. 

Some  effort  was  made  by  the  French  to  reduce  the 
salient  in  the  spring  of  1915.  Just  prior  to  the  Artois 
offensive,  they  attacked  under  appalling  conditions  of 
weather  and  terrain,  at  the  heights  of  Les  Eparges  and 
Combres.  After  terrible  losses  success  was  attained;  the 
salient  was  threatened  at  its  western  hinge.  And  other  at- 
tacks, launched  at  Flirey  and  Bois-le-Pretre,  had  for  their 
object  to  loosen  the  enemy's  hold  on  the  eastern  angle. 
But,  only  locally  successful,  these  attempts  were,  after 
all,  little  more  than  episodes  in  the  prevailing  war  of  attri- 
tion. A  kind  of  stalemate  followed  them.  Neither  side  at- 
tempted anything  more  serious  than  local  raids  for  months 
previous  to  the  entrance  of  the  Americans  on  the  scene, 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  101 

which  occurred  early  in  1918.^  One  of  those  tacit  truces 
had  prevailed  —  a  strange  but  no  uncommon  happening 
along  the  front,  at  different  times  and  places.  Troops  in 
need  of  a  rest  or  refitting  were  sent  in  by  both  sides  as 
garrisons  of  the  salient;  the  defenses  were  not  well  kept 
up;  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  artillery  was  com- 
posed of  "pieces  of  position"  —  guns  of  old  or  obsoles- 
cent pattern,  not  suitable  for  use  in  sectors  where  heavy 
fighting  was  to  be  expected. 

The  general  character  of  the  sector  taken  over  by  the 
Twenty-Sixth  was  in  marked  contrast  with  that  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames.  Its  principal  tactical  feature  was  an 
east-west  ridge,  with  gentle  slopes  toward  the  valley  of  the 
little  Rupt  de  Mad,  extending  from  Apremont,  at  the  foot 
of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse,  to  the  vicinity  of  Flirey. 
Along  this  ridge  ran  an  important  lateral  highway.  The 
front  line  was  pivoted  on  the  villages  of  Xivray-Marvoisin 
and  Seicheprey,  and  on  Remieres  Wood,  from  which  latter 
point  the  fine  was  refused,  to  connect  with  the  French 
lines  in  Jury  Wood.  On  the  ridge  lay  the  villages  of  Ram- 
bucourt  and  Beaumont,  both  of  which  were  connected 
by  an  excellent  road  system  to  the  rear.  On  the  extreme 
left,  about  Apremont,  the  line  ran  over  high  ground  in  the 
rough  and  ragged  Bois  Brule  (Burned  Wood),  but,  gen- 
erally speaking,  the  sector  extended  over  gently  rolling 
grassland,  swampy  in  the  broad  hollows,  with  occasional 
large  ponds  —  features  common  to  all  the  Woevre  plain. 
A  deep  ravine  and  a  quarry,  in  front  of  Beaumont,  were 
of  tactical  importance  in  organizing  the  defense  of  the 
principal  line  of  resistance.  The  enemy  positions  lay  gen- 
erally along  the  farther  (north)  bank  of  the  Rupt  de  Mad, 
through  the  villages  of  Richecourt,  Lahayville,  and  Saint- 
Baussant.  Extensive  forest  tracts,  such  as  Sonnard  Wood, 

^  The  Second  Division  occupied  a  sector  near  Spada,  on  the  western  side  of  the 
salient,  as  the  First  Division  had  taken  over  tiie  sector  (front  of  one  brigade)  on 
the  southeast  side,  which  the  Twenty-Sixth  was  to  occupy  later. 


102  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Nonsard  Wood,  Creue  Wood,  and  Mort  Mare  Wood,  af- 
forded well-concealed  artillery  positions  and  facilities  for 
concentration  of  troops,  secure  from  observation.  The  iso- 
lated hill  of  Mont  See,  standing  midway  of  the  German 
lines,  and  elevated  high  above  the  plain,  gave  unequaled 
facility  for  extended  observation  over  all  the  American 
sector.  Interior  communications,  with  Thiaucourt  and 
Vigneulles  as  centers,  had  been  improved  by  the  con- 
struction of  several  light  railway  Hues.  The  tactical  ad- 
vantage lay  with  the  enemy.  Our  own  lines  formed  a  num- 
ber of  awkward  salients,  difficult  of  defense;  the  front  was 
entered  by  several  shallow  ravines  which  could  afford 
cover  to  an  attacking  force,  while,  as  has  been  said,  he  had 
every  advantage  of  observation.  The  trenches  taken  over 
by  the  Twenty-Sixth  were  in  a  very  poor  condition  of  re- 
pair; shelters  were  in  no  wise  shell-proof;  and  the  marshy 
character  of  the  ground  made  trench  drainage  very  diffi- 
cult, notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  the  First  Division  to 
effect  some  improvement.  A  new  railhead,  munition  de- 
pots, and  a  road  through  the  La  Reine  Forest,  were  under 
construction. 

The  entire  length  of  the  front  taken  over  by  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  was  not  less  than  18,000  meters.  The  infantry  re- 
lieved not  only  the  single  brigade  which  the  First  Division 
had  in  the  line,  but  also  a  French  division  and  regiment 
of  infantry.  Its  artillery  took  over  some  "batteries  of 
position,"  in  addition  to  all  the  divisional  artillery  work  of 
both  the  French  and  Americans  there  before  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  arrived.  For  the  first  time  an  entire  American  divi- 
sion was  entrusted  with  a  divisional  sector,  for  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  entered  the  La  Reine  Sector  functioning  in  all  its 
branches  complete. 

The  relief  of  the  First  and  the  French  division  began  on 
March  28.  The  Secretary  of  War,  the  Honorable  Newton 
D.  Baker,  had  paid  a  flying  visit  to  the  Division,  followed 
by  a  legislative  commission  from  Massachusetts,  charged 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  103 

with  the  duty  of  estabhshing  a  club-room  and  information 
office  for  troops  from  that  State  in  Paris.  ^  Hardly  had  the 
visitors  departed  before  the  movement  began,  as  orders, 
counter-orders,  and  yet  further  sets  of  instructions,  both 
written  and  verbal,  poured  in  on  Division  Headquarters 
from  the  French  Headquarters  directing  the  operation. 

In  later  days  the  custom  was  established  of  having  the 
Staff  of  the  unit  in  sector  prepare  the  orders  and  all  de- 
tailed arrangements  for  the  relief,  after  conference  between 
the  two  commanders  concerned.  Higher  authority  simply 
ordered  the  relief  to  be  made  on  a  certain  day,  told  the  out- 
going unit  where  it  should  proceed  and  how,  and  left  the 
rest  to  the  two  units  involved.  An  attempt  was  made  to 
follow  this  method  now;  but  the  First  Division's  orders 
were  not  received  until  after  the  Twenty-Sixth  had  started 
its  movement,  in  compliance  with  directions  from  the 
French  Corps,  which  exercised  supreme  control.  Wliat 
followed  was  not  an  uncommon  experience  in  the  early 
days.  When  staff  work  was  still  to  be  perfected,  when 
everybody  was  anxious  to  do  the  correct  thing,  yet  a  bit 
in  doubt  as  to  how  to  set  about  it;  when  the  French  po- 
litely prodded,  and  commanding  generals  worried;  when 
lesser  commanders  felt  that  they  only  knew  what  could 
and  should  be  done;  when  everybody  felt  that  somebody 
higher  up  was  taking  notes  —  though  possessing  not  a 
whit  more  practical  experience  —  of  course  there  was 
misunderstanding. 

The  artillery  moved  over  the  roads;  the  infantry  was 
taken  in  French  trucks  to  points  just  in  rear  of  the  sector. 
And  it  was  not  easy.  The  Division  passed  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  First  Corps  (U.S.)  to  that  of  the  French 
Thirty-Second  corps  d'armee,  and  this  made  for  confusion. 
At  Toul,  Menil-la-Tour,  or  Royaumeix,  where  regimental 

^  Headed  by  the  Honorable  Louis  Frothingham  and  Dr.  Morton  Prince,  of 
Boston,  this  commission  performed  an  admirable  task  in  its  Massachusetts  club- 
room  enterprise,  through  which  agency  the  troops  from  that  State  were  kept  in 
close  touch  with  home  interests,  and  their  welfare  looked  after  most  effectively. 


104  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

commanders  stopped  on  their  wanderings  toward  the 
front  to  obtain  instructions  or  orders,  they  were  baffled  by 
a  flood  of  contradictions.  The  Division  Staff  had  estab- 
Hshed  an  advanced  echelon  in  Toul,  to  facihtate  and  ex- 
pedite the  movement  of  the  troops;  but  this  office,  promptly 
reduced  to  bewilderment  by  delays  in  the  receipt  of  orders 
and  by  the  swift  changes  of  plan  directed  by  higher  au- 
thority, accomplished  very  little.  Guides  did  not  know 
the  way.  The  sole  clue  which  one  infantry  regimental  com- 
mander received  as  to  the  destination  of  his  unit  was  ob- 
tained from  the  French  subaltern  in  charge  of  a  section  of 
the  truck  train  —  and  the  latter  knew  no  more  than  the 
place  where  the  regiment  was  to  disembark  from  the  ca- 
mions. Another  infantry  regiment  actually  completed  its 
relief  and  took  position  on  the  line,  without  having  re- 
ceived a  definite  order  at  all.  Without  appreciation  of  the 
great  discomfort  sure  to  follow,  one  order,  issued  by  the 
operations  officer  detailed  from  the  First  Corps  to  assist 
in  the  movement,  prescribed  that  each  company's  rolling 
kitchens  should  be  towed  behind  a  truck  en  route.  Of  course, 
as  should  have  been  foreseen,  many  of  the  kitchens,  racked 
and  wrenched  by  the  rough  journey,  were  badly  damaged; 
and  some,  with  frozen  axles,  had  to  be  abandoned  alto- 
gether. The  net  result  was  that  many  units  had  to  impro- 
vise what  cooking  arrangements  they  could,  for  days.  The 
whole  tissue  of  misunderstandings  and  cross-purposes 
vividly  illustrates  the  necessity  for  trained  staffs,  in  all 
units  from  the  army  corps  to  the  platoon.  The  Division 
incurred  some  criticism  on  account  of  the  mistakes  of  this 
movement;  and  so  did  the  Headquarters  of  the  First  Di- 
vision, for  the  same  reason.  Wliile  responsibility  rested 
mainly  on  the  outgoing  division,  both  felt  that  the  French 
Headquarters  was  principally  to  blame.  The  reports  of 
the  inspectors  supervising  the  movement  were  afterwards 
reproduced  in  a  memorandum  published  at  the  Staff  Col- 
lege, with  purpose  to  illustrate,  by  the  mistakes  of  both 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTORi  l05 

the  First  and  Twenty-Sixth,  some  of  the  "things  not  to 
do"  in  a  relief  movement.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  much 
was  learned  of  great  value  from  this  practical,  hard  ex- 
perience; but  the  hardships  which  some  of  the  troops  were 
called  upon  to  undergo,  without  sufficient  reason,  gave 
point  to  the  adage  that  experience  keeps  a  dear  school. 

Command  of  the  sector  passed  to  General  Edwards  on 
April  3,  and  Headquarters  was  opened  at  Boucq.  Infantry 
on  the  Hne,  from  left  to  right,  were:  104th  in  the  Bois  Brule 
sub-sector;  101st  in  and  about  Xivray  and  Rambucourt; 
102d  in  Seicheprey  and  Remieres  Wood,  with  Headquar- 
ters at  Beaumont.  On  our  left  was  a  regiment  of  the  10th 
Colonial  Division  (French);  on  the  right,  in  Jury  Wood, 
was  the  162d  Regiment,  the  Division's  old  friends  of  the 
Neuf chateau  area.  The  artillery  was  disposed  in  two  group- 
ings, east  and  west,  the  machine  guns  were  disposed  in 
a  similar  manner,  each  brigade's  battalion  being  closely 
united  with  its  own  infantry.  It  was  just  prior  to  this  time 
that  a  change  had  been  made  in  the  divisional  machine- 
gim  organization,  two  companies  having  been  taken  from 
the  divisional  battalion  (101st)  and  added  one  to  each  of 
the  brigade  battalions  (102d,  103d).  The  engineers  were 
distributed  at  once  through  the  area  for  work  on  accessory 
defenses;  the  signal  battalion,  in  addition  to  detailing  a 
platoon  to  each  infantry  regiment,  began  work  immedi- 
ately in  simplifying  and  extending  the  existing  telephone 
system.  One  infantry  regiment  (103d)  was  retained  in 
reserve.  The  railhead  and  rear  echelon  of  Division  Head- 
quarters were  in  Menil-la-Tour.  It  has  been  already  noted 
that  the  Division  became  one  of  the  units  of  the  Thirty- 
Second  corps  (Uarmee,  at  the  time  under  the  command  of 
General  Passaga. 

One  after  another  the  platoons  moved  up  to  the  front 
and  support  positions,  and  took  over  the  trench  stores, 
munition  depots,  and  miscellaneous  front-line  property  — 
along  with  the  duties  of  the  sector.  Two  inheritances  from 


106  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

the  First  Division  were  unexpected.  The  first  was  a  large 
quantity  of  equipment  and  other  property,  in  good  con- 
dition, which  departing  units  had  left  behind.  The  second 
odd  legacy  was  a  group  of  twenty  American  prisoners, 
convicted  of  various  offenses  in  summary  and  special 
courts,  who  were  working  out  their  sentences  by  laboring 
at  the  upkeep  of  the  Seicheprey  trenches.  In  a  wretched 
state  they  were.  Their  service  records  and  trial  papers 
were  missing;  no  provision  had  been  made  for  their  cus- 
tody, transfer,  or  other  care;  they  lacked  clothing  and 
other  suitable  equipment.  A  curious  addition  to  the 
strength  of  the  Division  —  most  informally  adopted  like 
so  many  foundlings  —  these  fellows  ultimately  became 
soldiers  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  in  good  standing,  in  a  rather 
singular  fashion,  as  will  be  seen. 

This  was  a  livelier  front  than  the  Chemin  des  Dames. 
Ofiicially  designated  "quiet,"  it  was  very  far  from  deserv- 
ing that  name  in  actual  experience,  as  even  the  hardy  First 
Division  was  eager  to  testify.  From  the  very  outset  all 
ranks  were  impressed  with  two  absolute  necessities  —  that 
of  keeping  under  cover  during  daylight,  and  of  observing 
extreme  care  in  the  matter  of  communications,  lest  in- 
formation should  get  to  the  enemy,  who  proved,  as  was 
told  by  the  outgoing  division,  to  be  both  alert  and  aggres- 
sive. From  his  watch-towers  on  Mont  Sec,  as  from  his 
drachen  balloons,  he  kept  a  vigilant  eye  on  every  corner 
of  the  forward  area.  And  it  needed  but  a  hint  from  his  ob- 
servers to  his  "sniping  batteries,"  hidden  in  the  dells  of 
Sonnard  Wood,  to  bring  a  shower  of  shells  on  this  or  that 
most  insignificant  target.  The  half-hearted  attentions  of 
the  enemy  artillery  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  had  scarcely 
prepared  the  troops  for  this  activity.  It  was  a  fact  that, 
for  days  at  a  time,  a  motor-car,  a  group  of  three  or  four 
soldiers  in  the  open,  a  thread  of  smoke  from  a  kitchen,  for 
instance,  was  nearly  sure  to  draw  fire  from  the  "seventy- 
sevens,"  or,  from  what  was  especially  dreaded,  the  so- 


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THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  107 

called  "Austrian  eighty-eights,"  a  gun  of  uncanny  pre- 
cision and  very  high  velocity.  Harassing  fire  was  of  daily 
occurrence.  Out  of  a  clear  sky  there  would  drop  on  a 
cross-roads,  a  battery  position,  a  regimental  headquar- 
ters in  some  village,  a  volley  of  thunderbolts  —  just  enough 
to  make  life  in  that  place  somewhat  of  a  problem.  Occu- 
pants of  the  trenches  received  continual  attention  from 
snipers  and  machine  guns.  It  was  hazardous,  indeed,  to  be 
abroad  "up  front"  at  any  hour  between  daybreak  and 
dusk.  The  casualties  suffered  by  the  infantry  on  the  very 
first  day  the  Division  was  in  the  sector  went  far  to  prove 
that.  And  by  night  there  were  frequent  concentrations 
of  gas  or  high-explosive,  directed  especially  on  Mandres, 
Rambucourt,  and  Beaumont.  At  all  times  our  men  were 
made  aware  that  the  war  was  still  going  on. 

As  they  learned  caution  so  they  learned  secrecy.  From 
the  First  Division,  and  also  from  French  sources,  there 
were  passed  along  amazing  tales  of  the  enemy's  skill  in 
picking  up  information  of  our  movements,  positions,  and 
activities  of  all  descriptions.  Nor  was  the  Division  long 
in  confirming  the  truth  of  these  assertions.  Let  the  relief 
of  a  battalion  be  ordered  for  a  certain  night,  and  almost 
surely,  no  matter  with  what  precautions  the  movement 
was  covered,  the  roads  over  which  the  troops  must  pass 
were  shelled  with  unusual  persistency.  Let  a  wagon  or 
ammunition  train  section  form  the  habit  of  passing  over  a 
given  cross-road  at  a  certain  hour  of  the  night,  and  in- 
variably it  would  have  to  drive  for  its  life.  Let  it  be  whis- 
pered over  the  telephone  that  an  important  officer  was 
going  "up  front"  on  inspection,  and  the  chances  were  more 
than  even  that  his  car  would  have  to  run  a  gantlet  of 
"seventy-sevens"  either  at  the  north  exit  of  Mandres  or 
near  Bouconville. 

To  neutralize  this  danger  practically  all  communica- 
tions between  units  or  headquarters  were  in  code.  Numer- 
ical designations,  those  of  commanding  officers,  and  geo- 


108  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

graphical  names,  were  all  exchanged  for  arbitrary  code 
designations,  frequently  altered.  And  for  the  wireless  ap- 
paratus, for  reports  of  casualties,  and  emergency,  special 
codes  of  both  phrases  and  letter  combinations  were 
adopted.  Great  efforts  were  made,  also,  to  discourage  the 
natural  xAmerican  tendency  to  employ  the  telephone  for 
all  purposes  of  quick  communication,  not  only  for  the  sake 
of  wonting  officers  to  the  use  of  other  means,  but  to  ob- 
viate the  danger  that  the  enemy  would  tap  a  line  and 
listen.  Increasing  dependence  was  placed  on  relays  of 
runners,  and  bicycle  or  motor-cycle  couriers,  for  the  quick 
conveyance  of  messages;  frequent  use  was  made  also  of 
the  T.P.S.  (earth  telegraphy)  apparatus,  for  brief  com- 
munications up  to  about  one  thousand  yards. 

As  to  whether  there  were  disloyal  civilians  in  the  sector, 
some  doubt  remains.  But  strange  things  did  happen.  It  is 
certain  that,  more  than  once,  lights  which  flashed  a  dot- 
dash  signal  toward  the  enemy  were  detected;  and  other 
efforts  to  send  information  to  the  Germans  by  one  or 
another  of  the  wretched  civilians,  who  were  allowed  by  the 
French  to  drag  out  a  dreadful  existence  in  such  villages 
as  Ansauville,  Mandres,  or  Raulecourt,  were  suspected. 
The  disappearance  of  several  of  these  into  permanent 
French  custody  apparently  confirmed  the  suspicions  con- 
cerning them.  In  any  case  it  is  doubtless  the  fact  that 
there  was  a  certain  leakage.  The  German  lines  and  the 
German  frontier  were  both  very  near;  the  German  in- 
telligence service  was  well  manned;  and  the  local  com- 
manders made  use  of  their  information  to  excellent  ad- 
vantage. It  is  probably  true,  also,  that  the  loose-tongued 
babble  prevalent  at  many  American  centers,  as  far  back 
as  the  base  ports,  defying  censorship  and  heedless  of 
orders,  facilitated  the  enemy's  desire  for  knowledge  re- 
specting American  identities  .md  plans,  not  only  at  this 
time,  but  later. 

But  only  a  few  days  after  the  Twenty-Sixth  arrived 


THE  LA  REINE  (BOUCQ)  SECTOR  109 

in  the  La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector,  the  enemy  attempted  one 
of  the  accepted  and  often  most  satisfactory  means  both 
of  discovering  the  newcomers'  names,  and  of  testing  their 
quahty  as  fighting  men. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FIGHTS  AT  BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY 

IT  will  be  remembered  that  the  left  of  the  La  Reine 
(Boucq)  Sector,  as  the  Division  took  it  over,  was  lo- 
cated in  the  vicinity  of  the  village  and  important  highway 
junction  of  Apremont.  Directly  to  the  north  and  west  of 
the  tiny  town  rose  abruptly  the  wooded  scarp  of  the 
Heights  of  the  Meuse,  the  tableland  between  the  Woevre 
plain  and  the  Meuse  valley;  and  here,  in  a  stretch  of  shat- 
tered forest,  called  Bois  Brule  (Burned  Wood),  were  the 
trench  lines  held  by  the  western  Massachusetts  troops 
(104th  Infantry).  Linked  to  the  Americans  on  the  left 
were  units  of  a  French  Colonial  division  —  the  Tenth  — 
commanded  by  General  Marchand  of  Fashoda  fame,  whom 
the  Twenty-Sixth  was  to  have  again  for  neighbors  in  the 
bitter  fighting  before  Verdun,  some  seven  months  later. 
The  position  was  difficult  to  organize  and  defend.  The 
forward  lines  were  composed  of  short  sections  of  trench 
organized  as  resistance  centers  by  small  groups  with  the 
support  of  automatics  or  machine  guns  —  outposts,  so  to 
call  them.  Their  mission  was  to  delay  any  attack  by  resist- 
ance to  the  last.  They  were  to  expect  no  reinforcements 
from  the  principal  line  of  resistance;  and  their  task  was 
rendered  more  difficult  by  the  fact  that  the  regiment's 
sub-sector  formed  a  narrow  salient,  very  open  to  attack; 
the  outpost  positions  were  confused  with  a  tangle  of  aban- 
doned trenches,  saps,  and  boyaux,  some  of  which  led  in  the 
direction  of  the  enemy;  the  whole  imperfectly  wired.  The 
dangers  of  this  little  salient  were  pointed  out  to  General 
Edwards  by  the  Corps  Commander,  immediately  upon 
the  arrival  of  the  Division  in  the  sector.  The  French  Divis- 
ion Commander  had  said  it  was  a  place  where  the  Germans 


BOIS  BRULE  AND  SEICHEPREY  111 

could  come  and  take  prisoners  almost  at  will  —  an  enter- 
prise he  had  carried  out  on  several  occasions.  Plans  were 
immediately  made,  therefore,  to  change  the  disposition  of 
the  outposts  and  to  construct  improved  defensive  lines; 
but  hardly  had  this  work  been  commenced,  before  the 
Germans  undertook  to  repeat  on  the  Americans  the  treat- 
ment which  had  proved  so  profitable  when  applied  to  the 
French. 

Command  of  the  sector  passed,  as  has  been  seen,  on 
April  3.  From  April  5  to  8  a  heavy  artillery  fire  was  di- 
rected on  the  junction  of  the  French  and  American  lines 
in  Bois  Brule.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  10th  this  fire 
increased  in  intensity,  taking  on  the  character  of  a  regular 
*' preparation,"  as  the  formidable  mineniverfer  commenced 
hurling  their  huge  projectiles  into  our  forward  trenches; 
and  presently,  in  the  gray  of  the  dawn,  the  German  in- 
fantry appeared  on  the  front  of  the  left  battalion  (III)  of 
the  104th  Infantry,  which  was  posted  on  a  hill  crest,  on 
the  left  side  of  the  local  salient,  at  the  same  time  attacking 
the  adjoining  sub-sector  held  by  the  French.  But  the  waves 
of  assault  were  checked  almost  at  once.  At  the  first  hint 
that  the  enemy  infantry  were  coming  over  —  a  hint  given 
by  the  changed  character  of  the  supporting  artillery  fire, 
our  own  guns,  ^  without  waiting  for  the  infantry's  signal, 
dropped  a  barrage  across  the  threatened  front,  which 
broke  up  effectually  the  leading  lines  of  the  German  assail- 
ants. But  their  supports  were  close  behind,  nor  did  they 
lack  determination.  In  little  groups,  widely  spaced,  they 
pushed  forward  their  advance  across  the  narrow  waste  of 
No  Man's  Land,  and  not  till  the  Americans  had  laid  down 
a  heavy  protective  fire  from  hand  gi'enades  did  the  enemy 
falter  and  fall  back  through  the  curtain  of  shells  our  artil- 
lery placed  behind  them.  Instead  of  making  prisoners  the 
Germans  left  some  of  their  own  men  in  our  hands,  wounded, 
and  collected  by  our  stretcher-bearers  as  the  fight  dwin- 
1  Il/lOlst  F.A.;  "F"  Battery,  103d  F.A. 


112  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

died  and  died  down.  And  very  useful  some  of  these  fel- 
lows were  to  prove,  for  not  only  did  they  reveal  what  en- 
emy troops  were  opposite  the  American  lines,  ^  but  also 
thev  told  that  a  renewal  of  the  attack  was  intended  for  the 
following  day. 

As  it  happened,  however,  there  was  given  the  Americans 
an  opportunity  to  catch  their  breath  and  to  effect  some 
reorganization.  On  the  11th  there  occurred  no  activity 
on  the  enemy's  part,  save  a  very  heavy  and  sustained  ar- 
tillery bombardment,  over  the  same  Bois  Brule  area. 
Severe  though  it  was,  this  fire  was  not  sufficient  to  inter- 
fere with  the  relief,  that  same  night,  of  the  battalion  which 
had  fought  on  the  10th,  by  another  battalion  of  the  same 
regiment  (11/ 104th  Infantry),  the  remaining  battalion 
retaining  its  position  on  the  right  of  the  regimental  sub- 
sector.  Damage  was  done  to  the  wire  communications  by 
the  enemy  bombardment,  but  no  more  than  could  be  re- 
paired by  the  indefatigable  signalmen,  whose  work  at 
this  time,  as  always  under  fire,  was  very  admirable. 

Not  till  the  next  day  was  the  attack  resumed.  But  this 
time  it  quickly  became  apparent  that  the  affair  was  to 
be  far  more  serious  than  the  raid  of  the  10th.  At  day- 
break the  enemy  attacked,  behind  a  dense  barrage,  at  two 
places  simultaneously.  One  party  drove  at  the  right  of  the 
104th's  line;  the  other  was  directed,  as  before,  against  the 
hillside  where  our  line  joined  up  with  that  of  the  French. 
In  squad  columns  and  small  combat  groups,  little  deterred 
by  the  heavy  fire  which  was  rained  on  them,  the  gray  in- 
fantry came  on  with  the  utmost  steadiness.  There  was 
weight  behind  the  attack;  the  gaps  in  the  lines  were 
quickly  filled;  and,  under  cover  of  a  splendid  artillery  sup- 
port, it  was  not  long  before  a  few  groups  had  effected  a 
lodgment  in  portions  of  our  advanced  trenches,  while  the 
main  force  of  the  attack  swung  against  the  French. 

^  Detachments  of  the  25th,  36th,  and  65th  Regiments,  brought  into  the  sector 
for  the  express  purpose  of  this  attack. 


BOIS  BRULE  AND  SEICHEPREY  113 

Over  on  the  right  the  fight  became  a  series  of  encounters 
between  isolated  groups  and  even  individuals.  It  was  only 
on  the  left  that,  early  in  the  action,  the  situation  gave  any 
cause  for  concern.  For  a  brief  space  the  French  gave  way. 
Finding  their  advanced  posts  untenable  under  the  intense 
minenwerfer  fire,  and  hard-pressed  by  the  German  infan- 
try, they  withdrew  from  certain  forward  positions  of  doubt- 
ful value,  which  the  enemy  promptly  occupied.  Our  left 
flank  became  exposed ;  a  counter-attack  was  called  for,  and 
the  response  by  the  104th  was  immediate.  With  the  bayo- 
net our  men  advanced  steadily,  though  suffering  consider- 
ably by  the  exceedingly  well-placed  enemy  artillery  fire, 
and  pushed  their  attack  home.  Stubbornly  the  Germans 
resisted;  but,  after  a  period  of  bitter,  hand-to-hand  fight- 
ing, they  presently  were  driven  out  with  heavy  loss,  and 
the  situation  on  the  French  front  quite  restored. 

In  two  other  places,  shortly  after  noon,  the  enemy 
pushed  into  our  forward  positions.  So  numerous  were  the 
forces  engaged  and  so  sustained  his  attack  that  it  was 
thought  he  might  be  intending  a  break  through  our  lines, 
to  the  commanding  heights  in  the  rear.  But,  more  prob- 
ably, they  were  correct  in  their  estimation  who  saw  in  the 
Bois  Brule  affair  merely  a  strong  demonstration,  the  in- 
tention of  which  might  have  been  to  assist  in  pinning  the 
local  forces  to  their  present  ground  and  to  prevent  the 
dispatch  of  further  forces  from  the  Lorraine  front  to 
Flanders  —  where,  in  the  second  phase  of  the  mighty  Ger- 
man offensive,  Ludendorff's  forces  under  Von  Quast  and 
Sixt  Von  Arnim  were  sending  the  British  reeling  back  from 
Messines,Estaires,  and  Neuve-Chapelle.  It  was  on  April  11, 
be  it  remembered,  that  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  order  of  the 
day  contained  the  solemn  warning,  "With  backs  to  the 
wall,  and  believing  in  the  justice  of  our  cause,  each  one 
of  us  must  fight  to  the  end.  The  safety  of  our  homes,  and 
the  freedom  of  manldnd,  depend  alike  upon  the  conduct 
of  each  one  of  us  at  this  critical  moment."   With  sue- 


114  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

cess  almost  within  his  grasp,  the  German  Commander-in- 
Chief  must  prevent  at  all  hazards  the  arrival  of  any  rein- 
forcements for  his  hard-pressed  British  adversary.  It  is 
probable  that  this  local  Bois  Brule  attack  had  little  other 
purpose.  But  it  gives  a  certain  relief  to  even  the  compara- 
tively unimportant  fight  in  the  woods  above  Apremont, 
when  one  considers  it  not  as  an  isolated  raid,  but  as  in- 
timately linked,  even  across  leagues  of  distance,  with  the 
struggle  of  giants  on  the  Flanders  plains  and  marshes. 

And  the  fight  was  of  real  importance  to  the  Twenty- 
Sixth,  for  considerable  forces  were  engaged;  incidents  oc- 
curred which  took  the  stoutest  sort  of  fighting  to  turn  to 
advantage,  along  with  good  leadership  and  quick  thinking; 
and  it  sealed  our  alliance  with  the  French  forever. 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  12  reinforcements  were  sent 
in  to  assist  the  2d  Battalion  and  the  Machine-Gun  Com- 
pany, 104th  Infantry,  which  had  borne  the  weight  of  the 
fighting  all  day.  These  included  3d  Battalion,  103d  In- 
fantry, and  Company  "C,"  103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion; 
nor  was  it  any  time  at  all  before  they  were  also  engaged, 
and  hotly.  All  through  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the 
12th  the  struggle  continued  —  the  Germans  holding  stub- 
bornly to  the  sections  of  trench  they  had  entered,  only  to 
be  fiercely  assailed  by  the  Americans,  who,  in  turn,  would 
be  checked  by  well-placed  hostile  artillery  fire.  It  was 
a  fight  of  sections  and  platoons,  in  a  tangle  of  broken 
trenches,  twisted  wire,  and  thick  underbrush,  where  or- 
ganized control  was  diflScult  and  unified  direction  impossi- 
ble, where  individual  grit  and  fighting  ability  counted  for 
everything.  And  in  this  rough-and-tumble  work  the  Ger- 
mans were  outclassed  from  the  start  by  the  hard-bitten, 
tough  young  giants  from  the  West,  who  fought  as  joyously 
with  their  fists  as  with  grenade  or  bayonet.  The  sole  pris- 
oner to  be  taken  by  the  Germans  was  a  corporal,  who, 
covering  the  withdrawal  of  his  squad  from  a  section  of 
trench  in  accordance  with  orders,  was  cut  off  by  staying 


BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  115 

too  long  in  the  face  of  the  advancing  enemy,  fighting 
single-handed.  By  these  methods  was  the  situation  re- 
stored. The  enemy  was  pushed  out  of  the  first-line  posi- 
tions he  had  entered,  less  by  the  sweep  of  a  counter-attack 
organized  in  accordance  with  the  manuals  than  by  fierce, 
impetuous  hammer-blows  delivered  by  little  groups  of 
fighting  men,  led  by  subalterns  and  sergeants,  all  eager 
to  come  to  grips  with  their  foe.  On  the  night  of  the  12th 
a  renewed  attempt  to  enter  the  lines  of  these  Massachu- 
setts troops  was  made;  but  this,  less  resolutely  pushed 
than  its  predecessors,  was  promptly  smothered,  while  a 
final  local  counter-attack,  by  Company  "G,"  104th  In- 
fantry, early  the  following  morning,  drove  out  any  small 
remnants  which  had  clung  to  their  places  through  the 
night  hours. 

The  fighting  spirit  was  there!  That  was  what  the 
Apremont-Bois  Brule  affair  proved  anew,  with  respect  to 
the  Twenty-Sixth  Division.  For  the  single  prisoner  lost 
the  battalions  engaged  took  more  than  forty.  The  Ger- 
mans who  broke  their  way  into  our  advanced  positions 
were  met,  not  as  enemies  whose  reputation  and  strength 
were  redoubtable,  indeed,  but  as  so  much  vermin  to  be 
exterminated.  It  was  the  Yankee,  not  the  German,  who 
showed  the  true  fighting  edge  throughout  those  long  three 
days  of  ding-dong  wrestling.  The  enemy  attack  was  ac- 
cepted, not  as  a  menace,  but  as  a  challenge;  and  the  result 
was  what  could  have  been  expected. 

The  satisfaction  of  the  French  was  quickly  manifested. 
Hardly  had  the  guns  cooled  before  the  Corps  Commander 
commended  the  American  troops  in  general  orders.^  A 

»  No.  1870-3     ^  Vni  Army,  Sid  Army  Corps  Staff 

General  Orders  >•  ///  Bureau,  Headquarters 

No.  124        )  April  U,  1918 

On  April  12,  just  past,  the  enemy,  supported  by  powerful  artillery,  made  an 
attack  in  force  on  the  lines  held  i)y  the  left  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  American  Divi- 
sion and  the  right  of  the  Tenth  Colonial  Division. 

The  struggle  continued  throughout  the  day  and  night  of  April  12  and  !.">. 

In  the  course  of  the  eugagemeul,  thanks  to  the  vigorous  and  repeated  counter- 


116  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

fortnight  later,  when  the  104th  Infantry  had  gone  into 
reserve  positions,  it  was  to  receive  an  even  higher  honor. 
Assembled  near  Boucq,  on  Sunday,  April  28,  the  regiment 
was  thrilled  to  the  heart  with  honest  pride  when  General 
Passaga  affixed  the  Croix  de  Guerre  to  the  regimental 
colors,  with  the  words,  "I  am  proud  to  decorate  the  flag 
of  a  regiment  which  has  shown  such  fortitude  and  courage; 
I  am  proud  to  decorate  the  flag  of  a  nation  which  has  come 
to  our  aid  in  the  fight  for  liberty." 

Thus  it  was  the  colors  of  a  unit  of  the  Twenty-Sixth 
Division  which  was  the  first,  in  all  the  history  of  the  Ameri- 
can Army,  to  receive  a  foreign  decoration.^ 

To  the  regimental  commander  and  116  other  officers  and 
men  were  also  awarded,  on  the  same  occasion,  the  coveted 
bronze  cross  with  its  red  and  green  ribbon.  And  conspicu- 
ous, indeed,  were  the  acts  of  gallantry  which  earned  that 
honor,  in  a  fight  where  gallantry  and  pluck  were  every- 
where.^ 

Scarcely  a  week  was  to  elapse  before  the  enemy  again 
tested  the  mettle  of  the  new  troops  opposed  to  him.  That 
he  was  planning  an  attack  somewhere  in  the  vicinity  was 
fairly  evident.  On  April  17  the  French  on  the  right  brushed 

attacks  of  the  Americans  and  of  our  Colonials,  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  his  superi- 
ority in  numbers,  was  thrown  back  from  several  trench  positions  where  he  had 
gained  a  foothold,  and  left  in  our  hands  more  than  forty  prisoners  and  a  large 
number  of  dead. 

During  this  fight,  carried  on  under  a  severe  bombardment,  the  American 
troops  gave  proof  not  only  of  their  splendid  courage,  which  we  know,  but  also  of  a 
brotherhood  in  arms  which  was  absolute  and  ever  present. 

With  such  men  as  these,  the  cause  of  liberty  is  sure  to  triumph. 

Headquarters,  April  14,  1918  Passaga 

^  The  citation  reads:  "For  greatest  fighting  spirit  and  self-sacrifice  during 
action  of  April  10,  12,  and  13,  1918.  Suffering  from  very  heavy  bombardments, 
and  attacked  by  very  strong  German  forces,  the  [regiment]  succeeded  in  prevent- 
ing their  dangerous  advance,  and  with  greatest  energy  reconquered,  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet,  the  few  ruined  trenches  which  had  to  be  abandoned  at  the  first 
onset,  at  the  same  time  making  prisoners." 

2  Troops  principally  engaged  at  Bois  Brule  were:  2d  Battalion,  3d  Battalion, 
Machine-Gun  Company,  104th  Infantry;  Company  "C,"  103d  Machine-Gun 
Battalion;  3d  Battalion,  103d  Infantry;  Batteries  "D,"  "E,"  "F,"  101st  Field 
Artillery;  Battery  "F,"  103d  Field  Artillery;  3  platoons  90-mm.  gims  of  101st 
Field  Artillery;  101st  Trench  Mortar  Battery. 


BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  117 

back  a  raiding  party.  Reports  of  the  watchers  in  the  bal- 
loons, or  in  the  observation  posts  hidden  in  the  ruins  of 
Beaumont  or  in  the  edge  of  Jury  Wood,  told  of  increased 
train  movements  along  the  Vigneulles  line,  of  an  apparent 
rehearsal  of  some  attack  formation  by  troops  in  the  rear 
area,  of  artillery  coming  into  the  sector.  A  relief  of  the 
German  division  then  in  hne  was  the  opinion  of  many. 
A  conviction  that  the  enemy  was  going  to  show  in  this 
neighborhood  a  raiding  activity  similar  to  that  which  he 
had  displayed  elsewhere  as  preliminary  to  attacks  in 
force,  was  implanted  in  the  minds  of  other  good  author- 
ities. The  suspicion  grew  with  still  a  third  group  that  a 
grand  attack  was  to  be  launched  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
Verdun,  or  the  right  of  the  line,  in  reverse.  The  feeling 
that  the  Germans  were  too  deeply  committed  in  the  pro- 
digious enterprises  against  the  British  in  Flanders  and 
Picardy,  to  attempt  anything  at  all  in  this  part  of  the  line, 
prevailed  comfortably  with  not  a  few.  A  demonstration 
—  yes,  but  nothing  serious.  But  one  feature  of  the  enemy 
activity  was  very  noticeable  —  his  artillery  was  conduct- 
ing an  extensive  registration  fire.  That  meant  that  new 
batteries  had  come  into  the  sector,  and  more  than  would 
be  the  case  were  it  merely  a  question  of  relieving  batteries 
already  in  position.  Daily,  at  all  hours,  his  guns  would  fire 
on  communications,  assembly  places,  observation  points, 
cross-roads,  battery  positions,  command  posts.  It  was  not 
the  ordinary  harassing  fire.  The  troops  had  become  ac- 
customed to  sudden  bursts  of  shelling  dropped  with  un- 
canny accuracy  on  this  or  that  "sensitive  point"  within 
our  lines  —  a  fire  as  intense  as  it  was  brief,  as  irregular  as 
it  was  disconcerting.  But  the  fire  which  began  on  April  15 
had  a  different  quality.  It  was  a  shell  here,  another  yonder, 
a  pair  of  them  "bracketing"  a  position,  often  overlooked 
by  an  aeroplane  sailing  high  in  the  blue.  And  this,  as  the 
French  said,  "gave  furiously  to  think." 

From  the  observers  came  a  bit  of  news  one  afternoon 


118  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

which  spread  quickly  —  news  which  a  couple  of  prisoners 
picked  up  by  the  French  confirmed.  This  was  the  passage 
through  the  village  of  Mont  Sec,  away  in  rear  of  the 
enemy  lines,  of  a  column  of  infantry  strange  to  the  sector, 
whose  presence  boded  important  events,  since  it  com^- 
prised,  so  babbled  the  prisoners,  one  of  the  new  Sturm- 
baiaiUone  of  which  the  Western  Front  was  beginning  to 
hear.^  That  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  pick  and  train 
especially  qualified  assault  troops,  for  any  unusual  opera- 
tion, revealed  a  certain  weakness  in  the  internal  German 
organization  and  morale.  True,  the  German  tendency 
always  had  been  to  create  corps  d'elite,  but  it  was  never- 
theless significant  that  the  High  Command  felt  that,  for 
special  strains,  it  could  not  wholly  rely  on  the  ordinary 
infantry.  And  that  the  cream  of  many  battalions  had  been 
skimmed  to  provide  these  hardy,  capable  fellows  meant 
that  the  average  value  of  these  units  was  lowered  by  just 
so  much.  However,  the  presence  in  the  La  Reine  Sector 
of  one  of  these  chosen  bodies  could  hardly  mean  other  than 
that  some  project  of  importance  was  in  the  wind,  taken  in 
conjunction  with  the  obvious  increase  in  the  enemy  ar- 
tillerv  of  all  calibers. 

It  appeared  probable  that  the  enemy  attack,  if  deliv- 
ered, would  lie  against  the  right  of  the  Division.  Here  lay 
his  best  chance  of  success,  whether  for  a  raid,  or  for  a 
break-through  toward  the  Beaumont-Flirey  ridge,  the 
key  of  the  position.  For  long,  improved  plans  of  defense 
for  this  part  of  the  sector,  partly  based  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  American  commanders,  had  been  under  con- 
sideration by  the  Corps  Staff.  Provisional  plans  had  already 

*  The  typical  Sturmbataillon  of  the  period  included  the  following  elements: 

4  assault  companies  (Stosstruppen,  each  100  men). 

6  machine  guns. 

1  company  of  bombers. 

1  company  of  flame-throwers. 

1  battery  of  accompanying  6eld  artillery. 
Motor-cars  were  attached  for  quick  transportation.  The  battalion  commander 
usually  had  the  rank  of  captain. 


BOIS  BRULE  AND  SEICHEPREV  119 

been  put  into  effect.  The  commander  of  the  Beaumont  sub- 
sector  had  altered  more  than  once  the  disposition  of  his 
infantry  and  machine  guns,  agreeably  to  the  changing 
ideas  of  higher  authority,  in  the  resistance  centers  of 
Seicheprey  and  Remieres  Wood.  For  here  the  defense 
presented  grave  difficulties. 

The  Seicheprey-Remieres  Wood  front  had  an  extent, 
on  the  map,  of  something  more  than  three  thousand  meters, 
which  implies  a  distance  of  about  two  miles  on  the  ground. 
It  covered  the  crest  and  reverse  slope  of  a  low,  east-west 
elevation,  lying  about  fifteen  hundred  meters  in  advance  of 
the  zone  of  principal  resistance  on  the  ridge  along  the 
Metz-Saint-Dizier  highway.  A  gradual  slope  on  the  north, 
or  enemy  side,  extended  down  to  the  vale  of  the  Rupt  de 
Mad,  while  on  either  flank  wide,  shallow  ravines,  or 
"draws,"  extended  in  from  the  enemy's  lines.  Formerly 
there  had  existed  a  fairly  complete  system  of  fire  and  sup- 
port trenches  in  advance  of  the  village  and  the  wood;  but 
upon  the  adoption  of  the  principles  of  organization  for 
defense  in  depth,  these  forward  lines,  once  held  by  a  con- 
siderable garrison,  were  abandoned,  both  infantry  and 
machine  guns  being  disposed  in  deeper  echelons.  On  the 
Seicheprey  front,  drawn  back  from  the  original  front  line 
into  two  points  of  resistance,  considerably  separated, 
there  were  retained  but  two  companies  —  one  in  and  about 
the  village,  the  other  in  the  woods,  both  backed  by  ma- 
chine-gun detachments.  Their  mission  was  one  of  surveil- 
lance, coupled  with  such  resistance  as  would  delay,  if  it 
did  not  break  up,  a  hostile  attack.  Troops  on  this  line 
could  expect  no  reinforcements.  Their  duty  was  to  hold  to 
the  last;  to  dislodge  temporarily  successful  enemy  assail- 
ants by  local  counter-attacks.  The  two  other  com})anies 
of  the  battalion  in  this  sub-sector  were  echeloned  one 
thousand  yards  in  rear,  in  the  forward  trenches  of  the 
main  position  in  front  of  Beaumont  village.  Another  bat- 
talion was  similarly  disposed  on  the  left,  its  zone  being 


120  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE' 

bounded  by  the  line  Xivray-Rambucourt.  The  remaining 
battaHon  was  in  reserve,  in  the  villages  of  Mandres  and 
Ansauville;  Regimental  Headquarters  were  in  Beaumont. 

Communications  were  inadequate.  Between  the  main 
position  and  the  outpost  line  there  extended  a  single 
country  road,  bordered  by  a  single  boyau  for  circulation 
in  both  directions.  Another  trench  led  back  from  Remieres 
Wood;  crossed  the  draw  on  the  right  flank;  and  connected 
with  the  left  of  the  French  sector,  in  Jury  Woods.  But  as 
this  was  organized  as  a  fire  trench,  its  use  for  communi- 
cations was  badly  hampered,  and  its  rear  terminus  lay 
outside  the  divisional  sector.  Between  Seicheprey  and 
Remieres  Wood  ran  a  single  trench,  very  lightly  held,  in 
part  only  a  corridor  between  walls  of  sandbags  and  ga- 
bions. Shell-proof  shelters,  when  the  Division  took  over  the 
sector,  may  be  said  not  to  have  existed.  In  Beaumont  and 
Seicheprey  a  few  fairly  secure  shelters  had  been  constructed 
in  the  cellars  of  the  houses;  but  these  sufficed  for  only  a 
small  proportion  of  the  garrisons;  and  in  the  trenches 
proper  the  shelters  were  of  the  most  illusory  description. 
The  wire  entanglements  were  in  good  condition;  and  some- 
thing had  been  done  to  strengthen  the  combat  positions 
and  the  flanks,  a  progressive  plan  of  works  having  been 
inaugurated  for  the  sector  by  the  engineers,  soon  after 
arrival,  which  was  being  developed  nightly  by  large  de- 
tails from  the  infantry.  The  ground  lay  open  —  bare  fields 
of  coarse,  long  grass,  with  marshy  spots  in  all  the  hollows, 
with  scarcely  a  tree  save  the  characteristic  poplars  along 
the  Metz  highroad  and  the  rough  thickets  of  Remieres 
Wood.  And  every  foot  of  it,  as  has  been  already  noted,  was 
under  direct  and  easy  observation  by  the  enemy  watchers 
on  Mont  Sec. 

The  Connecticut  regiment  of  infantry  (102d),  together 
with  two  companies  of  machine-gunners,  was  assigned  to 
the  Seicheprey-Remieres  lines,  when  the  Division  took 
over  the  sector.  Since  March  31  it  had  floundered  about  in 


BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  121 

the  sticky  mud  of  the  Seicheprey  trenches;  there  had  been 
much  harassing  fire,  especially  gas,  on  the  forward  ele- 
ments, as  also  on  Headquarters.  An  episode  occurred  which 
angered  the  regiment  (and  higher  authorities,  too,  God 
wot!),  as  showing  how  simple  it  was  for  energetic  enemy 
patrols  to  penetrate  well  within  our  thinly  held  and  long- 
extended  outpost  line.^  It  happened,  on  a  night  just  after 
the  fight  in  Bois  Brule,  that  a  ration  wagon  was  pro- 
ceeding out  past  Xivray,  toward  the  tiny  hamlet  of  Mar- 
voisin,  where  the  102d  Infantry  maintained  a  platoon  in 
night  combat  position.  Two  men  were  in  charge  of  the 
wagon;  and  among  their  supplies  they  carried  a  sack  of 
company  mail.  All  was  going  quietly,  w^hen  suddenly,  only 
a  hundred  yards  or  so  from  the  detail's  destination,  the 
wagon  was  halted  by  an  enemy  ambush,  the  mules  promptly 
pistoled,  and  one  man  spirited  away,  along  with  the  in- 
valuable mail,  in  less  time  than  it  takes  to  write  about  it. 
As  silently  as  they  had  come  did  the  Germans  get  away, 
eluding  the  pursuit  which  was  immediately  sent  after  them. 
Not  a  soul  saw  them,  though  they  had  laid  their  ambush 
nearly  a  half-mile  inside  our  outpost  line.  The  episode  had 
value  as  an  illustration  of  how  easily  the  Division's  front 
could  be  entered  if  conditions  of  weather  were  right;  it  had 
the  efifect  of  redoubling  all  precautions.  Nor  did  the  fol- 
lowing days  lack  for  additional  rumors  of  impending 
trouble;  and  the  night  of  April  19,  when  a  rehef  was  on, 
the  anxiety  was  intense,  indeed. 

That  night  the  3d  Battalion,  102d  Infantry,  was  re- 
lieved in  front  and  support  trenches  of  the  Beaumont  sub- 
sector,  by  the  1st  Battalion,  102d  Infantry,  under  Major 
G.  J.  Rau.  The  latter  troops  came  into  the  area  for  the 
first  time  —  which  takes  on  significance  in  view  of  what 

^  As  a  means  of  preventing  the  capture  of  either  isolated  sentinels  or  large  out- 
posts, Corps  Headquarters  had  prescribed  tliat  outpost  groups  slioulil  never  ex- 
ceed twenty-five  men,  and  that  sentries  should  not  \)c  posted  more  tlian  fifty  feet 
away  from  the  group.  The  result  was  that,  inevitably,  long  distances  separated 
these  little  combat  groups,  and  the  intervals  were  difficult  to  watch  after  dark. 


122  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

happened  later  —  though  they  had  already  garrisoned 
the  left  of  the  regimental  sector.  The  2d  Battalion  was  on 
the  left  at  this  time,  with  Companies  "G"  and  "E"  in 
line,  "F"  and  "H"  in  support.  When  the  relief  was  com- 
pleted the  incoming  battalion  found  itself  with  "C"  Com- 
pany in  Remieres  Wood,  "D"  Company  in  and  about 
Seicheprey  (where  also  the  Battalion  Headquarters  was 
located),  while  "A"  and  "B"  Companies  occupied  the 
support  trenches  in  front  of  the  *'One-Bis  position,"  as  the 
main  line  of  resistance  was  called,  where  their  right  (Com- 
pany "A")  connected  with  the  French  left  in  Jury  Wood. 
The  outgoing  battalion  commander,  Captain  C.  M. 
Thompson,  and  the  company  officers  remained  in  posi- 
tion, in  accordance  with  the  usual  custom,  to  acquaint 
their  successors  with  the  terrain  when  daylight  should 
come,  and  to  turn  over  the  permanent  trench  stores;  but 
the  command  passed  as  soon  as  the  relief  was  completed. 
The  night  was  very  still.  No  patrols  or  working  parties 
were  out  because  of  the  relief;  but  a  singular  quiet  had 
settled  over  the  hostile  lines,  in  marked  contrast  with  the 
aggressive  activity  of  the  days  just  previous.  There  was 
little  rest,  however,  at  Regimental  Headquarters.  Again 
and  again  were  all  lines  of  communication  tested,  all  plans 
reviewed  for  the  employment  of  the  machine  guns  and  in- 
fantry utilities;  close  touch  was  established  with  the  en- 
gineers posted  in  Beaumont,^  and  with  the  regiments  to 
right  and  left.  Not,  indeed,  till  word  came  in,  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  April  20,  that  the  relief  was  com- 
pleted, was  there  any  slackening  of  the  tension. 

But  the  relaxation  was  brief  enough.  At  3.05  o'clock  in 
the  morning  of  April  20  there  was  laid  on  every  part  of  the 
forward  zone,  and  on  the  artillery  positions,  such  a  bom- 
bardment as  the  Division  had  not  yet  even  dreamed  of. 
On  the  Seicheprey-Remieres  trenches,  the  support  posi- 
tions, and  on  Beaumont  village,  there  crashed  down  a  con- 

1  Company  "A,"  101st  Engineers. 


BOIS  BRULE  AND  SEICHEPREY  123 

centration  from  guns  of  all  calibers  up  to  210  millimeters, 
which  recalled  to  the  French  officers  with  the  102d  In- 
fantry those  fearsome  days  of  Verdun  in  1916.  Implacably, 
with  deadly  accuracy  and  great  intensity,  the  fire  of 
destruction  continued.  Eight  minutes  after  it  commenced 
all  wire  communications  out  of  Beaumont  were  cut,  save 
a  single  thread  to  the  artillery;  runners  became  casualties 
almost  as  soon  as  they  started  with  their  messages.  In  the 
forward  trenches  the  meager  shelters  were  caved  in  or 
blown  apart,  in  many  cases  burying  their  occupants;  the 
volumes  of  gas  which  were  released  along  with  the  high- 
explosive  shells  were  severe  on  the  laboring  artillerymen, 
who  sent  over  their  normal  protective  barrages  and  counter- 
battery  fires,  in  prompt  response  to  the  rocket  signals 
from  the  front-line  infantry.  For  two  hours  the  bombard- 
ment continued  with  scarcely  a  lull  in  its  savage  intensity, 
with  the  result  that  the  Remieres-Seicheprey  outpost  gar- 
risons were  not  only  much  reduced  by  casualties,  but  also 
broken  up  into  isolated  groups  with  only  a  slender  com- 
munication, when  any  existed  at  all.  Platoon  command- 
ers who,  at  the  first  alarm,  brought  their  men  together  in 
the  prescribed,  but  as  yet  unfamiliar,  combat  positions, 
saw  them  killed  or  wounded  in  groups;  others  who  dis- 
posed their  little  forces  in  the  slight  shelter  of  shell  holes 
ran  the  danger  of  losing  control;  direct  hits  played  havoc 
with  both  machine  guns  and  field  pieces;  the  Regimental 
Headquarters,  smothered  in  fire,  was  for  the  moment  put 
completely  out  of  action. 

To  add  to  the  confusion  caused  by  the  bombardment 
a  heavy  daybreak  fog  lay  thickly  in  every  hollow,  min- 
gling with  the  smoke  of  the  bursting  shells  and  the  dust,  to 
screen  the  enemy's  movements,  and  to  obscure  all  rocket 
signals.  Vainly  the  outposts  peered  toward  the  German 
lines;  not  a  hint  of  the  enemy's  intended  action  was  re- 
ceived until,  about  five  o'clock,  the  forms  of  his  infantry 
were  seen  plunging  out  of  the  mist  and  the  battle  haze, 


124  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

right  in  the  wake  of  his  devastating  barrage.  A  torrent  of 
fire  was  rolled  over  Seicheprey  and  Remieres  Wood,  set- 
tling like  a  wall,  enclosing  them.  And  then,  so  close  that 
they  suffered  from  their  own  shelling,  before  the  stunned 
defenders  in  Seicheprey  could  wholly  rally,  the  gray-clad 
raiders  descended. 

They  came  on  in  three  columns.  Up  the  wide  draw  to 
the  west  and  south  of  the  village  came  one  party;  another 
flanked  Remieres  Wood  from  the  east;  a  third  drove 
straight  against  our  thin-held  front.  And  resolute  troops 
they  were.  The  Siurmbataillon  led  the  attack,  supported 
on  its  flanks  by  two  battalions  of  infantry  already  in  the 
sector,  accompanied  by  detachments  of  signalmen  and 
pioneers.  By  the  Germans'  own  statements  not  less  than 
three  thousand  men  participated  in  the  attack,  the  onrush 
of  whom  was  sustained  by  two  American  companies  — 
less  than  four  hundred  rifles.  Methodically  and  rapidly  the 
enemy  raiders  worked.  In  a  moment  they  had  entered 
Seicheprey  from  flank  and  rear,  where  they  picked  up  the 
medical  officer  and  entire  personnel  of  the  battalion  aid- 
station  with  other  prisoners;  all  along  the  line  they  picked 
up  many  individuals,  survivors  of  luckless  outpost  groups. 
Immediately  on  gaining  that  section  of  the  outpost  trenches 
called  Sibille  Trench,  west  and  north  of  the  village,  they 
set  about  organizing  it  for  defense  against  counter-attack; 
in  Seicheprey  they  set  contact  mines;  their  signalmen  laid 
their  telephone  wires  almost  before  the  infantry  was  ready 
for  them. 

But  not  for  long  was  the  enemy  allowed  to  stay.  His 
intention  was,  undoubtedly,  to  effect  a  permanent  lodg- 
ment. A  captured  officer  stated  before  he  died  that  the 
German  plan  contemplated  holding  the  captured  trenches 
against  an  expected  American  counter-attack,  then  to 
renew  their  advance,  and  gain  possession  of  the  Beau- 
mont-Flirey  ridge.  Other  versions  indicated  that  at  least 
the  line  of  the  Sibille  Trench  was  to  be  held;  and  the  very 


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BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  125 

complete  preparation  for  its  organization  bore  out  this 
assertion.  An  operation  more  extensive  than  a  mere  raid 
to  make  prisoners  was  in  order,  at  all  events;  but,  thanks 
to  the  grit  and  fighting  ability  of  Connecticut  militia 
troops,  the  plan  was  brought  to  naught. 

A  defensive  force  of  a  sort  was  quickly  got  together  by 
Major  Rau  at  the  first  alarm.  With  the  orderlies,  clerks, 
and  runners  at  Battalion  Headquarters,  from  the  company 
kitchens,  from  the  twenty  prisoners  inherited  from  the 
First  Division,  a  resolute  counter-attack  was  delivered, 
which,  continuing  through  the  streets  of  the  village,  drove 
out  the  enemy  before  he  could  realize  on  his  initial  gains. 
The  fiercest  hand-to-hand  fighting  occurred.  It  was  with 
his  cleaver  that  one  cook  accounted  for  his  adversary;  it 
was  with  the  bayonet  and  the  pistol  that  the  Germans 
were  driven  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  cemetery  and  of 
Sibille  Trench  north  of  the  town.  Combat  patrols  to  the 
flanks  kept  close  touch  with  the  retiring  foe.  By  6  o'clock 
the  village  proper  was  cleared. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  tangles  of  Remieres  Wood  the  raiders 
had  achieved  a  similar  first  success.  Smothered  by  the  ar- 
tillery fire,  the  defenders  were  thrown  into  a  momentary 
confusion  of  which  the  enemy  took  advantage.  But  here, 
too,  as  soon  as  a  semblance  of  organized  resistance  could 
be  set  up,  the  enemy  was  checked  and  later  driven  out. 
But  not  for  long  after  he  had  relaxed  his  hold  on  Seiche- 
prey  did  he  fall  back  from  the  other  important  pivot  of 
the  forward  position. 

Everywhere  the  struggle  became  a  soldier's  battle, 
where  the  fighting  power  of  the  individual  counted  for 
everything.  And  how  well  our  men  fought  the  Germans 
themselves  have  testified.  In  Remieres  Wood,  for  instance, 
were  found  two  men  of  a  machine-gun  crew,  killed  —  one 
with  his  finger  on  the  trigger,  the  other  with  a  feed  strip 
in  his  hand,  all  ammunition  exhausted,  but  with  a  heap 
of  dead  Germans  in  front  of  them,  stopped  by  the  two  in 


126  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

their  attempt  to  rush  the  gun.  On  the  left  eight  sole  sur- 
vivors of  a  platoon  of  "E"  Company,  which  became  in- 
volved, themselves  wounded  or  having  been  once  buried 
in  a  smashed  dugout,  fought  cheerfully  throughout  the 
day.  In  other  centers  combat  groups  were  killed,  fighting 
to  the  last  man,  at  their  posts.  Surrounded,  there  was  many 
a  lad  who,  summoned  to  surrender,  fought  with  clubbed 
and  broken  rifle,  and  when  overpowered,  still  struggled 
with  his  captors  —  as  was  told  by  the  Germans  themselves 
months  later.  For  every  prisoner  taken,  the  enemy  paid 
in  good  measure. 

Of  all  this  desperate  work  on  the  front  not  a  word  could 
•be  got  back  to  Regimental  Headquarters  for  some  time. 
Not  till  6.30  o'clock  did  the  Commander  get  definite  word 
that  Seicheprey  was  attacked ;  and  one  can  fancy  the  elec- 
trical effect  of  this  first  message,  when  the  runner,  wounded 
and  spent,  stumbled  in  with  word  that  the  enemy  infantry 
was  actually  in  the  village.  OflScers  and  scouts  sent  for- 
ward from  Beaumont  could  learn  nothing  owing  to  the 
intensity  of  the  fire,  while  the  dust  and  mist  closed  the  eyes 
of  the  observers.  What  reports  came  in  through  the  morn- 
ing were  all  of  dark  import,  indeed.  Remieres  Wood  was 
lost;  Rau,  in  Seicheprey,  was  merely  holding;  the  enemy 
had  effected  a  lodgment  between  the  two  front-line  bat- 
talions; the  French  had  been  attacked  in  Jury  Wood 
itself;  casualties  were  heavy;  oflScers  had  been  killed  or 
taken  prisoner;  the  enemy  was  attacking  in  force;  four  of 
the  machine  guns  had  been  lost  by  direct  hits  from  shell- 
fire.  At  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  situation  looked 
dark  enough.  It  appeared  that  the  front  line  had  crumbled 
away. 

Actually,  however,  long  before  this  time,  the  situation 
had  begun  to  be  righted.  But  of  this  little  could  be  sur- 
mised. The  diflSculty  of  directing  the  fight  can  be  imag- 
ined, with  Beaumont  practically  isolated,  communica- 
tions cut,  officers  and  runners  able  to  get  contact  with  the 


BOIS  BRULE  AND  SEICHEPREY  127 

front  only  by  taking  advantage  of  momentary  lulls  in  the 
continuous  bombardment  that  plastered  all  the  communi- 
cating trenches.  Coordination  of  the  infantry's  signaled 
demands  for  artillery  support  and  the  gunners'  response 
was  for  hours  impossible,  owing  to  delay  in  transmission 
from  fog,  smoke,  and  fire.  Back  at  Brigade,  Division,  and 
Corps  Headquarters,  even  greater  uncertainty  reigned. 
For,  although  information  officers  from  all  three  Staffs  and 
from  the  artillery  were  sent  at  once  to  Beaumont  and  to 
Seicheprey  to  obtain  information,  their  efforts  were  for 
hours  in  vain,  the  fierce  intensity  of  the  enemy  fire  on  all 
communications  making  traveling  slow  and  difficult. 

But  though  the  situation,  early  in  the  afternoon,  began 
to  clear  a  little,  it  appeared  grave  enough.  The  enemy  was 
still  holding  Sibille  Trench  and  part  of  Remieres  Wood  in 
force.  He  had  moved  up  large  numbers  of  troops  close 
behind  his  own  front.  He  began  anew  a  fire  for  demoli- 
tion —  this  time  on  the  wire  and  other  accessory  defenses 
of  the  main  resistance  line,  effecting  serious  breaches.  And 
this  looked  as  if  he  was  going  to  press  his  attack.  Prepara- 
tions were  at  once  made  to  meet  it  should  it  develop.  The 
3d  Battalion,  102d  Infantry,  was  brought  forward  again 
from  its  reserve  billets  to  Beaumont,  to  man  the  *'One- 
Bis"  trenches;  while  two  companies  of  the  101st  Infantry 
came  from  Raulecourt  as  reinforcements  of  the  same  line, 
along  with  the  engineer  company  already  in  Beaumont. 
From  the  Division  reserve  (104th  Infantry)  two  battal- 
ions were  put  at  the  disposal  of  General  Traub,  and  moved 
forward  within  easy  reach.  By  nightfall  these  arrange- 
ments had  been  completed.  The  regimental  commander 
of  the  102d  Infantry  was  able  to  supervise  personalh'  the 
disposition  of  the  troops;  and  was  cheered  by  a  friendly 
call  from  the  Division's  old  friend  Colonel  Bertrand,  of 
the  neighboring  162d  (French),  who  cantered  over  with 
his  adjutant  to  get  in  closer  touch,  through  the  eager  shell- 
ing of  enemy  sniping  batteries,  as  happy  as  a  boy  to  be 


128  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

in  action,  though  annoyed  by  his  fine  mount's  being  both- 
ered by  the  gun-fire. 

By  evening,  iiowever,  it  appeared  evident  that  a  further 
German  attack  was  stayed,  at  least  for  the  moment.  Our 
artillery  had  landed  on  his  reserves  massed  in  Saint-Baus- 
sant  with  deadly  effect.  His  own  continued  its  punishing 
fire,  but  with  slackened  intensity ;  his  infantry  was  making 
no  forward  movement.  Along  the  front  there  was  much 
sniping  activity,  but  nothing  else. 

With  that  negative  information  one  was  forced  to  be 
content,  since  no  word  had  come  back  to  Headquarters 
from  the  three  sets  of  combat  patrols  which  had  been  sent 
forward  to  gain  contact  and  bring  back  information.  The 
Corps  had  planned  a  counter-attack  in  some  force  should 
the  enemy  still  be  within  our  outpost  line  on  the  morning 
of  the  21st,  to  check,  before  it  started,  any  effort  on  his 
part  to  gain  a  further  advantage.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  20th  the  memorandum  containing  the  outline  of  this 
project  had  come  down  to  the  102d  Infantry,  four  com- 
panies of  which  regiment  were  to  make  the  attack  in  con- 
junction with  two  French  companies  on  the  right.  The  ob- 
jectives were  to  be  Sibille  Trench  and  Remieres  Wood,  if 
reports  of  patrols  should  show  that  any  portion  of  our  line 
was  still  in  enemy  hands. 

General  Traub  (commanding  the  51st  Infantry  Bri- 
gade) was  charged  with  the  detailed  preparation  of  the 
plan;  but,  actually,  since  the  Corps  Commander  in  person 
and  his  staff  were  in  and  out  of  Brigade  Headquarters  all 
day  with  volleys  of  orders,  advice,  recommendations,  and 
instructions,  a  large  part  of  the  study  of  the  situation  and 
the  framing  of  the  proper  orders  was  taken  out  of  General 
Traub's  hands  by  higher  authority.  Division  Headquarters 
had  little  to  do  in  the  Seicheprey  fight  from  beginning  to 
end,  so  localized  was  it.  Calls  for  extra  ammunition,  for 
new  Chauchat  automatics,  and  for  rations,  however,  were 
promptly  met  as  fast  as  they  were  received  from  the  102d 


BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  129 

Infantry;  and  several  times  the  supply  trucks  or  side  cars 
ran  the  gantlet  of  the  enemy  bombardment  to  fetch  for- 
ward the  necessary  supplies.  The  Division  Commander 
was  in  close  personal  touch,  however;  and  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  just  assigned,  was  forward  in  Beaumont  during  a 
good  part  of  the  critical  day,  for  observation  of  the  situ- 
ation. 

All  through  the  evening  plans  for  the  counter-attack 
were  made,  changed,  amended.  A  battalion  commander 
from  the  102d  Infantry  was  selected  by  General  Traub  on 
his  own  responsibility  as  most  suitable  to  lead  the  attack. 
Toward  11.30  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  brigade  attack 
order  was  given  him,  with  final  instructions.  Briefly,  the 
order  contemplated  an  artillery  preparation  of  half  an 
hour,  to  be  followed  by  the  advance  of  the  four  companies, 
with  the  French  on  the  right,  at  4.30  o'clock.  The  parallel 
of  departure  was  fixed  in  the  vicinity  of  the  crossing  of  the 
Seicheprey-Beaumont  road  and  the  "One-Bis"  trench  lines, 
approximately;  details  of  the  attack  were  to  be  arranged 
by  the  commander  of  the  party;  and  these  he  completed 
after  conference  with  the  commander  of  the  102d  Infantry 
ill  Beaumont  soon  after  midnight.  The  company  com- 
manders were  notified  of  the  project,  and  given  directions 
for  the  assembly.  All  appeared  to  be  well  in  preparation, 
with  one  important  exception.  The  Corps  had  expressly 
prescribed  that  the  attack  should  be  dependent  on  the 
reports  of  patrols  as  to  whether  elements  of  our  front  line 
were  still  occupied  by  the  enemy;  and  all  night  long  no 
reports  came  in.  Three  sets  of  patrols  had  gone  out,  earlier 
in  the  day,  from  Battalion  and  Regimental  Headquarters; 
but  such  were  the  difficulties  of  getting  about  their  re- 
ports were  incredibly  slow  in  getting  back.  A  final  patrol, 
divided  into  two  parties,  was  ordered  forward  by  General 
Traub,  at  2  o'clock,  with  the  idea  that  their  work  could  be 
done  and  their  reports  returned  in  time  to  furnish  a  basis  for 
the  scheduled  attack  at  4.30  — an  absolute  impossibihty. 


130  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

By  this  silence  of  the  scouts  the  attack  commander 
allowed  himself  to  be  unduly  influenced.  Displaying  com- 
mendable energy  at  first,  he  presently,  attaching  too  much 
importance  to  a  delay  in  the  arrival  of  his  companies  at 
tlie  starting-place,  and  the  absence  of  authentic  news  from 
the  front,  as  well  as  by  what  he  considered  an  incomplete 
equipment  for  his  troops,  sent  back  word  to  Regimental 
Headquarters  expressing  a  doubt  that  he  could  make  the 
attack  at  all.  And  finally,  a  short  half-hour  before  his  at- 
tack was  scheduled  to  start,  he  took  the  extreme  responsi- 
bility of  disobeying  explicit  orders,  and  called  the  opera- 
tion off.  In  point  of  fact,  the  last  groups  of  enemy  raiders, 
exhausted  and  spent,  had  crept  back  to  their  own  lines 
with  the  fall  of  darkness;  but  this  was  not  known  positively. 
Promptly  on  the  appointed  minute  the  French  companies 
moved  out  from  Jury  Wood,  covered  by  a  patrol  which 
the  Seicheprey  battahon  sent  to  protect  their  left  flank. 
Promptly  the  artillery  dropped  the  prescribed  barrier  fire 
across  the  area  it  was  expected  our  infantry  would  traverse 
in  its  advance.  But  all  to  no  purpose.  As  soon  as  they 
saw  that  our  troops  had  not  started,  the  French  halted. 
The  whole  operation,  planned  with  such  solicitude  by  all 
concerned,  ended  in  a  complete  breakdown.  The  leader's 
excuse  was  that  he  believed  General  Traub  would  have 
changed  his  orders  had  he  (the  General)  been  cognizant 
of  the  changed  conditions.  Promptly  court-martialed, 
however,  for  disobedience  of  orders,  and  convicted,  the 
officer  (who  had  long  been  suspected  by  his  intimates  of 
not  being  quite  sound  mentally),  ended  a  creditable  army 
career  in  obscurity,  carrying  the  burden  of  blame  for  a 
fiasco,  which  a  better  intelligence  service,  or  a  better 
estimate  of  the  situation  by  highest  authority,  perhaps 
might  have  averted. 

Any  review  of  the  fight  at  Seicheprey  is  like  to  reach 
only  one  general  conclusion.  The  balance  of  profit  lay  with 
the  American  troops.  The  moral  advantage  remained  with 


30IS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  131 

the  Division.  Unquestionably,  the  Germans  won  material 
successes.  They  took  about  130  prisoners,  inckiding  sev- 
eral oflficers;  two  infantry  companies  and  a  machine-gun 
company  were  reduced  by  more  than  fifty  per  cent  in 
strength.  Certain  sections  of  our  advanced  line  were  pene- 
trated, after  a  devastating  bombardment;  the  organized 
defense  of  the  sector  was  thrown  temporarily  into  con- 
fusion; the  German  planes  were  masters  of  the  air,  whether 
for  directing  artillery  fire  or  for  employing  machine-gun 
fire  themselves.  As  a  raid,  the  operation  succeeded  hand- 
somely. 

Certain  points  of  weakness  developed  also  in  the  Ameri- 
can organization.  For  instance,  a  shortage  of  ammunition 
for  certain  batteries  occurred  rather  early  in  the  action  — • 
not  so  serious,  however,  that  the  volume  of  fire  was  ap- 
preciably affected.^  Patrolling  to  the  front  did  not  bring 
back  promptly  information  which  could  immediately  be 
made  use  of  to  advantage.  Communication  between  in- 
fantry and  artillery  was  uncertain  and  slow;  the  air  service 
was  of  little  use;  other  means  of  information  were  insuffi- 
cient to  meet  the  emergency. 

But  the  moral  advantage  —  which,  in  war,  is  the  finally 
determining  element  —  rested  with  the  Americans.  They 
sufiPered;  they  lost  prisoners;  but  the  losses  they  inflicted 
on  the  enemy  were  exceedingly  heavy.  Upwards  of  150 
dead  were  left  for  our  troops  to  bury;  the  German  official 
report  admitted  upwards  of  COO  casualties;  the  enemy 
abandoned  a  large  amount  of  valuable  material  on  the 
field.  The  mission  of  the  American  troops — to  fight  to 
the  death  in  place  without  reinforcement  — was  performed; 
the  enemy  was  driven  out  of  Seichcprcy  and  Remieres 
Wood  by  bloody,  hand-to-hand  fighting.  A  Sturmhataillon, 
backed  by  other  troops  of  long  experience,  yielded  before 
the  courage,  tenacity,  and  fighting  spirit  of  some  despised 

'  The  51st  Artillery  Brigade  fired  approximately  25,000  rounds  on  the  day  of 
April  20-21,  far  in  excess  of  its  normal  allowance. 


132  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

New  England  militia.  Stunned  by  a  bombardment  of  ter- 
rific intensity,  their  defenses  in  ruins,  with  no  hope  of  rein- 
forcement, with  only  an  uncertain  connection  with  their 
artillery,  the  Yankee  infantry  recovered  its  organization 
and  fought  successfully  to  a  stand-up  finish.  Its  fighting 
edge  was  merely  tempered  by  the  fire;  the  blows  it  dealt 
the  enemy  were  the  stronger,  as  they  felt  the  enemy's 
strength  the  greater.  Choked  by  gas,  blinded  by  fog  and 
smoke,  the  gunners,  ambulance-drivers,  runners,  signal- 
men, and  caisson-drivers  went  about  their  tasks  with  per- 
fect coolness  and  courage,  under  the  heaviest  bombard- 
ments, as  only  men  can  work  to  whom  duty  and  pride  are 
the  sole  considerations.  The  troops  came  out  of  Seicheprey 
bruised  and  bleeding;  but  their  heads  were  held  high. 

Interesting  sidelights  on  the  Seicheprey  fight  developed 
later.  The  first  considerable  engagement  fought  alone  by 
American  troops  in  France,  the  contest  took  on  an  unex- 
pected value  in  stimulating  interest  in  America  over  sub- 
scriptions to  the  third  popular  loan  for  the  expenses  of  the 
war,  full  accounts  of  the  valor  of  the  New  England  troops 
being  sent  home  at  once,  through  official  channels. 

Another  sidelight  was  that  cast  by  the  captors  of  some 
of  the  officers  of  the  102d  Infantry,  in  conversation  with 
our  men.  To  them  the  Germans  revealed  complacently 
the  efficiency  of  their  intelligence  service  in  the  La  Reine 
Sector  —  telling  how  their  men,  fluent  in  English  and  wear- 
ing American  uniforms,  had  made  their  way  into  our  lines 
for  brief  stays,  mingled  with  our  units,  by  asserting  that 
they  belonged  to  a  neighboring  regiment,  and  proved  this 
by  relating  to  our  captured  officers  many  anecdotes  of 
the  American  company  kitchens  and  mess-line  gossip, 
asking  for  this  or  that  sergeant  or  cook  by  their  nicknames, 
and  so  on.  Incidents  such  as  General  Traub's  having  been 
shelled  out  of  his  Headquarters  in  Ansauville  were  com- 
mon talk;  information  regarding  the  American  organiza- 
tion was  complete  and  carefully  charted,  the  only  error 


BOIS  BRULfi  AND  SEICHEPREY  133 

being  in  the  number  of  automatic  rifles  allowed  to  an  in- 
fantry company.  It  was  as  disconcerting  as  it  was  amazing. 
Wrong,  however,  was  the  German  estimate  of  the  number 
of  American  troops  in  France  —  they  appeared  to  have 
no  idea  of  what  actually  was  being  accomplished  in  the 
matter  of  building  and  transporting  an  army.  Sincere  ap- 
parently was  their  respect  for  the  prowess  of  the  American 
fighting  man;  respectful  indeed  were  their  remarks  con- 
cerning the  power  and  accuracy  of  the  American  artillery. 
The  German  press  might  sneer  as  it  w^ould  about  the  effort 
of  the  United  States  to  assist  her  Allies;  the  men  "up 
front"  knew  that  their  new  adversaries,  as  tried  out  in 
Bois  Brule  and  Seicheprey,  while  not  yet  expert  soldiers, 
were  dangerous  in  a  stand-up  fight. 


w 


CHAPTER  IX 

DAY  BY  DAY  IN  THE  LA  REINE  SECTOR 
HAT  influences,  other  than  fighting,  were  at  work 


at  this  time,  to  shape  the  Division's  character,  and 
to  spread  its  reputation?  Like  any  other  Hving  thing  with 
a  soul  and  a  spirit,  a  combat  unit,  such  as  the  Twenty- 
Sixth,  is  always  taking  color  from  its  surroundings;  upon 
its  inherited  traits  are  grafted  constantly  the  growths 
sprung  from  environment  and  circumstance.  One  thinks 
of  a  Division,  not  as  a  community,  but  as  an  individual. 

Perhaps  we  should  consider  in  this  connection  how  the 
system  of  promotions  and  replacements,  put  into  opera- 
tion late  in  the  winter,  came  to  affect  this  unit  of  the  Ex- 
peditionary Force. 

As  originally  published,  orders  with  respect  to  filling 
vacancies  prescribed  that  (a)  those  vacancies  caused  by 
casualties'  in  combat  should  be  filled  one  third  by  promo- 
tion, and  two  thirds  by  replacements,  and  (b)  all  other 
vacancies  should  be  filled  by  replacements.  The  result 
was  to  block  the  promotion  of  any  captain  of  a  combat 
regiment  unless  all  the  majors  were  killed  or  wounded; 
until  three  of  the  lieutenant-colonels  of  infantry  of  a  Divi- 
sion were  battle  casualties,  no  major  could  be  moved  up; 
in  the  non-commissioned  grades  a  similar  difficulty  stood 
in  the  way  of  promoting  a  likely  corporal.  Naturally,  va- 
cancies caused  by  death  or  wounds  were  fewer  than  those 
caused  by  other  reasons;  but  to  positions  made  vacant  by 
the  dispatch  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  to 
the  United  States,  to  schools,  to  hospital  for  sickness  or 
injury,  or  by  transfer,  no  candidate  from  a  lower  grade 
could  be  promoted  in  any  event. 

Thus  a  traditional  and  satisfactory  reward  for  good  con- 


DAY  BY  DAY  IN  LA  REINE  SECTOR  135 

duct  was  practically  inhibited ;  an  effective  stimulus  to  ex- 
ceptional effort  was  taken  away;  ambition  was  deadened. 
Illustrative  were  the  cases  of  two  infantry  captains  in  one 
regiment  in  the  Division.  Their  respective  battalion  com- 
manders having  been  transferred  in  November,  1917,  a 
few  weeks  after  arrival  in  France,  one  to  staff  duty,  another 
to  the  Provost  Marshal's  department,  the  two  captains 
were  each  given  charge  of  a  battalion,  and  led  their  units 
with  enthusiasm,  competency,  and  devotion  through  the 
training  period,  the  Chemin  des  Dames  experience,  the 
front-line  work  of  the  La  Reine  Sector,  and  the  Aisne- 
Marne  offensive  of  July,   without  promotion,   although 
repeatedly  recommended  for  advancement  on  the  basis 
of  meritorious  conduct  in  the  field.  More  than  that,  to 
one  of  these  battalions  were  sent  from  the  replacement 
depots  no  fewer  than  three  majors,  one  after  the  other, 
whose  complete  inexperience  in  the  field  and  utter  incom- 
petence required  their  relief  after  the  briefest  period  pos- 
sible. Of  other  replacement  officers  assigned  to  the  Divi- 
sion under  the  operation  of  the  system  —  to  mention  only 
those  of  high  rank  —  one  was  relieved  as  the  result  of 
the  findings  of  a  board  of  inquiry;  another  was  relieved 
because  his  sanity  was  in  question;  a  third  was  trans- 
ferred to  duty  with  a  chain  of  army  laundries;  a  fourth 
was  so  incompetent  that  only  the  loyalty  of  his  adjutant 
and  operations  oflBcer  carried  him  through  at  all.  And  these 
were  all  officers  of  the  Regular  estabhshment,  whose  assign- 
ment to  the  command  of  regiments  blocked  absolutely  the 
promotion  of  field  officers  who  had  carried  the  battalions 
through  months  of  front-line  fighting  and  a  half-dozen 
movements  by  rail  or  road.  It  speaks  highly,  indeed,  for 
the  soldierly  qualities  of  the  officers  thus  passed  over  that 
in  not  a  single  case  did  they  waver  from  their  steady  work 
for  the  common  cause  and  for  the  reputation  of  their  units. 
This  feature  of  the  replacement  system  was  less  objec- 
tionable, however,  than  the  fact  that  an  adequate  number 


136  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

of  substitutes  was  not  furnished  for  the  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  who  left  the  Division  for  other  duty 
or  as  hospital  cases.  These  men  were  lost  to  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  for  good.  Once  a  wounded  man  got  back  into  the 
base  hospitals,  he  never  came  back  to  his  old  command, 
save  in  rare  instances.  Attached,  upon  recovery,  to  a  re- 
placement battalion,  he  was  transferred  far  and  near. 
Causing  great  disappointment  to  the  individual,  the  rule 
worked  badly  also  in  that  the  morale  of  the  whole  Divi- 
sion was  affected  by  the  knowledge  that  it  could  not  get 
its  own  old  men  back.  It  is  difficult  to  understand,  even 
at  this  distance,  the  advantages  of  a  system  which  denied 
the  natural  desire  to  be,  in  the  case  of  any  individual, 
closely  and  continually  identified  with  his  own  company, 
regiment,  or  division.  Combat  regulations  emphasized 
the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  identity  of  all  units, 
from  the  squad  upwards,  recognizing  the  immense  value 
to  discipline  and  fighting  spirit  that  results  from  com- 
panionship and  intimacy.  But  the  replacement  orders 
effected  a  complete  reversal  of  this  principle.  It  was  hard 
to  get  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  had  the  problem 
of  providing  replacements,  not  only  for  a  single  division, 
but  for  an  enormous  and  most  complex  force.  It  was  un- 
fortunately easy  to  raise  the  cry  that,  here  again,  was  be- 
ing manifested  a  desire  on  the  part  of  General  Headquar- 
ters to  break  down  the  identity  of  a  National  Guard  Di- 
vision. The  rumor  received,  indeed,  wide  currency  among 
the  French,  even  at  this  early  date,  that  the  Twenty-Sixth 
was  being  badly  treated  in  this  matter  of  replacements 
and  promotions  for  the  further  reason  that  the  Division 
Commander  was  not  au  mieux  at  General  Headquarters  — 
so  swift  is  gossip,  even  among  troops  in  the  field. 

One  would  wish  to  dismiss  summarily  the  rumor  of  a 
certain  animus  against  the  Division  at  General  Head- 
quarters. It  is  deeply  to  be  regretted  that  such  gossip  ever 
gained  credence,  for  its  effect  on  all  concerned  was  not 


DAY  BY  DAY  IN  LA  REINE  SECTOR  137 

good.  There  should  be  no  room  for  exploiting  personal 
grievances,  or  personal  grudges,  within  sound  of  the  guns. 
Not  that  it  is  difficult  to  understand  the  attitude  of  either 
the  Division  or  of  General  Headquarters  —  the  one  very 
jealous  of  its  identity,  very  loyal  to  its  Commander,  feel- 
ing itself  a  little  distinct  from  other  less  experienced  divi- 
sions, especially  beloved  by  the  French;  the  other  unwill- 
ing to  show  favors,  and  hence  perhaps  inclined  to  enforce 
its  orders  with  special  stress  on  any  Division  which  thought 
well  of  itself.  It  is  possible,  should  personal  differences 
have  existed  between  the  Division  Commander  and  high 
ranking  officers  at  General  Headquarters,  that  these  should 
have  been  reflected  in  the  mutual  attitude  of  the  Division 
and  the  Headquarters  Staffs.  From  whatever  source  it 
sprang,  hov/ever,  notwithstanding  the  inherent  unlikeli- 
hood of  any  rancor  existing  between  a  combat  unit  of  good 
reputation  and  its  exceedingly  capable  governing  authori- 
ties, such  a  feeling  appears  to  have  existed,  though  quite 
without  definition,  during  a  considerable  period  of  the 
Division's  service. 

The  latter  weeks  of  April  and  most  of  the  month  of  May 
passed  without  special  incident.  Twice  the  Division's  sec- 
tor limits  were  enlarged  (May  23  and  27)  toward  the  right 
(east)  until  its  right  boundary  followed  the  Noviant- 
Limey  road  and  the  eastern  edge  of  Voisogne  Wood; 
while  on  the  left  its  boundaries  were  restricted  to  the  line 
Broussey-Varge\'aux  Pond,  both  exclusive.  The  change 
was  part  of  the  general  plan  for  the  improvement  of  the 
sector's  defense,  which  had  been  under  contemplation 
ever  since  it  had  been  shown  that  the  plans  existing  when 
the  Twenty-Sixth  took  over  the  sector  were  insufficient  to 
prevent  enemy  incursions.  It  was  the  Division's  task,  now, 
to  enlarge  the  work  commenced  by  its  predecessors;  and 
comprehensive  schemes  for  new  wiring,  dugouts,  new 
trench  Hues  in  rear   (along  the  Ansauville-Bernecourt- 


138  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Raulecourt  general  line)  were  sited  and  begun,  as  well  as 
cable  trenches,  and  other  elements  of  accessory  defense. 
The  "work  maps"  at  Headquarters  showed,  as  a  result 
of  the  labors  of  the  engineers  and  large  infantry  details,  a 
daily  extension  of  new  construction. 

Commanders  of  troops  were  invited  to  submit  schemes 
looking  to  improved  tactical  dispositions.  The  situation 
was  given  most  thorough  study  by  both  the  Division  and 
the  Corps  Staffs;  and,  as  a  consequence,  there  were  certain 
changes  made  in  the  direction  of  echelonment  in  greater 
depth  and  to  insure  a  more  flexible  defensive  line.  Reliefs 
of  front-line  battalions  occurred  every  fifth  day,  the  men 
going  to  rest  billets  where  baths  and  the  steam  delousing 
machines  were  available.  In  many  directions  it  was  pos- 
sible to  set  machinery  in  motion  which  made  for  the  troops' 
increased  efficiency  and  comfort.  Sanitary  inspectors, 
dietitians,  and  experts  in  such  matters  as  record-keeping, 
paid  visits  to  all  units  at  the  front  and  made  helpful  recom- 
mendations; the  allowance  of  motor  transport  was  en- 
larged, thus  improving  the  service  of  distribution  of  ra- 
tions, forage,  and  other  supphes.  In  the  General  Staff 
sections  at  Division  Headquarters  there  was  developed  a 
quickened  energy  and  a  smoother  coordination  of  effort, 
which  was  reflected  all  through  the  organization.  For  this 
result  it  appears  that  much  credit  should  go  to  Major 
(later  Lieutenant-Colonel)  A.  L.  Pendleton,  Jr.,  Assistant 
Chief  of  Staff,  G-1,  whose  influence  had  already  been  in 
evidence  at  more  than  one  crisis  in  the  Division's  affairs. 
The  entry  on  the  scene  of  the  new  Chief  of  Staff  was  not 
without  effect,  also,  and  in  more  ways  than  one.  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel C.  M.  Dowell,  upon  being  attached  to  the 
102d  Infantry  as  second  in  command,  was  succeeded  as 
Chief  of  Staff,  on  April  18,  as  has  already  been  noted,  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  (later  Colonel)  D.  K.  Major,  Jr.  An 
infantry  officer  of  the  Regular  establishment,  a  graduate 
of  the  Leavenworth  schools,  the  newcomer  brought  to  his 


DAY  BY  DAY  IN  LA  REINE  SECTOR  139 

duties  an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  military  art  and  of 
the  theory  of  General  Staff  work,  together  with  a  tremen- 
dous capacity  for  driving  toil.  A  most  efficient  executive, 
this  officer  often  achieved  results  by  methods  somewhat 
at  variance  with  the  principles  ordinarily  accepted  as  regu- 
lating the  daily  relations  between  a  Chief  of  Staff  and 
those  about  him. 

Since  at  this  time  the  General  Staff  system  received  a 
remarkable  accession  of  influence  and  authority  in  the 
Division's  administration,  and  for  the  best,  it  may  be  not 
without  value  to  review  briefly,  at  this  point  of  the  narra- 
tive, some  of  the  objects  it  was  hoped  to  obtain  by  devel- 
oping to  the  full  the  principles  of  General  Staff  duties  laid 
down  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations. 

For  one  reason  alone  a  General  Staff  for  a  field  force  was 
regarded  as  indispensable.  Under  the  American  system 
there  had  always  existed  a  danger  that  our  field  forces 
might  be  encumbered  by  incompetent  general  officers. 
None  too  many  of  the  titular  brigade  or  division  command- 
ers of  the  Regular  Army  had  ever  led  such  bodies  of  troops, 
even  at  peace  strength,  in  peace-time  maneuvers;  with 
the  handling  of  the  large  units  of  the  1917  organization, 
they  had  no  more  than  the  textbook  acquaintance  pos- 
sessed by  any  junior.  \Miatever  their  native  ability  and 
long  service  in  all  ranks,  the  American  generals  in  France 
were,  in  the  main,  without  experience  as  field  commanders. 
Nor  could  the  Regular  Army  supply  enough  general 
officers  for  armies  of  the  size  contemplated  in  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  even  though  a  great  many  senior  field  offi- 
cers received  temporary  advancement  to  the  rank  of  brig- 
adier or  major-general;  even  though  it  was  assumed  that 
all  so  promoted  were  competent  to  command  brigades  or 
divisions  in  the  field.  It  was  feared  also  that  the  war  would 
produce  a  number  of  so-called  "political  generals,"  like 
those  of  the  Civil  War,  under  whom  the  new  armies  would 
be  saddled  with  amiable  but  probably  incompetent  oflS- 


140  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

cers  in  posts  of  high  responsibihty.  How  to  meet,  then,  this 
possible  weakness  in  High  Command?  The  answer  was 
beheved  to  be  found  in  the  creation  and  thorough  training 
of  a  large  body  of  picked,  energetic,  General  Staff  officers. 
These  surrounding  the  General  could  not  only  assist  him, 
but  also  could  direct  him,  should  his  native  skill  or  good 
fortune  ever  desert  him.  A  good  staff  could  save  the  Gen- 
eral from  obvious  mistakes  and  the  troops  from  the  hard- 
ships and  losses  incident  to  bad  leadership;  with  a  good 
staff,  the  chances  of  making  the  most  of  a  tactical  advan- 
tage, or  the  best  of  a  reverse,  were  largely  increased. 

A  danger  in  the  system  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  typical 
General  Staff  officer  tended  too  much  to  regard  the  tacti- 
cal employment,  supply,  and  administration  of  troops  in 
combat  as  a  map-problem  instead  of  an  affair  in  which 
flesh-and-blood,  the  weather,  morale,  and  the  condition 
of  the  ground  bore  all-important  parts.  Too  many  field 
orders  were  based  on  what  a  map  indicated  rather  than 
on  what  the  real  country  and  the  roads  presented.  Too 
many  field  orders  directed  operations  which  the  text- 
books, staff  manual,  and  map  all  would  agree  in  prescrib- 
ing and  approving,  but  which  exhaustion  of  the  troops,  the 
death  of  a  trusted  leader,  hunger,  or  fields  deep  in  mud — ele- 
ments unknown  to  or  disregarded  by  the  staff  officer  draft- 
ing the  order  —  rendered  impossible  of  execution  from  the 
start.  The  Staff  tended  to  abide  by  a  formula;  the  fine  mis« 
trusted  all  knowledge  save  that  based  on  intimacy  with 
present  conditions.  The  Staff  complained  justly  that  the 
line  exercised  independent  judgment,  with  resulting  con- 
fusion; the  line  asserted  that  the  Staff  issued  orders  which 
were  arrant  nonsense  —  and  here  also  there  were  facts  to 
prove  the  assertion.  In  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  how- 
ever, as  has  been  noted,  this  danger  of  mutual  misunder- 
standing was  largely  dispersed  by  the  close  friendships 
between  officers  of  both  branches,  mutual  trust,  and  a 
common  effort  to  solve  a  difficulty.  Division  Headquarters 


DAY  BY  DAY  IN  LA  REINE  SECTOR  141 

had  no  reason,  for  instance,  for  dictating  to  the  artillery 
or  engineers;  field  orders  affecting  the  infantry  were  based 
on  accurate  knowledge  of  what  the  infantry  could  do. 

And  the  soundness  of  the  general  system,  whatever  the 
local  mistakes,  is  incontestable.  That  business-like  meth- 
ods, sound  knowledge  of  theory,  wide  vision,  energy,  and 
tact  are  elements  in  the  conduct  of  troops  in  the  field  quite 
as  important  as  courage,  patience,  and  quick  thinking,  is 
recognized  everywhere.  To  capitalize  these  qualities  was 
the  object  of  the  General  Staff  training,  all  the  way 
through. 

To  train  competent  assistants  and  understudies  for 
staff  duties,  there  were  detailed  to  Division  Headquarters 
at  this  time,  and  later,  a  considerable  number  of  junior 
officers  from  line  organizations.  It  was  the  belief  of  the 
Division  Commander  that  officers  who  had  served  in  the 
field  with  troops  in  subordinate  positions  were  best  quali- 
fied to  work,  later,  in  staff  positions.  And  this  principle 
was  pursued  throughout  the  Division's  tour  of  service. 
After  each  major  engagement  there  were  attached  for 
longer  or  shorter  periods  to  Headquarters,  two  or  three 
Heutenants  or  captains  who  had  done  well  in  the  strain 
of  work  with  their  platoons  or  batteries,  in  action. 

Important  changes  in  officers  of  the  Staff,  between  April 
and  June,  included  the  substitution  of  Major  W.  Krueger 
for  Major  A.  A.  Maybach,  as  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 
G-3,  who  in  turn  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.  S.  Bowen.  Captain  the  Reverend  M.  J.  O'Connor,  for- 
merly chaplain  of  the  101st  Infantry,  became  Divisional 
Chaplain.  The  work  of  the  Division  Adjutant's  office  was 
simplified  by  the  appointment  of  a  Personnel  Adjutant, 
while  similar  officers  (in  charge  of  service  records,  pay, 
casualty  and  sick  reports,  and  the  like)  were  assigned  to 
each  Regimental  Headquarters.  The  intelligence  service 
was  also  put  on  a  most  satisfactory  basis,  the  entire  work 
of  obtaining  information  of  the  enemy,  from  patrols  to 


142  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

balloon  observation,  from  listening-posts  to  examination 
of  prisoners,  being  carefully  organized  from  a  central  au- 
thority (Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2),  by  whom  reports 
were  collated,  information  analyzed,  and  daily  bulletins 
issued.  A  similar  duty,  applying  to  operations,  was  per- 
formed by  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3,  from  close 
daily  contact  with  the  front  line,  daily  reports,  and  fre- 
quent personal  inspections.  Every  day,  also,  saw  the  Di- 
vision Commander  well  forward,  often  in  the  most  ad- 
vanced positions,  to  secure  first-hand  information  of  the' 
daily  situation  of  his  infantry,  artillery,  and  machine- 
gunners.  Improvement  was  made  with  respect  to  both 
the  artillery  and  transport  animals,  though  at  all  times  — 
as  commonly  in  the  Expeditionary  Force  —  it  was  neces- 
sary to  contend  against  the  twofold  problem  of  inadequate 
numbers  and  indifferent  condition.  About  the  time  the 
Division  entered  the  La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector,  several 
small  issues  of  French  draft  stock  were  received ;  and  then 
it  was  that  the  infection  of  French  mange  began  to  spread 
seriously.  Successful  efforts  were  made,  however,  to  check 
the  disease.  A  dipping  vat  was  erected  at  Sanzey,  in  charge 
of  the  Mobile  Veterinary  Unit;  and  here  all  horses  and 
mules  were  plunged  in  an  antiseptic  bath,  at  least  four 
times.  And  this  treatment,  combined  with  efficient  groom- 
ing and  clipping  and  improved  stabling,  had  the  effect 
of  practically  stamping  out  the  mange  before  the  Division 
left  the  sector.  The  problem  was  complicated,  however, 
by  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  good,  well-drained  horse 
standings  or  sufficient  forage. 

About  this  time  also  was  organized  the  Division  "show," 
to  borrow  a  term  from  the  British.  The  experience  of  the 
latter  had  taught  that  a  good  vaudeville  or  comedy  troupe, 
presenting  a  lively  stage  entertainment,  was  a  very  valu- 
able asset  in  every  division.  And  so  the  Twenty-Sixth,  in 
accordance  with  orders  from  higher  authority,  was  early 
in  creating  such  an  organization  out  of  the  talent  available 


DAY  BY  DAY  IN  LA  REINE  SECTOR  143 

in  its  ranks.  The  **YT)  Show"  grew  and  prospered,  first 
under  the  direction  of  Captain  A.  L.  Forde,  later  under 
Lieutenant  J.  P.  King.  Its  first  performance  was  held  on 
June  27,  in  the  municipal  theater  at  Toul,  the  affair  being 
enhvened  by  the  enemy  having  chosen  that  evening  for  a 
bombing  raid  on  the  city.  Again  and  again,  the  "show" 
proved  a  great  help  in  bringing  an  hour  of  laughter  to  the 
troops,  often  in  time  of  greatest  strain. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE 

MOST  of  May  passed  uneventfully,  so  far  as  encoun-. 
ters  with  the  enemy  were  concerned.  No  activities 
on  either  side  were  marked  in  the  daily  operations  reports, 
save  occasional  clashes  of  patrols.  There  was  considerable 
activity  in  the  air;  on  several  occasions  enemy  planes  re- 
leased small  paper  balloons  which,  falling  to  earth,  were 
found  to  contain  most  unimpressive  propaganda.  Great 
efforts  were  made  by  our  people  to  secure  prisoners,  the 
ambushes  being  laid  for  this  purpose  almost  every  night 
in  such  localities  as  Bois  des  Elfes  (Wood  of  the  Elves), 
w^hich,  like  so  many  other  sinister,  black  holes  along  the 
battle  fronts,  seemed  to  rejoice  in  the  quaint  inappropriate- 
ness  of  its  charming  name. 

But  one  should  understand  just  what  is  meant  by  the 
technical  term  "quiet  sector,"  which  the  La  Reine  (Boucq) 
Sector  is  officially  credited  with  being.  The  phrase  is  em- 
ployed simply  to  designate  those  parts  of  the  battle  front 
where  operations  of  importance  are  not  being  undertaken. 
"Quiet"  does  not,  by  any  means,  imply  absence  of  hos- 
tile action.  There  were  certain  sectors  in  the  Vosges  where 
neither  side  was  active  for  weeks,  it  is  true;  but  the  calm  of 
those  regions  must  not  be  taken  as  extending  to  fronts 
like  the  La  Reine  Sector.  Here  the  "quiet"  was,  to  say 
the  least,  relative.  The  casualty  jSgures  for  April,  May, 
and  June,  those  months  when  the  Twenty-Sixth  occupied 
this  part  of  the  line,  are  illustrative: 

April  May  June 

Killed 148  167  89 

Wounded 504  151  259 

Gassed 250  226  875 

Missing 162  57  3 

Total  casualties 1064     601     1226 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE  145 

The  laconic  bulletins  sent  daily  to  the  War  Department 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  concerning  the  Division  are 
also  interesting  as  throwing  light  on  life  in  a  quiet  sector. 
Following  are  examples  from  the  communiques  of  June : 

June  1,  1918.  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  May  31st  to  June  1st, 
noon  to  noon.  General  impression  quiet.  Total  of  hostile  shells 
1060.  Enemy  apparently  using  a  15-centimeter  heavy  field 
howitzer. 

June  16, 1918.  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  June  13th  to  June  14th, 
noon  to  noon;  there  was  little  activity  of  any  description.  The 
hostile  batteries  used  about  1000  shells  of  which  about  250  con- 
tained gas.  The  enemy  planes  were  fairly  active,  a  total  of  21  be- 
ing seen.  Of  these  13  were  within  our  territory.  Our  patrols  were 
very  active  and  on  several  occasions  drew  rifle  and  grenade  fire 
from  the  hostile  trenches. 

June  23,  1918.  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  June  20th  to  June 
21st,  noon  to  noon;  hostile  artillery  still  active  but  less  so  than 
during  last  few  days.  Intermittent  shelling  of  the  entire  sector 
throughout  afternoon  and  evening  with  heaviest  fire  concen- 
trated on  right  and  center.  On  the  left  Xivray  bombarded  with 
high  explosives  and  gas.  Total  number  of  shells  used  1800. 

June  24,  1918.  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  June  21st  to  June 
22d,  noon  to  noon;  the  day  was  quiet  except  for  a  rather  hea\'y 
harassing  fire  executed  by  the  hostile  batteries.  A  total  of  1450 
rounds,  mostly  small  caliber  including  a  little  gas,  were  used  by 
the  enemy.  The  fire  was  distributed  over  most  of  the  Sector. 

June  26,  1918.  Twenty-Sixth  Division:  Daily  average  1800 
rounds.  Maximum  for  one  day  6000  rounds,  fired  on  June  19th. 
Minimum  for  one  day  300  rounds,  fired  on  June  21st. 

Not  till  May  27  did  any  important  event  occur  in  the 
comparative  monotony  above  described. 

It  has  been  noted  that  the  line  held  by  the  Division 
was  extended  easterly  to  include  Jury  Wood  and  Hazelle 
Wood  near  Flirey,  where  we  relieved  the  French.  The  first 
troops  to  occupy  the  new  sub-sector  were  the  101st  In- 
fantry, with  Head(iuarters  in  Bernecourt.^  And  on  the 
very  night  when  these  changes  in  disposition  were  being 

'  The  left  of  the  sector  in  the  vicinity  of  Apremont,  as  far  as  Broussey,  was 
taken  over  by  French  Colonial  troops  at  the  same  time. 


146  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

made,  the  enemy  broke  his  long  silence.  Late  in  the  after- 
noon of  May  26  batteries  of  the  101st  Field  Artillery  allo- 
cated to  the  new  sub-sector  were  taken  to  their  new  posi- 
tions and  quickly  registered;  and  scarcely  had  the  front- 
line infantry  battalion  ^  entered  the  outpost  trenches  that 
same  night,  relieving  the  French,  even  before  the  men  had 
unslung  their  packs,  when  the  Germans  sent  over  a  raid. 
A  party  about  125  strong,  from  the  100th  Regiment, 
Fortieth  Division,  newly  arrived  from  the  Russian  front, 
advanced  against  our  lines  in  Humbert  Plantation  from 
a  ravine  opposite  Flirey,  at  2  a.m.,  May  27.  They  came  on 
singing.  Under  excellent  artillery  protection  they  worked 
along  in  two  groups,  the  one  driving  straight  at  our  front, 
the  other  endeavoring  to  enter  our  trenches  in  flank  and 
rear.  But  the  raiders  accomplished  nothing  beyond  the 
infliction  of  slight  losses  (three  killed;  several  wounded). 
And  since,  in  exchange,  they  left  twenty  dead  behind,  as 
well  as  two  wounded  prisoners,  it  could  hardly  be  said  that 
the  operation  was  a  complete  success  from  a  German 
standpoint.  The  affair  was  over  in  a  few  minutes,  the  en- 
emy simply  making  a  dash  into  our  lines  and  a  quick  with- 
drawal. The  most  notable  feature,  perhaps,  was  the  prompt 
and  eflScient  support  given  by  our  artillery,  which  had 
been  taken  into  the  sub-sector  so  short  a  time  before  the 
enemy's  attack  developed.  Remarkable,  too,  in  a  sense, 
was  the  heavy  fire  of  both  artillery  and  machine  guns 
which  the  enemy  laid  down  on  the  Humbert  Plantation 
trenches  continually  for  two  days  following  the  raid.  It 
seemed  in  some  of  its  phases  like  the  "counter-prepara- 
tion" fire  which  is  delivered  on  an  adversary  who  is  about 
to  start  an  attack;  and  one  wondered  what  the  Germans 
suspected  our  troops  were  planning. 

What  actually  was  in  hand  by  way  of  an  enterprise 
against  the  adversary  was  not  developed  at  this  time, 
nor  at  the  place  where  he  appears  to  have  expected  the 

1  I/lOl  Infantry. 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  ]VL\Y  AND  JUNE  147 

Americans  to  come  over.  Early  in  the  month,  when  all  was 
quietest,  word  was  whispered  down  to  the  regimental  com^ 
manders  and  their  intelligence  officers  that  minute  recon- 
naissance should  be  made  of  the  enemy  defenses  about 
Richecourt,  along  the  stream  of  the  Rupt  de  Mad.  It  was 
time  our  troops  did  something  "on  their  own";  they  must 
not  be  content  to  have  repelled  two  stiff  attacks  and  then 
merely  stand  watch  over  their  defenses.  They  must  not 
lose  the  spirit  of  enterprise  and  initiative,  which  alone 
makes  fighting  men. 

After  days  of  reconnaissance  both  aerial  and  by  patrols, 
study  of  photographs,  efforts  to  gain  complete  knowledge 
of  the  Richecourt  defenses,  it  was  given  out,  under  cover 
of  the  deepest  secrecy,  that  a  large  raid  was  going  to  be 
launched  against  the  unsuspecting  garrison  of  that  par- 
ticular hornets'  nest.  From  the  101st  Infantry  were  chosen 
three  hundred  volunteers  under  Major  J.  F.  Hickey;  in 
their  support  were  detailed  detachments  of  engineers, 
signal  and  medical  troops;  reconnaissance  and  observa- 
tion were  assured  by  detachments  from  the  1st  Aero  Squad- 
ron, 94th  Pursuit  Squadron,  and  2d  Balloon  Company. 
The  usual  mission  was  assigned  —  namely,  to  make 
prisoners  and  destroy  defenses. 

Near  Aulnois  was  laid  out  a  replica  of  the  section  of 
enemy  trenches  it  was  proposed  to  raid,  together  with  a 
plan  of  approaches;  and  here  the  raiding  party  was  re- 
peatedly rehearsed.  Every  individual  was  shown  his  par- 
ticular duty;  each  squad  and  platoon  was  drilled  by  day 
and  night,  till  both  approaches  and  defense  lines  were  per- 
fectly familiar.  The  engineers  with  their  bengalore  tor- 
pedoes for  breaching  the  wire,  the  signalmen  with  wire 
reels  and  telephones,  the  infantry  with  grenades,  incen- 
diary bombs,  trench  knives,  clubs,  and  pistols  —  all  knew 
the  location  of  dugout,  shelter,  machine-gun  emplacement, 
or  command  post,  and  what  to  do  when  they  got  to  it.  Ar- 
tillery, backed  by  the  heavier  guns  of  the  Corps,  arranged 


148  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

an  elaborate  fire  of  preparation,  counter-battery,  and 
neutralization,  to  be  followed  by  a  rolling  barrage  and 
"encaging  fire  "  for  the  immediate  protection  of  the  raid- 
ers. The  enemy  in  and  about  Lahayville,  some  eleven 
hundred  yards  to  the  northeast  of  Richecourt,  down  the 
valley,  was  to  be  deluged  with  gas  as  sooil  as  the  attack 
was  fairly  under  way.  The  approach  was  to  be  made  from 
Seicheprey  in  a  northwest  direction  across  the  sub-sector 
occupied  by  the  102d  Infantry,  for  some  five  hundred 
yards  to  Richecourt,  where  a  bridge  over  the  Rupt  de  Mad 
was  to  be  destroyed. 

So  far,  so  good.  The  preparations  were  approved  by  the 
Corps,  were  made  complete  and  painstaking.  Everything 
necessary  for  the  success  of  the  raid  had  been  worked  out 
with  the  greatest  forethought.  Everything?  Hardly  that. 
For  without  secrecy  the  prospect  of  a  raid's  succeeding 
is  nothing  at  all;  and  news  of  this  Richecourt  enterprise 
leaked  far  and  wide  and  early.  War  correspondents  heard 
of  it  and  flocked  to  Beaumont,  which  had  been  designated 
as  the  place  from  which  the  raid  was  to  be  directed.  Oper- 
ations officers  and  observers  from  Corps  and  Division 
crowded  the  dugout  occupied  by  the  102d  Infantry  Head- 
quarters. There  was  a  stir  of  troops  all  through  the  little 
villages  close  behind  the  front,  like  Mandres  and  Ansau- 
ville.  In  the  early  hours  of  the  long  twilight  a  German  ob- 
servation plane,  swooping  down  recklessly  close,  directly 
over  the  raiding  party  where  it  was  assembled  for  the 
march,  took  a  long  look  which  must  have  told  the  observer 
all  he  wished  to  know. 

Exactly  at  eleven  on  the  appointed  night  the  infantry 
and  supporting  troops  were  on  the  parallel  of  departure, 
where  it  had  been  outlined  with  tape  on  the  marshy  grass- 
land west  of  Seicheprey.  And  exactly  then,  too,  began  the 
artillery  preparation.  In  the  starlit,  windless  night,  the 
spectacle  was  wonderful,  indeed  —  the  horizon  ringed  with 
flame,  the  air  alive  with  the  shrill  whine  of  the  climbing 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE  149 

shells.  For  three  hours  the  bombardment  lasted.  Then,  at 
two  o'clock,  the  barrage  was  started,  and  away  went  the 
raiders  close  behind  it.  Exactly  on  schedule  the  rocket 
flared  up  signaling  "objective  reached."  The  men  method- 
ically proceeded  about  their  work  of  bombing  the  bridge, 
the  German  dugouts,  and  seeking  prisoners.  With  only 
one  killed  and  two  seriously  wounded,  the  party  coursed 
through  the  Richecourt  trenches,  meeting  no  resistance, 
and  inflicting  a  loss  on  the  enemy  of  at  least  forty  killed 
and  wounded.  And  the  raiders  got  one  prisoner  —  a  lad 
of  sixteen,  the  worst-scared  boy  on  the  whole  Western 
Front  that  night,  together  with  a  machine  gun  and  some 
other  material  of  less  value.  Elated  and  excited,  as  only 
successful  troops  can  be,  the  party  returned  —  nor  was 
it  noticed  that  many  were  coughing  in  a  way  that  boded 
ill.  But  a  few  hours  suflSced  to  bring  to  light  the  other  side 
of  the  picture.  A  complete  success,  so  far  as  smooth  opera- 
tion and  accomplished  mission  were  concerned,  the  "mil- 
lion-dollar raid,"  so  called  from  the  vast  expenditure  of 
artillery  ammunition,  contributed  to  the  Division's  edu- 
cation two  points  which  cost  rather  dearly.  The  first  was 
that  the  normal  garrison  of  an  outpost  line  like  that  at 
Richecourt,  warned  in  advance  of  an  impending  raid,  is 
drawn  away  before  the  attack  is  launched,  so  that  the 
raiders  can  make  at  best  only  an  insignificant  haul  of 
prisoners.  There  appears  to  be  little  doubt  but  what  Ric- 
key's men  were  expected;  the  attempts  at  secrecy,  when 
the  raid  was  in  preparation,  came  to  naught.  The  second 
point  was  taught  by  the  fact  that  hardly  a  man  of  the 
raiding  party  escaped  the  effects  of  the  gas  released  on 
Lahayville,  one  thousand  yards  away,  by  our  artillery. 
The  distance  was  believed  to  be  perfectly  safe,  in  the 
judgment  of  experts;  but  some  slight  air  current,  perhaps 
the  mere  conformation  of  the  ground,  was  sufficient  to 
roll  back  the  deadly  gas  on  our  own  troops,  who  in  the 
excitement  did  not  perceive  its  presence.  A  searching  in- 


150  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

vestigation  followed  this  mishap  which  exonerated  the  ar- 
tillery; but  this  could  not  restore  the  scores  of  men  who 
had  suffered. 

For  any  of  a  dozen  reasons,  however,  the  enemy  must 
not  be  allowed  any  repose.  It  was  not  enough  to  harass 
him  with  artillery  fire,  to  annoy  his  outposts  by  daring 
patrols,  or  even  to  do  him  such  damage  as  was  accom- 
plished in  the  raid  of  May  30.  He  must  be  made  to  feel  that 
the  Americans  were  vigilant,  aggressive,  dangerous.  Con- 
sequently, a  new  attack  was  sent  against  his  lines  within 
a  week  after  the  Richecourt  affair.  This  time  the  secret 
was  well  kept.  In  Jury  Wood,  opposite  a  salient  of  the 
German  line  which  girdled  the  wicked  depths  of  Sonnard 
Wood,  was  installed  at  vast  labor  a  battery  of  projectors 
in  charge  of  the  Gas  and  Flame  Regiment  —  mysterious 
fellows,  of  whom  one  always  expected  the  newest  and  the 
deadliest  methods  of  warfare.  Some  ninety  of  these  devices 
were  tucked  away  in  the  underbrush,  each  ready  to  shoot 
many  pounds  of  gas  in  the  form  of  a  projectile  with  a  time 
fuse,  all  fired  together,  and  intended  to  smother  Sonnard 
Wood  with  its  nests  of  field  guns  and  assembly  places.  For 
some  nights,  however,  the  weather  conditions  were  unfavor- 
able; but  just  before  dawn  on  June  6  our  troops  were  drawn 
back  from  the  forward  lines  in  Jury  Wood,  under  protection 
of  a  covering  force,  and  the  projectors  were  fired.  Heavy,  in- 
deed, was  the  enemy  loss,  for,  as  was  learned  later,  the 
deadly  gas  fell  full  on  an  infantry  battalion  moving  in. 
Just  what  the  German  plans  were  for  that  morning  has 
never  been  ascertained.  Some  operation  was  intended  — 
there  had  been  unmistakable  sounds  of  new  work  in  the 
forward  trenches;  officers  were  seen  on  reconnaissance;  in 
the  recesses  of  ominous  Sonnard  Wood  more  than  one  un- 
accustomed movement  had  been  detected.  Only  a  short 
hour  before  our  gas  attack  was  sent  over,  a  German  com- 
bat patrol  made  a  sudden  descent  on  our  lines  in  Remieres 
Wood,  held  by  a  company  of  the  102d  Infantry,  only  a  few 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE  151 

yards  from  the  edge  of  the  zone  exposed  to  the  gas.  They 
came  with  flammenwerfer,  but  only  got  themselves  killed 
for  their  pains.  Only  in  one  place  did  they  get  close  enough 
to  squirt  a  jet  of  the  hquid  fire  from  the  reservoirs  they 
carried  on  their  backs,  and  even  here  no  damage  was  done, 
the  wretched  man  who  carried  the  reservoir  being  quickly 
pistoled.  But,  as  if  in  revenge,  the  enemy  artillery  awoke 
to  renewed  life.  For  three  days  the  front  and  all  communi- 
cations were  subjected  to  most  persistent  attentions.  The 
usual  rumor  ran  about  that  a  large  attack  was  being  pre- 
pared, and  all  plans  were  made  to  meet  it;  but  nothing  de- 
veloped. Again  was  manifested  the  tendency  of  the  enemy 
to  expend  quantities  of  costly  ammunition  in  what  seemed 
purposeless  enterprises,  so  often  observed  while  the  Divi- 
sion was  in  the  La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector.  Three  days  he 
fired  peevishly,  and  then  again  a  relative  quiet  descended. 
The  chief  damage  he  did,  aside  from  inflicting  a  few  cas- 
ualties, was  to  explode  a  regimental  grenade  and  pyrotech- 
nic dump  at  Beaumont  by  a  direct  hit  —  which  made  an 
evening  of  not  a  little  excitement  even  for  the  hardened 
dwellers  in  that  chosen  village  —  which,  like  the  dust- 
heaps  of  Seichcprey,  was  invariably  bombarded  at  all  the 
usual  bombarding  hours. 

For  another  week  life  w^as  peaceful.  It  was  "a  good  war." 
The  weather  continued  warm  and  clear,  day  after  day; 
living  conditions  in  the  trenches  were  vastly  bettered  — 
the  Jury  Wood  sub-sector  being  especially  well  organized, 
although  Hazelle  Wood,  adjoining  it,  was  a  favorite  target 
for  sudden,  heavy  bursts  of  harassing  fire.  The  cooking  and 
distribution  of  rations  was  greatly  improved;  mail  began 
to  come  more  regularly;  the  troops  had  not  only  become 
wonted  to  the  life,  but  w^ere  thriving  on  it;  some  replace- 
ments had  been  also  received.  True,  there  was  a  steady 
toll  taken  by  shell-fire  or  sniping  —  but  this  was  accepted 
as  part  of  the  routine.  Every  day  there  were  air-fights  to 
watch,  or  the  daring  efforts  of  the  airmen  to  pass  the  bar- 


152  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

rier  fire  of  the  "archies";  in  which  contests  the  honors  ap- 
peared to  be  about  even.  June  16,  however,  the  peace  was 
broken  by  another  German  raid,  very  Hke  the  one  launched 
against  Seicheprey  two  months  before. 

For  this  objective  he  selected  the  twin  villages  of  Xivray- 
Marvoisin,  on  the  left  of  the  divisional  sector.  His  mission 
probably  did  not  go  beyond  making  prisoners,  to  accom- 
plish which  purpose  he  sent  over  a  force  of  some  500 
Landwehr  and  line  troops  backed  by  80  men  from  a  Sturm- 
hataillon,  with  the  support  of  40  pioneers  and  20  flame- 
throwers. The  main  duty  of  the  latter  was  to  hide  the  ad- 
vance under  cover  of  a  smoke  screen. 

The  two  villages,  of  which  the  Marvoisin  hamlet  stood 
advanced  by  some  three  hundred  yards,  very  close  to  the 
enemy  lines,  and  the  trench  system  connecting  them,  were 
held  by  a  battalion  (III)  of  the  103d  Infantry  and  the  103d 
Machine-Gun  Battalion  —  the  former  having  a  platoon  in 
Xivray  proper,  with  two  companies  near  at  hand  in  Bou- 
conville,  outposts  in  Marvoisin,  and  platoons  in  various 
flanking  local  centers  of  resistance. 

The  attack  began  with  a  twenty-minute  artillery  "prep- 
aration "  laid,  as  usual,  on  the  objective,  communications, 
and  support  positions.  This  was  as  violent  a  fire  as  any  the 
Division  had  experienced;  and,  with  its  character  changed 
to  a  fire  of  destruction,  it  was  continued  long  after  the  raid 
was  over.  The  enemy  was  divided  into  three  columns,  and 
each  of  these  was  again  subdivided  into  three  smaller 
groups,  a  part  of  whom  drove  straight  at  Marvoisin  from 
the  front,  while  the  remainder  attempted  to  work  into 
Xivray  from  the  flanks,  on  east  and  west,  all  under  cover 
of  a  heavy  morning  mist. 

But  a  sturdy  resistance  by  the  troops  on  the  ground,  to- 
gether with  an  immediate  counter-attack  by  a  platoon  of 
the  companies  from  Bouconville,  broke  down  the  enemy's 
effort  almost  at  once.  While  his  artillery  fire,  in  which 
heavy  minenwerfer  participated,  did  cause  casualties,  es- 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE  153 

peclally  near  Marvoisin,^  his  infantry  accomplished  prac- 
tically nothing.  Plans  for  the  defense  of  the  position, 
worked  out  in  great  detail  by  Brigadier-General  Cole,  in 
command  of  the  brigade,  were  as  exactly  followed  as  if  at 
maneuver;  the  crews  of  the  forward  machine  guns  stuck 
manfully  to  their  work  through  the  heaviest  fire.  The  Ger- 
man discomfiture  was  complete.  Some  sixty  of  their  dead 
were  counted  in  front  of  our  wire,  scores  were  carried  away; 
and  they  left  ten  prisoners,  three  fight  machine  guns, 
flame-throwers,  and  quantities  of  equipment  in  the  hands 
of  our  troops. 

Again,  as  if  to  wreak  revenge  for  their  repulse,  the  Ger- 
mans laid  down  furious  bursts  of  artillery  fire  over  all  the 
Division  area  throughout  the  day,  and  at  intervals  for 
three  or  four  days  later.  As  many  as  48  shells  a  minute,  of 
all  calibers  up  to  210  millimeters,  fell  on  Beaumont  be- 
tween G.30  and  9  o'clock  and  again  at  noon  of  June  16. 
Bernecourt  suffered,  where  officers  of  the  101st  Infantry 
were  wounded;  in  Royaumeix,  Chaplain  W.  Danker,  104th 
Infantry,  was  killed.  Colonel  G.  H.  Shelton  slightly 
wounded,  and  three  enlisted  men  killed  by  a  single  burst. 
Among  the  horse  lines  at  Sanzey  and  Cornieville,  the 
shells  did  damage,  while  at  Boucq,  where  Division  Head- 
quarters was  established,  the  bombardment  was  so  heavy 
on  June  20,  well  directed  by  aeroplanes,  that  Headquarters 
was  compelled  to  evacuate  temporarily,  going  a  mile 
farther  back,  to  Trondes.  Heavy  retaliation  fire  was  sent 
back  by  our  own  artillery;  and  gradually  the  activity 
spent  itself.  But  while  the  enemy  fire  was  at  its  height  the 
back  area  was  far  from  being  the  safe  retreat  which  men 
*'up  front"  were  prone  to  consider  it. 

The  last  days  of  June,  featureless  save  for  the  daily  fire 
of  our  artillery  and  occasional  air  fights,  were  none  the  less 
thrilling.  For  hardly  had  the  echoes  of  the  Xivray-Mar- 

^  Losses  in  this  affair  included:  103d  Infantry,  2G  killed,  96  wounded,  47 
gassed;  103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion,  i  killed,  11  wounded. 


154  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

voisin  fight  abated,  before  a  whisper  of  news  ran  round  the 
lines  that  stirred  the  men  hke  an  alerte.  There  appeared 
in  the  sector  groups  of  strange  ofiicers,  other  than  the  ob- 
servers who  had  been  coming  up  regularly  from  the  schools 
for  periods  of  instruction.  Extra  stores  of  travel  rations 
were  collected  ready  for  issue;  revised  inventories  of  per- 
manent trench  stores  were  ordered  in  each  sub-sector  — 
materials  for  accessory  defenses,  rubber  boots,  signaling 
devices,  munitions,  trench  rations,  and  the  like.  And  from 
other  evidences,  plainly  to  be  read,  it  appeared  that  the 
relief  of  the  Division  was  finally  at  hand. 

Several  changes  in  command  had  been  effected,  during 
the  weeks  just  past.  Of  these,  the  most  important  occurred 
in  the  artillery.  The  command  of  the  brigade  (51st  F.A.) 
passed  from  Brigadier-General  Lassiter  to  Brigadier- 
General  D.  W.  Aultman  on  May  9;  and  in  the  103d  Regi- 
ment (155-mm.  howitzers)  Colonel  E.  T.  Smith  was  suc- 
ceeded on  June  15  by  Colonel  P.  D.  Glassford,  soon  to 
prove  himself  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  and  able  offi- 
cers the  Division  ever  possessed.  It  may  be  said  at  this 
point,  indeed,  that  the  artillery  brigade  had  been  singu- 
larly rich  in  its  officer  personnel  from  the  very  beginning. 
The  battery  commanders  and  the  Brigade  Staff  were  all 
exceptionally  capable;  while  the  spirit  and  skill  of  the  en- 
listed men,  together  with  their  aptness  in  learning  the 
technical  operation  of  the  French  material,  earned  high- 
est praise.  Never,  it  appears,  did  the  artillery  of  the  Divi- 
sion fail  to  surpass  expectations  —  to  do  more  than  was  re- 
quired of  it.  It  was  never  necessary  for  the  Division  Staff 
to  do  more  than  indicate  the  mission,  destination,  or  duty 
of  the  gunners.  Performance  was  invariably  prompt,  effi- 
cient, and  workmanlike.  The  brigade  had  no  need  of  de- 
tailed orders,  fussy  supervision,  constant  inspection.  Proud 
of  its  record,  aware  of  its  own  efficiency,  it  worked  on 
honor  —  and  never  once  fell  below  its  own  highest  stand- 
ards, which  were  those  of  the  best  troops  anywhere. 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  IVIAY  AND  JUNE  155 

While  its  most  showy  work  was  to  come  later,  the  per- 
formance of  the  artillery  in  the  La  Reine  (Boucq)  Sector 
w^as  noteworthy,  indeed.  The  study  and  practice  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  was  translated  daily  into  actual  serv- 
ice of  the  most  effective  sort.  Divided  into  two  general 
groupings,  the  brigade's  mission,  briefly,  was  to  act  with 
the  right  and  left  infantry  units,  each  in  the  defense  of  half 
the  front.  On  every  occasion,  often  within  a  few  seconds 
after  receiving,  by  rocket  or  telephone,  the  infantry's  call 
for  barrage,  the  guns  replied  with  a  will.  On  every  raid,  or 
to  meet  unforeseen  emergencies,  the  artillery  performed 
special  firing  missions  with  an  entire  success,  due  partly  to 
the  skill  with  which  the  firing  data  were  handled,  partly 
to  the  energy  of  the  gunners  and  the  fellows  who  handled 
ammunition.  But,  further  than  this  regular  duty  of  all 
divisional  artillery  in  sector,  the  brigade  took  over  the 
operation  of  four  batteries  of  "position  pieces"  —  guns  of 
90-  and  95-millimeter  caHber,  remaining  permanently  in  the 
sector;  and  it  furnished,  moreover,  several  "gypsy  pieces," 
or  "roving  guns,"  the  command  of  which  was  the  dream  of 
many  a  young  officer.  Accompanied  by  a  truck-load  of 
ammunition,  a  "rover"  would  estabhsh  itself  at  night  here 
and  there  in  the  sector,  usually  well  forward,  open  fire 
from  an  unsuspected  direction  on  selected  targets,  and  then 
trundle  away  in  the  darkness  before  the  enemy  had  time 
to  locate  the  piece  or  seek  to  neutralize  it.  Another,  and 
not  unimportant,  activity  of  the  gunners  was  to  support 
with  their  fire,  on  four  different  occasions,  the  operations 
of  French  divisions,  in  the  Corps,  to  right  or  left. 

The  spirit,  skill,  and  discipline  which  made  the  artillery 
so  valuable  were  inherited  intact  from  the  original  Massa- 
chusetts and  Connecticut  batteries  which  formed  its  nu- 
cleus. Upon  this  fine  foundation  such  leaders  as  Lassiter, 
Sherburne,  Goodwin,  Herbert,  and  Twachtman  built 
strongly  and  well,  while  Keville  did  likewise  with  the  am- 
munition train.  The  brigade  which  General  Aultman  in- 


156  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

herited,  early  in  May,  was  in  all  respects  the  equal  of  any 
American  artillery  in  France. 

Changes  had  come  also  in  the  command  of  the  102d 
Machine-Gun  Battahon.  Major  J.  Perrins  was  succeeded 
on  April  9  by  Captain  D.  T.  Gallup,  who,  in  turn,  was 
supplanted  by  Major  (later  Lieutenant-Colonel)  J.  D. 
Murphy,  on  April  18.  Originally  the  machine-gun  oflScer 
of  the  101st  Infantry,  Major  Murphy  was  to  gain  dis- 
tinction for  courage  and  abihty,  and  to  carry  the  responsi- 
bihties  which  come  usually  to  the  lot  of  officers  many  years 
his  senior.  The  101st  Field  Signal  Battalion  received  as 
successive  commanders  Major  S.  W.  Walmsley  (April  29) 
and  Major  P.  W.  Evans  (June  19). 

The  Division  had  been  in  the  hne  since  the  first  week  of 
February,  except  for  about  a  week  during  the  march  from 
the  Chemin  des  Dames.  Leaves  had  been  out  of  the  ques- 
tion; rest  and  recreation,  even,  had  been  very  sketchy. 
For  all  officers  the  strain  had  been  unbroken.  It  is  true 
that  the  men  looked  very  fit;  but  they  were  tired  after 
one  hundred  and  thirty  days  of  continuous  service,  all  but 
a  week  of  which  had  been  spent  exposed  to  enemy  fire. 
They  were  exceedingly  pleased  with  themselves;  they  de- 
served the  congratulations  given  them  by  the  French;  they 
had  won  the  respect  of  their  German  opponents,  as  cap- 
tured enemy  officers  themselves  admitted.  These  war- 
seasoned  fellows  would  not  have  known  themselves  for  the 
lads  who  were  still  learning  war  six  months  earher.  But, 
none  the  less,  when  advance  parties  of  a  new  division 
actually  came  into  the  sector,  they  received  from  all  ranks 
of  the  Twenty-Sixth  the  heartiest  of  welcomes. 

The  American  newcomers  were  units  of  the  Eighty- 
Second  Division,  fresh  from  prefiminary  training  in  the 
British  area  near  Abbeville,  behind  Amiens,  who  had  be- 
gun their  movement  on  June  16.  Without  artillery,  ma- 
chine guns,  and  one  regiment  of  infantry,  they  also  lacked 
all  experience  of  life  in  the  enemy's  presence;  they  also 


THE  AFFAIRS  OF  MAY  AND  JUNE  157 

were  without  much  necessary  equipment.  But  as  the 
Americans  were  supplemented  by  the  154th  French  Divi- 
sion (less  one  regiment),  at  least  the  full  force  necessary  for 
the  garrisoning  of  the  sector  was  available. 

The  relief  began  on  the  night  of  June  24.  One  by  one  the 
battalions  and  batteries  gave  place  to  their  successors,  in 
perfect  order.  So  many  times  had  the  Division  effected 
interior  reliefs  that  the  process  had  by  now  become  simple 
enough,  even  on  a  large  scale;  and  the  changes  were  made 
easily.  A  novel  feature  was  that  a  large  proportion  of  the 
infantry  was  taken  out  of  the  sector  in  decauvilles,  or  cars 
of  the  narrow-gauge  steam  tramway  which  threaded  all 
the  rear  area,  from  Ansauville  back  to  Menil-la-Tour  and 
Toul  itself.  A  most  satisfactory  feature  of  the  operation 
was  that,  although  as  many  as  58,000  men  were  in  motion 
at  one  time  on  the  nights  of  the  relief,  apparently  no  hint 
of  the  movement  reached  the  enemy,  and  thus  no  delay 
from  German  activity  or  other  cause  occurred  to  interrupt 
it.  On  June  28,  at  nine  o'clock,  the  command  passed.  An 
hour  later.  Division  Headquarters  opened  in  Toul;  and 
the  troops  were  concentrated  near  by,  in  the  general  area 
Villey-Saint-Etienne  -  Francheville  -  Foug  -  Chaudneney  - 
Velaine-en-Haye. 


L 


CHAPTER  XI 

TO  THE  CHAMPAGNE-MARNE  DEFENSIVE 

ESS  than  twelve  hours  after  the  rehef  of  the  Division 
orders  came  for  a  move.  They  were  not  wholly  un- 
expected. The  unusual  accumulation  and  issue  of  travel 
rations  had  set  speculation  going.  The  concentration  of  the 
troops  in  close  proximity  to  a  principal  railway  at  Toul, 
and  the  obviously  temporary  billet  and  cantonment  ac- 
commodations, made  it  plain  that  no  extended  stay  was 
contemplated.  Indeed,  it  was  as  soon  as  June  30  that  the 
troops  began  entraining  in  and  near  Toul  for  what  the 
orders  announced  was  to  be  a  "journey  of  twelve  hours' 
duration." 

It  was  truly  a  secret  move.  No  destination  was  even 
guessed  at.  Even  the  troop  train  commanders  knew  no 
more  than  that  Troyes  was  the  first  "regulating  station" 
or  junction  where  the  trains  would  be  given  their  final 
time  schedules  and  destinations.  It  was  hoped  that  Troyes 
might  at  least  reveal  whether  the  train  turned  southward, 
which  might  mean  Italy,  or  north,  which  meant,  perhaps, 
a  chance  of  joining  the  British.  Visionaries  proclaimed 
that  Paris,  with  a  street  parade  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  was 
the  goal.  Only  a  few,  whose  memories  of  the  war  map  of 
the  Marne  Valley  were  fresh,  had  a  suspicion  of  what  was 
really  in  store. 

For  considerably  more  than  the  estimated  twelve  hours 
the  troop  trains  trundled  westward.  It  was  perfect  summer 
weather,  with  the  sheen  of  yellow  wheat  in  the  sun  along 
the  valleys  and  larks  high  in  the  air.  One  seemed  to  be 
leaving  war  behind.  And  when  finally  the  trains  drew  into 
Noisy-le-Sec,  which  the  maps  said  was  a  Paris  suburb, 
and  when  one  actually  saw  motor-busses  with  Paris  street 


CHAMPAGNE-MARNE  DEFENSIVE  159 

names  on  their  signs,  there  rose  one  happy  sigh  from  head 
to  rear  of  each  battaHon.  One  waits  for  orders  from  the 
R.T.O.,  or  the  regulating  oflScer.  They  come  presently 
and  give  strange  names  as  destinations  —  Meaux,  Tril- 
port.  Where  on  earth  are  they?  Again  the  map,  and  one 
has  a  kind  of  vision  unfolded.  For  Meaux  and  Trilport  are 
on  a  bend  of  the  Marne,  near  where  the  httle  river  Ourcq 
joins  it  from  the  north.  And  there  along  the  Marne,  in 
Chateau-Thierry  and  Dormans,  only  a  dozen  miles  away, 
the  mighty  German  VIII  Army  under  Von  Boehn  is  gath- 
ering itself  for  another  tiger-spring  which  should  secure 
him  the  crossings  of  the  river. 

At  dawn  one  descends  from  the  train;  the  billeting 
parties  are  there  to  show  the  way,  and  the  troops  move 
out,  to  establish  themselves  by  the  night  of  July  2  in  the 
area  Tancrou-Germigny  -  Mareuil-les-Meaux  -  Quincy  - 
Villemareuil-Changis.  Division  Headquarters  opened  in 
Nanteuil-les-Meaux.  Not  a  Fourth-of-July  celebration 
was  in  store,  nor  yet  a  jaunt  to  Italy.  To  anybody  able 
to  read  a  map,  to  anybody  who  had  followed  the  daily 
sweep  of  the  German  hosts  down  from  the  heights  of  the 
Aisne  since  May  27,  between  Rheims  and  Compiegne,  the 
work  in  store  for  the  Division  was  evident  enough.  No 
longer  the  garrison  of  a  Lorraine  sector  still  learning  war 
by  raid,  patrol,  and  local  bombardment,  but  trusted  with 
a  part  in  the  scene  of  greatest  activity  was  now  the  Divi- 
sion's fortune.  Wliat  its  other  American  comrades  had  done 
it  was  expected  to  accomplish.  The  brilliant  success  of  the 
First  Division  at  Cantigny  (May  9) ;  the  steady  courage  of 
the  Third,  on  the  Marne  at  Chateau-Thierry  (June  4), 
by  which  the  German  was  refused  a  foothold  on  the  south- 
ern bank;  the  valorous  charges  of  the  Marines  in  Belleau 
Wood,  the  work  of  the  9th  and  23d  Infantry  in  the  neigh- 
boring Vaux  and  Bouresches  (June  11-13) — all  these 
feats  of  arms  were  for  the  Twenty-Sixth  to  emulate,  before 
the  eyes  of  the  world.  Two  of  its  fellow  National  Guard 


160  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

divisions  were  not  far  away,  also  in  the  "big  show."  The 
Forty-Second  (Rainbow  Division)  was  a  unit  in  the  Fourth 
French  Army  under  Gouraud,  holding  the  gate  of  Cham- 
pagne, while  the  Twenty-Eighth  (Pennsylvania)  was  in  the 
same  neighborhood  as  the  New  England  troops. 

By  July  4  the  Division  began  to  move  up  to  the  line.  Ad- 
vantage was  taken  of  a  temporary  lull  in  the  fighting  on 
the  sector  of  front  just  to  the  northwest  of  Chateau- 
Thierry,  where  the  Second  Division  ^  had  been  heavily  en- 
gaged, to  effect  the  gradual  relief  of  its  weary,  battered 
units.  The  artillery  first  went  into  position  and  began 
firing  on  July  8.  The  infantry  followed,  one  regiment  at 
a  time,  as  the  situation  warranted  risking  a  change  in  the 
front-hne  dispositions.  The  52d  Infantry  Brigade  took  over 
from  the  gallant  Marine  Brigade  the  ground  the  latter  had 
won  and  held  so  splendidly  in  Belleau  Wood  and  in  front 
of  Torcy,  as  far  to  the  left  (northwest)  as  Bussiares;  the 
51st  Infantry  Brigade  relieved  the  9th  Infantry  in  the 
vicinity  of  Vaux,  and  the  23d  Infantry  at  Bouresches. 
Division  Headquarters  moved  up  to  Chamigny,  then  to 
Genevrois  Farm,  where  also  was  the  artillery,  the  infantry 
Brigade  Headquarters  being  established  at  Domptin  (51st) 
and  La  Loge  Farm  (52d).  By  July  9  the  relief  was  com- 
pleted, and  the  Division  was  on  the  battle  front. 

To  the  extent  of  line  taken  over  from  the  Second  Divi- 
sion had  been  given  the  designation  of  "Pas  Fini  Sector,'* 
and  there  was  a  ring  of  stubborn  defiance  in  the  name 
which  promised  well;  "unfinished"  the  struggle  still  was. 
For  though  the  French  had  given  ground  steadily  before 
the  German  onslaughts,  from  Soissons  to  the  Marne, 
though  a  renewal  of  the  German  attacks  was  expected  to 
begin  not  later  than  July  15,  there  still  remained  alive  the 
belief  that  the  battle  was  very  far  from  being  decided  in 
Ludendorff's  favor.  Not  yet  had  he  broken  the  forces  in  the 
field.  The  French  retreat,  though  extensive,  had  been  made 

'  9th  and  23cl  Infantry;  5th  and  6th  Marines. 


CHAMPAGNE-MARNE  DEFENSIVE  161 

in  good  order;  more  than  once  the  advancing  Germans  had 
been  checked  by  smashing  counter-attacks;  and  confidence 
abounded  that  Foch,  the  master  of  war,  had  plans  which 
would  bring  ultimate  success. 

The  German  intentions  were  well  known.  Apparently 
the  enemy  was  so  confident  of  success  that  he  took  no 
pains  to  insure  the  effect  of  surprise.  For  five  or  six  weeks, 
during  most  of  June  and  the  first  of  July,  he  attempted  no 
important  move,  collecting  his  forces  for  one  final  on- 
slaught—  the  so-called  " Friedensturm"  —  which  was  to 
bring  about  the  AUies'  final  downfall.  An  "army  of  pur- 
suit "  (IX  Army,  under  Von  Carlowitz)  was  brought  from 
the  Eastern  Front  and  collected  near  Soissons,  to  follow 
up  initial  successes.  The  French  fine  was  to  be  broken  by 
Von  Boehn  on  the  Marne,  who  should  cut  the  great  Paris- 
Nancy  railway;  the  armies  of  Von  Below  (I)  and  Von 
Einem  (III)  were  to  effect  another  breach  east  of  Rheims; 
and  at  the  same  time  Von  Hutier  and  Von  der  Marwitz 
were  to  separate  for  good  the  French  and  British  on  the 
front  between  Amiens  and  Montdidier.  These  tasks  ac- 
complished, the  combined  forces  would  move  toward 
Paris  down  the  Marne  Valley  and  from  the  north  —  a 
grandiose  plan,  indeed,  to  which  the  German  successes  of 
the  past  weeks  gave  a  semblance  of  feasibility.  How  Foch, 
by  a  counter-stroke  of  supreme  audacity,  brought  the  plan 
to  naught;  how  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  shared  daily  in 
the  first  week  of  that  fighting  between  Aisne  and  INIarne 
which  definitely  turned  the  tide  of  war,  will  be  told  in  its 
place.  First  we  have  to  look  at  the  Division,  crouched  for 
the  spring,  along  the  line  of  Vaux,  Bouresches,  and  Bel- 
leau  Wood,  just  above  Chateau-Thierry. 

It  was  a  rolling,  lovely  land  under  the  hot  midsummer 
sun,  a  country  of  broad  wheat-fields  interspersed  with 
extensive  woods  and  coppices.  Across  the  front  ran  a  little 
railway,  the  embankment  of  which,  together  with  the  cut- 
tings at  Vaux  and  Bouresches,  was  a  tactical  feature  of 


162  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

interest.  On  the  right  the  sector  was  dominated  by  Hill 
204,  most  of  which  was  in  German  hands,  while  the  posses- 
sion of  Belleau  Wood,  cresting  a  hill  with  a  steep  scarp 
toward  the  enemy,  gave  us  an  advantageous  position  on 
the  left.  Certain  farms  like  Thiolet,  Triangle,  or  Paris, 
together  with  the  villages  of  Lucy-le-Bocage  and  Coupru, 
afforded  points  for  Battalion  and  Regimental  Head- 
quarters, while  the  concealment  of  Bezu  Woods  was  uti- 
lized for  the  kitchens  and  wagon  trains.  Guns  were  every- 
where. The  veriest  novice  in  war  must  have  known  that 
only  some  exceptionally  important  object  could  explain  the 
presence  in  every  wood  and  dug  into  every  roadside,  of 
so  much  artillery  and  then  more  artillery.  For  ten  nights 
after  the  Division  took  its  post  the  guns  were  steadily  com- 
ing in,  all  through  the  dark  hours.  It  speaks  well  for  the 
care  and  skill  of  all  concerned  that  apparently  the  enemy 
had  no  intimation  of  the  concentration  being  prepared 
against  him. 

Not  that  he  was  inactive.  His  infantry  was  quiet  enough, 
but  his  gunners  made  life  very  hard  for  all  hands  at  the 
front.  There  were  no  trenches,  little  wire,  no  shelters,  even 
of  the  sketchiest  sort;  the  men  sought  safety  in  shallow 
"fox-holes"  scratched  to  a  depth  of  a  foot  or  two  and 
lightly  covered  with  brushwood.  The  infantry  defense  plan 
consisted  of  reciprocally  flanking  centers  of  resistance, 
together  with  the  numerous  machine  guns  which  were  laid 
to  deliver  a  most  intricate  barrage  across  the  whole  front. 
As  before,  there  were  established  an  outpost  line  and  a 
principal  resistance  line;  but  an  interesting  feature  in  the 
Pas  Fini  Sector  was  that  the  echelonment  of  all  infantry 
and  machine  guns  in  extreme  depth  was  especially  insisted 
on,  to  insure  flexibility  and  ease  of  maneuver.  So  marked 
was  this  that,  behind  the  outpost  line  was  traced  a  zone 
extending  across  the  whole  sector  and  one  thousand  meters 
broad,  in  which  no  troops  at  all  were  stationed.  This  was 
a  secondary  artillery  barrage  zone,  for  the  protection  of 


THE  MARNE-CHAIVIPAGNE  DEFENSR^        163 

the  principal  resistance  line,  designed  to  break  up  any 
attack  which  should  overrun  the  outposts.  The  latter  had 
the  usual  mission  —  to  fight  to  the  last  man  without  hope 
of  reinforcement.  The  counter-attacks  on  successful  enemy 
groups  by  platoons  on  the  ground,  designated  for  that 
purpose,  supplied  another  feature  of  the  general  defensive 
plan.  As  has  been  said,  the  whole  scheme  of  things  was 
based  on  the  supposition  that  the  Division  was  occupying 
a  position  in  readiness  to  ward  off  an  expected  attack  in 
open  warfare,  but  to  take  the  initiative  at  the  first  possible 
moment. 

It  hardly  needed  the  reiterated  reports  of  German  pris- 
oners and  deserters  to  tell  us  that  the  attack  was  to  be 
renewed  within  a  few  days  —  the  activity  of  the  enemy 
artillery  told  that  plainly.  At  all  hours  the  troops  of  the 
outpost  line  (a  battalion  from  each  of  the  four  infantry 
regiments,  in  line)  were  fired  on  by  machine  guns  and  the 
lighter  field  pieces.  Our  suspected  battery  positions  also 
were  visited  frequently,  and  certain  stretches  of  highway 
over  which  traffic  had  to  pass  were  never  safe.  It  was  a 
hard,  grinding  time.  All  food  and  water  for  troops  at  the 
front  had  to  be  carried  up  to  them  by  ration  details.  Under 
cover  of  darkness  these  parties  would  creep  forward  from 
the  kitchens  and  depots  in  Bezu  Wood,  carrying  the  heavy, 
sealed  cans  called  mar  mites,  each  of  which  contained  enough 
stew  or  coffee  for  perhaps  a  squad.  But  progress  was  slow 
in  the  darkness;  and  often  it  was  checked  altogether  by 
rafales  of  machine-gun  fire  in  such  devilish  stretches  as  the 
ravine  leading  up  to  Bouresches  or  that  near  Lucy-le- 
Bocage  behind  Belleau  Wood.  The  condition  of  the  food 
can  be  imagined,  carried  about  in  hot  summer  weather, 
churned  by  the  rough  journey  into  slush.  A  large  number 
of  casualties  resulted  from  gas.  The  woods  in  which  the 
forward  companies  were  collected  against  observation 
were  frequently  dosed  heavily  with  mustard,  as  also  such 
traps  as  the  villages  along  the  forward  area.  The  numerical 


161  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

strength  of  both  infantry  and  machine-gun  units  was  im- 
paired to  a  degree  which  aroused  not  a  httle  concern. 

It  is  not  unhkely  that  the  traditionally  sinister  character 
of  Belleau  Wood  had  a  certain  effect  on  the  morale  of  the 
troops  stationed  there.  Apart  from  the  hourly  peril  of  the 
place,  with  its  constant  visitations  from  shell-fire,  gas,  and 
machine-gun  bursts,  the  woods  in  themselves  were  full  of 
horror.  Where  the  5th  and  6th  Marines  had  battled  val- 
iantly in  June  was  in  July  a  haunted  place  of  dread.  Shape- 
less fragments  of  what  once  were  men  hung  in  the  jagged 
branches  of  the  trees,  blown  there  by  shells;  stiffened 
shapes  were  found  by  the  new  troops,  lying  still  unburied 
where  they  had  fallen  before  German  machine-gun  nests^ 
in  the  rocky  hollows.  A  grisly  odor  of  death  hung  heavy 
in  the  summer  air  around  the  stone  hunting  lodge  near  the 
eastern  skirts  of  the  woods,  and  men  there  came  to  move 
and  talk  as  when  they  know  that  ghosts  are  watching  them. 

At  Bouresches  and  Vaux  there  were  not  infrequent 
clashes  between  patrols,  and  other  activities  of  a  more 
serious  character.  The  village  of  Bouresches  itself  was  in 
American  hands,  but  the  railway  station,  some  two  hun- 
dred yards  distant  and  separated  by  a  narrow  ravine  from 
the  town,  had  been  turned  into  a  miniature  fortin  by  the 
enemy.  Machine  guns  and  trench  mortars,  most  cleverly 
disposed  in  the  little  ravine,  constantly  annoyed  the 
Bouresches  garrison,  and  more  than  one  attempt  was  made 
both  by  artillery  concentrations  and  raiding  parties,  to 
clear  the  place  out.  But  nothing  was  accomplished.  Along 
the  Belleau-Bussiares  sub-sector  on  the  left  of  the  line, 
there  occurred  little  or  nothing  in  the  way  of  local  aggres- 
sive work  for  the  fortnight  following  the  arrival  of  the 
Division  on  this  front.  Orders  were  strict  against  the  troops 
exposing  themselves;  all  their  strength  was  being  reserved 
for  the  grand  attack  in  preparation;  but  had  it  not  been  for 
a  brisk  little  fight  in  Vaux,  one  would  incline  to  think,  for 
once,  the  infantry's  fighting  edge  was  a  bit  dulled  fi'om  the 


< 
> 


1 


THE  MARNE-CHAMPAGNE  DEFENSIVE       165 

continued  harassment  of  the  enemy  fire,  the  strain  of  an- 
ticipation, scanty  food,  and  temporary  inabihty  to  retaH- 
ate  on  a  foe  who  appeared  especially  aggressive  and  well 
served  by  his  aeroplanes. 

The  incident  at  Vaux,  however,  revived  all  spirits.  This 
stricken  heap  of  stones,  lying  under  the  shoulder  of  Hill 
204,  and  commanded  by  high  ground  to  the  east,  belonged 
in  the  charge  of  the  101st  Infantry,  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  sector.  Only  sentry  posts  were  kept  there  by  day,  but 
at  night  platoons  moved  in,  covering  the  town  and  the 
railway.  On  the  night  of  July  13-14,  the  little  garrison  was 
subjected  to  a  very  heavy  fire,  both  high-explosive  and 
gas,  lasting  upwards  of  four  hours.  At  dawn  of  the  14th 
the  platoons  started  to  go  back  to  their  regular  day  posi- 
tions; and  observers,  seeing  groups  coming  down  into 
Vaux  from  the  high  ground,  believed  the  latter  to  be  a 
platoon  of  the  Americans.  As  a  consequence,  the  groups  — 
who  happened  to  be  Germans  —  were  not  disturbed,  and 
proceeded  to  occupy  both  the  village  and  the  railway 
station  with  machine  guns.  Promptly,  however,  the  Vaux 
detachment  of  the  101st  Infantry,  under  Lieutenants  W. 
Fitzgerald,  E.  J.  Price,  and  J.  Rose,  advanced  to  dislodge 
the  intruders,  on  orders  from  Regimental  Headquarters. 
Aided  by  an  effective  box  barrage  of  our  artillery,  which 
was  dropped  behind  and  around  Vaux  in  order  to  cut  off 
the  German's  way  out,  the  Boston  infantry  proceeded  to 
oust  the  enemy  from  the  village  most  methodically.  The 
railway  station  and  an  adjoining  line  of  shell  craters  were 
the  principal  objectives,  where  the  Germans  had  installed 
several  machine  guns,  but  the  station  was  cleared  very 
rapidly.  Gaining  by  hook  or  crook  a  point  of  vantage  close 
under  the  walls,  clear  of  the  machine-gun  fire,  a  group 
from  "K"  Company  tossed  grenades  over  the  roofless 
walls,  thus  driving  out  the  gun  crews,  who,  as  they  ran, 
were  fired  on  by  automatic-rifle  men.  Private  D.  Ross 
captured,  single-handed,  a  machine  gun  which  had  been 


166  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

set  up  in  one  of  the  village  streets;  small  parties  cleared 
out  the  enemy  riflemen  the  length  of  the  railway  embank- 
ment and  the  shell  holes;  many  were  shot  down  as  they  re- 
treated to  the  cover  of  the  woods;  and  the  whole  was  con- 
ducted with  very  small  losses  and  the  capture  of  eighteen 
prisoners.  Early  in  the  evening  a  German  artillery  bom- 
bardment, which  had  all  the  characteristics  of  "prepara- 
tion fire,"  came  down  again  on  the  lines  about  Vaux.  On 
the  edge  of  the  woods  a  body  of  his  infantry  was  discerned 
deploying  for  attack.  But  his  demonstration  —  whatever 
its  intention  —  was  not  pressed.  Promptly  taken  under 
heavy  fire  from  both  the  artillery  and  the  rifles  of  our  in- 
fantry, the  German  formation  dispersed  in  some  disorder. 

But  the  incident,  like  all  movements  or  actions  in  war, 
must  be  considered  only  in  connection  with  other  activ- 
ities of  the  moment.  No  action  is  isolated,  unrelated,  with- 
out bearing  on  a  general  plan ;  there  is  no  minor  enterprise, 
no  troop  movement  by  any  unit  of  a  large  force  which  does 
not  receive  its  impetus  and  derive  its  character  as  merely 
a  link  in  the  great  chain  of  events  being  forged  by  the 
master-smiths.  To  the  101st  Infantry,  snarling  and  snap- 
ping at  the  troublesome  foe  in  front  of  it,  the  Vaux  affair 
seemed  at  the  time  entirely  localized;  but  actually  this 
display  of  German  energy,  such  as  it  was,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  intended  to  attain  a  definite  object  as  part  of 
the  renewed  attacks  of  Von  Boehn  on  a  large  scale  along 
the  Marne,  which  were  fully  developed  on  the  following 
day. 

July  15  Von  Boehn  commenced  in  earnest  the  long- 
awaited  movement.  That  day  the  armies  of  Von  Mudra 
and  Von  Einem  flung  themselves  at  Gouraud  east  of 
Rheims,  in  Champagne.  That  day,  while  the  Germans 
fatally  deepened  their  Marne  salient  between  Fossoy  and 
Clairizet,  the  American  Third  Division  at  Fossoy,  at  Vaux 
(on  the  Marne),  and  in  Chateau-Thierry,  forbade  the  foe 
to  widen  it;  and  farther  east,  the  Germans  never  reached 


CHAMPAGNE-MARNE  DEFENSIVE  167 

Gouraud's  main  battle  zone.  On  the  16th  and  17th  more 
ground  was  won  south  of  the  river,  where  now  the  Ger- 
mans had  pushed  forward  eight  divisions;  but  the  impor- 
tant ridges  stayed  in  French  hands  and  the  French  artil- 
lery commanded  the  river  crossings.  Committed  to  follow 
up  his  advance  to  the  south,  the  enemy  had  left  his  right 
flank  dangerously  exposed  on  the  (Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry)  side  of  the  deep  sahent.  Over-extended,  pinned 
to  the  ground  he  had  won,  he  could  not  divert  his  reserves 
to  meet  danger  from  the  west.  The  moment  had  come  for 
the  counter-stroke. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  AISNE-IVMRNE  OFFENSIVE  —  FIRST  PHASE 

AS  the  Division  stands  to  its  arms,  through  the  days 
of  the  so-called  "Champagne-Marne  Defensive," 
let  us  look  at  its  situation  with  respect  to  other  troops  be- 
side it.  Minor  changes  in  the  positions  of  divisions  occurred, 
owing  to  the  relief  of  units  on  the  line;  but  the  order  of 
battle  on  the  western  side  of  the  Marne  salient,  after  the 
Twenty-Sixth  returned  to  the  front,  may  be  taken  as  not 
differing  materially  from  that  of  July  15. 

Away  to  the  left,  at  the  hinge  of  the  salient,  to  the  west 
of  Soissons,  the  Tenth  French  Army  was  holding  in  front 
of  the  Foret  de  I'Aigue,  Compiegne,  and  Villers-Cotterets; 
its  right  rested  on  the  line  Crepy-en-Valois-Coyolles- 
Faverolles.  From  thence  southerly  to  Saint-Gengolph  and 
Vaux  (inclusive)  lay  the  Sixth  French  Army  of  Degoutte, 
in  which  were  included,  from  left  to  right,  the  Second 
French  Corps  (33d  and  2d  Divisions,  French),  Seventh 
French  Corps  (47th  and  164th  Divisions,  French),  and 
First  American  Corps,  with  the  167th  (French)  on  the  left 
of  its  line  and  the  Twenty-Sixth  on  the  right.  Next,  cov- 
ering Chateau-Thierry  and  the  Marne  as  far  as  Dormans, 
was  the  Thirty-Eighth  French  Corps,  including,  from  left 
to  right,  the  Thirty-Ninth  French,  Third  American,  12oth 
French  Divisions.  The  Thirty-Ninth,  which  had  led  the 
first  Verdun  counter-attack  February  26,  1916,  and  had 
advanced  on  the  British  right  in  the  desperate  doings  on 
the  Somme  with  magnificent  dash  and  complete  success, 
was  immediately  next  to  the  Twenty-Sixth ;  and  the  latter, 
knowing  itself  to  be  brigaded  on  the  battle  front  with  some 
of  the  finest  infantry  in  Europe,  felt  a  thrill  of  pride  in 
realizing  that  where  it  now  held  and  where  it  was  to  attack 


THE  AISNE-:\URNE  OFFENSIVE  169 

were  considered  points  so  important  as  to  be  entrusted 
only  to  troops  of  tried  excellence. 

On  the  left  of  the  Division  lay  another  unit  of  the  First 
Corps  —  the  167th  Division  (French).  Thorough  arrange- 
ments for  the  exchange  of  information  and  joint  action  in- 
cluded the  assignment  of  information  officers  and  agents 
at  the  respective  Divisional  Headquarters;  ^  while  officers 
from  the  Corps  maintained  touch  between  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  and  superior  Headquarters.  Communication  by  wire 
and  messengers  was  assured;  the  divisional  message  center 
was  carefully  organized  to  insure  the  prompt  and  intelli- 
gent handling  of  all  orders  and  other  messages  having  to 
do  with  operations. 

Important  changes  in  command  occurred  during  the 
days  immediately  preceding  the  Division's  entrance  into 
the  general  engagement.  On  July  10,  INIajor  J.  L.  Howard 
was  transferred  to  the  Division  Staff  as  Divisional  j\Ia- 
chine-Gun  Officer,  being  succeeded  in  command  of  the 
101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion  by  Major  M.  G.  Bulkeley, 
Jr.  Julv  12  Colonel  John  H.  Sherburne,  who  had  com- 
manded  the  101st  Field  Artillery  with  conspicuous  success, 
was  promoted  to  be  Brigadier-General  and  transferred  to 
duty  with  the  167th  Artillery  Brigade.  He  continued  to 
perform  duty  with  his  old  command,  however,  until  July 
25,  July  16,  on  the  very  eve  of  the  attack,  the  51st  In- 
fantry Brigade  underwent  a  change  of  leaders,  as  Brig- 
adier-General Traub  was  promoted  to  Major-General  and 
transferred  to  the  command  of  the  Thirty-Fifth  Division 
(Missouri  National  Guard),  his  place  being  taken  by 
Colonel  George  H.  Shelton,  104th  Infantry,  now  promoted 
to  be  Brigadier-General. 

Nor  did  the  imminence  of  a  general  engagement  check 
the  operation  of  the  machinery  by  which  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  were  taken  out  of  units  on  the  line 

^  To  the  39lli  Division  and  the  IGTth  Division  were  attached  Captain  R. 
Peters  aud  Lieuteuaiit  J.  1'.  King  respectively. 


170  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

for  the  sake  of  supplying  divisions  in  the  United  States. 
The  cardinal  principle  of  supply  —  that  combat  forces 
should  have  no  care  other  than  the  accomplishment  of 
their  battle  mission  —  was  in  this  case  oddly  reversed.  Few 
officers  were  sent  from  the  replacement  depots  to  fill  va- 
cancies in  the  Twenty-Sixth;  but  the  call  on  the  Divi- 
sion's front-line  battalions  to  help  recruit  training  units 
was  continual.  There  were  moments  when  it  required  good 
discipline  in  regimental  commanders  to  accept  the  wisdom 
of  the  theory  that  the  good  of  the  whole  army,  rather  than 
that  of  his  own  unit,  must  be  first  considered  under  all 
circumstances. 

Sharply  and  suddenly  the  time  of  waiting  ended.  July 
16  there  was  received  at  Division  Headquarters  a  mem- 
orandum from  the  Corps  entitled:  "Action  to  be  taken  by 
the  First  Corps  in  case  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy." 
Immediately,  the  Division  Commander  called  a  conference 
of  the  brigadiers  and  others  concerned;  and  later  that  day 
there  were  issued  Instructions  No.  74,  outlining,  in  further- 
ance of  the  Corps'  plan  of  action,  the  scope  and  purpose 
of  any  advance  by  the  Division  against  the  enemy's  lines. 
WTiat  amounted  to  a  warning  that  operations  were  im- 
pending was  transmitted  that  evening  to  the  infantry 
colonels:  "No  working  parties  will  be  sent  out  to-night." 
The  eight  words,  under  the  circumstance,  were  eloquent, 
indeed. 

But  secrecy  was  imperative.  The  great  counter-stroke 
was  to  be  delivered  as  a  complete  surprise  to  the  confident 
but  much-extended  enemy.  To  students  of  the  Second 
Battle  of  the  Marne,  now  to  begin,  it  has  been  difl^cult  to 
understand  how  Von  Boehn,  or  the  German  High  Com- 
mand, permitted  the  risk  involved  in  leaving  the  western 
side  of  the  Chateau-Thierry  salient  exposed  to  Foch's 
blow.  Between  Chateau-Thierry  and  the  vicinity  of  Sois- 
sons.  Von  Boehn  had,  on  July  18,  but  eight  divisions  in 
line  and  six  in  reserve,  surely  a  force  slight  enough  for  that 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSRTE  171 

length  of  line.  But  it  may  be  considered  probable  that 
he  far  underestimated  Foch's  available  reserves;  and  the 
"army  of  pursuit"  under  Von  Carlowitz  was  assembled 
in  the  interior  of  the  salient,  ready  for  use  in  any  direction. 
If  a  hint  of  Foch's  intentions  was  wafted  across  the  lines, 
through  some  luckless  prisoner,  perhaps,  the  Allies'  diffi- 
culties would  be  increased  enormously;  and  so  the  issue  of 
specific  attack  orders  had  to  be  delayed  till  the  last  pos- 
sible moment.  Not  till  22.15  o'clock  ^  on  July  17  was  there 
received  the  all-important  Corps  order  ^  for  the  Division's 
entrance  into  the  battle.  And  the  accompanying  letter 
prescribed  that  "H"  hour  —  the  time  for  the  forward 
movement  to  begin  —  was  to  be  4.35  o'clock  on  July  18.' 
Six  hours  in  which  to  draft,  issue,  and  have  executed 
the  orders  for  the  Division's  attack!  Six  hours  in  which 
to  notify  the  artillery,  signalmen,  machine-gunners,  and 
trains,  to  dispose  and  form  the  infantry  battahons  for 
their  attack,  to  get  the  connection  groups  in  position,  to 
insure  that  every  commander  down  to  company  and  pla- 
toon leaders  knew  his  task!  Six  hours,  while  a  torrential 
rain  and  thunderstorm  helped  the  persistent  enemy  guns 

^  The  military  system  of  designating  the  hours  of  the  day  by  the  numbers 
0.00  to  24.00,  instead  of  by  the  familiar  a.m.  and  p.m.  numbers,  is  here  employed. 

2  Field  Order  No.  9,  First  Army  Corps,  dated  July  17,  1918,  17.30  o'clock. 

»  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps,  American  E.F. 

July  17,  1918 
From:     Commanding  General,  1st  Army  Corps. 
To:         Commanding  General,  26th  Division. 
Subject:  J  day  and  II  hour. 

1.  J  Day  is  the  18th  of  July. 

2.  H  hour  is  4.35  o'clock. 

3.  No  artillery  fire  will  be  permitted  before  4.35  a.m.,  after  which  it  is  well 
understood  tliat  the  advance  will  begin  in  order  to  capture  the  advanced 
posts  of  the  enemy  as  stated  in  Field  Order  No.  9. 

4.  This  order  will  not  be  transmitted  by  phone  to  any  one,  but  carried  by  offi- 
cers to  the  different  echelons  concerned. 

5.  Watches  will  be  very  carefidly  .synchronized  this  evening  according  to  the 
time  given  by  wireless  at  8  o'clock.  In  case  this  time  has  not  been  received, 
you  will  take  the  hour  from  the  officer  presenting  these  instructions. 

By  commuud  of  Major-General  Liggett: 

Malin  Craig 
Chief  of  Siiijff 


172  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

to  make  travel  on  the  roads  no  easy  task  for  the  staff 
officers  and  messengers,  who  were  sent  flying  to  the  Bri- 
gade Headquarters,  and  thence  forward  to  the  waiting 
battalions. 

The  general  instructions  outlining  the  strategic  purpose 
of  the  counter-attack  had  made  clear  both  the  immediate 
object  to  be  gained  and  the  manner  in  which  the  advance 
against  Von  Boehn's  right  must  proceed.  To  take  his  army 
in  reverse;  to  cut  his  communications  in  the  area  between 
the  Aisne  and  INIarne,  by  simultaneous  attacks  on  both 
his  right  and  left  toward  Fere-en-Tardenois  —  these  were 
set  out  as  representing  the  task  in  hand.  But  all  elements 
of  the  line  attacking  from  the  west  could  not  advance  at  the 
same  time.  The  left,  being  farthest  distant  from  the  gen- 
eral objective,  would  have  to  move  first,  while  the  right, 
as  pivot,  must  hold  fast  till  the  left  had  come  level  with  it. 

Thus,  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  must  regulate  its  ad- 
vance on  the  167th  French,  its  neighbor  on  the  left.  And 
the  51st  Infantry  Brigade  in  turn,  holding  the  sickle-shaped 
line  between  Vaux  and  Bouresches,  had  to  stay  its  hand 
until  the  52d,  between  Bouresches  and  Bussiares,  had 
straightened  out  abreast  of  the  Division's  right.  On  July 
18,  when  the  general  attack  was  to  be  continued  by  the 
New  Englanders  and  the  167th  (the  forward  elements  of 
the  First  Army  Corps),  the  initial  move  forward  of  the 
Twenty-Sixth  would  naturally,  therefore,  be  made  by 
Cole's  brigade  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  men. 

Aware  that  his  brigade  could  be  first  called  upon.  Cole 
had  issued  the  necessary  instructions  on  July  17,  and  com- 
pleted his  dispositions.  It  was  hardly  necessary  for  him  to 
wait  for  the  Division  attack  order.  Indeed,  as  it  was  im- 
possible that  this  could  be  prepared  and  issued  sooner 
than  12.30  a.m.  of  July  18,  Cole  did  not  delay  a  moment 
as  soon  as  he  heard  the  hour  at  which  the  attack  would 
begin  —  4.35  a.m.  —  but  at  once  started  his  battahons 
toward  their  jumping-off  positions. 


THE  AISNE-IVIARNE  OFFENSRT  173 

Because,  however,  the  Division's  field  order  presents 
completely,  though  summarily,  the  situation  faced  by  the 
New  Englanders  that  inspiring  morning,  it  is  here  repro- 
duced in  full: 

Headquarters  26tk  Division 
Secret  American  Expeditionary  Forces  G— 3 

France  No.  121 

Field  Orders  \  18tk  July,  '18 

No.  51  r  0.30  o'clock 

Maps:  Extract  from  Chateau-Thierry, Sainte-  ^ 

Aulde,  Conde-en-Brie,  Dulce-le-Cha- >  Scale:  1:20,000 
teau  ) 

1.  The  Vlth  Army  attacks  between  the  Ourcq  and  the  Ru  d' 
Alland,  in  conjunction  with  the  Xth  Army  to  its  left,  with 
the  object  of  taking  the  enemy  in  reverse  between  Chateau- 
Thierry  and  Rheims. 

2.  The  1st  Corps,  on  the  right  of  the  Vlth  Army,  attacks 
between  Bois  Croissant  and  Bouresches  (exclusive). 

Order  of  Battle  from  right  to  left:  26th  Division,  167th 
Division  (French). 

3.  Action  of  the  167th  Division  (French): 

Intermediate  Objective:  The  enemy  outpost. 
First  Objective:  Woods  S.E.  of  Haute  Vesne. 

4.  Action  of  the  26th  Division: 

The  52d  Infantry  Brigade  will  attack  on  the  line, 
Bouresches  (exclusive)  to  the  left  of  the  division  sector 
(inclusive). 

The  51st  Infantry  Brigade  will  stand  fast  and  await 
orders.  It  will  be  prepared  to  take  part  in  the  attack. 

5.  Zone  of  action  of  the  26th  Division: 

Left  Limit:  Torcy,  Givry,  Les  Brusses  Farm,  Saint- 
Robert  Farm  (all  to  26th  Division). 

Right  Limit:  Vaux  (R.R.  Bridge),  Vincelles  (exclusive), 
Les  Chesneaux  (exclusive). 
G.  01)jcctive  of  the  26th  Division. 

First   Objective:   Torcy-Belleau-Givry-Railroad   from 
Givry  to  Bouresches  (exclusive). 
7.  All  troops  will  be  in  position  before  daylight  on  J  day. 

Parallel  of  departure:  Present  outpost  line. 

Attack  will  take  place  on  J  day,  at  H  hour,  when  the 
infantry  will  move  forward. 

Evi:itY  CARE  WILL  BE  TAKEN  TO  PKEbERVE  THE  NORMAL 


174  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

APPEARANCE    OF   THE   SECTOR,    AND    THE    ENEMY    WILL' BE 
PREVENTED  AT  ALL  COSTS  FROM  TAKING  PRISONERS. 

8.  Troops.  1, 

(a)  In  addition  to  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade  (less  1st 
Battalion,  104tli  Infantry  (less  Company  D),  and 
Company  K,  104th  Infantry),  there  are  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Commanding  General  52d  In- 
fantry Brigade,  3  half  companies  101st  Engineers; 
101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion  (two  companies) ;  de- 
tachment, 101st  Field  Signal  Battalion;  and  detach- 
ment. Sanitary  Troops. 

The  Commanding  General,  51st  Infantry  Brigade 
will  assist  by  machine-gun  fire  the  advance  of  the 
5  2d  Infantry  Brigade. 

(b)  The  51st  Artillery  Brigade,  and  3d  Battalion,  181st 

Artillery  (French)  will  assist  the  attack  under  the 
plan  submitted  by  the  Commanding  General,  51st 
Artillery  Brigade. 

At  H  hour,  the  barrage  will  be  laid  down  along 
the  front  of  the  attack.  No  artillery  firing  will  take 
place  prior  to  H  hour. 

(c)  The  1st  Battalion,  104th  Infantry  (less  Co  D),  and 
Company  K,  104th  Infantry,  are  assigned  to  duty 
as  Corps  Reserve,  under  cover  of  woods  north  of 
Issonge  Farm  (one  half  kilometer  south  of  the  pyra- 
mid near  La  Voie  du  Chdtel).  It  will  be  in  position 
before  daylight  on  J  day. 

(d)  The  1 2th  Aero  Squadron  will  make  a  reconnaissance  at 
H-1  hour,  to  locate  our  advanced  infantry  positions. 

Signals:  "I  am  the  Infantry  Airplane  of  the  26th 
Division  "  —  one-star  white  rocket. 
Airplane  will  carry  white  streamer  from  right  wing. 

9.  Liaison  with  neighboring  units.  The  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, 52d  Infantry  Brigade,  will  maintain  liaison  with  the 
167th  Division  (French)  on  his  left  by  one  platoon  and  one 
machine-gun  section. 

The  Commanding  General,  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  will 
maintain  liaison  with  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade  by  a  pla- 
toon and  one  machine-gun  section. 

10.  Axis  of  Liaison:  Mery  -  Genevrois  Farm -Paris  Farm- 

Montgivrault-Belleau-Etrepilly-La  Penonerie  Farm. 

11.  Message  Center:  Genevrois  Farm. 
P.  C:  Mery 


THE  AISNE-IVIARNE  OFFENSIVE  175 

12.  Administrative  Order  will  follow. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Edwards: 

Duncan  K.  Major,  Jr. 

CJiief  of  Staff 

Cole's  order  of  battle  from  left  to  right  was :  3d  Battal- 
ion, 103d  Infantry;  3d  Battalion,  104th  Infantry;  2d 
BattaHon,  103d  Infantry.  One  of  his  battahons  (1/104, 
less  Co.  "D")  and  one  company  ("K,"  104th  Infantry) 
were  held  out  as  corps  reserve,  but  he  had  a  considerable 
addition  to  his  machine-gun  strength,  and  the  engineers 
assigned  to  him  were  available  for  use  as  infantry.  Behind 
him,  in  direct  support,  was  the  101st  Field  Artillery,  the 
batteries  of  the  1st  Battalion  being  assigned  to  assist  the 
attack  of  the  104th  Infantry,  those  of  the  2d  Battalion 
having  the  same  mission  w^ith  respect  to  the  103d  Infantry. 
I/lOl  F.A.  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Paris  Farm,  astride  the 
Paris-Metz  highway,  while  11/ 101  F.A.  was  astride  the 
road  running  south  of  Champillon  toward  La  Voie  du 
Chatel  and  near  the  Maison  Blanche. 

A  glance  at  the  ground  which  the  attack  was  intended 
to  secure  will  assist  in  understanding  what  followed  its 
launching.  Opposite  the  52d  Brigade  w^ere  the  villages  of 
Torcy  and  Belleau,  some  eight  hundred  yards  apart.  Be- 
hind them  the  ground  dipped  sharply  into  a  wooded  ravine, 
beyond  which  there  was  a  sharp  rise  toward  the  broad, 
rounded  crest  of  two  hills,  No.  190  behind  Belleau,  and 
No.  193  in  the  north.  The  pass  between  them,  extending 
east,  had  the  village  of  Givry  at  its  nearer  end,  while  Les 
Brusses  Farm,  on  the  slope  of  Hill  190,  afforded  the  enemy 
an  additional  defensive  point.  At  Bouresches  railway 
station,  just  to  the  right  of  the  zone  of  attack,  there  ex- 
isted a  very  strong  enemy  machine-gun  position,  as  we 
have  already  seen;  while  the  heavy  woods  on  the  rising 
slopes  behind  Belleau  afforded  other  points  of  resistance. 

But  the  first  phase  of  the  attack  of  the  52d  Brigade  suc- 
ceeded handsomely.  The  left  of  the  hue  (III/ 103)  took 


176  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Torcy  in  its  first  rush/  and  was  pressing  farther.  There 
was  little  or  no  artillery  reaction  from  the  enemy  on  the 
advance  of  this  battalion,  and  for  a  while  the  French  on 
the  left  were  able  to  keep  pace  with  it.  But  the  center  and 
right  of  the  attack  had  trouble.  The  former  (III/104)  was 
seriously  delayed  in  its  assembly  and  start.  In  the  tangles 
of  Belleau  Wood  two  of  the  companies  lost  their  way  and 
did  not  get  to  their  positions  until  after  daylight;  the  am- 
munition for  the  machine-gun  company  did  not  arrive  on 
time;  and  consequently  the  battalion  commander  did  not 
think  himself  justified  in  proceeding  when  "H"  hour 
sounded.  A  severe  fire  dropped  by  the  enemy  artillery  on 
the  battalion  in  Belleau  Wood,  with  the  purpose  of  break- 
ing up  the  assembly  for  attack,  succeeded  admirably.  For 
a  considerable  period  the  battalion  waited,  scattered  about 
the  wood.  Not  till  7.30  o'clock  did  it  advance,  behind  a 
second  artillery  protective  fire.  But  under  a  new  com- 
mander (Major  E.  E.  Lewis)  it  attained  its  objectives  in 
Belleau  and  Givry  about  8.30  o'clock,  and  was  once  more 
abreast  of  the  left  of  the  line.^ 

1  Following  are  the  messages  received  at  Division  Headquarters  reporting  this 
phase  of  the  progress  of  the  fight,  reproduced  from  the  "Journal  of  Operations": 

(a)  "July  18,  1918.  5.40  o'clock.  Signal  from  Torcy  that  Torcy  was  entered 
and  that  there  was  very  little  resistance.  Troops  seen  in  Torcy.  Reported  by 
Lieutenant  Woods,  "D"  Company,  103d  Infantry,  on  the  outpost  line." 

(6)  "July  18,  1918.  5.46  o'clock.  From  Smith  [Headquarters  52d  Infantry 
Brigade]  to  Bowen  [Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3].  At  5.42  Lieut.  Woods  re- 
ported our  infantry  has  passed  through  the  town  of  Torcy;  now  on  heights  be- 
yond the  town;  encountered  no  resistance;  that  he  saw  a  three-star  rocket  from 
Torcy  [this  means  objective  gained].  Above  telephoned  to  Corps  by  W.  P.  H.  at 
5.50  o'clock." 

2  The  incident  is  told  vividly  in  the  messages  transmitted  to  Division  Head- 
quarters at  the  time : 

(a)  "Pigeon  Message:  Time  6.05  o'clock.  Location:  at  woods  where  III 
Battalion  was  to  start  from. 

"  Did  not  reach  starting-off  place  until  after  attack  had  started.  Machine-gun 
company  did  not  arrive  until  5.10.  Their  ammunition  did  not  arrive.  Infantry 
companies  all  late  on  account  of  lateness  of  arrival  of  ammunition  and  other 
supplies.  When  they  began  to  arrive,  it  was  broad  daylight  and  fully  exposed, 
and  companies  were  being  shelled  by  enemy.  Battalions  now  scattered  about 
woods,  taking  whatever  cover  they  can  find,  as  woods  are  being  shelied  heavily 
by  high-explosive.  Can  get  in  touch  with  me  through  Major  Lewis'  P.C.Woods' 
P.C.  2d  Battalion.  (Signed)  McDade,  104th  Inf.,  3d  Bn." 


o 
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PL, 

o 
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o 


THE  AISNE-IVURNE  OFFENSIVE  177 

Tlie  right  of  the  attack  (11/103)  also  met  with  diffi- 
culties. Like  the  center  battalion,  it  was  unable  to  reach 
its  parallel  of  departure  until  7.30,  three  hours  late,  and 
had  to  have  its  barrage  repeated.  About  9.30,  however,  the 
battalion  had  captured  the  troublesome  Bouresches  rail- 
way station,  and  had  estabhshed  connection  in  the  village 
with  the  left  of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade.  Beyond  the 
station  and  railway  embankment,  however,  the  battalion 
ran  into  serious  trouble.  All  day  it  was  subjected  to  an 
enfilade  machine-gun  fire  and  could  not  advance;  it  dug 
in  as  best  it  could,  in  order  to  hold  its  ground.  But  at  night- 
fall, under  pressure  of  enemy  artillery  fire  from  Bouresches 
^Yood,  the  battalion  was  forced  to  give  up  its  gain  and  re- 
tire to  its  original  starting-place  in  the  face  of  an  enemy 
counter-attack  directed  toward  Bouresches  and  Belleau 
Wood,  which  was  presently  beaten  off.  It  was  relieved 
during  the  night  by  1/103.  For  a  while  it  appeared  that 
this  counter-thrust  of  the  enemy's  might  have  real  weight 
behind  it.  A  considerable  massing  of  infantry  was  dis- 
cerned toward  nightfall  in  the  vicinity  of  Les  Brusses 
Farm;  the  section  of  front  next  south  of  Bouresches  was 
plentifully  laced  by  the  enemy  artillery  as  if  in  prepara- 
tion for  an  attack.  In  the  early  hours  of  the  night,  as  the 
battalion  fell  back  from  the  ground  it  had  won,  there  was 
considerable  uncertainty  in  adjoining  units  as  to  the  extent 

(6)  "July  18,  1918:  6.45  o'clock.  From  Cole  [C.  G.  52d  Infantry  Brigade]  to 
Bowen  [Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3].  Have  just  received  message  that  bat- 
talion directed  to  Belleau  was  not  ready  to  start.  Am  starting  them  now.  Have 
relieved  one  Major  and  put  another  in." 

(c)  "July  18,  1918:  8.30  o'clock.  From  Moscow  [Headquarters  52d  Infantry 
Brigade]  to  Morgan  [at  Division  Headquarters].  Have  not  heard  anything  as  yet. 
Am  sending  out  string  of  runners  to  gain  information;  telephone  out  of  order. 
At  7.00  o'clock  no  word  from  Ilosford  [commanding  right  of  the  attack].  Mc- 
Dade  had  not  started,  but  would  start  at  7.30,  and  information  has  come  in  that 
they  had  started  at  7.30,  and  have  no  information  since.  Am  trying  to  get  it 
now." 

(d)  "July  18,  1918:  8.45  o'clock.  From  Cole  to  Bowen.  We  have  no  direct 
message,  but  some  American  wounded;  and  a  doctor  at  the  aid  station  says  that 
they  tell  him  they  come  from  Givry  and  that  we  are  in  Givry.  This  is  not  authen- 
tic yet." 


178  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

and  severity  of  the  apparent  repulse  which  this  unit  had 
sustained,  but  this  was  cleared  up  by  the  reconnaissance 
and  following  report  of  the  commanding  officer,  51st  In- 
fantry Brigade: 

From:  Boston  One  July  18, 1918 

To:      Bowen  is. 20  o'clock 

They  tried  to  get  in  (Bouresches).  Some  possibly  did  get  in. 
If  so  they  are  now  probably  all  dead.  What  is  certain  according 
to  report  that  reached  us  is  that  we  hold  Bouresches  intact. 

It  is  possible  that  the  motive  for  this  action  of  the  en- 
emy was  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that,  early  in  the  evening, 
he  began  to  withdraw  some  of  his  artillery  from  the  front 
of  the  adjacent  division  on  the  left,  in  which  case  he  may 
have  used  the  Bouresches  attack  as  a  screen. 

The  impetuous  rush  of  Cole's  left  was  stayed  by  the 
inability  of  the  French  to  make  equally  rapid  progress. 
Meeting  a  heavy  artillery  fire  in  the  vicinity  of  Licy- 
Clignon,  the  167th  was  checked  altogether  after  early  suc- 
cesses; and  later  in  the  day  it  was  to  find  difficulty  in 
clearing  Hill  193,  north  of  Givry.  The  initial  advance  of 
Cole's  men  had  carried  them  to  the  top  of  this  hill,^  but  it 
was  necessary  to  recall  them,  as  Hill  193  belonged  in  the 
French  zone  of  advance.  The  result  was  that  the  enemy 
promptly  reoccupied  the  hill,  from  which,  throughout  the 
remainder  of  the  day  and  part  of  the  day  following,  he 
poured  an  effective  enfilade  fire  of  machine  guns  on  our 
battalions  in  the  ravine  and  along  the  railway  between 
Belleau  and  Bouresches,  where  the  losses  sustained  by 
these  means  by  the  right  battalion  had  a  certain  bearing 
on  its  withdrawal  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day.  But  until 
the  167th  got  ahead,  the  Twenty-Sixth  could  only  wait. 
The  pivot  cannot  move  till  the  flank  progresses.  A  letter  of 
instructions  from  Corps  Headquarters,  received  early  in 

*  As  told  in  the  following  Field  Message:  "July  IS,  1918,  9.45  o'clock.  From 
Smith  (52d  Infantry  Brigade)  to  Strong  (at  Division  Headquarters).  Met  the 
Boche  on  his  line  of  resistance.  Sharp  fight  took  place,  after  which  Boche  turned 
tail  and  ran  like  hell  up  the  hill  back  of  Givry,  pursued  by  our  troops.  I^gpe  for 
nutfe  prisoners." 


THE  AISNE-^IARNE  OFFENSIVE  179 

the  afternoon,  reveals  so  clearly  the  broad  lines  of  the 
action  intended  without  regard  to  the  temporary  or  local 
situation,  that  it  bears  repeating: 

July  18,  1918 
13.45  o'clock 
From:  Chief  of  Staff,  1st  Corps. 
To:       Chief  of  Staff,  26th  Division.  (To  C.G.,  26th  Division.) 

The  167th  Div'ision,  French,  are  attacking  in  an  easterly 
direction  at  1  p.m.  in  liaison  with  other  forces  to  the  north,  with 
first  objective  Montiers-Givry  exclusive;  second  objective 
Epaux  Bezu,  La  Loge  Farm.  Your  division  will  advance  its  left 
in  conjunction  with  the  167th.  As  soon  as  the  167th  moves  from 
its  first  objective  towards  its  second  objective,  the  52d  Brigade 
will  attack  in  an  easterly  direction,  with  general  axis  Grande 
Picardie  Farm,  La  Sacerie  Farm,  maintaining  Uaison  with  the 
167th  to  your  north.  The  5 1st  Brigade  will  hold  itself  in  readi- 
ness to  advance,  keeping  its  left  in  touch  with  the  52d  Brigade. 

Liggett 

As  a  matter  of  cold  fact,  however,  the  French  at  one 
o'clock  of  the  18th,  so  far  from  attacking  in  any  direction, 
were  waiting  on  the  line  they  had  reached  early  in  the 
morning  until  the  situation  cleared  on  their  own  left.  From 
Petret  Wood  the  enemy  had  brought  heavy  machine-gun 
fire  to  bear  on  the  flank  of  the  167th,  as  well  as  against  the 
advance  of  the  164th  Division  which  was  next  in  line.  The 
village  of  Courchamps  was  another  center  of  resistance 
which  the  French  had  found  too  hard  a  nut  to  crack ;  and 
so,  while  Cole  waited  impatiently  all  through  the  afternoon 
and  evening  of  the  18th  for  the  French  to  come  abreast  of 
him,  so  that  he  could  press  on  to  his  second  objective,  in 
accordance  with  the  Corps  orders,  he  was  forced  to  hold 
his  hand.  Not  till  early  evening  did  the  French  get  ahead, 
maneuvering  to  outflank  Montiers  and  to  assault  the  re- 
doubtable Hill  193,  which  Cole's  men  had  already  scaled, 
only  to  be  required  later  to  relinquish. 

The  night  of  the  18th  was  relatively  quiet.  Orders  were 
received  from  the  Corps  ^  to  resume  the  attack  the  next 

*  Field  Orders  No.  11,  First  Army  Corps,  July  18,  1918. 


180  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

morning,  "particular  attention  being  paid  to  regulating 
the  advance  of  each  unit  by  the  progress  of  the  unit  on  its 
left."  At  the  request  of  the  167th  Division,  whose  com- 
manding general  paid  a  visit  to  Cole  late  in  the  afternoon 
for  the  purpose  of  asking  the  assistance  of  two  battalions, 
III/ 104  again  attacked  Hill  193  about  ten  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  patrols  reaching  the  top  without  opposition:  but 
again,  because  the  French  were  unable  to  cooperate  in 
securing  the  hill,  our  troops  had  to  be  recalled.  The  fol- 
lowing morning  the  French  resumed  their  efforts.  In  the 
direction  of  Courchamps,  Montiers,  and  Hill  193  they 
advanced,  following  a  heavy  artillery  preparation;  and 
before  nine  o'clock  word  was  received  from  aeroplane 
reconnaissance  that  a  steady  stream  of  enemy  infantry 
was  retreating  easterly  from  Bonnes.  A  curiously  inter- 
esting confirmation  of  this  news  was  gathered  from  an  in- 
tercepted German  wireless  message.  Farther  to  the  left 
the  164th  Division  made  some  progress  toward  Petret 
Wood  with  its  casemated  machine-gun  nests;  and  at  inter- 
vals throughout  the  day  came  reports  of  heavy  explosions 
and  fires  in  the  enemy's  back  areas,  where  he  was  evidently 
destroying  ammunition  and  stores.  Montiers  was  evacu- 
ated; a  demonstration  by  some  enemy  tanks  and  infantry 
on  the  French  front  was  not  pressed  to  a  conclusion;  there 
was  continual  evidence  from*  all  observers  that  a  consid- 
erable retirement  was  in  progress.  But  the  French  advance 
battalions,  far  from  hustling  this  withdrawal,  showed  a 
tendency  to  be  content  with  a  very  slight  forward  move- 
ment on  the  trace  of  the  retreating  foe.  It  required  the 
personal  pressure  of  the  French  Division  Commander  on 
the  colonel  of  his  right  regiment  to  stir  that  unit  up  to 
anything  like  an  energetic  attack  on  Hill  193;  but  allow- 
ance should  be  made  for  the  fact  that  the  division  next  in 
line  on  the  left  had  experienced  great  difficulty  in  breaking 
the  resistance  in  the  formidable  Petret  Wood. 
Not  yet  was  it  sure  that  the  Corps  was  being  confronted 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  181 

by  rear-guards  only.  Throughout  the  day  of  July  19  there 
was  strong  artillery  and  machine-gun  acti\aty  from  the 
enemy  Hues;  the  extent  of  his  conjectured  withdrawal 
could  not  yet  be  determined.  For  the  moment  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  was  obhged  to  wait  where  it  was,  with  what  patience 
was  possible,  attending  developments  on  the  left.  The  in- 
fantry spent  the  time  consolidating  its  new  positions,  while 
the  artillery  executed  special  fires  on  observed  targets,  as 
called  for  by  the  observers,  such  as  the  bodies  of  German 
infantry  seen  massed  and  deploying  near  Les  Brusses  Farm 
and  Halloudray  Farm,  or  the  convoys  and  artillery  ve- 
hicles on  the  roads  to  the  rear. 

July  20  saw  the  delay  ended.  Early  in  the  morning  the 
ICTth  Division  resumed  its  attack  with  vigor  following  a 
strong  artillery  preparation;  and  orders  came  from  the 
Corps  ^  at  1  P.M.  for  an  advance,  upon  which  there  was 
issued  from  Di\^sion  Headquarters  Field  Order  No.  55 
at  2  P.M.,  directing  an  attack  along  the  whole  division  front 
to  begin  at  3  o'clock.  At  last  it  was  the  turn  of  the  51st 
Infantry  Brigade,  the  right  of  the  hne,  to  move  forward; 
and  a  nice  bit  of  maneuvering  it  was  that  the  advance 
from  its  crooked  line  entailed.  The  left  regiment  of  the 
brigade  (102d  Infantry)  followed  an  axis  of  attack  straight 
east,  but  the  right  (101st  Infantry),  occupying  a  hne  which 
faced  northeast,  had  to  pivot  sharply  on  its  own  right  so 
as  to  link  up  and  move  straight  forward  with  its  neighbor. 

For  fifteen  minutes  prior  to  the  attack  the  artillery  de- 
livered a  violent  fire  of  preparation  on  the  woods  and  ra- 
vines in  advance  of  the  infantry's  front  line;  and  as  the 
latter  moved  forward,  all  batteries  fired  a  barrage  to  a 
depth  of  three  and  a  half  kilometers.  This  fire  was  not 
the  typical  barrage,  advancing  in  regular  progression  at  a 
fixed  rate,  but  rather  a  series  of  terrific  concentrations  on 
places  which  were  probable  machine-gun  nests  or  other 
centers  of  resistance.  From  well-sited  observation  points, 

1  Field  Order  No.  15,  First  Army  Corps,  July  20,  1918,  11.20  o'clock. 


182  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

away  forward,  the  artillery  could  follow  every  step  of  the 
infantry's  advance  along  the  entire  front,  could  note  its 
rate,  could  see  where  some  special  resistance  was  en- 
countered. And  so  the  artillery  support  was  perfect.  It 
was  no  mere  mechanical  protective  fire,  regulated  by  a 
theoretically  correct  time-table,  which  aided  the  infantry 
that  afternoon.  Flexible,  varying  in  intensity  with  the 
requirements  of  the  moment,  perfectly  controlled  by  the 
observers,  the  fire  of  the  gunners  on  July  20  was  a  wonder- 
ful example  of  a  moving  barrier  accurately  placed  and  in- 
telligently adapted.  An  incidental  activity,  a  bit  outside 
the  work  expected  of  artillerymen,  was  the  capture,  by  the 
personnel  of  an  observing  station  of  the  101st  Field  Ar- 
tillery, of  a  party  of  thirteen  German  infantrymen. 

And  how  Shelton's  brigade  of  Connecticut  and  Boston 
men  did  travel  on  the  skirts  of  the  barrage !  Released  from 
a  fortnight's  waiting  the  infantry  went  forward  with  a 
rush,  in  spite  of  the  enfilade  from  Hill  204  on  the  right 
which  struck  the  101st;  ^  sturdily  in  the  face  of  the  enemy 
machine  guns  and  trench  mortars  in  Rochet  Wood  and 
Borne  Agron  Wood  which  sought  to  stay  the  102d.  Across 
open  wheat-fields,  with  only  a  minimum  of  cover,  the 
brigade  advanced  with  fine  impetuosity.  On  the  left  the 
52d  Infantry  Brigade,  sorely  battered  by  its  work  of  the 
two  days  previous,  ploughed  pluckily  along.  Its  right  ^  was 
cut  up  by  artillery;  its  left  was  enfiladed;  but  by  nightfall 
the  whole  line  was  on  the  assigned  objective  and  good  con- 
nection established  between  the  103d  Infantry  and  102d 
Infantry  on  the  inner  flanks  of  the  brigades.  By  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening  the  French  had  come  up  abreast  of 
the  Twenty-Sixth,  reporting  that  the  enemy  had  with- 
drawn so  rapidly  on  their  front  that  they  had  lost  touch. 
Montiers  and  Petret  Wood  had  fallen;  Hill  193,  that  bas- 
tion of  defense,  was  evacuated.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the 

^  One  company  was  withdrawn  temporarily  from  the  position  it  had  gained 
because  of  minenwerfer  fire,  but  reoccupied  the  ground  later. 
_  2  Hanson's  battalion,  l/l03d  Infantry. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  183 

Germans  left  rear-guard  detachments,  as  small  as  single 
squads,  to  cover  the  retreat;  and  to  the  credit  of  these  lit- 
tle groups  be  it  said  that  all  of  them  defended  their  posi- 
tions to  the  last. 

It  had  been  a  good  day.  The  first  line  of  the  enemy  de- 
fenses had  been  broken  down;  he  was  in  full  retreat;  the 
Division  was  on  its  objective  at  the  edge  of  the  Etrepilly 
Plateau,  ready  for  the  next  stage  of  the  movement  to  cut 
the  enemy  lines  of  retreat.  And  how  the  work  of  the 
Twenty-Sixth,  during  the  first  three  days  of  the  offensive, 
impressed  the  Army  Commander,  General  Degoutte,  that 
general's  own  comments  will  testify: 

If  one  wants  to  judge  the  offensive  spirit  which  animates  the 
Americans  and  their  tactical  methods,  one  has  only  to  follow  in 
detail  the  operations  of  a  division  since  the  beginning  of  our 
counter-attack  between  Chateau-Thierry  and  Soissons. 

It  was  on  the  18th,  at  4  a.m.,  that  the  order  to  take  the  first 
line  of  German  positions  was  received.  The  American  division, 
whose  movements  we  will  relate,  was  at  that  time  northwest 
of  Chateau-Thierry,  in  the  Bois  de  Belleau,  at  the  pivot  of  the 
troops,  and  had  taken  the  place  of  a  division  which  took  part  in 
the  operations  of  Belleau  and  Bouresches,  and  it  wanted  to  dis- 
tinguish itself  as  well  as  those  Hite  troops.  But  the  divisions 
placed  at  the  pivot  have  to  advance  slowly,  according  to  the 
progress  made  by  the  wings. 

On  the  very  first  day  it  was  necessary  to  moderate  the  ardor  of 
the  Americans,  who  would  willingly  have  gone  farther  than  the 
first  objectives.  Indeed,  at  the  signal  of  the  attack  the  American 
troops  went  with  perfect  discipline,  in  rear  of  the  artillery  bar- 
rage, to  the  Torcy-Belleau-Givry  line  and  the  railroad  line  up 
to  the  Bouresches  station.  They  reached  this  line  in  one  sweep 
almost  without  meeting  any  resistance,  and,  excited  by  their 
success,  they  wanted  to  go  farther. 

However,  it  was  necessary,  before  continuing  the  general 
advance,  to  take  Montiers  and  Pctret  AVood,  still  strongly  occu- 
pied by  the  Germans.  There  was  hard  fighting  on  the  j^art  of  the 
French  troops  on  the  left  to  annihilate  the  resistance  of  the 
enemy. 

In  order  to  relieve  them,  the  Americans,  on  the  evening  of  the 
20th,  made  an  enveloping  maneuver  which  was  crowned  with 


184  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

success.  With  splendid  valiance  they  went  in  one  sweep  as  far 
as  Etrepilly  Height,  the  Gonetrie  Farm,  and  Halmardiere. 
American  audacity!  Notwithstanding  the  machine-gun  barrage 
and  the  enemy's  islands  of  resistance,  they  advanced  for  two 
kilometers,  capturing  three  guns,  a  big  minenwerfer,  and  numer- 
ous machine  guns.  Moreover,  200  prisoners  were  taken  by  the 
Americans. 

I  could  not  have  done  better,  in  a  similar  occasion,  with  my 
best  troops. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  AISNE-]\L\RNE  OFFENSIVE  —  EPIEDS  AND 

TRUGNY 

NOT  from  a  survey  of  the  local  situation,  nor  even 
from  a  study  of  the  fragmentary  dispatches  from 
other  parts  of  the  front  which  buzzed  and  chcked  into 
Headquarters  that  night,  could  the  Division  get  more  than 
a  glimmer  of  the  importance  of  the  action  in  which  it  had 
just  played  so  excellent  a  part.  The  New  Englanders  had 
gone  steadily  forward,  winning  all  objectives  by  hard  fight- 
ing, with  losses  no  greater  than  the  ransom  which  glory 
always  pays.  The  American  Commander-in-Cliief  had  visi- 
ted Headquarters  soon  after  the  battle  was  joined  on  July 
18,  had  cross-questioned  the  Division  Commander,  and  pro- 
nounced himself  satisfied.  One  read  bulletins  of  Allied  vic- 
tories to  the  north,  near  Soissons.  But  not  yet  could  one 
understand  the  hour's  significance.  Nobody  dreamed  that 
the  encounters  of  July  18-20  had  marked  a  turning-point 
of  the  war  —  that  with  the  forward  rush  on  that  brilliant 
morning,  the  initiative  and  the  offensive  had  alike  irrevoca- 
bly passed  to  Foch,  the  master  who  had  dared  so  splendidly. 
But  no  less  a  triumph  than  that  had  definitely  been  won. 
To  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Army  under  Degoutte,  the  Tenth 
Army  under  Mangin  had  secured  resounding  successes. 
His  left,  debouching  from  the  wooded  country  about  Am- 
bleny,  had  never  stopped  till  it  was  on  the  Montague  de 
Paris,  a  couple  of  miles  from  Soissons,  the  vital  point  in 
the  salient's  supply  and  communication  system;  his  center 
reached  Berzy-le-Sec,  cutting  the  salient's  principal  high- 
way; his  right  connected  with  Degoutte's  force  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Oulchy-la-Ville.^  The  left  of  the  Sixth  Army  in 

1  American  troops  with  Manf,'in,  including  the  First  and  Second  Divisions, 
were  engaged  on  both  July  18  and  19. 


186  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

two  days  advanced  from  Faverolles  to  Oulchy,  not  less 
than  13  kilometers;  and,  more  important  than  the  ground 
gained,  there  had  been  a  heavy  capture  of  prisoners  and 
guns,  while  the  enemy,  caught  unawares,  was  sent  reeling 
back  in  disorder.  The  western  side  of  the  salient  had  been 
smashed  in  from  end  to  end. 

Apparently,  even  Von  Boehn  did  not  grasp  the  impor- 
tance and  extent  of  the  Allied  victories  on  his  left  flank. 
Planted  on  the  Marne's  southern  bank,  where  as  many  as 
eight  divisions  were  committed,  he  hung  on  for  thirty-six 
hours  in  spite  of  the  growing  menace  to  his  principal  lines 
of  retreat  and  supply.  Not  till  the  night  of  July  20  did  he 
begin  his  retirement  from  the  river,  under  heavy  pressure 
from  the  Fifth  Reserve  Army,  under  De  Mitry,  and  the 
Ninth  Army  of  Berthelot.  Not  till  early  in  the  morning  of 
the  21st  was  Chateau-Thierry  evacuated;  and  then  was  the 
moment  for  Degoutte,  directly  on  the  flank  of  the  retiring 
Germans,  crowding  north  on  the  few  available  roads,  to 
deal  a  blow  which  should  spell  disaster. 

To  effect  this  speed  was  all-important.  At  all  costs  one 
must  quickly  break  through  whatever  screen  of  opposition 
Von  ^oehn  might  have  created  to  guard  his  flank,  and 
solidly  secure  the  routes  by  which  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  and  guns  in  the  neck  of  the  salient  must  be  made. 
Of  these  the  chief  were  the  Chateau-Thierry-Soissons 
highway,  and  then,  some  ten  kilometers  farther  east,  the 
road  extending  north  from  Jaulgonne,  on  the  Marne,  to 
Fere-en-Tardenois.  And  so  hardly  had  the  Twenty-Sixth 
and  its  French  companion  division  caught  their  breath 
after  the  fighting  of  the  late  hours  of  July  20,  before  orders 
came  from  the  Corps  directing  a  resumption  of  the  ad- 
vance the  following  morning.^  Forwarded  to  the  brigade 
commanders  by  endorsement,  the  Corps  order  was  sup- 
plemented by  Field  Order  No.  56,  directing,  in  accordance 

1  Field  Orders  No.  17,  First  Army  Corps,  July  20,  20.00  o'clock;  received  at 
Division  Headquarters  at  21.00  o'clock. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  187 

with  the  Corps  plan,  an  advance  without  reference  to  the 
progress  of  neighboring  divisions.  At  all  costs  the  troops 
must  get  forward  promptly.  On  the  theory  that  the  enemy 
was  in  full  retreat  and  that  he  must  be  closely  followed  up, 
the  movement  of  the  Division  forward  was  arranged  in  the 
form  of  a  march  in  which  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade  should 
lead  accompanied  by  the  102d  Field  Artillery,  the  other 
troops  remaining  in  position  till  further  orders,  except  one 
battalion  of  the  103d  Infantry  and  a  machine-gun  com- 
pany of  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  which  were  to  move 
out  as  left  flank  guard  of  the  51st  Brigade's  column.  In 
this  the  102d  Infantry  was  to  act  as  advance  guard  ac- 
companied by  the  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion;  it  was  to 
direct  itself  toward  the  hamlet  of  Trugny  via  Sacerie  Wood 
and  Sacerie  Farm.  One  thousand  yards  in  the  rear  the 
101st  Infantry  and  102d  Field  Artillery  marched  as  the 
main  body.  Later  orders  from  the  Corps  directed  the  ad- 
vance to  be  begun  at  4  a.m.  on  July  21. 

Through  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  forward  movement 
was  pursued  steadily,  without  opposition.  The  advance 
party  (I/l02d  Infantry)  took  some  prisoners  at  the  station 
near  where  the  Soissons-Chateau-Thierry  railway  passes 
under  a  tunnel  at  Sacerie  Farm;  by  noon  the  advance 
guard  was  on  the  great  Soissons-Chateau-Thierry  high- 
way. There  was  every  evidence  of  a  somewhat  precipitate 
withdrawal  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  great  quantities  of 
ammunition  being  left  behind,  with  other  supplies.  Most 
of  his  artillery  and  machine  guns,  however,  he  had  been 
able  to  remove.  For  a  couple  of  hours  the  troops  rested  and 
were  reorganized.  Then,  at  four  in  the  afternoon,  on  re- 
ceipt of  orders  from  Shelton,  the  102d  Infantry  resumed 
its  march  toward  Trugny,  along  the  road  by  Sacerie  Farm 
and  Breteuil  Farm,  and  through  the  copses  of  Breteuil 
\Yood.  Cautiously,  with  an  advance  party  deployed  as 
skirmishers,  did  the  102d  now  proceed,  for  reconnaissance 
by  the  regimental  commander  along  the  eastern  edge  of 


188  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Breteuil  Wood  overlooking  Trugny  and  the  village  of 
Epieds  had  promptly  drawn  fire,  and  it  became  evident 
that  what  had  started  as  a  pursuit  was  now  to  be  changed 
to  an  attack  on  a  resolute  rear-guard  holding  an  exceed- 
ingly well-chosen  position. 

The  head  of  the  advance  had  struck  an  obstacle  which, 
apparently,  had  not  been  reckoned  with.  Not  even  the 
Brigade  Commander  believed  that  the  line  of  Epieds- 
Trugny  and  Trugny  Wood  was  going  to  be  held;  and, 
farther  to  the  rear,  orders  and  more  orders  demanded  that 
the  advance  be  continued  without  delay  or  cessation,  that 
it  be  pressed  with  vigor,  that  the  troops  reach  the  Jaul- 
gonne-Fere-en-Tardenois  road  by  daylight  of  July  22.^ 
This  objective  was  a  matter  of  only  nine  kilometers  (5  5/8 
miles)  away  on  the  far  side  of  almost  continuous  wood- 
land, with  two  strongly  defended  villages  in  the  path,  and 
accessible  only  by  narrow  country  roads.  The  order  reached 
the  advanced  battalions  after  nightfall,  when  there  was 
no  possible  chance  for  reconnaissance  or  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  firing  data  by  the  artillery.  But  such  physical  con- 
siderations as  these  were  of  no  importance;  nor  did  it  ap- 
pear worth  attention  that  the  Division's  left  flank  was  in 
the  air,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  French,  less  advanced 
than  the  Twenty-Sixth,  had  been  blocked  by  the  German 
machine  guns  in  La  Goutterie  Farm.  Major  considera- 
tions —  to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  —  must  out- 
weigh all  others.  Division  Headquarters  meanwhile  had 
moved  up  to  Lucy-le-Bocage  and,  later  in  the  day,  to 
Grand  Ru  Farm,  where  it  remained  throughout  the  re- 
mainder of  the  Division's  operation. 

What  actually  happened  on  the  night  of  July  21  and 
early  in  the  morning  of  July  22  is  interesting  to  compare 
with  what  was  supposed  to  happen.  The  estimate  of  the 
situation  by  higher  Headquarters  was  partly  based  on  the 

1  Telephone  message  of  Corps  Commander,  16.36  o'clock,  and  written  Corps 
memorandum  received  at  18.30  o'clock,  followed  by  Field  Order  No.  58,  July  21, 
17.25  o'clock. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSR^  189 

reports  of  prisoners,  who  stated  that  only  small  rear-guard 
forces  were  opposing  the  Division  and  that  a  general  re- 
treat was  under  way.  To  push  vigorously  ahead;  to  break 
down  the  temporary  rear-guard  opposition;  to  come  to 
grips  at  once  with  the  disorganized  elements  of  the  main 
body  —  these  steps,  prescribed  by  both  common  sense 
and  the  Field  Service  Regulations,  were  promptly  tran- 
scribed in  field  orders  and  sent  forward.  And  it  was  as- 
sumed, of  course,  that  the  orders  would  be  promptly  car- 
ried out,  the  first  step  being  for  the  advance  troops  to  get 
contact  with  the  rear-guard,  attack,  and  destroy  it.  A 
field  message  from  the  Brigade  Commander  condensed 
the  orders  to  explicit  directions. 

We  have  seen  the  102d  Infantry  deplojang  past  Sacerie 
Farm  through  Breteuil  Wood,  toward  the  hamlet  of 
Trugny,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  July  21.  We  have  seen  how 
its  scouts  and  skirmishers  drew  fire  from  the  wide  semi- 
circle of  woods  which  backed  this  village  and  Epieds,  set 
amid  the  wide  fields  of  golden  wheat  in  a  shallow  bowl  a 
half-mile  wide,  where  not  a  rat  could  get  cover  from  ma- 
chine guns.  Reconnaissance  developed  clearly  that  the 
villages  were  strongly  held;  darkness  was  coming  on;  the 
advance-guard  commander  elected  to  wait  till  daylight 
before  beginning  his  attack.  Behind  him  was  the  101st 
Infantry,  not  far  from  Blanchard  Farm  and  Lauconnois 
Farm,  waiting  for  the  main  body's  complement  of  artillery 
to  come  up.  On  his  right  patrols  had  made  a  tenuous  con- 
nection with  the  French;  on  the  left  a  battalion  of  the  103d 
Infantry,  the  flank  guard  of  the  column,  had  come  up 
nearly  abreast  and  was  lying  opposite  Epieds,  with  many 
yards  of  perfectly  open  country  to  traverse  before  it  could 
get  near  the  town.  The  advance-guard  command  post,  was 
in  Breteuil  Wood,  some  twelve  hundred  yards  short  of 
Trugny  village. 

All  the  night  of  July  21  this  advance  guard  waited  in 
position  with  march  outposts  to  its  front  and  flanks.  Back 


190  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

at  Division  Headquarters  it  was  decided  that  the  101st 
Infantry  should  attack  at  daybreak  of  July  22  on  the 
right,  while  the  102d  Infantry  took  Trugny  village.  The 
52d  Infantry  Brigade,  meanwhile,  was  to  break  through 
the  enemy  lines  at  Epieds.  But  orders  from  the  Corps, ^ 
received  just  after  midnight,  directed  that,  owing  to  the 
contraction  of  the  Corps  front,  the  Twenty-Sixth  should 
take  it  over,  which  was  translated  to  mean  that  the  52d 
Infantry  Brigade,  on  the  left,  should  take  over  the  front  of 
the  167th  Division  (French)  while  the  51st  Brigade  cov- 
ered the  front  of  the  Twenty-Sixth.  Immediately  this 
order  was  got  forward,  but  owing  to  the  darkness  and  the 
congestion  of  the  roads,  the  order  did  not  reach  Shelton  till 
2  A.M.;  it  did  not  reach  Cole  till  5.30  a.m.  And  to  increase 
the  difficulty,  the  Corps  Commander  suspended  the  order 
as  soon  as  he  was  advised  that  the  advance  elements  of 
both  brigades  were  already  engaged  in  the  morning's 
attack;  howbeit  some  elements  had  already  gone  to  the 
new  positions,  and  the  French  (167th)  had  stood  fast,  not 
knowing  of  the  suspension  of  the  order. 

But  all  this  had  little  bearing  on  what  was  actually  in 
progress  that  July  morning.  At  11.20  p.m.  on  July  21, 
Shelton,  in  command  of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  sent 
the  following  message  to  the  commander  of  the  102d 
Infantry  which  was  still  acting  as  advance  guard. 

La  Sacerie  Farm,  July  2l/l8 
Hour  23.20.  No.  5 
To  CO.  102  Inf. 

Colonel  Herbert  with  three  batteries  102  Field  Artillery  will 
support  your  attack.  He  will  consult  with  you  in  respect  to  lo- 
cation of  guns  and  targets.  Logan  has  been  ordered  to  move 
his  regiment  immediately  and  dispose  it  on  your  right.  One  bat- 
talion of  Logan's  regiment  will  be  detached  as  brigade  reserve. 
The  103d  Infantry,  52d  Brigade,  is  moving  into  place  to  your 
left.  Establish  liaison  with  Logan  as  soon  as  he  arrives  and  re- 
port results  to  me.  Develop  enemy's  position  and  his  strength 
by  strong  patrols.  At  any  sign  of  withdrawal  or  weakness,  attack 

^  Field  Order  No.  19,  Headquarters  1st  Army  Corps,  July  21,  22.40  o'clock. 


THE  AISNE-J^L\RNE  OFFENSIVE  191  ^ 

at  once.  If  enemy's  strength,  in  your  judgment,  forbids  this  now, 
I  will  fix  upon  H  hour  for  a  combined  attack  as  soon  as  101st 
Infantry  has  been  reported  in  place.  Send  3  runners  to  report  to 
me  at  this  P.C,  who  can  find  your  F.C.  Keep  me  fully  informed 
of  developments.  The  most  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  this 
brigade  is  now  demanded. 

Shelton,  C.G. 

So  ran  the  brigadier's  orders.  In  the  middle  of  the  night 
Colonel  Herbert  found  the  advance-guard  commander  in 
Breteuil  AYood  and  endeavored  to  arrange  for  proper 
artillery  support  of  the  morning's  advance  —  a  difficult 
task,  since  objectives  and  the  exact  position  of  the  enemy 
were  not  yet  defined.  The  troops  in  the  wood  suffered  some 
from  an  enfilading  artillery  fire  from  the  left  rear,  from 
German  batteries  which  the  French  had  not  yet  cleared 
from  their  path;  but  the  advance  was  arranged,  and  at 
dawn  as  the  52d  Brigade  moved  on  Epieds,  the  102d  In- 
fantry advanced  on  Trugny,  believing  that  the  101st  In- 
fantry was  already  disposed  on  its  right,  to  cover  that 
flank  in  accordance  with  Shelton's  orders.  The  action 
developed ;  and  the  following  messages  from  the  battalion 
commanders  (Rau  in  advance,  Thompson  in  support, 
Bissell  in  reserve),  like  Shelton's  order,  are  eloquent,  in- 
deed, when  compared  with  the  carefully  drafted  plans 
and  the  expectations  of  high  authority.  Vividly  they  il- 
lustrate the  gap,  which  is  so  difficult  to  bridge,  between 
assaulting  units  and  the  High  Command.  Advancing 
from  Breteuil  Wood  and  the  farm  of  that  name  at  day- 
break, Rau  sent  the  following  message  at  6.45  o'clock  by 
runner : 

Am  held  up  on  my  right  flank  by  hostile  machine-gun  fire  in 
woods  to  northeast  of  Trugny.  Need  one-i)ounders  or  machine 
guns  to  knock  them  out.  My  right  flank  is  ai)])arently  exposed. 
Hostile  infantry  has  evidently  pulled  out  leaving  machine  guns 
in  possession  of  woods. 

Hardly  had  he  finished  this  report  of  the  situation  before 


192  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

it  altered  for  the  worse.  A  second  message  brought  by  the 
same  runner  says: 

Hostile  heavy  artillery  is  bombarding  us  heavily.  Hostile 
machine-gun  fire  on  both  flanks ;  nearest  are  firing  from  our  right 
rear.  Send  something  over  there,  or  we  will  have  to  stop  or  pull 
out  altogether. 

Suffered  to  approach  and  enter  Trugny  without  much 
opposition,  the  advance  battalion,  102d  Infantry,  unsup- 
ported on  its  flanks,  received  a  fatal  machine-gun  fire,  and 
was  hammered  at  the  same  time  by  German  heavy  artil- 
lery. How  severely  it  suffered  may  be  gathered  from  a 
third  message,  sent  a  few  minutes  later: 

For  Christ's  sake,  knock  out  the  machine  guns  on  our  right. 
Heavy  casualties.  What  troops  should  be  on  my  right  and  left, 
and  where  are  they.f^ 

Behind  Rau's  battalion  came  the  supports  under 
Thompson.  Involved  in  the  attack  from  the  early  stages, 
this  battalion  was  also  in  difficulties  from  the  outset,  as 
Thompson's  message  to  the  Regimental  Commander 
shows,  dated  at  7.30  o'clock: 

Where  is  that  reserve  battalion?  We  need  it  bad.  Send  ma- 
chine guns  quick.  We  can't  clean  up  with  what  we  have. 

And  a  fourth  message,  received  about  the  same  time  (8.30) 
at  Regimental  Headquarters,  from  Bissell,  commanding 
the  reserve  battalion,  is  illuminating  when  read  in  con- 
junction with  the  reports  of  the  other  battalion  command- 
ers. It  is  dated  7.35  o'clock. 

Have  sent  Lieutenant  Walker  of  3d  Battalion  to  flank  them. 
Am  afraid  to  use  artillery ;  machine  guns  still  active,  however. 
Must  have  our  right  protected.  Apparently  no  friendly  troops  on 
right.  Coordinates  of  machine  guns  63.9-87.6;  63.1-87.4. 
Friendly  troops  on  left  apparently  falling  back.  Machine  guns 
very  active  again ;  large  number  of  casualties  from  them. 

Checked  on  his  front,  though  his  attack  had  been  assisted 
by  a  company  of  the  101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion 
throughout;   with  his  right   unsupported,  the   advance- 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  193 

guard  commander  reported  the  situation  to  the  brigadier 
with  a  request  for  assistance.  The  latter  had  previously 
repeated  his  emphatic  order  to  press  the  attack,  believing 
that  the  enemy  screen  was  a  thin  one;  but  on  receipt  of 
full  information  regarding  the  check  to  the  leading  ele- 
ments, he  lost  no  time  in  giving  the  advance-guard  com- 
mander the  help  on  his  right  which  the  latter  had  all  along 
confidently  expected  and  now  was  urgently  demanding. 
To  Logan  he  sent  the  following  order  at  10.35  o'clock: 

Headquarters  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  July  22,  1918 
10.35  o'clock.     Message  No.  6 
To  Commanding  Officer,  101st  Infantry 

Colonel  Parker  reports  that  his  advance  line  held  up  by  ma- 
chine-gun fire  coming  from  about  the  right  front  of  his  line,  or 
from  your  left  front.  Advance  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  take 
these  in  the  flank.  I  have  already  informed  you  of  the  fact  that 
prisoners  report  machine-gun  ammunition  almost  exhausted. 
Remaining  Germans  in  our  front  are  reported  also  without  food 
since  retreat  started.  Push  thing  through. 

Sh ELTON,  C.G. 

At  the  same  time  (10.55  o'clock),  he  sent  to  Parker  the 
following  message  of  reassurance  and  encouragement: 

Cannot  use  artillery  preparation  just  now  on  line  in  your 
front.  Position  of  leading  elements  too  uncertain.  Have  directed 
101st  Infantry  to  assist  you  in  flanking  them,  and  artillery  will 
commence  on  areas  immediately  in  rear  at  once.  Under  existing 
circumstances  I  believe  this  will  enable  you  to  make  the  final 
shove  that  will  drive  them  out.  It  is  highly  important  that  they 
be  driven  out.  Advance  will  proliably  l)e  easy  after  that.  I  am 
also  sending  one  platoon  of  artillery  into  Logan's  sector  in  an 
attempt  to  bring  direct  fire  upon  machine-gun  nests  now  in  your 
front. 

Sh ELTON,  C.G. 

From  the  advance  battalion,  102d  Infantry,  strong 
patrols  had  crept  forward  through  the  open  wheat-fields 
and  along  a  creek  bottom;  they  had  secured  a  foothold  at 
Ejjieds  before  C.30  o'clock,  as  a  message  from  the  patrol 


194  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE  ' 

leader  indicated.^  But  in  general,  though  small  groups 
clung  for  a  while  to  their  initial  gains,  the  morning  attack 
presently  broke  down  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  heavy  and 
skillful  machine-gun  fire  from  the  nests  in  Epieds,  from 
ethers  hidden  in  the  wheat,  and  in  Trugny  Wood  on  the 
right.  Nor  did  the  advance  elements  of  the  52d  Brigade 
on  the  left  fare  any  better,  the  leading  battalions  losing 
heavily.  On  the  right  the  Thirty-Ninth  French  Division 
reported  that  it  was  held  solidly  (at  10.30  a.m.)  on  a 
line  running  through  Barbillon  Forest,  but  expected  to 
attack  again  at  12.45;  on  the  left  the  167th  French  Divi- 
sion could  not  progress  past  the  stubborn  resistance  of 
the  German  garrison  in  La  Goutterie  Farm,  which,  like 
every  point  of  their  general  line,  fairly  bristled  with  ma- 
chine guns. 

But  again  the  Twenty-Sixth  tried  it,  at  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  22d.  The  101st  Infantry,  getting  into 
action  on  the  right,  attempted  to  penetrate  Trugny  Wood; 
the  102d  Infantry,  its  strength  sadly  reduced,  pushed  once 
more  against  the  village,  after  an  artillery  preparation. 
Detachments  from  the  101st  Engineers  aided  in  the  at- 
tempt of  the  51st  Brigade;  while  the  52d  Brigade,  on  the 
left,  flung  itself  against  Epieds.  But  nothing  was  accom- 
phshed.  Once  more  the  enemy  resistance  proved  too  strong. 
During  the  night  the  101st  Infantry  was  forced  to  with- 
draw from  the  line  it  had  reached;  the  losses  elsewhere 

^  The  message  is  here  reproduced  for  its  human  as  well  as  its  military-histori- 
cal interest.  The  whole  party  was  captured  by  the  enemy  shortly  after  the  mes- 
sage was  forwarded: 

Detachments  Co.  D.,  Co.  A.,  6.30  a.m. 
In  south  edge  of  Epieds 

1.  Am  here  with  20  "A"  men,  Lts.  Gates  and  Milspaugh,  and  about  25  "D" 
men  with  Lts.  Bushy  and  Jewel. 

2.  Co.  "B"  has  converged  away  to  my  right.   The  Boches  are  in  north  edge 
of  town,  but  retiring  little  by  little. 

3.  Cannot  advance,  as  Boches  are  strong  with  machine  guns  ahead.  Will  wait 
here  till  2d  line  reaches  me.  We  need  ammunition  and  medical  aid. 

Daniel  W.  Strickland 
Capt.  Co.  "I>" 


THE  AISNE-IkL\RXE  OFFENSIVE  195 

were  severe.^  A  holding  line  was  established  at  nightfall, 
composed  of  miscellaneous  elements  —  engineers  and 
pioneer  platoons  being  mingled  with  the  meager  infantry 
forces;  and  a  darkness  came  down  which  seemed  dark, 
indeed,  as  the  enemy  artillery  fire  played  on  the  woods 
where  the  two  brigades  and  the  forward  batteries  were 
lying.  2 

During  the  night  a  change  of  plan  was  decided  on.  It 
is  true  that  Army  and  Corps  orders  of  the  moment  en- 
joined a  continuation  of  the  push  straight  forward;  the 
Division  Commander  was  reminded  of  this  both  by  Shel- 
ton  and  by  the  Chief  of  Staff.  But  with  a  full  understanding 
of  the  situation,  knowing  the  futihty  of  a  head-on  attack 
lender  the  circumstances,  which  would  have  attained,  as 
a  certainty,  only  a  large  loss  of  life.  General  Edwards  de- 
termined to  risk  a  variation  from  existing  orders,  believing 
that  other  methods  would  attain  the  desired  result  more 
surely  and  at  smaller  cost.  Briefly,  therefore,  instead  of 
sending  the  51st  Brigade  straight  against  the  Epieds- 
Trugny  Wood  positions,  he  decided  to  essay  flanking  meth- 
ods. Borrowing  a  little  of  the  field  assigned  to  the  French 

1  A  message  from  the  commanding  officer  of  the  advance  battalion,  102d 
Infantrj',  dated  at  5  p.m.  says: 

"On  reconnaissance  of  ground,  I  find  that  Trugny  has  Boches  there.  The  town 
of  Epieds  is  loaded  with  gur<;.  The  patch  of  Avoods  that  was  shelled  by  our  artil- 
lery still  has  all  of  ten  heavy  machine  guns.  It  is  impossible  to  advance  with  the 
troops  here.  Rau  has  about  100  men  left  out  of  his  battalion;  I  have  less  than 
200." 

2  Special  Situation  Report  from  C  G.  52d  Infantry  Brigade  (Cole)  states: 
"The  troops  have  been  under  a  heavy  shell-fire  and  machine-gun  fire  during 
most  of  the  night.  .  .  .  More  than  1000  shells  were  fired  in  the  vicinity  of  my 
P.C.  last  night.  ,  .  .  The  brigade  is  greatly  reduced  in  strength,  probably  not 
more  than  2400  effectives.  The  men  have  now  been  marching  and  fighting  for 
four  days,  part  of  the  time  at  night,  and  no  time  have  they  been  able  to  get  any 
sleep." 

Message  from  Division  Surgeon  to  Division  Headquarters,  dated  10.30  o'clock, 
July  23,  states:  "Casualties  passing  through  advanced  dressing-station  for  24 
hours  —  G  o'clock  22d  July,  1918,  to  6  o'clock  23d  July,  1918: 

Wounded 5G5 

Gassed 3fi8 

Sick  and  exhausted 293 

Total 122G 


196  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

on  the  right,  he  determined  to  thrust  the  101st  Infantry 
into  Triigny  Wood  Hke  a  wedge,  farther  to  the  south, 
turning  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy's  Hne.  In  person,  ver- 
bally, he  gave  the  necessary  instructions.  The  101st  In- 
fantry was  ordered  to  push  forward  resolutely  and  per- 
sistently in  the  new  direction.  Fatigue  of  the  men,  diffi- 
culty of  maneuver,  heavy  resistance  were  not  to  count.  And 
the  response  on  the  regiment's  part  to  the  general's  in- 
junctions was  taken  as  a  good  indication  of  the  morrow's 
success. 

Confirmed  in  this  decision  by  orders  from  the  Corps  ^ 
which  demanded  the  penetration  of  the  enemy's  line  by  a 
regiment  in  each  division,  the  Division  Commander  issued 
the  necessary  orders  for  such  an  attack,  which  was  to  be 
followed  by  an  exploitation  by  the  other  regiments  in  line,^ 
and,  following  verbal  by  formal  written  orders,  designated 
the  101st  Infantry  as  the  unit  to  carry  out  the  operation. 

At  6  A.M.,  after  a  thorough  artillery  preparation,  the 
101st  Infantry  moved  forward.  A  detachment  of  two  com- 
panies, 101st  Engineers,  operating  as  infantry,  maneuvered 
on  the  left  and  center  toward  Epieds.  For  several  hours 
the  infantry  essayed  to  make  progress  against  the  same 
solid  resistance  which  had  marked  the  conflicts  of  the  22d, 
but  in  the  end  the  101st  was  forced  back  to  its  original  po- 
sition, being  obliged  to  leave  some  of  its  wounded  on  the 
field. 

Earlier  in  the  day  the  Corps,  realizing  that  the  Division 
must  be  strengthened  in  numbers  if  it  was  to  carry  the  line 
forward,  had  assigned  the  111th  Infantry  (of  the  56th 
Brigade,  Twenty-Eighth  Division)  as  Division  Reserve 
for  July  23  only.  It  also  directed  that  the  Twenty-Sixth 
take  over  the  entire  Corps  front,  ^  pursuant  to  which  the 
Division  Commander  caused  orders  to  be  issued  by  which 
the  51st  Infantry  Brigade  should  take  over  the  Division's 

^  Field  Orders  No.  20,  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps. 

2  Field  Orders  No.  59,  July  22,  22.30  o'clock. 

»  By  Field  Orders  No.  21,  First  Army  Corps,  12.30  o'clock,  July  23,  1918. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  197 

front,  while  the  52d  Brigade,  strengthened  by  two  battal- 
ions of  the  111th  Infantry,  should  assemble  preparatory 
to  relieving  the  167th  French  Division.^  On  the  heels  of 
these  arrangements,  however,  came  orders  from  the  Corps 
at  about  18.30  o'clock, ^  directing  an  attack  by  both  the 
Twenty-Sixth  and  the  167th,  so  previous  orders  had  to  be 
revoked.  But  about  6.30  o'clock  in  the  evening  a  staff 
officer  from  the  Corps  brought  word^  that  the  whole  of  the 
56th  Brigade  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Division 
Commander,  who  was  directed  to  place  it  at  once  in  the 
line,  in  order  to  comply  with  current  Army  orders  and 
drive  the  line  forward.  The  new  troops  were  to  relieve  the 
52d  Brigade,  which  was  to  be  promptly  reorganized  with 
a  view  to  employing  its  units  in  carrying  the  advance  for- 
ward. 

All  efforts  were  made  to  bring  the  new  troops  (111th, 
112th  Infantry)  into  position,  the  movement  commencing 
late  in  the  day  of  the  23d.  It  should  be  remembered  that 
*'up  front"  the  day's  efforts  had  been  disappointing.  On 
the  right  the  101st  Infantry  had  not  been  able  to  make  good 
its  advance  into  Trugny  Wood,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
forward  infantry  had  effected  no  appreciable  gains,  gal- 
lant efforts  by  the  52d  Brigade  to  get  forward  having  re- 
sulted only  in  the  attack  being  broken  up  and  hurled  back 
in  some  disorder.  The  German  rear-guard  resistance  held 
solidly.  But  the  Division  Commander  drove  hard.  With 
fresh  troops  at  his  disposal,  he  employed  all  means  avail- 
able to  reorganize  his  advance  immediately  and  launch 
a  new  blow  against  the  German  resistance.  The  56th  Bri- 
gade arrived  without  rations  and  having  concluded  a  long 
march;  the  Brigade  Commander  was  unfamiliar  with  the 
ground  and  the  situation;  one  of  his  regiments  was  in 
Corps  reserve.  But  he  was  directed  to  overcome  all  these 

»  Field  Orders  No.  GO,  .July  23,  16.00  o'clock. 

«  Field  Orders  No.  li.  First  .\rniy  Corps,  July  23,  1918.  19.00  o'clock. 

»  Letter  No.  130,  G-3,  Headquarters,  First  Army  Corps. 


198  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

obstacles,  and  was  afforded  all  possible  assistance  at  Divi- 
sion Headquarters,  staff  officers  were  assigned  as  guides, 
rations  were  furnished  the  new  arrivals;  the  one  considera- 
tion was  to  get  the  battalions  in  position  for  an  advance 
at  4.05  o'clock  the  following  morning,  one  battalion,  112th 
Infantry,  being  designated  to  pass  through  the  101st  In- 
fantry in  the  right  sub-sector,  the  remainder  of  the  brigade 
being  assigned  to  the  relief  of  the  52d  Brigade  on  the  left. 
All  night  the  new  troops  were  pushed  forward  —  a  night 
of  the  greatest  strain  imaginable,  coming  as  it  did  on  top 
of  the  inconclusive  fighting  of  the  day  and  of  the  day 
previous. 

Daw^n  brought  varied  news.  With  the  coming  of  day- 
Hght  the  Commanding  General,  56th  Brigade,  reported 
that  he  had  been  unable  to  get  his  battalions  into  posi- 
tion at  "H"  hour  and  so  must  delay  his  attack.  But  from 
the  French  on  the  left,  at  almost  the  same  moment,  came 
news  of  a  different  color.  Advancing  after  an  artillery 
preparation  elements  of  the  167th  Division  had  found  that 
the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  their  front,  and  that  the 
French  cavalry  patrols  had  gone  forward  on  reconnais- 
sance and  to  reestablish  contact.  Immediately  a  change  in 
tlie  Division's  plans  were  made.  The  morning's  attack  was 
declared  off;  messages  to  Shelton  and  Weigel  ^  urged  their 
brigades  forward  at  once  —  they  were  to  crowd  ahead  and 
get  contact  by  every  means  possible.  Throughout  the  day 
the  forward  movement  was  rushed,  for  early  it  became  evi- 
dent that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  Barbillon  Forest, 
Trugny  W^ood,  and  from  Epieds.  To  the  101st  Machine- 
Gun  Battalion  (motorized)  the  Division  Commander  gave 
a  mission  such  as  would  usually  fall  to  divisional  cavalry. 
With  right  of  way  over  all  other  troops,  the  machine-gun- 
ners were  to  press  through  to  the  Jaulgonne  road  with 
directions  to  intercept  or  hamper  the  enemy's  retreat.  The 
sorely  battered  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  its  fine  work  com- 

»  C.G.,  56th  Infantry  Brigade. 


THE  AISNE-I^L\RNE  OFFENSIVE  199 

pleted  for  the  present,  was  relieved  and  had  withdrawn  to 
the  vicinity  of  Etrepilly,  west  of  the  Chateaii-Thierry- 
Soissons  highway  by  late  afternoon ;  but  on  the  part  of  all 
tlie  rest  of  the  Division  there  was  a  surge  forward,  each 
combat  element  eager  to  close  with  the  enemy,  every  man 
smarting  under  the  check  which  the  infantry  had  received 
in  front  of  Epieds  and  in  bloody  Trugny  Wood.  By  after- 
noon, with  the  102d  Infantry  again  in  the  lead,  the  col- 
umns of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade  were  on  the  edge  of  La 
Fere  Forest,  where  its  left  rested  five  hundred  yards  to  the 
east  of  La  Logette  Pond.  Toward  evening  battahons  of  the 
56th  Brigade  were  got  into  the  advance-guard  position; 
the  artillery  assigned  to  the  brigade  was  in  close  support; 
and  the  101st  Machine-Gun  Battalion  (checked  in  its 
rapid  advance)  bivouacked  close  to  Shelton's  Headquarters 
in  Grange  Marie  Farm. 

While  it  was  known  that  a  brigade  of  the  Forty-Second 
Division  was  intended  to  arrive  in  the  area  that  day  (24th 
July)  by  motor-truck,  and  effect  the  relief  of  the  51st  and 
56th  Brigades,  while  arrangements  were  in  hand  to  have 
the  newcomers  take  up  the  pursuit  at  dawn  on  July  25,^ 
nevertheless  the  advance  must  be  kept  up  without  relax- 
ation. Steadily  forward,  therefore,  had  Shelton  pushed  his 
battalions  until  darkness  was  at  hand,  when  the  impossi- 
bility of  reconnaissance  and  the  necessity  of  taking  up 
positions  in  readiness  for  deployment  into  approach  forma- 
tions made  a  further  advance  in  column  for  the  moment 
impracticable.  At  nightfall,  therefore,  the  infantry  halted 
in  La  Fere  Forest,  awaiting  detailed  orders.  From  Divi- 
sion Headquarters,  moreover,  had  been  dispatched  the 
following  message,  which  gave  Shelton  the  most  specific 
instructions  possible,  and  confirmed  him  not  only  in  his 
action  of  halting  in  place  in  La  P'ere  Wood,  but  also  in 
the  behef  that  the  relief  of  his  exhausted  troops  was  at 
hand: 

1  Field  Orders  No.  CJ,  2i  July,  191b,  1C.4J  o'clock. 


200  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Eq.  2Gth  Div.,  24  July,  1918,  14.00  o'clock 
Message  No.  3. 
To:  Commanding  General,  51st  Infantry  Brigade. 

1.  The  infantry  of  the  26th  Division  will  be  relieved  during 
the  night  24/25  July  by  a  brigade  of  the  42d  Division.  This  re- 
lief will  be  accomplished  so  as  to  enable  the  brigade  of  the  42d 
Division  to  take  up  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  at  dawn,  25  July, 
1918. 

2.  The  51st  Brigade  will  remain  in  place  under  cover  until 
further  orders. 

3.  You  will  immediately  report  in  the  most  expeditious  way 
the  location  of  your  units.  Telephone  connection  with  the  Divi- 
sional P.C.  should  be  obtained  at  the  earliest  practicable  hour. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Edwards : 

Duncan  K.  Major,  Jr. 
Chief  of  Staff 

With  what  feelings,  therefore,  must  Shelton  have  re- 
ceived the  subsequent  orders  ^  which,  owing  to  the  cou- 
riers' difficulty  on  the  congested  roads,  did  not  reach  him 
till  midnight.  The  Division  Chief  of  Staff,  who  had  arrived 
at  Grange  Marie  Farm  about  the  same  time  as  the  orders, 
insisted  that  the  following  directions  should  be  taken 
literally,  as  exactly  expressing  the  Corps'  desire: 

The  1st  Corps  is  to  be  pushed  forward  to-night  without  cessa- 
tion. A  supreme  effort  is  tobe  made  to  attack  and  take  Sergy  not 
later  than  2  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  25,  and  to  push  on 
without  delay  to  the  plateau  beyond. 

The  Sergy  Plateau  must  be  reached  just  prior  to  the  break  of 
day.  Accomplishment  of  this  will  permit  the  Cavalry  Corps  to 
pass  through  and  effectively  break  up  a  hard-pressed  and  re- 
treating enemy.  A  complete  victory  is  at  hand. 

The  26th  Division  (less  52d  Brigade)  and  the  56th  Brigade 
will  push  forward  on  Sergy  and  the  plateau  to  the  east  of  Sergy. 

To  this  project  Shelton  opposed  objections  with  the 
blunt  frankness  of  the  commander  on  the  ground  Who 
knows  conditions.  It  was  physically  impossible  even  to 
get  his  battalions  in  formation  to  start  the  advance  before 
dawn;  the  artillery  plans  had  not  been  made;  he  had  no 

1  Field  Orders  No.  64.  24  July,  1918,  20.30  o'clock. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  201 

instructions  as  to  supply  or  evacuation;  there  was  no 
chance  for  reconnaissance;  his  troops  were  utterly  ex- 
hausted. At  the  very  hour  that  this  order  was  delivered, 
the  German  artillery  was  drenching  La  Fere  Forest  with 
gas  and  lacing  the  wood  roads  with  high-explosive  shell. 
And  when  the  Chief  of  Staff  insisted,  Shelton,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  his  regimental  commanders,  demanded  an  auto- 
graphed confirmation. 

What  the  Chief  of  Staff  composed  in  answer  to  this 
request  has  a  quaintly  human  interest.  His  message  ran : 

Hq.  26th  Division 
0.35  o'clock,  25  July,  1918 
From :      C.  of  S. 

To:  C.  G.  51st  Infantry  Brigade. 

Subject :  Farther  Advance. 

1.  You  will  make  every  preparation  to  attack  at  H  hour 
25  July,  1918.  H  hour  may  be  as  early  as  4.00  o'clock. 

2.  Notice  to  attack  will  be  announced  from  Division  Head- 
quarters. 

D.  K.  Major,  Jr. 
Chief  of  Staff 

The  fact  that  this  order  was  not  signed  "by  Command" 
made  it  a  semblance  of  an  order,  and  nothing  more.  It 
evidenced  that  ready  ingenuity,  property  of  all  good  sol- 
diers, in  reconciling  on  paper,  at  least,  any  disparity  be- 
tween real  conditions  at  the  front  and  assumed  conditions 
at  the  rear.  "H"  hour  never  was  announced;  though  offi- 
cers from  every  unit  in  the  brigade  and  from  the  artillery 
waited  at  Grange  Marie  Farm  till  three  hours  after  the 
moment  they  were  directed  to  be  in  Sergy. 

The  day  saw  the  167th  French  Division  make  its  way 
into  Beuvardes,  while  their  smart,  well-horsed  cavalry 
patrols  got  forward  into  La  Fere  Forest;  away  on  the  right 
tlie  Thirty-Ninth  French  Division,  emerging  from  Bar- 
billon  Forest,  were  forced  to  spend  time  and  strength  in 
forcing  a  way  through  the  village  of  Le  Channel.  The  in- 
fantry of  the  Forty-Second  Division  began  to  arrive;  and 


202  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

during  the  late  afternoon  and  evening  the  51st  Infantry 
Brigade,  and  also  the  56th,  gave  place  to  the  newcomers 
on  the  line  through  La  Fere  Forest,  Fary  Farm,  and  thence 
to  the  Jaulgonne  road. 

The  fight  was  over,  so  far  as  the  riflemen  and  machine- 
gunners  were  concerned.  The  new  battalions  got  to  their 
places,  and  command  passed  to  the  Commanding  General, 
Forty-Second  Division,  at  19  o'clock,  July  25. 

The  fight  was  over,  with  eighteen  kilometers  of  ground 
gained  in  the  face  of  stubborn  resistance.  The  American 
Commander-in-Chief  had  visited  the  Division  and  praised 
its  work;  the  French  Army  Commander,  after  twitting 
the  Division  Commander  with  having  ventured  to  deviate 
from  Army  orders,  the  while  broadly  smiling  his  approval 
of  a  move  which  accomplished  a  purpose  and  saved  lives, 
singled  out  the  Twenty-Sixth  as  exemplifying  the  best 
characteristics  of  the  American  troops;  the  local  French 
municipal  authorities,  from  whose  doors  the  Division  had 
helped  avert  the  German  flood,  penned  testimonials  elo- 
quent of  their  gratitude.  Perhaps,  indeed,  that  which  made 
the  soldiers  reahze  most  vividly  that  they  had  helped  to 
stem,  not  only  a  military,  but  a  national  peril,  was  the 
sight  of  the  peasants  creeping  back  to  their  wrecked  vil- 
lages, eager  and  able  to  start  life  anew,  thanks  to  les 
Americains,  even  before  the  troops  had  completed  their 
march  along  the  Httered  roadways  toward  the  rear. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  AISNE-^MRNE  OFFENSIVE  —  AFTERWARDS 

THE  artillery,  ammunition  train,  engineers,  and  signal 
troops  stayed  on.  In  the  wake  of  the  infantry  of  two 
other  divisions  the  gunners  moved  forward,  forever  firing, 
forever  hmbering  up  with  their  scarecrow  teams,  but  with 
drivers  and  cannoneers  who  were  always  game,  with  staff 
and  battery  officers  who  toiled  most  tirelessly.  Official 
military  reports  are  interesting  mainly  to  experts;  but 
there  is  a  story  of  devotion,  discipline,  and  skill  between 
the  hnes  of  General  Aultman's  every  paragraph  which 
has  an  appeal  for  every  reader.  The  following  extracts 
from  Aultman's  report  relate  vividly  the  work  of  the  ar- 
tillery after  the  rehef  of  the  Division's  infantry  and  ma- 
chine-gun units: 

On  the  night  of  July  25-^6,  1918,  the  Infantry  of  the  26th 
Division  and  the  56tli  Brigade  were  relieved  by  the  84th  Bri- 
gade of  the  42d  Division  (Brig.-Gen.  R.  A.  Brown,  NA.).  At 
the  same  time  the  83d  Brigade,  42d  Division  (Brig.-Gen.  M.  J. 
Lenihan,  NA.),  relieved  the  167th  Division  (French),  thus 
placing  the  42d  Division  on  the  entire  1st  Corps  front. 

As  a  part  of  this  plan,  the  Divisional  Artillery  of  the  42d  Divi- 
sion was  to  recnforce  the  51st  F.A,  Brigade  on  the  night  of  July 
25-26.  The  extension  of  the  divisional  front  of  the  42d  Division, 
however,  resulted  in  diverting  the  42d  Divisional  Artillery  to  the 
support  of  the  83d  Brigade,  leaving  the  51st  F.A.  Brigade  in 
support  of  the  84th  Infantry  Brigade  alone. 

The  command  passed  from  the  26th  Division  to  the  42d  Divi- 
sion upon  the  passage  of  the  first  units  of  the  latter  through  the 
front  line  of  the  26th  Division,  this  actually  taking  place  on  the 
morning  of  July  26.  ...  In  the  foregoing  oi)erations,  while 
the  command  post  of  the  brigade  was  frequently  at  a  consider- 
able distance  from  Division  Hcadciuarters,  liaison  was  main- 
tained therewith  through  conferences  at  Division  Headquarters, 
and  through  visits  of  the  Division  Commander  and  the  Chief  of 
Staff  to  the  forward  Brigade  I'.C. 


204  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  26,  plans  were  made  to  support  the 
attack  on  our  right  of  the  39th  French  Division  and  the  3d 
American  Division.  The  artillery  preparation  was  made,  and  the 
infantry  advance  found  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  across 
the  Ourcq.  .  .  .  After  reconnaissance  on  the  morning  of  July 
27,  batteries  were  moved  on  the  night  of  July  27-28  to  posi- 
tions in  the  vicinity  of  Esperance  Farm,  Four-a-Verre,  La  Croix 
Blanche  Farm,  and  Croix  Rouge  Farm,  covering  with  their  fire 
the  plateau  north  and  east  of  Sergy.  .  .  .  During  the  period 
from  the  morning  of  July  28  to  the  morning  of  August  1, 
with  the  exception  of  a  slight  forward  move  by  two  heavy  artil- 
lery battalions,  the  brigade  remained  in  position,  and  engaged 
in  repeated  artillery  demonstrations  in  connection  with  infantry 
attacks  on  the  heights  to  the  north  and  east  of  Sergy.  Its  special 
mission  during  this  time  was  neutralization  of  machine  guns  .  .  . 
which  enfiladed  any  infantry  attack  to  the  north  and  east. 
The  neutralization  of  these  points  was  especially  necessary  in 
view  of  the  slowness  of  the  advance  of  the  troops  on  our  right 
by  whom  they  could  be  taken  in  reverse,  and  in  whose  sector 
they  lay.  Heavy  concentrations  were  also  placed  upon  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  Chateau  de  Nesle,  Nesle,  and  the  Ferme  de  Camp, 
which  were  reported  to  contain  enemy  organizations. 

At  9  o'clock,  July  30,  the  84th  Brigade  attacked  the  heights 
north  of  Sergy.  Artillery  preparation  commenced  at  8  o'clock, 
and  was  to  continue  throughout  the  operations.  .  .  .  Bois  de 
Pelger  and  Bois  de  la  Planchette  were  to  be  held  under  heavy 
fire  prior  to,  during,  and  after  the  operation,  in  order  to  protect 
the  right  flank  of  the  infantry  attack.  This  programme  was  not 
adhered  to,  and  the  fire  on  these  points  was  lifted  in  accordance 
with  the  verbal  request  of  the  infantry  commander.  The  attack 
failed. 

On  July  31  another  attack  was  planned  in  conjunction  with 
the  troops  on  our  right.  The  artillery  plan  was  similar  to  that  of 
the  previous  day.  The  preparation  was  to  start  at  16.30.  At  16.20 
the  infantry  commander  gave  orders  to  stop  all  artillery  fire. 
Five  minutes  later,  the  infantry  brigade  commander  requested 
fire  to  be  placed  on  all  points  except  the  Bois  de  Pelger  and  Bois 
de  la  Planchette.  With  this  exception  the  programme  was  fired. 
At  18.10  a  repetition  of  part  of  the  programme  was  requested 
and  given,  and  at  18.18  a  request  was  made  to  concentrate  on 
Bois  de  Pelger  and  Bois  de  la  Planchette  all  possible  fire  and  to 
continue  the  same  until  further  order.  It  is  understood  that  the 
attack  did  not  progress,  and  fire  was  later  ordered  to  cease. 


THE  AISXE-]\L\RNE  OFFENSIVE  205 

On  August  1  the  brigade  prepared  an  attack  of  the  84th 
Brigade,  which  was  to  advance  on  the  heights  north  of  Sergy  in 
conjunction  with  the  32d  Division  on  its  right.  The  artillery  pre- 
paration was  fired  throughout,  and  the  advance  w^as  successful. 

As  a  result  the  enemy  withdrew  on  the  night  of  August  1-2, 
and  on  the  night  of  August  2-3  all  batteries  were  moved  forward 
to  positions  in  the  valley  of  the  Ourcq,  the  light  artillery  north 
of  the  stream,  and  the  heavy  artillery  south  of  it.  The  brigade 
P.C.  was  moved  to  Sergy  early  on  the  morning  of  August  3, 
when  it  developed  that  the  enemy's  withdrawal  was  more  ex- 
tensive than  at  first  indicated.  The  brigade  P.C.  was  at  once 
moved  to  Xesle,  and  the  entire  brigade  started  forward  in  sup- 
port of  the  infantry. 

During  this  movement,  the  8th  Brigade  of  the  4th  Division 
(Brig.-Gen.  E.  E.  Booth,  N.A.)  passed  through  and  relieved  the 
84th  Brigade  of  the  42d  Division. 

At  14.15  o'clock  August  3,  telephonic  orders  were  received 
(later  confirmed  by  F.O.  No.  26,  4th  Division)  for  this  brigade 
to  occupy  a  position  for  the  defense  of  the  line  marked  by  Hills 
204.8  and  210.  Positions  were  immediately  reconnoitered  and 
batteries  placed  in  position  by  nightfall,  the  light  artillery  east 
and  west  of  Chery-Chartreuve,  and  the  heavy  artillery  in  the 
vicinity  of  Chartreuve  Farm.  Brigade  P.C.  was  established  at 
Dole.  This  order  placed  the  brigade  in  a  defensive  position,  and 
relieved  it  from  any  further  mobile  mission  with  the  4th  Divi- 
sion. 

It  later  transpired  that  it  was  not  intended  to  move  the  bri- 
gade into  these  positions,  but  to  make  the  reconnaissance  and 
prepare  for  occupation.  The  order  was,  however,  explicit,  and 
was  obeyed  without  delay  or  question.  The  positions  taken  com- 
manded towns  and  heights  north  of  the  Vesle. 

At  14  o'clock  on  August  4,  forward  observers  of  the  brigade 
noticed  heavy  movements  of  enemy  troo])s  in  these  areas.  This 
was  reported  to  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  67th  Brigade;  but,  as 
this  regiment  was  not  prepared  to  fire  thereon,  the  51st  Brigade 
took  the  targets  under  fire.  The  final  fire  of  the  51st  F.A.  Brigade 
was  by  the  3d  Battalion  of  the  103d  Field  Artillery  upon  German 
organizations  north  of  the  Vesle. 

At  17  o'clock,  August  4,  verbal  orders  from  the  Command- 
ing General,  4th  Division,  confirmed  by  Field  Orders  No.  26, 
relieved  the  brigade  from  duty  with  the  4th  Division,  and  di- 
rected it  to  i)roceed  to  rest  billets.  The  movement  commenced 
at  midnight,  August  4th.  ... 


206  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

The  service  of  the  ammunition  throughout  the  operations  was 
satisfactory.  At  only  one  time  was  there  any  shortage  or  prospec- 
tive shortage  of  ammunition,  and  in  this  sole  instance  the  diffi- 
culty was  remedied  before  the  reserve  at  the  batteries  was  en- 
croached upon.  The  101st  Ammunition  Train,  supplemented  by 
the  personnel  of  the  101st  Trench  Mortar  Battery,  functioned 
admirably  throughout  the  entire  period  in  the  service  of  ammu- 
nition. .  .  . 

The  spirit  shown  by  the  personnel  of  the  brigade  was  em.i- 
nently  satisfactory,  and  typified  the  high  character  of  the  Ameii- 
can  soldier.  The  batteries  performed  their  duties  with  alertness 
and  energy.  Even  after  the  members  of  the  brigade  saw  their  in- 
fantry withdrawn  to  rest,  while  they  themselves  were  required 
to  go  on,  they  did  so  with  unflagging  spirit  and  untiring  zeal. 
Due  to  this  spirit,  the  batteries  were  never  late  in  getting  into 
positions,  calls  for  fire  were  answered  within  the  shortest  possi- 
ble time;  and  even  toward  the  end  of  the  operations,  when  the 
change  of  position  north  from  Sergy  to  Chery-Chartreuve  was 
made,  the  zeal  and  energy  of  the  officers  and  men  were  such  that 
the  batteries  were  in  position  before  the  main  body  of  the  in- 
fantry of  the  4th  Division  arrived  abreast  of  them. 

It  is  of  record,  though  not  included  in  the  Brigade  Com- 
mander's formal  report,  that  not  a  single  case  of  straggling 
occurred  in  the  artillery  throughout  this  long  advance 
under  difficult  conditions.  More  than  forty  kilometers  the 
regiments  moved  forward,  daily  firing;  and  they  had  been 
actively  employed  in  the  Pas  Fini  Sector  for  ten  days 
before  they  started  their  advance. 

Bunnell's  indispensable  engineers,  attached  to  the 
Corps,  pounded  along  cheerfully  at  road-making  in  the 
forward  zones  day  and  night,  until  August  2;  the  101st 
Field  Signal  Battalion  also  remained  in,  to  sustain  the  gen- 
eral reputation  of  the  American  signal  troops  —  an  or- 
ganization whose  work  and  methods  are  called  by  com- 
petent French  critics  one  of  the  outstanding  achievements 
of  our  military  effort  which  foreign  services  could  copy  to 
advantage.  The  101st  Trench  Mortar  Battery,  as  has  been 
seen,  labored  splendidly  at  unfamiliar  tasks. 

But  the  infantry  of  the  Division,  immediately  upon  re- 


THE  AISNE-IMARNE  OFFENSIVE  207 

lief,  was  taken  out  of  the  fight.  By  easy  stages  the  regi- 
ments moved  back,  first  to  the  vicinity  of  Trugny  Wood 
where  the  bivouac,  as  can  be  imagined,  was  indeed  a  grue- 
some one;  then  to  other  areas  which  had  been  crossed 
during  the  advance,  until,  after  three  days'  marching,  the 
two  brigades  were  encamped  and  billeted  in  the  vicinity 
of  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  along  the  shady  borders  of  the 
winding  Marne,  Division  Headquarters  being  established 
at  Mery-sur-Marne.  Here  a  pause  was  made  for  recupera- 
tion. Inspections  were  in  order;  the  various  means  were 
set  in  motion  to  reestablish  smartness  and  alertness.  And 
it  was  surprising  to  note  how  quickly  the  men  were  re- 
stored. A  couple  of  good  nights'  sleep,  a  swim  in  the  river, 
an  afternoon's  pass  into  La  Ferte,  and  the  work  was  done. 
The  haggard  soldiers  who  had  stumbled  down  the  roads 
leading  out  of  dark  La  Fere  Wood  changed  again  to  real 
men. 

Their  numbers  were  considerably  reduced.  The  few 
stragglers  rejoined;  most  of  the  missing  were  found  to  have 
been  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  other  organizations,  separated 
from  their  own  in  the  confusion  of  battle.  But  the  losses 
had  been  severe  when  one  realizes  that  the  Division  began 
the  offensive  with  little  more  than  two  thirds  of  its  author- 
ized strength.  The  figures  are  interesting  (see  p.  208). 

The  twenty  per  cent  battle  losses  of  the  Division  in  a 
week's  fighting  were  at  least  severe  enough  to  prove  that 
it  was  present  when  the  "show"  was  going  on,  and  that 
it  played  a  prominent  part  in  the  grim,  splendid  drama. 
Of  the  missing,  the  great  majority  were  later  accounted  for, 
as  has  been  said ;  only  a  few  were  made  prisoners  —  mainly 
in  the  town  of  Epieds. 

For  a  fortnight  the  Division  stayed  in  reserve.  Then,  on 
August  11,  orders  were  issued  for  another  move  by  rail; 
and  the  newspaper  correspondent  who  had  come  from 
the  gossip  centers  at  Chaumont  and  Paris  expressed  a 
wiUingness  to  wager  that,  for  the  present,  the  Division 


208  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Casualties,  Offensive  commencing  July  18,  1918 


Division  Headquarters. . 

101st  Machine-Gim 
Battalion 

101st  Infantry 

102d  Infantry 

102d  Machine-Guu 
Battalion 

103d  Infantry 

lO^th  Infantry 

103d  Machine-Gim 
Battalion 

101st  Field  Artillery 

102d  Field  Artillery 

103d  Field  Artillery 

101st  Trench  Mortar 
Battery 

101st  Engineers 

101st  Field  Signal 

Battalion 

101st  Ammunition  Train 

101st  Sanitary  Train.  .  . 

51st  F.A.  Brigade  Head- 
quarters   

Totals 


^1 

CO 

Gassed 
severely 

Gassed 
slightly 

Co 

.  . 

1 

1 

,  . 

.  . 

8 

8 

26 

1 

54 

127 

111 

20 

232 

41 

139 

415 

35 

44 

17 

308 

13 

2 

70 

13 

13 

176 

307 

290 

18 

335 

74 

115 

331 

151 

54 

55 

54 

18 

3 

83 

8 

10 

19 

7 

18 

6 

10 

23 

19 

13 

2 

3 

1 

13 

5 

42 

2 

1 

2 

8 

18 

47 

2 

26 

1 

5 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 
3 

1 

16 

594 

1245 

897 

169 

699 

502 

e5 


43 

585 
958 

111 

1200 
760 

122 
60 
61 
62 

3 

102 

11 

6 

19 


4106 


This  does  not  include  the  evacuation  of  sick  and  exhausted,  about  1200. 

was  "out  of  the  war."  Eighteen  kilometers  of  ground 
gained  in  the  face  of  stubborn  opposition;  a  handsome 
yield  of  prisoners  and  guns;  ^  a  difficult  maneuver  well  ac- 

1  The  following  captures  were  reported: 
248  prisoners. 

1  210-mm.  howitzer. 

2  177-mm.  minenwerfer. 
4  77-mm.  minenwerfer. 

1  small  minenwerfer. 
18  88-mm.  field  gun. 

2  77-mm.  field  guns. 

9  machine  guns,  complete. 
14  machine  guns,  incomplete. 
1  pontoon  wagon  train   (for  infantry  foot-bridge),  a  large  quantity 
of  ammunition,  consisting  of  shells  of  all  calibers,  and  small-arms 
ammunition. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  209 

complished;  all  objectives  gained;  its  supply  and  evacu- 
ation service  functioning  admirably  all  the  time;  the  pub- 
lic, pointed  praise  of  the  Army  Commander  —  all  this  the 
Twenty-Sixth  had  to  its  credit,  together  with  an  honorable 
loss  in  action  of  some  five  thousand  men.  And  for  the  mo- 
ment the  Division  could  be  well  content  to  rest  on  its 
laurels,  nobly  won. 

From  the  smiling  region  about  La  Ferte,  and  from  where 
the  little  Ourcq  drops  into  the  Marne,  the  Division  trun- 
dled down  to  a  country  even  lovelier  —  north  of  Chatillon- 
sur-Seine,  south  of  Bar-sur-Seine,  along  the  beautiful 
river  valley,  with  Division  Headquarters  established  (on 
August  13)  at  Mussy-sur-Seine.  An  area  well  organized 
by  a  very  efficient  group  of  zone-majors  and  town-majors,^ 
with  ample  drill  grounds,  and  the  Second  Corps  schools 
of  Chatillon  at  hand,  the  country  afforded  every  facility 
(including  good  rifle  ranges)  for  training.  And  promptly 
the  Division  set  to  work,  some  of  the  regiments  under 
new  leaders.  The  effort  of  the  Division  Commander  to 
give  two  of  his  Staff  the  advantage  of  serving  with  troops 
had  brought  down  a  sharp  rebuke  from  General  Head- 
quarters. He  had  assigned  his  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  command 
of  the  104th  Infantry  on  July  31,  and  the  Division  In- 
spector, Colonel  H.  P.  Hobbs,  had  been  sent  to  the  102d 
Infantry  upon  the  relief  of  Colonel  J.  H.  Parker  on  the 
same  date,  the  latter  destined  to  win,  with  a  regiment  in 
another  division,  the  highest  honors  for  personal  gal- 
lantry in  action.  But  promptly  the  Division  Commander 
was  reminded  that  he  was  without  authority  thus  to  as- 
sign officers  of  the  General  Staff  or  of  the  Inspector-Gen- 
eral 's  Department ;  and  so  the  new  regimental  commanders 
were  returned  to  their  duties  at  Headquarters.  To  the 
lU^d  Infantry  came  Colonel  H.  I.  Bearss,  an  officer  of  the 
JNIarine  Corps  of  established  reputation;  to  the  10-lth  In- 
fantry was  assigned  Colonel  G.  McCaskey,  soon  to  be 

^  Of  the  Rents,  Requisitions,  and  Claims  Service. 


210  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

transferred,  however,  following  the  recommendation  of 
a  board  of  inquiry.  To  the  101st  Field  Artillery  was  as- 
signed Colonel  A.  T.  Bishop,  who  remained  in  command 
for  some  three  weeks.  On  August  13  Colonel  M.  E.  Locke 
was  transferred  from  the  command  of  the  102d  Field  Artil- 
lery to  duty  at  the  schools.  An  effort  is  reported  to  have 
been  made  at  this  time  to  bring  about  the  relief  of  General 
Cole  (52d  Infantry  Brigade)  and  Colonel  Logan  (101st 
Infantry)  on  the  grounds  of  deficiency  in  troop  leader- 
ship; but  such  charges  appeared  to  the  Division  Com- 
mander to  be  without  foundation. 

Under  the  provisions  of  a  Memorandum  on  training 
troops  when  out  of  the  line,^  two  days  were  allowed  for 
rest  and  the  cleaning  of  arms  and  equipment.  Clothing 
was  issued;  the  men  were  bathed;  the  vehicles,  animals, 
and  billets  were  systematically  cleaned  and  policed.  Fol- 
lowing this,  a  progressive  programme  of  work  was  laid  out 
for  all  units.  The  methods  of  open  warfare  dominated  all 
study  and  drill.  With  the  long  period  of  position  warfare 
now  definitely  concluded,  the  Division  must  look  forward 
to  a  war  of  movement.  For  obtaining  practice  in  maneuver 
there  were  directed  weekly  terrain  exercises,  the  problems 
to  be  set  by  the  Corps,  ^  or  by  Division  Headquarters  for  the 
smaller  units.  And  favored  by  beautiful  weather  the  work 
made  good  progress.  The  exercises  were  arranged  to  re- 
quire the  employment  of  all  methods  of  communication, 
since  it  was  in  this  respect  that  the  Twenty-Sixth,  like  the 
other  American  divisions  in  the  field,  had  found  one  of  its 
greatest  difficulties.  By  the  employment  of  planes  from 
the  Chatillon  aerodrome,  good  practice  was  obtained  by 
the  infantry  in  the  methods  of  position-marking  and  sig- 
naling between  an  advanced  line  or  a  headquarters  and  a 
plane;  a  helpful  demonstration  of  signaling  devices  and 
mechanical  means  of  communication  was  given  at  the 

1  Memorandum  for  Corps  and  Division  Commanders,  G.H.Q.,  August  5. 

2  Fifth  Corps. 


THE  AISNE-MARNE  OFFENSIVE  211 

Second  Corps  Schools;  and  in  the  second  divisional  ter- 
rain exercise  elaborate  tests  were  made  of  the  Division's 
skill  in  maintaining  and  extending  communication  lines, 
under  the  eye  of  high  ranking  officers  of  the  Corps  and 
from  the  training  section  at  General  Headquarters,  who 
gave  careful  critiques  on  the  conclusion  of  the  exercise. 

A  large  number  of  enlisted  replacements  were  received 
at  this  time,  many  being  transferred  from  other  combat 
divisions  in  the  area.  Many  hailed  originally  from  the 
lower  Mississippi  Valley;  and  it  was  very  interesting  to 
note  how  quickly  these  Southerners  were  assimilated 
and  caught  the  spirit  of  the  Yankee  Division.  Drafted  men, 
hastily  trained,  large  numbers  of  these  replacements  were 
very  deficient  in  military  knowledge,  some  having  never 
fired  their  rifles.  But  intensive  training  methods  were  at 
once  applied.  They  all  were  given  target  practice,  grenade 
and  gas  drills,  with  instruction  in  open-warfare  formation, 
before  the  Division  was  called  again  to  active  duty. 

No  leaves  were  possible.  In  the  days  immediately  fol- 
lowing relief  from  the  Aisne-Marne  work,  a  few  officers 
who  were  plainly  suffering  from  overstrain  were  allowed 
forty-eight-hour  passes.  But  in  the  Chatillon  area  there 
was  work  for  everybody,  since  it  was  very  evident  from 
the  character  and  intensity  of  the  prescribed  training  pro- 
gramme that  the  Division  was  about  to  return  to  active 
duty;  and  for  this  all  ranks  must  be  ready. 

The  question  of  animal  transport  again  became  acute. 
The  work  of  the  Aisne-Marne  drive  had  taken  a  heavy 
toll  of  the  horses  and  mules,  especially  in  the  artillery  and 
ammunition  train.  During  the  advance  forage  rations  were 
so  low  that  it  was  necessary  to  send  all  grain  to  the  an- 
imals with  the  forward  echelons,  leaving  those  in  rear  to 
subsist  on  hay  or  by  grazing.  And  so  severe  was  the  strain 
that,  between  August  13  and  22,  eight  hundred  animals 
were  evacuated  by  the  Division  Veterinary  Corps,  of 
which  thirty  died  on  the  road  in  transit.  Some  issues  of 


212  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

French  draft  stock  were  received,  both  stallions  and  mares, 
heavy,  fine-looking  animals;  but  under  the  strain  of  gun- 
fire and  the  conditions  at  the  front  they  soon  became 
exhausted  in  strength  and  had  to  be  evacuated.  In  the 
Chatillon  area  forage  again  was  so  short  that  the  quar- 
termaster authorized  supply  officers  to  purchase  hay  and 
grain  direct  from  French  civilians. 

A  draft  of  twenty-three  officers  and  seventj'-two  non- 
commissioned officers  was  selected  at  this  time  for  return 
to  the  United  States  as  instructors. 

Changes  in  command  and  in  the  Staff,  other  than  those 
already  listed,  included  the  following:  Brigadier-General 
D.  W.  Aultman  was  transferred  on  August  15  from  the 
command  of  the  artillery  brigade  to  the  166th  Field  Ar- 
tillery Brigade,^  being  succeeded  by  Colonel  O.  W.  B. 
Farr,  formerly  commanding  the  howitzer  regiment  of  the 
Third  Division.  On  August  1  Captain  A.  L.  Forde  was 
assigned  to  command  the  Headquarters  Troop,  succeeding 
Captain  B.  L.  Ashby;  Major  W.  K.  Mackall,  Assistant 
Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  was  transferred  away  from  the  Divi- 
sion, as  was  Captain  W.  B.  Morgan,  Assistant  to  Gr-3. 

It  was,  in  general,  a  period  not  only  of  brisk  training,  but 
also  of  reorganization  and  refitting.  Through  a  pleasant  suc- 
cession of  sunny  days,  in  a  most  charming  country,  the  bat- 
talions recovered  the  strength  which  the  stern  days  above 
Chateau-Thierry  had  taken  away.  Spirits  soared  again;  first 
anniversaries  began  to  be  celebrated ;  ^  and  the  men  felt 
ready  for  any  new  calls  which  might  be  made  upon  them. 

^  In  Brigadier-General  Aultman  the  Division  lost  one  of  its  most  distinguished 
officers.  Of  continuous  service  in  the  field  artillery  after  1894,  he  organized  and 
trained  the  Cuban  artillery  between  1898  and  1906;  he  was  a  member  of  the 
military  mission  to  Germany  in  1914,  returning  in  1915.  Following  his  service 
with  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  he  filled  various  important  corps  and  army 
artillery  commands,  becoming  Chief  of  Artillery,  Second  Army.  He  was  deco- 
rated with  the  Croix  de  Guerre  with  palm  (twice),  the  Legion  of  Honof,  and  the 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

2  Notably  that  of  the  famous  Military  Police  of  the  Division,  a  picked  body  of 
men  from  Massachusetts  whose  discipline,  courage,  and  intelligence  were  of  the 
grade  attained  by  only  the  best  troops  in  the  American  Expeditionary  Force. 


T 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE 

HE  Staff  had  just  drafted  plans  for  a  terrain  exercise 
to  be  held  on  August  27,  when  a  warning  order  tele- 
phoned from  Fifth  Corps  Headquarters  directed  the  Di- 
vision to  prepare  immediately  for  a  movement  "to  another 
area"  by  rail,  motor  transport  to  go  over  the  road.  And 
the  very  next  day  Headquarters  closed  at  Mussy-sur- 
Seine,  and  the  loading  of  the  troop  trains  began. 

The  purpose  of  the  movement  soon  became  evident 
enough.  When  the  stations  of  Ligny-en-Barrois,  Tronville, 
and  Longeville-Nangois  were  announced  in  field  orders 
as  the  detraining  points;  when  it  was  given  out  that  an 
advanced  echelon  of  the  Staff  would  be  established  at  Bar- 
le-Duc,  a  glance  at  the  map  made  it  plain  why  the  Division 
was  being  sent  in  that  particular  direction.  A  unit  in  the 
Fifth  Corps  of  the  just  organized  First  American  Army 
was  the  Division's  new  designation;  and  the  first  activity 
of  that  great  force,  under  General  Pershing's  direction  as 
a  field  commander,  was  plainly  to  be  the  reduction  of  the 
Saint-Mihiel  sahent,  long  before  determined  as  the  scene 
of  independent  American  endeavor,  and  so  quite  generally 
understood. 

In  the  region  between  Bar-le-Duc  and  Souilly,  about 
Commercy  and  Toul,  an  immense  troop  concentration  was 
made  all  through  the  last  part  of  August  and  early  days 
of  September.  Every  night  all  roads  were  crowded  with 
endless  motor  trains  of  infantry  or  columns  of  artiller3^ 
Units  of  the  Twenty-Sixth,  on  detraining,  had  to  be 
marched  immediately  away,  to  clear  the  neighborhood  of 
the  railway  for  other  troops;  one  encountered  in  the  black- 
ness of  the  night  along  the  dust-choked  roads,  or  halted 


214  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

mysteriously  in  the  streets  of  a  village,  soldiers  belonging 
to  American  divisions  which  one  did  not  even  dream  were 
in  France.  Stringent  orders  to  take  advantage  of  cover 
against  aeroplane  observation  prevailed  everywhere; 
troops  could  march  only  between  the  hours  of  eight  at 
night  and  four  in  the  morning;  they  camped  in  woods  very 
generally  instead  of  being  billeted  in  villages;  the  whole 
countryside  was  alive  with  them  as  soon  as  darkness  fell, 
where  by  day  scarcely  a  sign  betrayed  the  presence  of  the 
scores  of  thousands  who  crowded  into  the  region  round- 
about the  edge  of  the  Woevre  Plain  and  on  the  Heights  of 
the  Meuse,  between  Pont-a-Mousson  and  the  southeastern 
rim  of  the  defenses  of  Verdun. 

Steadily  the  Division  pushed  northward.  Under  the 
traffic  regulations  of  the  Corps,  it  could  use  only  the  roads 
that  paralleled  the  famous  highway  between  Bar-le-Duc 
and  Verdun  —  that  Via  Sacra,  by  which  alone  Verdun 
was  kept  connected  with  the  outer  world  for  months  in 
1916,  and  which  now  was  reserved  for  motor  transport 
only.  Frequent  steep  and  long  grades  made  the  night 
marches  exceedingly  difficult  for  the  artillery,  badly 
horsed  as  it  was ;  and  all  animal-drawn  transport  had  hard 
going ;  but  with  the  host  of  troops  which  were  being  pushed 
into  the  area  it  was  necessary  to  employ  every  road  al- 
lotted to  the  Division's  use,  whether  it  was  good  or  bad. 

Northward  (past  Pierrefitte,  Vavincourt,  Chaumont) 
rolled  the  dusty  columns  of  men  and  guns,  the  52d  Brigade 
leading.^  Past  Souilly,  the  Army  Headquarters  town,  they 
plodded  and  thence  eastward  one  march  more,  till  by  Sep- 
tember 3  the  Division  found  itself  above  the  old  religious 
shrine  of  Benoite  Vaux,  in  the  vicinitv  and  east  of  Somme- 
dieue,  in  which  village  headquarters  was  estabhshed. 
The  movement,  ordered  to  be  completed  by  September  4, 
had  been  delayed  at  the  outset  for  fifteen  hours  by  a  train 

^  The  1st  Battalion,  101st  Infantry,  was  moved  up  in  trucks  in  advance  of 
the  rest  of  the  infantry,  to  expedite  a  relief. 


TIIE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  215 

wreck  near  Chatillon,  and  afterwards  by  the  congestion 
on  the  roads;  but  it  was  of  first  importance  in  such  a  large 
troop  movement  that  the  Corps'  march-table  should  be 
accurately  kept;  and  the  Division  was  up  with  its  sched- 
ule in  reaching  the  Sommedieue  area.  It  had  been  a  hard 
march;  but  the  troops  had  stood  it  well,  though  there  was 
suffering  among  the  none  too  sturdy  animals. 

For  a  day  or  two  a  pause  ensued.  Reconnaissance  was 
made  of  the  sector  between  Haudiomont  and  Mont-sous- 
les-Cotes  inclusive,  at  the  extreme  left,  or  northwesterly 
hinge,  of  the  salient.  To  the  left,  beyond  Haudiomont, 
began  the  defenses  of  Verdun,  sweeping  away  in  a  great 
arc  round  the  city.  Directly  in  front,  below  the  Heights  of 
the  Meuse,  where  the  Allies'  line  ran,  lay  Bonzee,  the  im- 
portant village  of  Fresnes,  with  Etain  out  on  the  far- 
stretching  Woevre  plain,  and  on  the  distant  eastern  hori- 
zon the  uplands  toward  Chambley  and  Briey.  On  the  right 
jutted  out  from  the  plateau  of  the  Heights  the  grim  spur 
of  Les  Eparges,  dominating  the  whole  countryside. 

It  was  the  best  sector  the  Division  had  seen.  The  com- 
manding site  of  its  trench  lines,  their  excellent  upkeep, 
the  admirable  camps  back  in  the  clean  woods  toward 
Sommedieue,  even  the  warm,  dry  weather,  gave  promise 
of  comfort  to  the  men  and  every  advantage  in  laimching 
the  intended  attack.  On  the  steep,  pine-clad  hillside,  ad- 
joining Sommedieue  on  the  east,  the  French  had  con- 
structed a  very  fine  divisional  headquarters;  while  an  ex- 
tensive hospital  system,  abundant  water,  well-organized 
supply  and  administration  facilities  with  railhead  at  Ance- 
mont  and  Rattantout,  combined  to  insure  that  the  troops' 
every  need  ^vould  be  fulfilled  or  even  anticipated. 

But  hardly  had  the  preliminary  reconnaissance  been 
made,  looking  to  occupation  of  this  part  of  the  line,  looking 
also  toward  an  extensive  advance  out  into  the  Plain,  before 
plans  were  changed.  It  was  evident  that  some  great  pro- 
ject had  been  in  preparation.  The  day  after  the  Division 


216  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

established  itself  in  the  vicinity  of  Sommedieue,  there 
crept  out  from  among  the  pine-trees,  along  a  spur  track, 
a  monster  piece  of  railroad  artillery  of  thirteen  inches  cal- 
iber which  went  leisurely  into  position;  a  battalion  of  tanks 
ambled  into  the  cover  of  the  woods  in  a  ravine.  The  con- 
fidential staff  maps  from  American  Headquarters  showed 
ambitious  objectives  indeed;  in  the  areas  farther  to  the 
rear,  along  the  Meuse,  there  had  been  a  continual  in-pour- 
ing of  troops  of  all  arms.  But  different  counsels  prevailed. 
It  was  decided  merel}^  to  effect  a  reduction  of  the  salient 
to  the  line  (approximately)  of  Fresnes-Dampvitoux- 
Pagny-sur-Moselle;  and  in  accordance  with  this  purpose 
the  mission  and  objective  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  were  al- 
tered. The  direction  of  its  attack  was  not  east,  but  south- 
east. The  sector  which  the  Division  should  hold  was  that 
which  adjoined  the  Sommedieue  line  on  the  right;  and 
there,  on  the  nights  of  September  4-o,  the  relief  was 
effected  of  the  French  Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion. The  latter  moved  to  its  own  immediate  right,  as  the 
Twenty-Sixth  came  in;  and  on  the  left  of  the  Americans 
was  posted  the  Fifteenth  Colonial  Division. 

The  sector  taken  over  extended  approximately  from 
what  had  been  the  village  of  Les  Eparges  southeasterly  to 
Loclont  Wood.  On  the  left  were  the  classic  fighting  grounds 
of  Saint-Remy  village  and  Eparges  Wood,  w^here  the 
French  had  struggled  desperately  in  1915;  on  the  right  the 
Division's  line,  in  front  of  the  village  of  Mouilly  and  the 
sinister  Ravin  de  France,  was  merged  in  the  dense  thickets 
of  Saint-Remy  Wood.  It  was  a  confused  area  of  spurs  and 
ravines,  this  plateau  of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse  from 
w^hich  the  enemy  was  now  to  be  driven.  Threaded  by  roads 
of  none  too  good  construction,  intricately  defended  by 
huge  bands  of  barbed  wire  strung  through  the  trees  and 
thickets,  and  by  many  concreted  machine-gun  nests,  the 
zone  of  attack  was  not  easy  to  traverse.  The  woods  were 
exceedingly  dense,  heavy  underbrush  having  grown  up  to 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  217 

fill  the  spaces  between  the  trees  blasted  by  four  years  of 
artillery  fire.  In  rear  of  his  lines  the  enemy  had  constructed 
elaborate  shelters  and  battery  positions,  with  typical  Ger- 
man forest  lodges  for  headquarters.  The  sector  had  for 
months  been  very  quiet,  and  the  always  industrious  ad- 
versary had  had  leisure  to  perfect  his  light  railways,  water 
points,  munition  depots,  even  his  cemeteries,  which  boasted 
elaborately  carved  stone  memorials.  He  was  well  served 
in  the  matter  of  back-area  organization,  for  directly  in 
his  rear  lay  the  important  rail  center  of  Vigneulles,  while 
along  the  base  of  the  hills  on  the  edge  of  the  Woevre  Plain, 
connected  up  with  excellent  roads,  were  the  villages  of 
Vieville,  Billy,  Thillot,  Saint-Maurice,  and  Hannonville, 
with  a  second  row  a  short  distance  in  rear.  On  a  spur  of 
the  Meuse  Heights,  above  Vigneulles,  was  situated  Hat- 
tonchatel,  one  of  the  most  useful  of  his  observatories  over 
the  Woevre  Plain. 

At  first  Genicourt  was  designated  as  the  Headquarters 
village;  but  this  was  almost  immediately  changed  in  favor 
of  Rupt-en-Woevre,  where  Division  Headquarters  was 
opened  on  September  5.  Command  of  the  sector  —  "Rupt 
Sector"  on  the  staff  maps  —  passed  to  General  Edwards 
three  days  later. 

The  order  of  battle  of  the  infantry  regiments,  from  left 
to  right,  was:  10-4th,  103d,  101st,  with  102d  Infantry  in 
close  reserve  behind  the  right  of  the  line.  Machine  guns, 
engineers,  and  signalmen  were  all  close  at  hand,  camped 
about  INIouilly,  in  Amblonville  Wood,  Cote  de  Senoux, 
and  Soff  Wood.  Never  had  the  Division  been  concentrated 
in  so  small  an  area.  But  it  soon  was  very  evident  why  so 
limited  a  space  was  available.  Every  night,  and  by  day  as 
well,  taking  advantage  of  the  showery  weather  which  made 
observation  by  the  enemy  impossible,  a  steady  stream  of 
artillery  poured  in  to  support  the  coming  attack.  The  re- 
quirements of  the  situation,  as  reported  by  the  Division 
Commander,  were  generously  met;  and  when  at  length 


218  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

the  infantry  moved  forward  it  was  to  the  accompaniment 
of  fire  not  only  from  the  famihar  divisional  guns,  but 
also  from  those  of  the  following  organizations:  13th  and 
77th  Field  Artillery  (4th  Division) ;  9  batteries,  203d 
Artillery  (French) ;  oth  R.A.P.  (220-millimeter  howitzers) ; 
2  batteries,  73d  Artillery  (270-millimeter  howitzers) ;  1  bat- 
tery, 176th  Artillery  (240-minimeter  trench  mortars).  In 
the  sodden,  muddy  glens  and  wooded  hollows,  right  in  the 
open  along  the  roadside  under  a  sketchy  camouflage  of 
leafy  boughs,  the  guns  were  put  in  position  —  in  places  al- 
most hub  to  hub,  while  by  decauville  from  Genicourt,  by 
truck  and  wagon,  there  was  carried  in  a  store  of  shells  in 
seemingly  endless  amounts.  The  whole  area  was  alive  with 
preparation.  Not  a  copse,  not  a  road-cutting,  but  what  was 
in  use  to  conceal  men,  guns,  or  material;  the  villages  of 
Mouilly  and  Rupt  were  packed;  the  camps  in  the  woods 
overflowed  with  troops.  For  a  week  the  Division  prepared 
itself  for  the  duty  expected  of  it,  very  little  molested  by  the 
enemy  in  the  trenches  opposite,  its  main  preoccupation 
being  to  contrive  some  sort  of  shelter  from  the  almost 
steady  rain. 

The  story  of  the  share  taken  by  the  Twenty-Sixth  in 
the  operation  to  reduce  the  Saint-Mihiel  salient  is  less  an 
account  of  heavy  fighting  than  of  a  maneuver  in  which  new 
situations,  continually  presented,  were  promptly  and  effi- 
ciently met.  It  was  an  operation  in  which  the  Division 
Commander  exercised  personal  direction  at  all  times;  in 
which  large  masses  of  troops  were  handled  smoothly;  in 
which  the  service  of  intelligence,  flank  communication, 
and  the  cooperation  of  all  arms  were  all  maintained  un- 
broken and  eflScient,  as  well  as  communication  with  the 
Corps  Headquarters  in  rear.  It  was  an  operation  of  the 
type  which  delights  the  staff  officer  —  in  which  every 
movement  goes  according  to  schedule,  in  which,  moreover, 
the  unexpected  is  met  and  turned  to  advantage  promptly, 
in  which  control  is  never  lost. 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  219 

The  general  plan  contemplated  a  converging  movement 
against  the  south  and  west  sides  of  the  salient,  the  position 
of  the  Twenty-Sixth  being  on  almost  the  extreme  left 
of  the  line,  with  direction  of  attack  southeast.  On  its  right 
was  the  Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  Division,  on  its  left, 
the  Fifteenth  Colonial  Division.  Moving  astride  of  an  axial 
road,  called  the  "Grande  Tranchee  de  Calonne,"  in  the 
direction  of  Hattonchatel  and  Vigneulles  for  the  most  part 
through  dense  woods,  the  Division  had  for  its  immediate 
mission  to  clear  this  part  of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse,  and 
by  thus  breaking  the  salient  at  its  western  pillar  to  aid 
in  effecting  the  German  withdrawal  from  the  whole  area. 
The  Fifteenth  Colonial,  in  the  meantime,  was  to  obtain 
possession  of  Saint-Remy,  Cote  Amaranthe,  and  Combres, 
from  which  a  hold  could  be  assured  on  the  crests  above 
Herbeuville,  Saint-Maurice,  and  Billy-sous-les-Cotes,  thus 
compelling  a  German  retirement  to  the  Woevre  Plain. 
On  the  right  the  Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  Division 
had  Creue  as  its  ultimate  objective,  though  the  woods 
and  rough  slopes  about  Dompierre  and  Deuxnouds  had 
jBrst  to  be  cleared  methodically.  In  brief,  the  three  divi- 
sions moving  abreast  had  the  duty  of  pushing  the  enemy 
off  the  Meuse  Heights  from  the  line  Les  Eparges-Mouilly- 
Ranzieres  to  the  line  Saint-Maurice-Hattonchatel-Creue, 
the  general  scope  of  the  operation  being  outlined  in  Battle 
Instructions  No.  1,  Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  re- 
ceived at  the  Division  on  September  6. 

On  the  basis  of  the  Corps'  order  for  the  actual  beginning 
of  the  operation,^  the  Division's  attack  order  ^  was  issued 
on  September  11.  The  movement  was  to  be  made  with 
tliree  infantry  regiments  in  line,  each  with  one  battalion 
forward,  the  other  two  being  echeloned  in  support  and 
reserve,  except  in  the  case  of  the  101st  Infantry,  which  had 
two  battalions  in  the  attacking  line  and  one  in  support. 

*  Field  Order  17,  Ilcadqiiarlcrs  Fiftli  Army  Corps. 

*  Field  Order  77,  Headquarters  Tweuty-Sixlh  Division. 


220  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

The  Division  reserve  (I02d  Infantry  and  101st  Machine- 
Gun  Battalion)  was  kept  close  at  hand,  well  forward.  To 
each  front-line  battalion  were  assigned  a  machine-gun 
company,  Stokes  mortar  and  37-mm.  platoons,  a  section 
of  smoke  and  thermite  troops  of  the  1st  Gas  Regiment, 
one  half  company  of  engineers,  and  one  accompanying 
75-mm.  field  piece.  The  engineers  were  equipped  with 
bengalore  torpedoes  to  assist  in  breaching  the  enemy  wire, 
of  which  heavy  bands  extended  all  through  the  woods.  The 
artillery  preparation  was  to  be  very  thorough.  For  seven 
hours  it  was  to  play  on  the  German  defenses,  communica- 
tions, and  assembly  points,  save  for  two  intervals,  one  of 
five,  one  of  ten  minutes;  then  it  would  lay  a  rolling  bar- 
rage in  front  of  the  attacking  infantry  at  zero  hour,  8  a.m. 

With  an  intermediate  objective  along  the  Vaux-Saint- 
Remy  road  (where  the  infantry,  inevitably  disordered  by 
its  attack,  would  re-form),  the  Division's  objective  for  the 
first  day  was  the  line  of  the  Longeau  Farm-Dompierre- 
au-Bois  road,  about  six  kilometers  distant  from  the  par- 
allel of  departure. 

The  night  of  September  11-12  was  dark  with  rain.  Under 
cover  of  the  weather  preparations  had  gone  forward  me- 
thodically to  the  very  last  moment.  At  the  divisional  com- 
bat post  of  command,  established  in  a  dripping  dugout  on 
a  hillside  above  Rupt-en-Woevre,  everything  was  in  readi- 
ness long  before  the  hour;  even  the  venerable  village  cure, 
who  had  remained  at  his  post  all  through  the  war,  was 
welcomed  along  with  the  usual  information  officers  from 
the  flanking  divisions  and  from  the  Corps.  The  service  of 
intelligence  had  been  efficiently  reorganized  by  a  new 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  Captain  (later  Lieutenant- 
Colonel)  H.  R.  Horsey;  and  from  long  before  the  actual 
start  of  the  combat,  informing  messages  regarding  the 
enemy  and  the  front-line  situation  were  coming  in  from 
the  divisional  observation  groups. 

The  enemy  was  singularly  passive.  It  would  appear 


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THE  SAIXT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  221 

from  even  the  official  German  reports  and  bulletins  that, 
while  a  large-scale  atteck  on  the  Saint-Mihiel  salient  was 
regarded  as  in  preparation,  there  was  uncertainty  as  to 
the  probable  date  and  the  point  of  the  main  attack.  He 
held  the  southern  face  of  the  salient  very  lightly  (two 
divisions  occupying  a  front  of  twenty-two  kilometers); 
another  division  (77th)  was  greatly  reduced  in  strength; 
another  (33d  Reserve)  had  suffered  so  many  recent  deser- 
tions of  its  x\lsace-Lorrainers  that  its  reliability  was  seri- 
ously in  question.  Opposite  the  Twenty-Sixth  lay  the  60th 
and  82d  Landwehr  regiments  of  the  Thirteenth  Landwehr 
Division,  who  showed,  as  has  been  said,  only  a  somewhat 
perfunctory  interest  in  the  preparations  going  on  behind 
the  x\merican  lines.  It  is  possible  that  these  had  been  better 
concealed,  thanks  to  the  rain  and  mist  and  wooded  coun- 
try, than  one  had  dared  to  hope;  perhaps  the  enemy's 
heart  was  gone.  But  at  all  events,  the  first  point  noticed, 
after  the  attack  started,  was  the  feeble  enemy  reaction, 
especially  of  his  artillery. 

At  one  o'clock  on  September  12  hell  broke  loose  from 
our  own  guns.  Methodically  directed  on  trench  fines, 
roads,  assembly  points,  and  places  in  the  rear  areas,  the 
fire  was  uninterrupted  for  seven  hours,  save  for  two  brief 
periods  in  which  sound  ranging  was  carried  out.  The 
pauses  were  followed,  respectively,  by  five  and  ten  minutes 
gas  concentration  on  back  areas.  Five  gaps  in  the  enemy's 
wire  were  to  be  cut  by  the  "  75s  "  and  one  by  the  loo-mm. 
mortars,  which  was  done  satisfactorily;  while  other  open- 
ings were  made  by  the  engineers  by  bengalore  torpedoes, 
and  by  the  infantry  using  wire-cutters  at  the  time  of  the 
actual  attack.  The  101st  Trench  Mortar  Battery  employed 
thermite  shells,  which  scattered  on  bursting  a  white  fire 
of  terrific  intensitv.  Trouble  was  had  with  the  mounts  of 
the  mortars,  a  number  of  which  broke  under  the  strain 
of  firing;  but  the  battery  delivered  nevertheless  its  full 
quota  of  rounds.  At  eight  o'clock,  behind  a  roUing  barrage, 


222  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

the  infantry  went  over.  On  the  left,  Cole's  brigade  had 
to  overcome  considerable  opposition  from  machine  guns 
almost  from  the  start.  The  Senegalese  battalions  of  the 
Fifteenth  French  Colonial  Division  made  slow  progress 
against  the  formidable  slopes  of  Amaranthe  Hill;  and 
tliis  —  because  it  was  necessary  to  maintain  touch  with 
the  French  —  had  the  effect  of  further  hampering  Cole's 
advance;  but  nevertheless  the  52d  Brigade,  on  the  north 
side  of  the  axial  Tranchee  de  Calonne,  moved  steadily 
ahead  across  country  which  afforded  little  cover,  when  it 
was  not  covered  by  dense  woods  threaded  with  wire.  On 
the  right  the  101st  Infantry  advanced  for  about  a  kilo- 
meter with  little  opposition.  On  neither  section  of  the 
front  was  there  encountered  any  artillery  reaction  worthy 
the  name.  The  mopping-up  parties,  of  the  second  waves 
of  attack,  took  prisoners  at  will,  dazed  by  the  artillery 
bombardment  and  eager  to  surrender. 

It  was  on  the  enemy's  main  resistance  line  that  the 
right  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  first  ran  into  anything  like  real 
opposition,  which  took  the  form  of  machine-gun  fire  from 
the  concreted  nests  and  from  the  so-called  Kiel,  Essen, 
and  Stettin  Trenches,  and  from  Prusse  Trench  on  the  left. 
By  degrees,  however,  flanking  out  the  machine  guns,  the 
101st  Infantry  got  forward  to  the  day's  intermediate  ob- 
jective, the  road  between  Vaux-les-Palameix  and  Saint- 
Remy,  by  10.15  o'clock;  but  here  a  brief  halt  was  made. 
The  leading  battalions  had  become  considerably  disor- 
ganized by  the  advance  through  the  tangled  woods  and 
by  the  fighting;  so  the  reserve  battalion  was  ordered  for- 
ward, and  from  the  Division  reserve,  which  had  been  kept 
close  at  hand  behind  the  advance,  the  1st  Battalion,  102d 
Infantry,  was  ordered  to  pass  through  the  line  and  con- 
tinue the  attack. 

On  the  left  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade  also  made  good 
progress.  It  met  a  solid  resistance  from  the  machine  guns 
in  Le  Chanot  Wood;  but  once  this  was  overcome,  the  two 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  223 

regiments  (104th  on  the  left,  103d  on  the  right)  moved 
along  without  undue  trouble.  Its  left  flank  was  in  the  air. 
True,  the  French  had  taken  the  village  of  Saint-Remy  by 
11.30  o'clock;  but  they  had  great  difficulty  on  Amaranthe 
Hill,  and  could  not  proceed  at  the  same  rate  as  the  more 
fortunate  Americans.  Moving  ahead,  however,  with  com- 
bat patrols  covering  the  left  flank,  the  latter  got  to  the 
first  objective  (the  road  between  Longeau  Farm  and  Dom- 
pierre-aux-Bois)  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening. 

In  the  afternoon  a  change  in  the  plan  of  the  general  ad- 
vance had  been  determined  upon.  At  15.15  o'clock  (quarter 
after  three)  there  were  received  from  the  Corps  orders  ^ 
prescribing  that  the  Twenty-Sixth  should  take  over  from 
the  French  division  on  its  left  the  territory  which  the  lat- 
ter had  captured  between  Herbeuville  and  Dommartin, 
the  French  not  advancing  for  the  present  beyond  the  Une 
Hannonville-Longeau  Farm.  A  more  extensive  programme 
had  been  laid  out  for  this  division  (Fifteenth  Colonial); 
but  the  severe  opposition  it  had  early  encountered  made 
it  impossible  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  original  plan, 
and  therefore  the  Americans  were  called  upon  to  assist 
in  furthering  the  advance  on  the  left. 

A  practical  method  of  effecting  this  purpose  was  deter- 
mined upon  at  a  conference  between  General  Hennocque, 
in  command  of  the  Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  Division 
(on  the  right  of  the  Twenty-Sixth),  and  General  Edwards, 
at  whose  command  post  the  French  general  called  late  in 
the  afternoon.  Realizing  that  the  purpose  of  the  two  divi- 
sions operating  together  was  to  clear  this  portion  of  the 
Meuse  Heights,  the  French  commander  proposed,  since 
both  the  Twenty-Sixth  and  his  own  division  had  attained 
their  prescribed  objectives,  that  the  two  should  swing  their 
advance  to  the  left,  or  north,  and  clear  the  high  land  in 
the  direction  of  Saint-Maurice,  whither  the  bulk  of  the 
enemy  forces  was  apparently  retreating.  To  this  proposal 

'  Field  Orders  No.  19,  Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  September  12,  1918, 


224  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

the  Division  Commander  at  once  assented,  the  village  of 
Thillot  being  selected  as  the  objective  for  the  Twenty- 
Sixth's  advance.  A  message  explaining  the  plan  was  at 
once  carried  forward  by  a  staff  officer  to  the  commander  of 
the  51st  Infantry  Brigade;  another  to  Cole  (52d  Brigade) 
advised  the  latter  of  the  new  purpose;  and  the  operation 
was  on  the  point  of  being  started  when  a  telephoned  mes- 
sage from  Corps  Headquarters,  received  at  19.30  o'clock, 
completely  altered  the  situation. 

The  Division  was  to  continue  its  advance  straight 
through,  said  the  Corps,  along  the  forest  road  of  the 
Grande  Tranchee  de  Calonne,  to  Hattonchatel  and  Vign- 
eulles.  From  the  south  the  First  Division  was  advancing, 
and  the  two  forces  were  to  meet  at  Vigneulles,  thus  pinch- 
ing out  the  western  side  of  the  salient.  Thus  ran  the  tele- 
phone message  from  the  Corps  Chief  of  Staff;  and  it  suf- 
ficed to  get  action  instantly.  In  a  moment  the  Division 
Commander  was  in  communication  personally  with  the 
Headquarters  of  his  most  advanced  brigade  (51st),  where 
now  the  regiment  of  the  Division  reserve  (102d  Infantry) 
was  the  leading  unit.  The  movement  to  the  left  must  be 
stopped;  a  new  formation  must  be  made;  the  advance  to 
Vigneulles  must  be  started  without  a  second's  delay.  Per- 
sonally General  Edwards  sent  forward  his  emphatic  orders 
to  Shelton;  personally  he  set  in  motion  all  the  machinery 
for  the  new  movement,  communicating  his  owti  energy  to 
all  concerned  with  such  effectiveness  that  long  before  the 
written  orders  came  from  Corps  Headquarters  the  move- 
ment had  been  begun.  At  8.10  p.m.  the  Division  Com- 
mander got  word  to  Shelton  (51st  Brigade),  through  an 
aide  at  Brigade  Headquarters;  at  9  p.m.  he  was  in  tele- 
phone communication  with  Cole,  on  the  left,  directing  the 
latter  to  move  out  by  any  roads  available  on  the  left  and 
rear  of  the  Vigneulles  column,  with  the  line  Hattonchatel- 
Saint-Maurice  (inclusive)  as  an  objective.  By  9.30  p.m.  the 
advance  troops  of  Shelton's  brigade  had  started  along  the 


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THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  225 

Grande  Tranchee  de  Calonne.  Such,  in  brief,  was  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  march  was  inaugurated.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  the  httle  elapsed  time  between  the  Corps'  tele- 
phone call  and  the  beginning  of  the  102d  Infantry's  move- 
ment; to  mark  the  promptness  and  the  cooperation  of  all 
concerned  in  carrying  out  the  Corps  Commander's  order. 
A  sudden  situation,  a  change  of  orders,  a  wholly  new  dis- 
position of  the  Division's  combat  elements,  were  all  met, 
put  into  operation,  and  completed  within  two  hours.  This 
with  the  telephones  working  irregularly,  with  roads  almost 
impassable  even  for  the  staff  cars  and  motor-cycles,  with 
several  of  the  staff  officers  (including  the  Chief)  absent 
from  Headquarters  with  the  advanced  infantry  arranging 
for  the  previously  ordered  change  of  direction. 

By  magic  the  Division  Commander's  word  spread  down 
to  every  battalion.  It  was  to  be  a  race  between  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  and  their  old  friends  of  the  First,  with  Vigneulles  for 
the  goal;  to  the  Twenty-Sixth  had  been  given  the  task  of 
closing  in  the  west  side  of  the  salient  —  the  Division  was 
depended  on  to  clinch  a  great  American  victory.  Quickly 
Shelton  made  his  dispositions ;  with  no  confusion  the  troops 
formed  up  and  started,  every  man  eager  and  ready.  Lead- 
ing the  advance  was  the  102d  Infantry.  Behind  the  regi- 
ment came  the  Machine-Gun  Company  of  the  101st 
Infantry  and  the  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion,  closely 
followed  by  the  remainder  of  the  Division  reserve  (101st 
Machine-Gun  Battalion).  The  latter  could  not  use  its 
motor  cars,  owing  to  the  condition  of  the  roads,  so  carried 
its  guns  by  hand.  A  main  body,  comprising,  according  to 
the  order  ^  one  battahon  of  the  101st  Infantry,  the  101st 
Field  Artillery,  and  then  the  remaining  battalions  of  the 
101st  Infantry,  was  to  follow  the  advance;  but  as  it  was 
impracticable  for  the  moment  to  get  the  guns  forward, 
the  infantry  went  on  without  them. 

Along  the  littered  highway,  in  route  column,  with  ad- 
1  Field  Order  No.  78,  September  U.  1918, 


226  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

vance  and  flank  guards,  hurried  the  102d.  In  the  copses 
and  hollows  there  might  be  clouds  of  snipers  or  groups  of 
machine  guns  left  to  cover  the  enemy  retreat.  There  was 
no  time  and  no  opportunity  for  reconnaissance;  to  right 
and  left  it  was  none  too  easy  to  maintain  communication 
with  the  Second  (French)  Division  and  the  52d  Brigade. 
But  the  word  was  "  Get  forward ! "  and  forward  the  column 
moved,  electrified  by  the  Division  Commander's  pungent 
orders,  needing  no  spur  but  the  knowledge  that  it  had  an 
important  task  ahead  and  a  race  to  win. 

By  the  time  the  column  was  well  under  way,  the  written 
order  came  in  from  Corps  Headquarters: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps  (G-3  No.  25-30) 

American  Expeditionary  Forces 

France,  12  September  1918 
(20.00  hours) 
From :      Chief  of  Staff,  5th  Army  Corps. 
To:  Commanding  General,  26th  Division. 

Subject :  Closing  of  Gap  between  Western  and  Southern  attacks. 

1.  The  1st  Division  from  the  southern  attack  is  moving  on 
Vigneulles  to  join  with  you  in  closing  the  gap  between  the  two 
attacks. 

2.  The  Corps  Commander  directs  that  you  continue  the  ad- 
vance along  the  Grande  Tranchee  de  Calonne  so  that  by  daylight 
to-morrow  (September  13th)  you  will  have  established  contact 
with  the  1st  Division  and  will  have  one  regiment  in  Hatton- 
chatel. 

W.  B,.  BuRTT,  Brigadier-General 

THE/w  Chief  of  Staff 

R«c"d  26  Div  G-3 
12  Sep  1918 
23.20  o'clock 

On  the  right  Hennocque's  Second  Division  of  Dis- 
mounted Cavalry  (8th,  12th,  5th  Regiments  of  Cuiras- 
siers) ploughed  ahead  toward  Creue,  Chaillon,  and  Lamor- 
ville.  In  rear  the  engineers  were  working  madly  to  make 
a  passage  over  the  wrecked  roads  for  the  chafing  artillery- 
men. 

Through  the  night,  leaving  patrols  on  every  cross-road, 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  227 

gathering  in  prisoners  as  it  marched,  the  102d  Infantry- 
pushed  along  the  Grande  Tranchee.  Ahead  of  the  column 
rode  Colonel  Bearss,  with  his  adjutant,  the  French  infor- 
mation officer,  regimental  inteUigence  officer,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Alfonte  (the  Division  signal  officer),  and  three  or 
four  messengers.  Just  after  two  o'clock  on  September  13 
this  party  stormed  into  Hattonchatel,  which  had  been  set 
on  fire  by  the  enemy,  captured  then  and  there  a  loaded 
truck  train  and  a  machine-gun  crew,  too  surprised  to  offer 
resistance.  Into  blazing  Vigneulles,  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
below  Hattonchatel,  marched  the  regiment  before  three 
o'clock.  Strong  patrols,  with  machine-gun  sections,  were 
immediately  sent  to  the  southward,  toward  Creue  and 
Heudicourt;  and  it  was  in  the  latter  village  that  contact 
was  made  later  in  the  morning  with  elements  of  the  First 
Division.  The  race  was  to  the  Twenty-Sixth.  To  the  Corps 
Commander,  who  had  said  that  General  Pershing  wanted 
the  Division  to  be  in  Vigneulles  by  daylight.  General  Ed- 
wards had  given  an  assurance  that  his  men  would  be  there 
at  four  o'clock  at  the  latest;  and  his  men  had  made  good 
their  leader's  promise  handsomely. 

Comments  on  this  fine  performance  of  the  102d  Infantry 
by  those  high  in  command  followed,  generous  in  their  ap- 
preciation. On  September  18  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  in 
general  orders,  published  the  following  citation: 

1.  During  the  recent  operations  for  the  reduction  of  the  Saint- 
Mihiel  salient,  one  regiment  in  particular  of  the  Twenty-Sixth 
Division  should  be  mentioned  as  having  acquitted  itself  in  a 
most  inspiring  manner.  The  102d  Infantry  (Colonel  Hiram  I. 
Bearss  commanding)  was  ordered  late  in  the  evening  to  march 
at  once  on  Vigneulles,  in  order  to  close  the  remaining  gap  be- 
tween the  two  attacks. 

The  regiment  marched  five  miles  in  darkness  through  woods 
infested  with  the  enemy,  captured  280  prisoners,  and  completed 
its  mission  long  before  dayliglit.  The  main  roads  of  the  salient 
were  cut  ofT,  and  no  more  of  llie  enemy  could  escape. 

This  fine  example  of  courage  and  soldierly  acceptance  of  battle 


228  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

conditions  is  worthy  of  emulation.  The  Corps  Commander  con- 
gratulates them  and  looks  forward  with  confidence  to  a  continua- 
tion of  their  good  work. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Cameron 

W.  B.  BuRTT,  Brigadier-General  Chief  of  Staff 

To  the  commanding  oflScer  of  the  102d  Machine-Gun 
Battalion  the  general  in  command  of  the  51st  Infantry 
Brigade  penned  the  following  letter,  which  bears  repro- 
duction not  only  as  a  generous  appreciation  by  a  superior 
of  the  assistant's  work,  but  also  as  admirably  summariz- 
ing that  part  of  the  Division's  action  in  the  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive  which  attracted  most  attention: 

Headquarters  51st  Infantry  Brigade 

26th  Division,  American  Expeditionary  Forces 

September  15,  1918 

Dear  Major  Murphy:  The  march  of  the  leading  elements 
of  this  brigade,  consisting  of  the  102d  Infantry  and  the  102d 
Machine-Gun  Battalion,  on  the  night  of  September  12-13,  1918, 
from  our  position  at  the  close  of  the  first  day  in  the  attack  on  the 
Saint-Mihiel  salient,  for  more  than  nine  kilometers  along  the 
Grande  Tranchee  de  Calonne  to  Hattonchatel  and  Vigneulles, 
was  of  such  unique  and  important  character,  and  was  performed 
in  such  efiicient  and  spirited  manner,  that  I  desire  to  place  on 
record  my  personal  appreciation  of  this  accomplishment. 

Our  orders  required  the  brigade  to  pursue  the  retreating  enemy 
and  to  reach  Vigneulles  by  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  13th 
and  there  gain  contact  with  our  forces  advancing  from  the  south, 
and  thereby  prevent  the  escape  to  the  north  of  any  bodies  of 
the  enemy  still  in  the  salient.  To  have  attempted  to  push  forward 
a  line  covering  our  whole  sector  would  have  meant,  in  view  of 
the  woods  and  difficulty  of  the  terrain,  to  fail  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  our  mission.  The  only  alternative  was  to  push  boldly 
forward  on  the  only  accessible  road  through  unknown  hostile 
country,  losing  for  the  time  being  liaison  with  the  elements  of 
our  forces  on  our  right  and  left,  and  exposing  the  advance  ele- 
ments of  this  brigade  to  the  possibility  of  being  cut  off  and  sur- 
rounded by  the  enemy.  This  alternative  was  chosen,  and  the 
102d  Infantry  and  your  Machine-Gun  Battalion  were  selected 
to  lead  the  advance. 

The  results  are  known  to  you.  You  took  up  the  march  about 
21  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  12th.  Before  2  o'clock  the  following 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  229 

morning  the  leading  elements  of  the  column  were  in  Vigneulles. 
Hattonchatel  and  Vigneulles  were  completely  in  our  possession 
by  3  o'clock.  Soon  afterwards  the  mission  of  the  brigade  had 
been  completely  accomplished.  The  roads  leading  from  the 
southwest  had  been  blocked.  The  surrounding  towns  had  been 
garrisoned,  our  patrols  seeking  contact  with  our  forces  from  the 
south  were  in  the  plain  below  the  heights,  and  later  this  contact 
was  established.  Many  prisoners  and  a  large  supply  of  stores 
fell  into  our  hands. 

I  congratulate  you  and  your  battalion  upon  this  success  and 
upon  the  bravery  and  fine  spirit  manifest  throughout  its  accom- 
plishment. 

Very  sincerely  yours 

George  H.  Shelton 
Brigadier-General,  U.S.A.,  Commanding 

Early  on  the  13th  it  was  possible  to  realize  what  had 
been  accomplished.  From  Vigneulles  northwesterly  the 
Twenty-Sixth  had  secured  possession  of  the  Meuse 
Heights  as  far  as  Combres.  From  Hattonchatel,  occupied 
by  the  101st  Infantry  about  nine  o'clock,  one  could  look 
across  the  Woevre  Plain,  where  many  of  the  villages  had 
been  set  on  fire  by  the  retreating  enemy,  and  catch  the 
flash  of  Allied  guns  harrying  the  foe's  rear-guards.  In  the 
villages  nestling  in  the  ravines  at  the  foot  of  the  Heights, 
such  as  Hannonville  or  Vieville,  a  civilian  population, 
freed  from  four  years  of  slavery,  welcomed  our  men  as 
saviors.  The  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  stubbornly  forcing  a 
way  through  the  woods  on  the  north  side  of  the  Grande 
Tranchee,  had  debouched  at  dawn  on  the  edge  of  the  hills, 
and  before  noon  had  pushed  patrols  far  out  to  JNIarche- 
ville,  Saint-Hilaire,  Damvillers,  and  Butgneville,  the  Bri- 
gade Commander  scouting  forward  with  the  foremost. 
Less  spectacular  than  the  work  of  the  51st  Brigade, 
that  done  by  the  Maine  and  western  Massachusetts 
regiments  was  exceedingly  efficient  and  well  conducted, 
while  the  men's  aggressive  spirit  carried  the  brigade's 
advance  so  far  that  its  final  outpost  line  of  September  13 
had  to  be  considerably  withdrawn  to  conform  to  the 


330  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

general  plan.  Especially  notable  was  the  work  of  the 
101st  Engineers.  To  them  should  go  the  credit  of  effecting 
the  repairs  to  the  utterly  wrecked  roads  in  the  Ravin  de 
France  in  front  of  Mouilly,  on  the  Grande  Tranchee,  and 
between  Vaux  and  Saint-Remy  which  made  it  possible  to 
get  the  artillery  forward.  Torn  by  German  mines  into 
yawning  craters,  blown  apart  by  shell-fire  till  they  were 
no  longer  recognizable  as  roads  at  all,  these  priceless  bits 
of  highway  were  yard  by  yard  made  passable  for  the  guns, 
so  that  by  2  p.m.  of  the  12th  the  first  of  them  got  forward, 
and  early  next  day  the  whole  artillery  brigade  had  moved 
forward  to  new  positions  along  the  edge  of  the  Heights. 

The  prisoners  captured  numbered  about  2400.  Com- 
pletely broken  in  morale,  they  surrendered  in  groups.  Two 
of  the  divisional  observers  brought  in  thirty-nine;  three 
field  officers  and  thirty- two  other  officers  joined  the  ir- 
regular procession  which  the  Military  Police  shepherded 
back  to  Rupt-en-Woevre  for  preliminary  examination.  A 
regimental  band  was  taken  in  Vigneulles.  Of  material 
there  was  a  vast  ciuantity  captured.  In  their  retreat  the 
Germans  left  behind  large  stores  of  food,  engineering  and 
railway  material,  and  whole  depots  of  ammunition,  as  well 
as  field  pieces  and  machine  guns.  In  Saint-Remy  Wood, 
as  well  as  in  the  villages,  there  were  uncovered  an  endless 
amount  of  salvage  of  all  descriptions,  of  which  our  men 
most  promptly  possessed  themselves.  It  seemed  too  good 
to  be  true  when  real  beer  and  mineral  water  came  to  light; 
the  transport  officers  could  not  believe  their  good  fortune 
when  told  that  seventy  horses  and  a  large  number  of  motor- 
trucks had  also  been  secured. 

The  price  paid  had  been  small.  Casualties  were  not 
numerous.  A  deplorable  incident,  caused  by  a  shp  in  the 
communication  between  higher  Headquarters  and  the 
air  service,  contributed  some  thirty  wounded  to  the  list. 
Just  before  noon  of  the  13th  a  bombing  plane  passed  over 
Vigneulles  under  orders  to  drop  bombs  on  the  Germans 


THE  SAINT-MIHIEL  OFFENSIVE  231 

who  were  believed  to  be  still  in  occupation,  with  the  con- 
sequence that  the  deadly  missiles  fell  on  a  battalion  of  the 
102d  Infantry.  But,  generally  speaking,  the  absence  of 
enemy  artillery  fire,  and  the  fact  that  his  machine  guns 
did  not  oppose  a  really  determined  resistance,  save  at  in- 
tervals, enabled  the  Division  to  accomplish  its  original 
purpose,  and  brilliantly  to  take  advantage  of  new  oppor- 
tunities with  a  minimum  of  losses. 

One  cannot  conclude  any  account  of  the  action  of  Sep- 
tember 12-13  without  mention  of  what  the  victory  in  the 
Saint-Mihiel  salient  meant  to  the  civilian  population  of  the 
area  freed  by  the  American  Army.  One  feels  that  official 
thanks  could  hardly  be  expressed  more  feelingly  than  in 
the  following  letter,  written  by  the  parish  priest  of  the 
stricken  \allage  of  Rupt,  where  Division  Headquarters 
was  estabhshed  for  the  Saint-INlihiel  operation.  To  the 
Division  Commander  he  writes: 

Rwpt-en-Woevre,  September  13,  1918 

Sir:  Your  gallant  American  Division  has  just  set  us  free. 
Since  September,  1914,  the  barbarians  have  held  the  Heights  of 
the  Meuse;  have  foully  murdered  three  hostages  from  Mouilly; 
have  shelled  Rupt;  and  on  July  23,  1915,  forced  its  inhabitants 
to  scatter  to  the  four  corners  of  France. 

I,  who  remain  at  my  little  listening-post  upon  the  advice  of 
my  Bishop,  feel  certain,  Sir,  that  I  do  but  speak  for  Monseigneur 
Ginisty,  Lord  Bishop  of  Verdun,  my  parishioners  of  Rupt, 
Mouilly  and  Genicourt,  and  the  people  of  this  vicinity,  in  con- 
veying to  you  and  your  associates  the  heartfelt  and  unforget- 
table gratitude  of  all. 

Several  of  your  comrades  lie  at  rest  in  our  truly  Christian 
and  French  soil. 

Their  ashes  shall  be  cared  for  as  if  they  were  our  own.  We 
shall  cover  their  graves  with  flowers,  and  shall  kneel  by  them  as 
their  own  families  would  do,  with  a  prayer  to  God  to  reward 
with  eternal  glory  these  heroes  fallen  on  the  field  of  honor,  and 
to  bless  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  and  generous  America. 

Be  pleased,  Sir,  to  accept  the  expression  of  my  profound  respect. 

A.  Leclerc 
Cure  of  Riipf-en-Woevre 


CHAPTER  XVI 

IN  THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  —  ]\L\RCHE- 

VILLE 

WITHIN  a  few  days  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Saint-Mihiel  operation  certain  minor  readjust- 
ments of  the  sector  to  be  held  by  the  Twenty-Sixth,  on  the 
edge  of  the  Meuse  Heights,  were  made  by  order  of  the 
Corps. ^  Between  the  Fifteenth  Colonial  (later  the  Thirty- 
Ninth)  and  the  Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  Divisions  (all 
French)  on  left  and  right,  the  Twenty-Sixth  settled  down 
to  the  occupation  of  the  military  crest  between  Fresnes 
and  Thillot-sous-les-Cotes.  With  the  four  infantry  regi- 
ments in  line,  each  echeloned  in  depth,  a  chain  of  outposts 
was  also  established  in  the  Woevre  Plain  at  Saulx,  Wa- 
donville,  and  various  commanding  points  between;  the 
line  was  named  the  Troyon  Sector,  and  to  the  regimental 
sub-sectors  were  given  good  Yankee  titles  like  Augusta, 
Concord,  INIontpelier,  and  Providence.  Considerable  work 
was  done  toward  organizing  the  principal  resistance  line 
on  the  Heights,  wire  being  strung  and  strong  points  estab- 
lished. As  much  use  as  possible  was  made  of  the  former 
German  camps  and  dugouts  scattered  through  the  area; 
but  living  conditions,  owing  to  the  almost  continuous  bad 
weather,  were  difficult,  and  the  health  of  the  men,  owing 
to  the  presence  of  influenza,  began  to  give  some  concern. 
Notable  in  this  regard  was  the  personal  interest  of  General 
Blondlat,  the  Corps  Commander.  Almost  daily  he  would 
make  the  trip  from  distant  Saint-Mihiel  to  the  woods  where 
the  Americans  were  camped ;  closely  he  questioned  the  offi- 
cers as  to  food,  clothing,  the  arrival  of  the  mail,  canteen 

^  The  Second  Colonial  Corps  (French)  with  Headquarters  at  Saint-Mihiel. 
The  Division  passed  under  its  orders  on  September  14. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  233 

facilities,  arrangements  made  to  get  daily  newspapers. 
Attentively  he  would  listen,  encouraging  the  freest  discus- 
sion; and  it  is  known  that  his  reports  and  recommenda- 
tions to  the  First  Army  authorities  were  prompt  and  full. 

For  a  week  or  so  the  sector  was  quiet.  There  was  daily 
harassing  fire  by  the  enemy  artillery,  for  the  Germans  re- 
turned to  positions  in  and  about  Riaville,  Marcheville, 
Butgneville,  and  Saint-Hilaire,  when  it  became  evident 
that  the  American  success  was  not  to  be  followed  beyond 
the  edge  of  the  hills.  They  sent  over  quantities  of  gas, 
which  made  much  trouble  for  the  garrisons  in  such  places 
as  Herbeuville,  Hannonville,  or  Saulx.  Patrolling  was 
very  active;  and  on  two  occasions  somewhat  elaborate 
local  raids  to  make  prisoners  were  undertaken  against 
Saint-Hilaire  and  one  on  Warville  Wood,  by  detachments 
of  the  102d  Infantry.  But  there  was  no  long  delay  before 
another  action  of  real  importance  was  to  fall  to  the  share 
of  the  Yankee  Division,  as  part  of  the  general  American 
offensive. 

September  22  a  conference  of  Division  Commanders, 
their  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  Chiefs  of  Artillery  was  held  at 
General  Blondlat's  Headquarters,  when  the  Corps  Com- 
mander read  to  the  gathering  the  plan  he  had  received  ^ 
of  the  IMeuse-Argonne  offensive  of  the  First  American 
Army,  with  the  orders  for  the  participation  of  the  Second 
Colonial  Corps  in  the  first  day's  attack. 

The  pertinent  paragraph  read:  "The  Second  Colonial 
Corps  will  hold  the  front  of  Bois  le  Chauffour  inclusive 
to  Mesnil  exclusive.  The  Second  Colonial  Corps  will  make 
a  demonstration  along  its  front,  launching  an  artillery 
bombardment  as  well  as  making  extensive  raids  at  H 
hour."  This  was  interpreted  to  mean  that  the  raids  on  the 
front  of  each  division  should  have  such  weight  behind 
them  as  would  mislead  the  enemy  as  to  the  actual  point 
of  the  general  attack  through  the  Argonne  Forest,  north- 

1  G.O.  No.  20,  Headquarters  First  American  Army,  September  20,  1918. 


234  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

ward,  toward  the  Montmedy-Mezieres  railway.  The  pre- 
cise character  of  these  raids  provoked,  however,  some 
discussion.  Only  the  support  of  divisional  artillery  could 
be  expected,  as  the  Corps  had  no  guns  available  for  this 
purpose;  question  was  raised  as  to  whether  the  raiding 
parties  should  go  prepared  for  a  stay  in  the  occupied 
enemy  positions,  or  should  simply  undertake  to  make 
prisoners  and  withdraw  at  once.  But  the  spirit  of  the 
Army  order  was  taken  by  the  American  Division  as  re- 
quhing  a  real  penetration  of  at  least  the  enemy  outpost 
Hne  and  its  occupation  during  the  day;  the  withdrawal 
was  not  to  be  made  until  the  onfall  of  darkness.  It  was 
in  this  literal,  thoroughgoing  manner  that  the  Army  order 
was  taken  as  applying,  at  any  rate,  to  the  Twenty-Sixth. 
The  French  appear  to  have  believed  that  less  weighty 
demonstrations  would  answer  the  purpose;  they  chose 
objectives  and  made  arrangements,  with  the  Corps'  ap- 
proval, which  involved  no  great  expenditure  of  forces. 
But  because  the  possible  points  of  attack  opposite  the 
Twenty-Sixth  happened  all  to  be  naturally  strong  and 
strongly  held,  and  because  there  was  every  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  Division  Commander  to  carry  out  to  the  letter 
what  was  conceived  to  be  the  real  purpose  of  the  demon- 
strations, the  Division  was  committed  from  the  outset  to 
a  considerable  undertaking. 

An  attack  was  to  be  made  on  Riaville,  Marcheville, 
and  the  trench  system  (Haudinot  Trench)  connecting 
them.  The  troops  detailed  for  the  attack  were  formed  in 
two  groups,  one  of  which,  directed  against  Riaville  (Group 
11)  included: 

1  Battalion,  103d  Infantry 
Machine-Gun  Co.,  103d  Infantry 
Stokes  Mortar  Platoon,  103d  Infantry 
37-mm.  Platoon,  103d  Infantry 
One  half  Company  B,  101st  Engineers 
Detachment  101st  Field  Signal  Battalion 
Detachment  101st  Sanitary  Train 


THE  MEUSE-ARGOKNE  OFFENSIVE  235 

The  other  column  (Group  I),  directed  against  Marche- 
ville,  was  composed  of: 

1  Battahon,  102d  Infantry 

Cos.  A,  B,  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion 

Stokes  Mortar  Platoon,  102d  Infantry 

37-mm.  Platoon,  102d  Infantry 

One  half  Company  F,  101st  Engineers 

Detachment  101st  Field  Signal  Battalion 

Detachment  101st  Sanitary  Train 

The  whole  force  was  placed  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  H.  I.  Bearss,  102d  Infantr3\  The  general  plan 
contemplated  the  capture  of  the  towns  and  establishment 
of  a  defensive  line  on  the  far  side  of  them,  their  occupation 
throughout  the  day,  and  withdrawal  during  the  night  of 
the  26th-27th.  To  support  the  attack  batteries  of  the 
51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade  were  brought  down  into  the 
plain  at  the  foot  of  the  Meuse  Heights.  The  full  details 
of  the  plan  could  not  be  given  to  all  subordinate  com- 
manders in  advance  of  the  affair;  and  a  further  initial 
difficulty  was  presented  by  the  fact  that  the  battalion  of 
the  102d  Infantry  selected  for  the  attack  had  never  occu- 
pied the  forward  positions,  and  was  therefore  (and  owing 
to  lack  of  reconnaissance)  unfamiliar  with  the  terrain. 

Artillery  preparation  began  at  11.30  o'clock  on  the 
night  of  September  25,  and  continued  until  the  infantry 
advanced  at  5.30  o'clock  on  the  26th,  Group  I  starting 
from  Hill  230,  northwest  of  Wadonville,  Group  II  from  a 
position  southeast  of  Fresnes.  The  command  post  of  the 
party's  commander  was  directed  to  be  in  Saulx;  but  with 
characteristic  impetuousness  Colonel  Bearss  advanced 
with  the  first  waves  of  the  attack,  taking  witli  him  a  small 
connection  patrol  and  the  information  officers  from  Bri- 
gade and  Division  Headquarters. 

A  very  heavy  daybreak  fog  gave  cover  to  the  raiders; 
but  this,  with  the  addition  of  a  heavy  smoke  screen  and 
the  haze  of  the  shell  bursts  of  the  barrage,  made  it  easy 


236  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

for  units  to  lose  direction,  and  in  several  instances  for 
men  to  come  right  up  on  a  German  machine  gun  before 
either  side  was  aware  of  the  other's  proximity.  A  severe 
enemy  artillery  concentration,  dropped  on  the  columns 
just  as  they  were  forming  up  for  the  approach  across 
the  plain,  had  momentarily  disordered  the  assembly;  ma- 
chine guns,  hidden  in  a  small  grove  of  trees  south  and 
west  of  Marcheville,  slowed  up  the  advance  considerably; 
but  before  eleven  o'clock  the  102d's  battalion  had  entered 
Marcheville,  stopped  the  sniping  and  machine-gun  fire 
by  plucky  hand-to-hand  fighting,  and  took  up  a  position 
as  directed  on  the  east  side.  The  103d,  meanwhile,  had 
been  having  great  difficulty  in  progressing  toward  Ria- 
ville;  elements  which  gained  the  edge  of  the  town  were 
driven  back,  so  that  this  wing  of  the  attack  was  stopped 
short  early  in  the  day.  The  French,  on  right  and  left,  had 
simply  advanced,  made  prisoners,  and  retired,  completing 
their  activity  by  noon,  with  the  result  that  the  Marche- 
ville force  was  left  with  its  flanks  in  the  air  and  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  all  the  German  artillery  in  the  neighborhood. 
Up  to  noon,  however,  there  had  been  only  slight  ar- 
tillery reaction;  but  shortly  after  the  advanced  line  was 
established  a  German  aviator  flew  twice  over  Marcheville, 
less  than  a  hundred  meters  up.  And  within  five  minutes 
after  he  had  made  his  observation  an  enemy  concentra- 
tion of  great  violence  opened  on  the  town  which  was 
continued  with  only  brief  intervals  throughout  the  day. 
Marche\dlle,  Saulx,  and  the  communicating  trenches 
were  all  "plastered"  with  perfect  accuracy,  severity, 
and  intensity.  Shells  landing  squarely  in  the  advanced 
trenches  caused  many  casualties  and  forced  a  withdrawal 
of  the  holding  force  (reduced  to  about  200  effectives)  to 
the  shelter  of  a  stone  wall  and  a  shallow  trench  near  the 
chateau  on  the  southern  edge  of  the  village;  at  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  under  cover  of  this  bombardment,  a 
large   force    of   enemy    infantry   reentered    Marcheville 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  237 

without  difficulty  from  the  direction  of  Saint-Hilaire; 
the  party  with  Colonel  Bearss  had  to  fight  its  way  out 
to  join  the  troops  in  the  chateau  grounds.  For  some  hours, 
as  three  other  German  counter-attacks  developed,  there 
was  heavy  infantry  fighting  in  and  about  the  town,  a 
support  company  having  been  brought  in  to  assist.  Some 
prisoners  were  made;  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  re- 
occupy  the  advanced  positions,  the  battalion  being  fully 
engaged  in  clearing  the  streets  of  the  town  itself  of  the 
counter-attacking  forces.  It  was  a  murderous  kind  of 
day.  The  enemy  artillery  played  havoc  with  the  lines  of 
communication,  whether  wire  or  runner  relays,  the  for- 
mer being  destroyed  beyond  repair  and  the  runners  under- 
going so  many  casualties  that  the  delivery  of  orders  or 
information  was  delayed  for  hours.  The  heavy  fog  and 
haze  which  obscured  the  field  all  day  made  it  very  dif- 
ficult for  the  watchers  on  the  heights  to  follow  the  course 
of  events;  for  the  same  reason  (poor  visibility)  the  ar- 
tillery was  hampered  in  its  support  of  the  raiding  parties, 
while  the  latter,  practically  isolated  throughout  the  long 
afternoon,  could  do  little  but  cling  to  their  initial  successes 
under  heavy  German  shelling. 

At  7.30  in  the  evening  the  order  to  retire  was  sent  out 
to  JNIarcheville  from  the  Division's  advanced  command 
post  above  Hannonville.  All  the  wounded,  save  a  few 
cut  off  by  the  German  counter-attack,  were  evacuated; 
and  the  retirement  began  at  9.45  o'clock  in  perfect  order, 
by  platoons,  under  cover  of  machine  guns  and  infantry 
detachments  stationed  midway  between  Marcheville  and 
Saulx.  There  was  no  interference  with  the  withdrawal 
save  artillery'  fire,  and  the  movement  was  completed  be- 
fore midnight. 

Losses  were  severe  considering  the  character  of  the 
engagement.  But  the  main  object  of  the  raid  was  accom- 
plished. To  the  enemy  the  attack  appeared  the  beginning 
of  an  oi)eration  of  consequence,  following  as  it  did   the 


238  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

active  raiding  of  tlie  days  preceding;  and  so  thoroiiglily 
persuaded  was  he  of  the  importance  of  the  Marcheville- 
Riaville  demonstration  that  he  had  strongly  reinforced 
the  garrison  and  strengthened  the  position.  Since  both 
troops  and  the  attention  of  the  German  High  Command 
were  drawn  away  from  the  Argonne  front  partly  by  its 
means,  the  raid,  considered  as  a  diversion,  was  properly 
called  a  complete  success,  bought  at  however  large  a 
cost  of  killed  and  wounded. 

The  German  official  documents  of  the  period  throw 
considerable  light  on  the  success  of  the  demonstrations 
of  September  26  east  of  the  Meuse,  which  were  no  more 
than  the  climax  of  previous  activities  all  directed  to  the 
one  general  end  of  deceiving  the  enemy.  The  following 
captured  order  is  characteristic: 

West  Group  Center,  September  25,  1918.  Group  Order.  (Ex- 
tracts of  the  Division  Order  la  No.  125/9  of  September  22, 1918.) 
It  is  certain  that  the  Franco-Americans  will  attack  east  of  the 
Meuse  on  a  large  scale.  Whether  the  attack  will  be  extended  tq 
the  left  river  bank  is  not  yet  clear.  The  situation  requires  the 
greatest  watchfulness.  Under  no  circumstances  should  the  enemy 
be  able  to  surprise  us.  (Signed)  Voletchy 

Wliat  opinion  the  Corps  Commander  entertained  re- 
garding the  value  of  the  day's  work  of  troops  of  the 
Division  is  set  forth  in  his  letter  to  the  American  Com- 
mander-in-Chief ; 

No.  29329.  Headquarters,  Second  Colonial  Corps  Staff 

October  5,  1918 

From:       General    Blondlat,    Commanding    Second    Colonial 

Corps. 
To:  The  Commander-in-Chief  (through  channels,  General 

commanding  Second  Army). 
Subject:   Proposition  for  Citation  in  Army  Orders  in  favor  of 

the  1st  Battalion,  102d  Regiment  of  Infantry,  U.S. 
I  have  the  honor  to  send  you  the  report  which  I  had  the  Gen- 
eral commanding  the   Twenty-Sixth   United    States   Division 
make  on  the  very  hard  and  glorious  combat  in  which  this  divi- 
sion engaged  on  September  26,  1918. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  239 

The  Second  Colonial  Corps  had  received  orders  to  carry  out 
extensive  raids  to  attract  and  fix  the  attention  of  the  enemy  as 
follows:  "General  Orders  No.  20,  September  20,  1918,  of  the 
General  commanding  the  First  United  States  Army.  The  Second 
Colonial  Corps  will  hold  the  front  of  Bois  le  Chauflour,  inclusive, 
to  Mesnil,  exclusive.  The  Second  Colonial  Corps  will  make  a 
demonstration  along  its  front,  launching  artillery  bombard- 
ment as  well  as  making  extensive  raids  at  H  hour." 

The  dimenson  and  duration  of  the  raid  executed  by  the 
Twenty-Sixth  United  States  Division  certainly  deceived  the 
enemy  as  to  our  intentions;  the  losses  suffered  by  the  troops 
taking  part  in  this  operation  were  fairly  severe  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  those  suffered  by  the  Germans  were  much  more  serious. 

The  spirit  of  sacrifice  and  magnificent  courage  displayed  by  the 
troops  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  United  States  Division  on  this  occa- 
sion were  certainly  not  in  vain.  They  seem  to  me  worthy  of  recom- 
pense and  praise.  Therefore  I  directed  the  General  commanding 
the  division  to   address    propositions   to  me  on  this  subject. 

I  urgently  request  that  the  1st  Battalion  of  the  102d  Infantry 
be  cited  in  Army  Orders  on  the  following  grounds : 

Picked  troops  who,  trained  by  Colonel  Hiram  I.  Bearss,  who 
led  the  attack  in  the  first  line,  carried  out  brilliantly  and  with 
splendid  energy  a  particularly  delicate  operation;  engaged  bat- 
tle with  a  superb  dash;  won  a  victory  after  a  \dolent  combat 
over  an  enemy  who  was  both  stubborn  and  superior  in  num- 
bers, entrenched  in  concrete  shelters,  strongly  supported  by 
numerous  machine  guns  and  powerful  artillery,  and  who  made 
use  of,  in  the  course  of  the  action,  infamous  methods  of  war- 
fare; heroically  carried  out  their  mission  in  capturing  in  heaA'y 
fighting  a  village  where  they  maintained  themselves  all  day  in 
spite  of  four  enemy  counter-attacks,  and  thus  furnished  the  fin- 
est example  of  courage,  abnegation  and  self-sacrifice. 

I  recjuest  further  that  the  officers  and  men  mentioned  in 
General  Edwards'  report  receive  each  and  severally  the  rewards 
suggested  for  them  by  name. 

Bloxdk.\t 

And  that  the  American  High  Command  most  fully 
concurred  in  the  fort^going  high  estimate  was  evidenced 
by  the  number  of  decorations  awarded  to  the  participants 
in  the  raid,  including  a  citation  of  the  whole  Marche- 
ville  infantry  battalion,  as  will  be  told  in  its  place.  The 


240  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Marcheville-Riaville  episode  was  of  minor  importance 
when  measured  on  the  larger  scale  by  which  battles  are 
differentiated  from  combats  and  engagements.  But  there 
was  a  certain  intensity,  a  difficulty,  a  deadliness  about 
that  day's  encounter  out  on  the  Woevre  Plain,  far  in  ad- 
vance of  the  general  line,  which  gives  this  two-battalion 
raid  a  considerable  relief.  Certainly,  in  the  records  of  the 
participating  regiments,  the  day  looms  large,  and  the 
day's  work  of  the  supporting  artillery  was  heartbreaking. 
The  intensity  and  long  duration  of  its  fire,  was  a  revelation 
to  the  Corps  authorities;  the  whole  affair  gave  the  French 
a  new  assurance  of  the  deadly  earnestness  and  hard- 
hitting ability  of  their  new  allies;  not  that  by  this  date 
any  such  assurance  was  needed. 

For  a  few  days  following  the  sector  was  relatively  quiet. 
Considerable  gas  was  delivered  on  the  Division's  forward 
area  and  outpost  zone,  so  much  that  even  the  horses  were 
affected  on  the  lines  back  in  the  woods  along  the  Grande 
Tranchee.  October  2  a  raid  by  a  detachment  of  the  101st 
Infantry  was  made  on  Warville  Wood  and  Hants  Epines 
Wood,  in  conjunction  with  the  French.  The  latter,  how- 
ever, missing  the  appointed  place  of  rendezvous,  did  not 
actively  participate  with  the  Americans,  who,  by  nice 
maneuA^ering,  entered  the  enemy  positions  by  surprise 
and  returned  with  forty-nine  prisoners.  At  Division 
Headquarters,  which,  directly  after  the  Saint-Mihiel 
affair,  had  been  moved  back  from  Rupt  by  Corps'  order 
to  the  village  of  Troyon,  on  the  Verdun-Saint-Mihiel 
highway,  there  was  much  speculation  as  to  the  Division's 
next  duty.  For  one  felt  sure  it  would  be  actively  employed 
somewhere  in  the  great  Argonne  offensive  then  in  prog- 
ress. For  the  present,  however,  one  could  only  wait,  bend- 
ing much  energy  on  making  the  troops  as  comfort- 
able as  possible  in  view  of  the  continuous  bad  weather. 
In  accordance  with  the  Corps'  instructions,  for  instance, 
those  battalions  most  in  need  of  rest  were  drawn  back 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  241 

from  the  forward  zone  to  places  where  better  shelter 
could  be  secured;  a  withdrawal  was  also  made  of  troops  in 
the  Woevre  Plain,  except  a  chain  of  outposts,  on  October 
2,  for  the  purpose  of  leaving  a  barrage  zone  one  thousand 
meters  wide  in  front  of  the  zone  of  principal  resistance 
on  the  heights  above  Herbeuville,  Hannonville,  and 
Thillot-sous-les-Cotes. 

A  good  many  changes  of  command  were  effected  during 
the  stay  in  the  Troy  on  Sector.  Colonel  P.  D.  Glassford, 
promoted  to  be  Brigadier-General,  took  command  of  the 
51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade,  Colonel  Farr  remaining 
attached  in  an  advisory  capacity,  while  Colonel  J.  A. 
Twachtman  (formerly  Major,  103d  Field  Artillery)  was 
assigned  to  command  that  regiment.  In  the  Staff,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel W.  S.  Bo  wen  was  succeeded  as  G-3  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  M.  Dowell;  the  command  of  the 
104th  Infantry  passed  from  Colonel  G.  McCaskey  to 
Colonel  B.  F.  Cheatham;  Colonel  J.  A.  Mack  was  assigned 
to  lead  the  102d  Field  Artillery,  Other  changes  included 
the  appointment  of  Major  F.  B.  La  Crosse  to  the  101st 
Field  Signal  Battahon  (October  1),  Major  H.  L.  Bowen 
to  the  103d  Machine-Gun  Battalion  (October  18),  Major 
William  Denton  to  the  101st  Sanitary  Train  (October  1), 
Captain  W.  L.  JNIorrison  to  Headquarters  Troop  (Sep- 
tember 28),  Major  Henry  Wheelock  to  the  101st  Supply 
Train  (replacing  INIajor  T.  C.  Baker,  who  went  to  the 
First  Army),  In  the  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion  Captain 
J.  R,  Sanborn  succeeded  Major  (later  Lieutenant-Colonel) 
J.  D,  Murphy,  who  went  to  Division  Headquarters  to  be- 
come   presently    the    Divisional    Machine-Gun    Officer. 

For  a  few  days'  interval,  though  the  Division  remained 
in  the  sector,  there  was  a  lull.  But  the  air  was  heavy  with 
expectation  as  to  what  new  scene  was  being  made  ready 
once  the  curtain  came  down  on  the  Rui)t  and  Troyon 
Sectors,  where  the  Twenty-Sixth  had  been  continuously 
employed  since  the  first  days  of  September. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

IN  THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  —  VERDUN 

THE  general  situation,  as  the  Division  came  to  the 
Hne  again,  this  time  on  the  sinister  and  glorious 
hills  before  Verdun,  can  be  readily  summarized.  West 
of  the  Meuse  the  First  American  Army  was  facing  north, 
directing  itself  toward  the  vital  German  line  of  com- 
munications and  principal  line  of  retreat  —  the  Mont- 
medy-Mezieres  railway.  The  French  Seventeenth  Corps, 
meanwhile,  forming  the  extreme  right  of  the  First  Amer- 
ican Army,  was  disposed  on  the  east  side  of  the  Meuse 
in  a  segment  of  a  circle,  north  and  northeast  of  Verdun, 
on  lines  traced  on  the  identical  scene  of  the  struggle  of 
February,  1916.  Its  mission  was  to  protect  the  flank  of 
the  main  American  advance  in  its  earlier  stages.  To 
divert  as  many  German  forces  as  possible;  to  win  such 
local  successes  as  would  facilitate  the  general  advance, 
and  might  result  in  compelling  the  enemy  to  yield  his 
all-important  flanking  positions  on  the  edge  of  the  high 
ground,  where  this  northern  end  of  the  Meuse  Heights 
breaks  down  to  the  plains;  to  prevent  any  counter- 
attack in  flank;  to  launch  limited  attacks  which  would 
wear  the  enemy  down  —  such,  briefly,  were  the  tasks 
which  the  Seventeenth  Corps  was  called  on  to  fulfill 
during  the  latter  part  of  October  and  early  November, 
as  part  of  the  general  plan.  And  in  all  these  tasks  the 
Twenty-Sixth  had  its  full  share  of  responsibility  and 
achievement. 

We  have  reviewed  the  work  which  the  Division  per- 
formed on  the  first  day  of  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive 
—  how,  on  September  26,  it  directed  against  the  enemy 
lines  at  Riaville-Marcheville  one  of  the  local  demonstra- 
tions which  bhnded  the  German  High  Command  as  to 


THE  MEUSE-ARGOXNE  OFFENSIVE  243 

the  actual  point  of  the  main  Meuse-Argonne  attack. 
There  remains  now  to  trace  its  tour  of  duty  on  the  awful 
Verdun  front,  where,  for  twenty-six  consecutive  days 
and  nights,  the  New  Englanders  battled  to  loosen  the 
enemy's  hold  on  one  of  the  most  vital  positions  on  the 
whole  western  line.  One  dislikes  superlatives;  but  one 
may  be  permitted  to  believe  that  no  harder  tasks  were 
assigned  to  any  unit  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  than  the 
missions  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  between  October  18  and 
November  11;  and  this  opinion  is  ventured  with  a  clear 
appreciation  of  what  Cantigny,  the  Sergy  Plateau,  Fismes, 
Montfaucon,  and  the  Belleau  or  Argonne  thickets  meant 
to  the  friends  and  brothers  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  in  other 
American  divisions.  Of  the  importance  of  the  Verdun 
charniere  as  a  pivotal  point  of  the  enemy  defenses,  let 
the  Germans  themselves  testify: 

Vth  Army  Staff 

la  No.  10619  Secret  Army  Headquarters,  Oct.  1,  1918 

According  to  information  in  our  possession,  the  enemy  is  about 
to  attack  the  Vth  Army  east  of  the  Meuse  and  try  to  push 
toward  Longuyon.  The  object  of  this  attack  is  to  cut  the  Lon- 
guyon-Sedan  line,  the  most  important  artery  of  the  Army  of  the 
West.  jVIoreover,  the  enemy's  intention  is  to  render  it  impossible 
for  us  to  exploit  the  Briey  Basin,  on  which  depends  in  large  part 
our  steel  production.  Thus  the  heaviest  part  of  the  task  will  once 
more  fall  on  the  Vth  Army  in  the  course  of  the  combats  in  the 
coming  weeks,  and  the  safety  of  the  Fatherland  will  be  in  its 
hands.  It  is  on  the  unconquerable  resistance  of  the  Verdun  front 
that  depends  the  fate  of  a  great  part  of  the  west  front,  perhaps 
even  of  our  nation.  The  Fatherland  must  rest  assured  that  every 
commander  and  every  man  realizes  the  greatness  of  his  mission 
and  that  he  will  do  his  duty  to  the  very  end.  If  we  do  this  the 
enemy's  attack  will,  as  heretofore,  break  against  our  firm  will  to 
hold. 

The  Commander-in-Chief 

VoN  DEE  JNIaRWITZ 

General  of  Cavalry  and  Adjutant-General 

A  holy  place  to  France,  as  Ypres  will  always  be  for 

England,  the  gray,  melancholy,  haunted  hills  that  hedge 


244  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Verdun  on  the  north  have  been  described  so  often  as  to 
require  no  detailed  picture  in  these  pages.  A  land  of 
death;  a  mourning  land,  blasted  by  so  many  storms  of 
fire  that  all  vestige  of  human  occupation  had  long  since 
disappeared;  a  land  once  bowered  in  forests,  where  now 
the  soil  had  been  churned  to  knee-deep  miry  clay,  whence 
even  every  stump  and  leaf  had  been  blasted  —  one  can 
record  only  impressions,  only  the  weight  that  pressed  on 
the  troops  who  were  called  to  enter  that  graveyard.  The 
men  were  calloused  by  long  experience  of  war;  but  they 
were  sobered,  indeed,  as  the  witch-spells  of  Verdun  laid 
hold  of  them.  Imaginations  were  touched  by  a  knowledge 
of  the  heroism  and  glory,  which  at  Douaumont,  Vaux, 
JNIort  Homme,  Crow's  Wood,  Pepper  Hill,  or  Haumont 
had  splendidly  flamed  into  flower.  To  feel  that  one  was 
in  the  trench  lines,  made  for  all  time  historic  by  the  legion- 
aries of  Petain  and  Nivelle,  was  to  feel  a  quickening  glow 
of  sober  exultation  none  can  forget.  But  coloring  all  other 
emotion  was  horror  of  the  place  —  not  hatred,  not  loath- 
ing, but  the  grip  of  a  curious  awe  which  clutched  the  heart. 

Let  us  look  somewhat  carefully  at  the  actual  situation 
on  this  front.  It  may  be  possible  to  make  clear  some 
matters  which  have  not  appeared  in  all  the  records, 
official  or  otherwise,  of  certain  important  phases  of  the 
so-called  Meuse-Argonne  offensive. 

By  October  8  the  Division,  relieved  by  elements  of  the 
Second  Dismounted  Cavalry  and  Seventy-Ninth  (Ameri- 
can) Divisions,  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  Troyon 
Sector.  Designated  for  the  moment  as  part  of  the  army  re- 
serv^e,  it  was  concentrated  in  camps  and  billets  in  and 
southwest  of  Verdun  where  Headquarters  was  opened,  in 
the  citadel,  on  October  10.  Presently  the  engineers  and 
artillery  rejoined;  and  reconnaissances  were  made  by  all 
commanding  officers  of  the  terrain  north  of  the  city,  occu- 
pied by  elements  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps.  The  Corps 
order  of  battle,  from  left  to  right  at  this  time,  included  the 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  245 

Thirty-Third  Division;  Twenty-Ninth  Division  (one 
brigade,  the  58th);  Eighteenth  French  Division;  while  on 
the  extreme  right  lay  the  Twenty-Sixth  French  Division. 
Opposite  the  Corps  were  German-Austrian  divisions  as 
follows:  28th  (rated  first  class  and  just  brought  in);  1st 
Austro-Hungarian  (first  class);  15th  (one  regiment  in 
line,  two  in  reserve);  33d  (first  class);  32d  (third  class). 
Organized  in  depth,  in  three  zones  of  defense,  with  power- 
ful artillery  and  machine-gun  resources  and  admirable  air 
service,  the  enemy  was  opposing  to  all  attacks  a  most  ob- 
stinate resistance,  quite  in  accordance  with  the  army  com- 
mander's exhortations.  Attacks  by  the  Seventeenth  Corps 
with  the  slender  forces  available  had  resulted  in  only  lim- 
ited successes,  as  was  exemplified  by  the  somewhat  ex- 
tensive engagement  of  October  13.  Orders  from  First  Army 
Headquarters  directed  the  kind  of  combat  in  which  the 
Corps  must  engage  in  view  of  its  prescribed  mission.  The 
results  of  that  policy  were  already  making  themselves 
felt;  the  views  of  the  Corps  Commander  as  to  a  change  of 
policy  which  would  assure  better  results  will  be  interesting 
to  record  in  the  proper  place. 

For  the  moment  the  Corps  was  pursuing  the  traditional 
Verdun  method  of  feeding  into  the  line  not  whole  divisions 
at  a  time,  but  only  brigades  or  regiments,  to  effect  the  re- 
lief of  exliausted  units.  Thus  (as  had  already  happened 
with  the  Thirty-Third  and  Twenty-Ninth  Divisions),  it 
was  a  brigade  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  (the  52d)  which  first 
entered  the  line  on  this  historic  ground,  attached  to  the 
Seventeenth  Corps  under  General  Claudel.  October  11  the 
104th  Infantry  relieved  the  114th  Infantry  (Twenty- 
Ninth  Division)  in  the  vicinity  of  Cote  d'Oie  (Goose  Hill) 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Meuse;  October  13  the  regiment  be- 
came Corps  reserve,  going  to  the  Brabant-Samogneux 
area.  On  the  same  date  the  103d  Infantry  moved  to  Cote 
d'Oie,  while  Brigade  Headquarters  was  established  in  the 
rubbish  pile  which  once  had  been  the  village  of  Cumieres. 


246  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

The  line  occupied  by  the  Corps  at  the  time  extended  from 
a  point  south  of  Sivry,  on  the  river,  easterly  to  Molleville 
Farm  Wood,  thence  southeasterly  to  include  parts  of 
Haumont  W^ood  and  Caures  Wood.  It  was  a  place  where, 
as  had  been  said,  a  meter  of  ground  gained  was  the  equiva- 
lent of  a  kilometer  gained  elsewhere.  On  the  tops  of  the 
gra3%  bare  hills  the  enemy  had  observation  posts;  in  the 
confusing  ravines  and  wrecks  of  woodland  he  had  a  chain 
of  machine-gun  nests  and  intricate  trench  lines,  perfected 
after  months  of  work.  In  rear  of  the  hills,  hidden  in  a  score 
of  glens  and  hollows  secure  from  observation,  a  large  ar- 
tillery served  him  well. 

On  October  16,  before  the  Eighteenth  French  Division 
was  entirely  relieved,  troops  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  were 
told  off  for  an  attack  which  was  intended  to  complete  the 
capture  of  Haumont  Wood.  Approximately  a  battalion 
of  the  104th  Infantry  went  in  —  Companies  A,  D,  E,  with 
one  platoon  from  each  of  Companies  G  and  H.  Through 
a  heavy  rain,  the  composite  force  marched,  in  the  night 
of  October  15/16,  some  twenty  kilometers,  and  deployed 
at  dawn  over  unfamiliar  ground,  which  was  deep  in  mire, 
for  the  attack  in  which  the  troops  were  to  receive  the  sup- 
port of  sixteen  French  tanks.  But  they  could  not  make 
good  their  advance.  Receiving  no  assistance  from  the 
tanks,  which,  quickly  bogged  in  the  mire,  were  abandoned 
by  their  crews,  the  infantry  made  no  progress  against  the 
enemy's  machine-gun  defense.  Under  cover  of  a  well-sus- 
tained barrage,  here  and  there  a  section  or  a  combat  group 
got  forward  over  the  chaos  of  shell  craters,  wire,  and  mud; 
but  their  efiForts,  however  marked  by  feats  of  personal 
pluck,  were  all  in  vain.  Only  some  losses,  which  could  be 
ill  afforded,  remained  to  show  for  this  particular  attack 
against  a  single  point  in  the  enemy's  lines.  Again  was  dem- 
onstrated the  futihty  of  the  attempts  to  which  the  Corps 
was  committed  —  of  which  nobody  was  more  keenly  aware 
than  General  Claudel. 


MEU3L  -  A"B.CONNL    0TFLH51VL 

ScALC  i :  I  5  3,0  0  O  (,Appt^ox^MA.Te.L.>r■  ■) 

^E-CTOR.    liOUMBATtlt-S    A —  lb 

liHE.  Occupies   Zbli  II;visioK   Oct. ift"^  ^iH^iMB 

LlKt   OCtUTlt-tt     ZtT»  BlYlilOH     NoV.llt!  ^^H^^ 


Xro"  v.u. 


K  T*o»T    Dc   T<KVA 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSR^  247 

On  October  18  the  Division  Commander  and  the  ad- 
vanced echelon  of  Division  Headquarters  ^  were  estab- 
lished at  the  advanced  command  post  in  Bras,  called 
*'P.C.  Neptune."  Here,  between  what  had  been  the  villages 
of  Bras  and  Charny  (on  the  west  side  of  the  Meuse), 
bridges  had  formerly  existed  over  the  river  and  the  Meuse 
Canal,  connected  by  a  single  embankment;  and  now,  the 
bridges  destroyed  or  replaced  by  the  light  footbridges  of 
the  engineers,  the  embankments  had  been  ingeniously 
made  to  serve  the  purpose  of  a  command  post,  dugouts 
having  been  burrowed  under  it  beneath  a  canopy  of  camou- 
flage. Under  daily  shell-fire,  and  affording  a  most  illusory 
safety,  "P.C.  Neptune"  possessed  the  great  advantage 
of  bringing  a  Division  Commander  well  forward,  where 
his  personal  touch  could  be  constantly  exerted  to  control 
and  direct  his  men.  By  October  19  the  Division  was  in  po- 
sition, having  completed  the  relief  of  the  Eighteenth 
French.  The  51st  Infantry  Brigade  was  on  the  left  of  the 
line  this  time,  in  the  Bois  de  Chenes  (Oak  Wood)  and  in 
front  of  Ormont  Wood,  Headquarters  being  near  a  road 
fork,  north  of  Vacherauville,^  on  the  Vacherauville- 
Samogneux  road  which  followed  the  Meuse  Canal  northerly 
from  Bras.  The  52d  Brigade,  on  the  right,  occupied  a 
tangle  of  trenches  to  the  north  and  northeast  of  the  famous 
Pepper  Hill  (Cote  de  Poi\Te).  Difficult  to  designate,  in  a 
land  where  the  ordinary  local  geographical  points  had  all 
disappeared,  the  exact  positions  of  the  troops  are  nearly 
impossible  to  identify  in  ordinary  narrative.  It  may  be 
said,  however,  that  the  line  ran  in  a  general  way  south- 
easterly from  the  Brabant  Wood  through  Haumont  Wood 
and  Caures  Wood  to  the  northeast  of  Anglemont  Farm, 
but  so  confused  was  the  terrain,  so  full  of  minor  reentrants 
and  salients  was  the  line,  that  only  approximate  locations 
can  here  be  given.  The  artillery,  after  a  rest  of  two  days 

1  Chief  of  Staff,  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff  G-2,  G-3,  Machine-Gun  Officer, 
Signal  Officer,  Message  Center. 
^  Maiiou  des  COtelettcs. 


248  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FR.\NCE 

(October  12-13),  completed  the  relief  of  the  French  gun- 
ners on  October  16.  The  rear  echelon  of  Division  Head- 
quarters, with  the  railhead,  remained  at  Verdun;  Corps 
Headquarters  was  at  Regret,  just  to  the  southwest  of  the 
city  on  the  Bar-le-Duc  road.  In  Vacherauville,  a  mile  above 
Bras,  was  the  Headquarters  of  the  Twenty-Ninth  Divi- 
sion, which  prolonged  the  Hne  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  to  the 
left. 

It  was  at  this  time  —  to  leave  for  a  moment  the  narra- 
tive for  the  Division's  field  acti\dties  —  that  the  Yankees 
adopted  the  divisional  insignia  which,  worn  on  the  left 
shoulder  of  every  officer  and  man,  was  to  take  on,  in  their 
feeling  for  it,  the  characteristics  of  a  badge  of  honor.  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  had  prescribed  these  personal  insignia 
for  army  troops,  corps  troops,  and  all  divisions,  the 
Twenty-Sixth  receiving  the  following  communication: 

E.A.E.F.,  October  20,  1918 
Commanding  General, 
26th  Division 
N.  M-674.  Each  division  will  adopt  and  procure  immediately 
some  distinctive  cloth  design  which  will  be  worn  by  every  officer 
and  man  of  the  division  on  the  left  arm,  the  upper  part  to  be 
attached  to  the  shoulder  seam.  Report  will  be  made  to  these 
Headquarters  by  telegram  as  to  designs  adopted  in  order  that 
there  may  be  no  duplication.  Approval  of  design  will  be  made 
by  telegram  from  these  Headquarters. 

Davis 

In  conformity,  therefore,  with  these  directions,  a  design 
consisting  of  a  YD  monogram  in  blue  cloth,  of  the  color 
of  the  French  army  uniform,  on  a  diamond  of  olive  drab, 
was  submitted  for  approval  on  October  23.  The  color  of 
the  letters  was  later  changed  to  dark  blue,  and,  thus  modi- 
fied, the  design  was  authorized,  and  its  wearing  made  com- 
pulsory after  November  29^  in  orders  from  Headquarters 
First  Army.^ 

Reverting  now  to  operations,  with  the  Division  in  posi- 

/  G.O.  No.  33,  Headquarters  First  Army,  November  9,  1918. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  249 

tion,  it  is  appropriate  to  take  account  of  the  happenings  of 
the  moment  which  colored  the  situation  so  far  as  the 
Twenty-Sixth  was  concerned.  The  health  of  the  command 
at  this  time  was  seriously  impaired  by  the  influenza  epi- 
demic which  overran  all  Europe.  Daily  the  men  evacuated 
for  sickness  reached  large  numbers,  so  that  the  effective 
strength  of  the  units  was  seriously  impaired.  On  October  14 
Brigadier-General  Sheiton  was  forced  to  relinquish  com- 
mand of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  through  illness,  at 
a  time  when  his  presence  could  hardly  be  spared.  About 
the  same  date  Captain  Nathaniel  Simpkins,  one  of  the 
Division  Commander's  most  valued  personal  aides,  was 
also  stricken  to  die  on  the  22d  in  the  hospital  at  Souilly. 
From  every  regiment,  battalion  and  company  officers 
dropped  out  who  were  absolutely  indispensable.  The  dis- 
ease was  aided  by  very  bad  weather  conditions  —  contin- 
ual rain,  cold  autumn  river  mists,  and  also  by  the  appall- 
ing state  of  the  ground  where  the  troops  were  forced  to 
live  and  seek  shelter.  Flooded  dugouts,  hillsides  which 
were  merely  quagmires,  broken  roads,  great  difficulty 
in  providing  or  procuring  sufficient  hot  food,  continually 
vet  clothes  and  blankets,  all  tended  to  sap  the  strength 
of  the  battalions  posted  in  the  gas-drenched  hollows  or 
on  slopes  which  were  whipped  at  all  hours  by  snipers  and 
artillery. 

It  was  at  this  time,  moreover,  that  there  fell  on  the  Di- 
\'ision  a  blow  wliich,  for  the  moment,  stunned  it.  From 
General  Headquarters,  on  October  22,  an  order  came  re- 
lieving General  Edwards  of  command.  The  man  who  had 
organized  and  trained  the  Division;  the  leader  who  had 
won  the  affection  of  every  officer  and  man  by  his  daily 
solicitude  for  their  wants;  who  had  been  followed  with  con- 
fidence through  months  of  .service  on  the  firing-line  and 
battle-field;  who  was  needed  by  his  Division  now  as  never 
before,  on  the  eve  of  an  engagement,  was  caught  up  by  the 
machinery  regulating  the  return  of  officers  to  the  United 


250  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

States,  and  was  ordered  home,  like  any  captain  or  lieu- 
tenant, to  assist  in  the  training  of  new  levies. 

The  separation  of  General  Edwards  from  his  command, 
under  the  circumstances,  appeared  to  many  as  the  cul- 
minating incident  in  a  long  campaign.  Hotly  defended  by 
his  friends  in  America,  the  original  leader  of  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  became  the  storm  center  of  one  of  the  first  attacks 
against  the  methods  of  some  of  the  notable  figures  at 
American  Headquarters.  It  is  true  that  there  came  with 
the  order  relieving  him  from  command  a  personal  letter 
from  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Expeditionary  Force,  assur- 
ing General  Edwards  that  he  was  not  to  take  the  order  as 
in  any  sense  reflecting  upon  his  ability  or  reputation;  that 
he  was  to  be  given  a  commensurate  command  at  home  in 
charge  of  a  training  area;  that  his  return  to  the  United 
States  was  merely  in  line  with  the  general  policy  by  which 
experienced  officers  of  all  grades  were  being  sent  home  as 
instructors.  One  may  accept  all  that  as  accurately  express- 
ing the  sentiments  of  those  high  in  authority;  one  may  dis- 
miss the  personal  controversy  as  briefly  as  possible,  on  the 
ground  that  the  rights  or  wrongs  of  any  individual  were 
unimportant  in  a  drama  as  vast  as  that  enacted  by  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force.  But  the  Division  Com- 
mander's relief  on  October  22  possessed  a  wider  implica- 
tion. One  has  to  consider  the  effect  upon  his  officers  and 
men,  of  General  Edwards's  abrupt  relief. 

Comment  has  already  been  made  on  the  difficulties 
caused  in  batteries  and  battalions  by  taking  away  experi- 
enced officers  as  instructors,  often  on  the  eve  of  an  action. 
Inevitable  under  the  conditions  the  continuous  drain  did, 
however,  take  from  units  officers  whose  loss  could  be  ill 
aflForded.  And  now,  as  a  platoon  or  company  had  been 
shorn  of  its  strength  at  critical  moments,  so  did  the  whole 
Division  suffer.  Not  fifty  men,  but  fifteen  thousand  men, 
felt  the  shock  of  the  loss;  and  the  blow  descended,  as  has 
been  pointed  out,  at  a  moment  when  the  troops  needed 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  251 

every  possible  encouragement  and  support  if  they  were 
to  accomplish  in  the  best  manner  the  tasks  which  were  in 
store.  One  felt  that  full  knowledge  of  conditions  obtaining 
at  the  moment  would  have  made  impossible  the  issuance 
of  an  order  which  deprived  a  combat  division,  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  of  one  of  its  principal  reliances.  Once 
more  one  witnessed  the  apparent  bhndness  of  those  who, 
conducting  the  game  of  war,  neglect  to  consider  the  psy- 
cliology  of  the  pawns  on  the  chessboard. 

Relieved  on  October  22  the  Division  Commander  was 
allowed  to  retain  command  until  his  successor  should  re- 
port for  duty.  And  this  concession  was  at  least  something 
gained,  because  a  Corps  operation  was  in  preparation  for 
October  23  which  required  the  active  participation  of  the 
Twenty-Sixth. 

Opposite  the  left  of  the  Division's  line  a  wooded  ridge 
extended  from  northwest  to  southeast,  the  possession  of 
which  would  exploit  a  success  already  won  by  the  Twenty- 
Ninth  Division  on  its  front.  Could  this  Division  enlarge 
its  gains  to  its  right,  supported  by  an  advance  of  the 
Twenty-Sixth's  left,  commanding  ground  would  be  won 
from  the  enemy,  who  would  be  deprived  of  an  observation 
point  and  of  a  position  which  was  important  in  his  general 
defensive  scheme,  on  the  ridge  northeast  of  Molleville 
Farm  covered  by  Houppy  Wood,  Molleville  Wood,  and 
Belleu  Wood.  To  accomplish  this  purpose  the  Twenty- 
Ninth  Division  arranged  to  attack  with  two  battalions,  in 
a  direction  due  east,  while  two  battalions  of  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  launched  a  convergent  attack  in  a  northeasterly 
direction  ^  with  the  support  of  machine  guns  and  the  usual 
infantry  utilities.  This  operation,  which  came  to  be  known 
in  the  Division  as  the  "Battle  of  H  in  Houppy,"  because 
of  a  somewhat  unusual  map  reference  in  the  original  Field 
Order,  was  the  first  of  a  scries  in  which  the  51st  Infantry 
Brigade  was  engaged  without  intermission  until  October 

*  Field  Order  No.  92,  Headquarters  2Gth  Division. 


252  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

27.  A  series  of  futile  assaults  gallantly  delivered  against 
positions  of  great  strength,  these  operations  may  best  be 
treated  as  constituting  a  single  affair;  for  the  costly  at- 
tacks on  the  redoubtable  Hill  360  and  Ormont  Wood, 
which  closed  the  operation,  were  rendered  imperative  by 
the  preliminary  work  of  October  23  against  Belleu  W^ood 
on  the  Etrayes  Ridge. 

The  brigade  order  for  this  attack  most  vividly  explains 
the  situation.  Even  amid  the  unfamiliar  names  and  figures 
which  represent  only  the  coordinates  of  points  on  a  staff 
map,  one  may  sense  what  was  being  required,  one  may 
visualize  the  high,  frowning  ridges,  seamed  and  scarred 
and  blasted,  see  the  ragged  woods  with  their  nests  of  ma- 
chine guns,  minenwerjers,  and  heavy  wire,  realize  the  diffi- 
culty of  an  advance  over  a  country  of  steep  slopes,  con- 
fusing ravines,  and  deep  mud,  in  the  face  of  a  determined 
resistance  by  troops  told  off  to  hold  these  woods  and  ridges 
to  the  end.  In  the  following  order  of  Colonel  H.  I.  Bearss 
(commanding  the  51st  Brigade  while  General  Shelton  was 
ill),  one  reads  in  the  last  paragraph  an  appeal  to  troops  who 
had  been  told  that  this  was  to  be  their  last  battle  under 
the  eye  of  General  Edwards: 

Beadquarters  51st  Infantry  Brigade 

2Qth  Division,  American  E.F. 

France,  Oct.  21,  1918 

Field  Orders 

No.  25. 
Maps:  Samogneux  )  -,  /,/^  «^/% 
Verduii-4     \  ^i",""". 

Verdun-B    )  ,  ,q^  ^^^ 
Bradeville     [1/20,000. 

1.  The  51st  Infantry  Brigade  attacks  in  conjunction  with  the 
29th  Division  on  its  left  on  D  day  at  H  hour.  The  object  of  the 
attack  by  this  brigade  is  to  obtain  possession  of  the  Houppy  Bois, 
that  portion  of  Molleville  Bois  now  held  by  the  enemy,  and  Hill 
346  as  far  as  Bois  Belleu  exclusive. 

2.  General  Plan  of  Attack.  The  51st  Infantry  Brigade  attacks 
from  the  Ravine  de  Molleville  in  a  general  northeasterly  direc- 


'1    -^  v\'  sr^^    ' 


Q 

O 
O 

H 

:?; 
o 

o 

o 

a 

H 

o 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  255 

tion  while  the  29th  Division  attacks  in  an  easterly  direction 
along  the  ridge  375-361. 

3.  Plan  of  Attack  of  the  51si  Infantry  Brigade.  The  attack  of 
the  51st  Inf.  Brigade  consists  of  a  converging  movement  from  a 
line  between  25.5-81.6  to  25.5-81.84  in  the  Ravine  de  Molleville 
to  gain  possession  of  the  ridge  limited  by  the  Cotes  361-346  (both 
exclusive).  See  sketch  attached  to  F.O.  No.  92,  26th  Division. 

4.  Objectives  of  Attack.  The  attack  will  be  divided  into  two 
phases.  The  attack  of  the  intermediate  objective  marked  by  a 
general  line  on  the  eastern  edges  of  Houppy  Bois  as  far  as  27.31- 
81.45,  thence  a  line  running  southwesterly  to  27.22-81.00.  A  halt 
of  one  hour  will  be  made  on  this  line  to  reform  organizations. 
The  attack,  from  this  objective  to  the  normal  objective  between 
Pilon  d'Etrayes,  inclusive  (Cote  361)  and  Bois  Belieu  exclusive, 
will  then  be  resumed. 

When  the  normal  objective  has  been  reached,  preparations 
will  be  made  immediately  for  seizing  Belieu  Bois.  This  will  be 
accomplished  at  H  plus  5  hours  15  minutes  by  the  reserve 
battalion  which  will  pass  through  the  right  attacking  battalion 
on  the  normal  objective. 

5.  The  Means  to  be  employed  by  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade 

(a)  Colonel  H.  I.  Bearss,  Commanding  51st  Infantry 
Brigade 
101st  Infantry,  Colonel  E.  L.  Logan,  Commanding 
101st    and     102d    Machine-Gun    Battahons    and 
M.G.  Co.,  101st  Infantry 
37-mm.  platoon,  102d  Infantry 

Stokes  IMortar  platoon,  102d  Infantry 
Company  F,  1st  Gas  Regiment,  Capt.  Feeley, 

Commanding 
Detachment  101st  Field  Signal  Battalion 
Detachment  101st  Sanitary  Train 
281st  Aero  Squadron 
Balloon  No.  25 
(6)  51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

6.  Plan  for  use  of  Attacking  Troops 

(a)  Infantry 

The  infantry  attack  will  consist  of  a  converging  attack  by  the 
two  battalions  as  indicated  in  the  sketch  attached  to  F.O.  No.  92, 
26th  Division.  The  29th  Division  will  withdraw  at  H  minus  1 
hour,  45  minutes  from  the  line  now  held  to  a  north  and  south  line 
running  through  Molleville  Farm  at  25.5-81.7. 

The  1st  Battalion,  101st  Iiifantrj',  will  form  for  the  attack  on 


254  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

this  line  at  Molleville  Farm  facing  east  at  H  minus  one  hour  and 
will  attack  the  enemy  at  H  hour  in  conjunction  with  the  29th 
Division  on  its  left.  It  will  advance  in  an  easterly  direction  until 
reaching  the  intermediate  objective. 

When  the  1st  Battalion,  101st  Infantry,  has  reached  the  nose 
north  of  letter  H  in  Houppy  Bois  at  26.63-81.59,  the  3d  Bat- 
talion, 101st  Infantry,  will  pivot  on  its  right  flank  from  its  posi- 
tion in  Molleville  Bois,  and  the  two  battalions  will  continue  the 
attack  to  the  intermediate  objective.  CO.  3d  Battalion,  101st 
Infantry,  is  responsible  for  the  prompt  execution  of  this  move- 
ment and  it  must  be  executed  so  that  no  delay  will  be  caused  to 
the  1st  Battalion.  The  liaison  combat  group  from  its  position  at 
26.35-81.10  is  responsible  for  the  closest  liaison  between  the  two 
battalions  which  must  be  maintained  at  all  times. 

Battalions  will  be  formed  in  depth  with  two  companies  in  the 
firing  line  and  two  in  support.  One  37  mm.  platoon,  one  Stokes 
Mortar  platoon,  one  machine-gun  company  and  one  section  Gas 
and  Flame  troops  will  be  attached  to  each  battalion. 

The  attention  of  all  regimental,  battalion,  company,  platoon 
and  squad  leaders  is  called  to  Instructions  No.  106,  26th  Divi- 
sion. Particular  attention  will  be  paid  to  paragraphs  1  and  2. 
Each  man  will  be  equipped  with  two  bandoliers  of  ammunition  in 
addition  to  that  carried  in  the  cartridge  belt.  This  operation, 
which  is  carried  out  largely  through  woods,  requires  every  effort 
to  keep  the  command  well  in  hand  and  can  best  be  accomplished 
by  the  use  of  small  columns. 

Rate  of  advance  of  Infantry.  100  meters  in  10  minutes.  The 
1st  Bn.,  101st  Infantry,  leaves  the  parallel  of  departure  at  H 
hour.  The  3d  Bn.,  101st  Infantry,  leaves  its  parallel  of  departure 
when  the  1st  Bn.  has  reached  the  nose  of  Houppy  Bois  as  out- 
lined above.  Intermediate  objective  reached  at  H  plus  two  hours, 
30  minutes.  Departure  from  intermediate  objective  at  H  plus 

3  hours,  30  minutes.  The  normal  objective  reached  at  H  plus 

4  hours,  30  minutes.  Attack  of  the  zone  of  eventual  exploitation 
at  H  plus  5  hours,  15  minutes. 

7.  Plan  of  Liaison.  Telephone,  radio,  T.P.S.,  pigeons  and 
runners  will  be  employed. 

(a)  The  1st  Bn.,  101st  Infantry,  upon  reaching  the  nose 
in  the  Houppy  Bois  will  fire  one  yellow  rocket.  Upon 
reaching  its  intermediate  objective  it  will  fire  two 
yellow  rockets,  in  addition  to  displaying  their  panels. 
The  3d  Bn.,  101st  Infantry,  upon  reaching  the  inter- 
mediate objective,  will  fire  one  caterpillar  rocket. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  255 

Upon  reaching  the  normal  objective,  each  battalion 
will  fire  two  caterpillar  rockets  in  quick  succession. 
The  2d  Bn.,  101st  Infantry,  upon  completing  the 
exploitation  of  Belieu  Bois  will  fire  one  yellow  rocket 
and  one  caterpillar  rocket  in  quick  succession. 

8.  Axis  of  Liaison:  Bras,  Worms,  Haumont,  26.3-80.4. 
Regimental  Commanders  are  responsible  that  telephones  from 

the  head  of  the  Axis  of  Liaison,  26.3-80.4,  are  run  forward  to 
the  Battalion  Commanders  at  least  one  hour  before  H  hour  and 
they  will  be  responsible  that  telephone  communication  between 
them  and  their  battalion  commanders  is  maintained  throughout 
the  action. 

9.  Synchronization  of  Watches.  Watches  will  be  synchronized 
by  the  Division  Signal  Officer. 

(a)  Regimental  Commanders  will  arrange  for  the  prompt 
establishment  of  a  regimental  ammunition  dump 
and  will  fill  it  promptly. 

(b)  The  necessary  arrangements  will  be  made  for  the 
pioneers  to  go  forward  on  the  night  following  the 
attack  and  to  string  wire  in  front  of  our  positions. 

(c)  Evacuation  of  wounded  will  be  according  to  Division 
plans. 

(d)  Organization  commanders  will  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  insure  a  constant  supply  of  pyrotechnics 
and  ammunition  to  the  assaulting  troops. 

10.  Every  officer,  non-commissioned  officer  and  man  of  this 
brigade  is  depended  upon  to  uphold  the  glorious  traditions  of 
the  26th  Division.  Hell  with  all  its  flying  artillery  can't  stop 
this  brigade  when  once  engaged  in  action. 

11.  Posts  of  Command. 

Division  B.C.  No  change 

51st  F.A.  Brigade  B.C.        No  change 
51st  Inf.  Brigade  B.C.         After  17.00  o'clock  Oct.  21st 

—26.5-79.7 
By  order  of  Colonel  Bearss,  U.S.M.C. 
JuDsoN  Hannigan,  Captain 
Acting  Adjutant 

The  result  of  the  day's  effort  from  the  military  point  of 
view  is  summarized  in  the  report  prepared  at  the  time  by 
an  oflBcer  of  the  Staff.  Here  again  it  is  not  difficult  to  sense 
the  meaning  of  those  hours  of  struggle  in  the  woods  and 


256  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

mire,  following  the  first  advance  from  Molleville  Farm  in 
the  heavy  morning  mist.  Says  the  report: 

The  first  day  of  the  present  effort  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
commanding  heights  in  the  easterly  part  of  the  region  between 
Bois  de  Consenvoye  and  Flabas  ended  to  our  advantage.  At 
19.15  o'clock  of  October  23  it  was  announced  that  the  division 
had  reached  its  normal  and  exploitation  objectives  (the  latter 
being  the  Bois  Belleu).  The  work  of  consolidating  the  new  posi- 
tions and  rectifying  the  line  was  ordered  to  be  begun  at  once,  so 
as  to  insure  us  the  possession  of  the  Bois  Belleu,  Bois  des  Chenes, 
and  the  ground  between,  while  patrols  were  directed  to  maintain 
close  contact  with  the  enemy  in  the  Bois  d'Ormont. 

But  the  Germans  came  back  strongly  and  at  once.  Under  the 
pressure  of  a  heavy  counter-attack,  supported  by  an  intense 
flanking  artillery  fire,  the  battalion  of  the  101st  Infantry  which 
had  gone  through  Bois  Belleu  was  forced  to  relinquish  its  gains, 
so  that  morning  (October  24)  found  that  part  of  our  newly  won 
ground  still  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  —  an  enemy  who,  as  was 
learned  from  prisoners  and  deserters,  had  just  been  reinforced 
and  partially  relieved  by  fresh  troops  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Ninety-Second  Division,  —  a  class  one  organization. 

Our  attack  was,  how^ever,  promptly  renewed.  Supported  most 
efficiently  by  the  preparation,  encaging,  and  smoke  screen  con- 
centrations of  the  divisional  and  corps  artillery,  and  by  machine 
gun  battalions,  the  2d  Battalion,  101st  Infantry,  advanced 
against  Bois  Belleu  at  15  o'clock,  October  24,  while  the  102d  In- 
fantry (less  1st  Battalion)  attacked  a  line  in  which  the  principal 
objective  was  Hill  360,  starting  at  16.30.  Once  more  a  violent 
resistance  was  encountered.  By  the  most  varied  means,  ranging 
from  machine-gun  nests  hidden  in  trees  and  the  work  of  skillful 
snipers  to  bombardment  by  minenwerfers  regulated  by  aeroplane 
observation,  the  enemy  contested  every  inch  of  our  advance. 
This  was  pushed  steadily,  nevertheless,  until  darkness  made  a 
halt  and  a  new  consolidation  necessary.  We  had  penetrated 
Bois  Belleu  to  a  depth  of  500  meters,  and,  further  to  the  south, 
had  advanced  to  the  lower  slopes  of  Hill  360. 

But  the  first  successes  had  to  be  secured.  As  happened 
many  times  in  previous  engagements,  an  attacking  party 
would  win  a  position  with  its  advance  prepared  and  sup- 
ported by  heavy  artillery  concentrations,  only  to  find 
diflBculty  in  maintaining  its  ground  against  counter-at- 


THE  IVIEUSE-ARGOXXE  OFFENSnTE  257 

tacks  of  a  foe  determined  to  contest  possession  of  the 
ground  to  the  utmost.  So  in  the  case  of  Belleu  Wood.^ 
Hardly  had  the  lOlst's  battahons  secured  a  hold  on  that 
bloody  patch  of  bushes  and  stumps  before  heavy  artillery 
fire  and  a  series  of  rushes  by  German  infantry  forced  them 
back  to  the  western  edge.  As  the  report  has  it: 

Night  brought  a  new  enemy  reaction.  Against  the  heavily 
tried  battalion  of  the  101st  no  less  than  four  furious  counter- 
attacks were  directed  in  quick  succession.  Three  were  resisted 
successfully,  but  the  fourth  pushed  our  troops  back  again  be- 
yond the  western  edge  of  the  Bois  Belleu,  only  to  have  them  re- 
form and  return  to  the  attack  at  2.30  o'clock.  This  time  they 
succeeded  in  establishing  a  line  well  in  advance  of  their  original 
parallel  of  departure,  while  the  3d  Battalion,  101st  Infantry, 
moved  up  and  extended  the  new  line  westerly.  Two  companies 
of  the  brigade  reserve  (1st  Battalion,  101st  Infantry)  were  sent 
in  to  support  the  2d,  which  had  suffered  considerably. 

Once  more  the  51st  Infantrv^  Brigade  went  forward,  in  an 
attempt  to  consolidate  its  first  gains.  At  11.30  o'clock  on  October 
25th,  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  102d  Infantry,  after  a  violent 
artillery  preparation,  moved  out  to  the  capture  of  Hill  300, 
which  adjoined  the  Belleu  Wood  ridge  on  the  southeast.  But 
hardly  had  the  infantry  started,  their  intentions  and  objective 
having  been  made  quite  plain  to  the  enemy  from  the  direction 
and  character  of  the  artillery  fire,  before  the  enemy  clamped 
down  a  really  awful  storm  of  gas  and  high  explosive  under  which 
the  assaulting  waves  simply  melted  away.  The  meager  hold 
which  had  been  secured  on  the  lower  slopes  of  the  formidable 
Hill  360  had  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  shattered  battalions 
reeled  back  to  their  lines,  spent  and  exhausted,  though  a  few 
separated  sections  clung  to  their  gains  throughout  the  night. 
Noon  of  the  2Gth  found  our  lines  no  further  advanced  than  they 
were  on  the  afternoon  of  October  23d.  The  German  defense, 
most  skillfully  compounded  of  machine-gun  and  artillery  fire, 
admirably  directed  by  aeroplanes,  had  proved  for  the  moment 
impregnable. 

Interesting  comments  on  the  character  of  the  tasks  which 
the  Division  was  called  on  to  perform  at  this  time  are  con- 
tained in  the  two  letters  following.  The  first,  sent  by  the 

*  Spelled  Belieu  Wood  on  some  maps. 


258  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Brigade  Commander,  Shelton,  who  returned  to  duty  Octo- 
ber 24,  tells  the  story  of  those  attacks  by  small  units  on 
hmited  objectives  which  resulted  in  failure.  They  picture 
the  condition  and  strength  of  his  once  fine  brigade,  now 
that  sickness  and  the  casualties  of  battle  had  taken  their 
full  toll.  The  letter  reads: 

Headquarters  5\st  Infantry  Brigade 

26th  Division,  American  E.F  . 

France,  October  27,  1918 

From:       Commanding  General,  51st  Infantry  Brigade. 
To:  Commanding  General,  26tli  Division. 

Subject:   Present  situation. 

1.  Herewith  is  sketch  showing  from  best  information  now 
obtainable  the  lines  held  by  this  brigade  and  the  attached  troops, 
and  the  dispositions  of  these  troops. 

2.  This  sketch  shows  Belieu  Bois  held  entirely  by  the  101st 
Infantry.  The  remainder  of  the  line  shows  practically  no  advance 
except  by  covering  patrols  from  the  line  as  held  before  the  attack 
started,  October  24th.  In  the  center,  various  parts  of  the  objec- 
tive were  attained  at  diflPerent  times,  but  by  such  small  groups 
that,  lacking  at  the  time  available  supporting  troops,  the  parts  of 
the  objective  taken  could  not  be  held  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's 
resistance,  artillery,  machine  guns,  grenades.  On  the  right,  every 
attempt  to  take  Hill  360  proved  unavailing  even  with  the  sup- 
porting troops  of  tbe  104th  Infantry  thrown  in  on  the  night 
October  27/28.  Tbe  resistance  here  was  from  machine-gun  nests 
believed  to  be  in  concrete  emplacements  which  our  artillery  fire 
yesterday  failed  wholly  in  destroying.  In  my  judgment  these 
positions  cannot  be  taken  except  after  very  heavy  and  continued 
destructive  artillery  preparation  by  the  heaviest  calibres. 

3.  Referring  to  the  Belieu  Bois,  the  information  furnished  by 
the  101st  Infantry  is  definite  and  a  sketch  furnished  shows  it 
wholly  in  our  possession.  The  efforts  of  the  left  of  the  102d 
Infantry,  however,  to  establish  liaison  by  patrols  indicates,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  officers  leading  these  patrols,  that  the  lines 
of  the  101st  Infantry  are  not  as  far  east  as  reported.  According 
to  the  statements  of  these  patrols  the  eastern  line  held  by  the 
101st  Infantry  is  approximately  along  ordinate  28.0  or  perhaps 
even  farther  to  the  west.  The  Commanding  Officer,  101st  Infan- 
try, is  now  personally  investigating  this  disagreement  on  the 
ground  and  will  report  showing  lines  as  found  by  him  as  soon  as 
he  returns. 


THE  TvIEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  259 

4.  Directions  have  been  given  for  the  most  accurate  check  on 
the  eflfective  strength  that  can  be  made  under  present  conditions 
and  report  will  be  submitted  this  afternoon  in  accordance  with 
instructions  from  the  Chief  of  StaflF,  26th  Division.  The  esti- 
mated effective  strength  of  battahons  according  to  last  and  best 
data  is  as  follows : 

1015/  Infantry 
1st  Battalion  —  4  officers,  175  men 
2d  Battalion  —  3  officers,  100  men 
3d  Battalion  —  3  officers,  150  men 

102(Z  Infantry 
1st  Battalion  —  0  officers,  178  men 
2d  Battalion  —  2  officers,  100  men 
3d  Battalion  —  3  officers,  100  men 

The  1st  Battalion,  102d  Infantry,  is  commanded  by  the  Regi- 
mental Adjutant,  the  only  officer  with  it.  At  least  two  of  the 
officers  reported  still  present  are  suffering  from  injuries  but  are 
still  holding  on.  It  is  reported  that  few  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers and  particularly  sergeants  are  left.  Every  effort  is  being 
made  to  collect  stragglers  and  detached  elements,  and  wherever 
possible  these  have  been  thrown  into  the  line,  including  run- 
ners, orderlies,  and  others  on  special  duty.  It  is  difficult  with 
the  shortage  of  officers  to  enforce  action  of  any  kind  now,  be- 
cause through  exhaustion  the  remaining  men  have  in  every 
instance  to  be  aroused  by  the  employment  of  physical  force 
before  they  can  be  made  to  understand  that  action  is  required. 

5.  The  foregoing  estimate  of  effective  strength  does  not  in- 
clude, of  course,  runners,  litter  bearers,  and  some  others  present 
with  the  command  but  not  available  for  counting  witii  the  effec- 
tive fighting  strength.  Information  is  not  sufficient, to  enable  me 
to  make  an  accurate  estimate  of  casualties.  The  dressing  station 
near  this  P.C.  reports  that  from  noon,  October  24th,  to  this  writ- 
ing, 722  wounded  have  been  received  from  this  brigade.  Latest 
information  from  the  front  lines  indicates  that  not  all  of  the 
wounded  have  yet  been  evacuated.  Discounting  the  exaggera- 
tions always  attending  first  reports,  there  is  still  evidence  to 
indicate  that  the  percentage  of  killed  is  probably  heavy.  Not- 
withstanding the  efforts  made  by  the  units  engaged  themselves 
and  by  the  military  police,  comparatively  few  stragglers  have  so 
far  been  located. 

C.  The  results  expected  from  this  attack  have  not  been  at- 


260  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

tained  in  full  and  at  this  writing  it  is  not  certain  that  they  have 
been  attained  in  any  considerable  degree.  But  the  efforts  made 
by  the  troops  of  this  brigade  for  their  attainment  and  the  spirit 
of  sacrifice  shown  seem  commendable  to  me. 

Geo.  H.  Shelton 
Brigadier-General,  U.S.A. 
Commanding 

So  much  for  the  views  of  the  local  troop  commander  — 
a  man  not  prone  to  exaggerated  statement.  Let  us  compare 
his  views  with  those  of  General  Claudel,  the  Corps  Com- 
mander, who,  on  October  22,  thought  it  his  duty  to  set 
the  situation  on  the  Verdun  front  squarely  before  the  au- 
thorities at  First  Army  Headquarters,  in  the  hope  of  mak- 
ing them  realize  conditions. 

1st  American  Army 

nth  Army  Corps 

Staff  Eg.,  2U  October,  1918 

3d  Bureau 

No.  678  S/S 

Secret 

General  Claudel,  Commanding  the  17th  Army  Corps  to  the 
Commanding  General,  1st  x\merican  Army. 
In  reply  to  your  letter  of  October  21st,  relative  to  the  comple- 
mentary operations  to  be  carried  out  on  the  right  banks  of  the 
Meuse,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  as  follows : 

1.  Capture  of  the  line  of  resistance. 

The  operation  prescribed  in  my  memorandum  650  S/3  of 
October  18th,  must  give  us  the  northern  half  of  the  part  ha- 
chured  in  brown  ^  on  the  map  attached  to  your  memorandum. 
If  this  operation  succeeds,  an  operation  (already  planned  and 
studied  out  by  the  26th  D.I.U.S.)  will  be  undertaken  for  the 
object  of  giving  us  complete  possession  of  the  Bois  d'Ormont. 

The  part  hachured  in  brown  on  your  map  would  thus  be  won 
in  its  general  line. 

I  think  that  at  this  time  the  front  which  has  been  reached  will 
be  coherent  enough  to  be  able  to  be  stabilized. 

2.  Capture  of  the  line  of  advanced  posts. 

The  line  to  be  captured  (bistre  line  on  the  map)  indicates  the 

^  Reference  here  and  elsewhere  is  to  colored  lines  on  map  accompanying 
memorandum  of  First  American  Army  of  October  21st. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  261 

entire  zone  of  resistance  established  by  the  enemy  on  the  reverse 
slope,  and  included  between  the  green  and  bistre  lines. 

This  zone  is  all  the  more  solid  as  it  is  the  last  organization  of 
the  enemy  on  the  Hants  de  Meuse  and  the  one  which  commands 
the  valley  of  the  Theinte. 

It  is  to  be  expected  therefore  that  the  enemy  will  defend  it 
stubbornly. 

^\Tiat  will  be  our  forces  to  attack  it? 

Three  divisions  (79th  D.I.U.S./  26th  D.I.U.S.,  26th  D.I.F). 

Of  these  three  divisions  the  26th  D.I.U.S.  will  already  have 
carried  out  the  attack  of  October  23d  on  the  Bois  d'Etraye  and 
the  attack  on  the  Bois  d'Ormont. 

Another  division,  the  26th  D.I.F. ,  which  carried  out  the  attack 
of  October  8th,  and  which,  for  two  weeks  in  a  sector  continually 
shelled  and  fought  over,  is  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  carry  out 
a  deep  operation. 

Furthermore,  its  relief  must  be  considered,  and,  to  mj^  knowl- 
edge, nothing  is  yet  planned  regarding  its  relief. 

Facing  these  three  divisions,  one  of  which  will  be  weakened, 
and  the  other  very  tired,  the  enemy  has  four  divisions  at  its  dis- 
posal -  supported  by  an  artillery  which  seems  at  least  equal  to  ours. 

jNIoreover,  the  line  which  is  fixed  for  me  is  none  other  than  the 
First  exploitation  objective  of  my  plan  of  engagement  No.  532 
S/3  of  October  4th. 

I  had  requested  five  divisions  to  attain  it  ^  with  the  object 
of  exploiting  immediately  the  surprise.  Three  were  given  me 
which  carried  out  the  attack  of  October  8th. 

Under  these  conditions  the  question  may  be  asked  if  what 
three  divisions  reinforced  with  six  crack  (elite)  battalions  (Sene- 
galese battalions)  against  an  enemy  surprised  tactically,  could 
not  do,  whether  three  divisions  of  which  two  at  least  are  worn  out 
by  a  prolonged  stay  in  a  battle  sector,  will  be  capable  of  doing  it 
against  an  enemy  who  has  been  reinforced  and  is  on  his  guard? 

The  17th  French  Army  Corps  is  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
IMeuse,  in  the  final  phase  of  an  engagement,  in  close  contact  with 
the  enemy.  In  my  opinion,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that, 
once  on  the  defensive,  there  may  be  hope  to  win  by  means  of 
small  operations  all  the  terrain  which  you  desire  to  make  a  zone 
of  advanced  posts. 

1  After  relief  of  the  29th  D.I.U.S. 
^  ^Vllich  the  enemy  seems  bent  upon  reinforcing. 

'  ]\'iemorandum  No.  520  S/3,  of  the  17th  French  Army  Corps,  dated  Octo- 
ber 2nd. 


262  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Only  by  means  of  attacks  prepared  and  carried  out  with  pow- 
erful forces  will  the  enemy  be  forced  to  yield  this  important 
terrain;  and  to  accomplish  it,  successive  reliefs  of  units,  as  were 
carried  out  on  analogous  fronts  (the  Aisne  front  for  example), 
would  be  necessary  as  a  matter  of  course. 

3.  Conclusion: 

To  sum  up :  If  the  idea  is  to  economize  the  forces  on  the  right 
bank,  the  green  line  may  be  held  to  for  the  purposes  of  stabilization. 

In  order  to  attain  the  bistre  line,  considerable  forces  in  infantry 
and  ammunition  must  be  provided  for. 

With  Sufficient  resources  of  men  and  guns  Claudel  could 
attack  on  the  wide  front  and  effect  so  deep  a  penetration 
that  he  could  force  the  evacuation  of  the  Verdun  charniere. 
Situated  as  he  was,  with  no  expectation  of  reinforcement, 
or  even  of  relief  for  his  dwindling  divisions,  he  could  hold 
fast  and  harass  the  enemy  with  artillery  fire,  awaiting  the 
moment  when  an  American  advance  west  of  the  Meuse 
would  compel  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  Verdun.  And 
this  w^as  in  Claudel's  mind.  But  neither  course  was  open 
to  him.  His  orders  stood,  and  he  was  forced  to  continue 
the  series  of  local  attacks  by  small  units  which  day  by  day 
took  heavy  toll  in  losses,  though  accomplishing  a  tangi- 
ble success  in  occupying  the  attention  of  considerable 
German  forces,  and  possibly  this  latter  fact  was  enough 
to  justify  the  course  pursued. 

With  the  episode  of  General  Edwards's  relief  and  the 
costly  efforts  of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade,  October  23-27, 
ends  the  first  period  of  the  Division's  duty  at  Verdun  — 
days  w  hich  also  saw  the  expenditure  of  the  Twenty-Ninth 
Division  and  its  relief  by  the  Se venty -Ninth.  ^ 

On  October  24  the  new  Division  Commander  reported 
for  duty  —  Brigadier-General  Frank  E.  Bamford,  who  had 

^  Parting  messages  from  the  Division's  first  commander  to  his  men  are  con- 
tained in  the  following  communications.  His  farewell  general  order  reads: 

1.  In  compliance  with  Paragraph  8,  Special  Orders  No.  293,  General  Head- 
quarters, American  Expeditionary  Forces,  the  undersigned  relinquishes  com- 
mand of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division. 


THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  OFFENSIVE  263 

commanded  an  infantry  brigade  of  the  First  Di\asion.  On 
the  same  date  General  Edwards  took  his  leave,  and  the 
Division  started  upon  a  new  phase  of  its  career.  Taking  to 
heart  the  last  message  of  its  original  leader,  the  ofBcers 
and  men  resolved  loyally  to  "carry  on,"  outfacing  the  loss 
of  strength  which  pressed  on  the  Division  dangerously, 
indeed. 

2.  He  thanks  the  Division  for  its  loyalty  to  him  and  for  what  it  has  accom- 
plished in  the  common  cause.  He  bespeaks  for  his  successor  in  command  the 
same  loyalty  and  devotion,  and  he  leaves  the  Division  in  full  confidence  that  its 
same  fine  work  will  continue  to  the  end. 

C.  R.  Edwards 
MajoT-General  Commanding 

To  the  51st  Brigade  of  Artillery,  was  addressed  the  foIloT\ing: 

1.  To  the  artillery  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  is  due  my  expression  of  ad- 
miration for  its  efficiency  and  fighting  qualities,  and  for  its  indefatigable  support 
of  our  fine  infantry.  Artillery  can  desire  no  higher  tribute  than  the  conscious  fact 
that  it  has  gained  the  confidence,  reliance,  and  thanks  of  the  infantry. 

2.  During  more  than  eight  months  of  fighting  ser\nce  the  spirit  of  loyalty  dis- 
plaj'ed  by  every  officer  and  man  of  the  Fifty-First  Field  Artillery  Brigade  toward 
his  duty,  toward  the  Yankee  Division  and  toward  the  Division  Commander,  has 
been  fine. 

3.  The  record  of  the  Fifty-First  Artillery  Brigade  in  the  second  battle  of  the 
Mame  is  glorious.  It  went  with,  supported,  and  protected  the  infantry  in  its 
advance  of  I85  kilometers  by  Chateau-Thierry,  and  afterwards,  in  succession, 
two  other  divisions  in  the  advance  from  the  Marne  to  the  Vesle  for  a  period  of 
eighteen  days,  between  July  18  and  August  4,  with  a  gain  of  over  40  kilometers. 
It  is  a  record  of  which  the  entire  division  and  our  country  justly  may  be  proud. 

I  congratulate  and  thank  the  artillery  brigade  of  the  Yankee  Division. 

C.  R.  Edwards 
Major-General  Commanding 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER 

JUST  as  one  groups  the  earlier  activities  of  the  Division 
at  Verdun  around  the  series  of  attacks  of  October  23- 
27,  so  one  can  center  its  later  work  about  the  operations 
between  November  7  and  November  11.  The  first  set  of 
operations  was  an  endeavor  to  wrest  from  the  enemy  local 
positions  of  commanding  importance;  the  second  series 
sought  to  hustle  the  German  withdrawal,  which  American 
successes  west  of  the  Meuse  had  rendered  inevitable. 

Following  the  action  in  Belleu  Wood  and  on  the  slopes 
of  Hill  360,  a  change  was  made  in  the  Division's  sector  and 
direction  of  advance.  The  Seventy-Ninth  Division,  on  its 
left,  took  over  that  portion  of  the  Twenty-Sixth's  Hne 
which  included  Ormont  Wood;  and  the  latter,  with  its 
front  somewhat  reduced,  now  had  opposite  its  lines  the 
villages  of  Ville-devant-Chaumont  and  Flabas,  with  the 
roughly  wooded  region  known  as  "Bois  de  Ville"  (Town 
W^ood),  as  the  principal  geographical  locations. 

It  was  a  time  when  the  closest  watch  had  to  be  kept  on 
the  enemy  —  not  lest  he  attempt  any  attack,  but  lest  he 
withdraw  his  forces  unperceived  under  cover  of  a  screen 
of  rear-guards.  On  the  left  the  Seventy-Ninth  Division 
and  the  Fifteenth  French  Division  kept  up  a  pressure 
through  local  attacks  and  the  exploitation  of  local  suc- 
cesses, while  to  the  Twenty-Sixth  was  given  the  duty  of 
making  energetic  local  raids  on  portions  of  the  German 
lines  for  the  purpose  of  making  prisoners.  Of  these  there 
were  secured  a  considerable  number  almost  every  day  — 
wretched  fellows  whose  spirit  was  quite  gone,  whose  gen- 
eral condition  was  deplorable.  It  seemed  as  if  the  entire 
German  strength  lay  now  in  the  personnel  of  the  machine- 
gun  and  artillery  branches;  certainly  the  infantry  was  poor 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        265 

enough.  There  was  a  steady  fire  from  the  German  guns  on 
especially  favored  areas  within  our  lines,  such  as  Haumont 
Ravine,  Bras,  Charny,  and  the  location  of  Division  Head- 
quarters; the  forward  trench  lines  were  still  sprayed  by 
machine-gun  fire  at  any  sign  of  Hfe;  but  the  German  in- 
fantry had  no  fight  left  in  it.  A  curious  episode  was  the 
effort  of  a  group  of  thirty-seven  Germans  (including  an 
officer),  who  about  this  time  engaged  two  of  the  enlisted 
men  of  the  102d  Infantry  in  an  attempted  parley  regard- 
ing their  surrender.  They  were  afraid  to  desert;  they  were 
afraid  of  the  American  artillery;  they  were  eager  to  voice 
their  unwillingness  to  kill  or  be  killed,  now  —  as  they 
insisted  —  that  the  war  was  over.  The  report  of  the  Ameri- 
can soldiers  of  the  incident  resulted,  of  course,  in  added 
precautions  being  taken  against  fraternization;  but  the 
incident  was  not  without  significance  as  reflecting  the 
spirit  of  the  enemy's  former  fighting  men. 

At  length,  almost  without  warning,  the  break  came. 
About  noon,  on  November  8,  a  party  of  eighty  Germans 
wearing  their  packs  was  seen  marching  out  of  Flabas  to- 
wa,rd  the  rear  with  no  effort  at  concealment;  and  at  the 
same  time  word  came  from  the  Corps  of  other  evidences 
of  a  general  retirement.  At  once  strong  patrols  were  pushed 
forward  from  all  four  regiments  to  keep  in  touch.  The  two 
battalions  of  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  which  had  been 
loaned  to  the  Seventy-Ninth  Division's  right  brigade  on 
November  6,  were  recalled,  and  a  new  advanced  line  was 
established  late  in  the  afternoon  on  the  eastern  edge  of 
the  Heights  overlooking  the  Azannes-Damvillers  road  and 
the  low  ground,  to  which  the  enemy  had  sulkily  retreated. 

All  preparations  were  made  to  follow  up  this  initial  ad- 
vance with  the  coming  of  daylight.  But  early  on  Novem- 
ber 9  came  orders  with  information  that  the  direction  of 
advance  had  been  changed  to  the  southeast,  which  brought 
as  the  next  objective  for  the  Twenty-Sixth  the  curious 
isolated  hills  called  the  "Ornes  Twins"  and  the  village  of 


2G6  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Azannes.  The  advanced  battalions  stayed  where  they  were 
for  the  moment;  then,  as  the  support  battahons  formed 
up  in  the  new  direction,  the  former  would  fall  in  behind. 
On  the  right  the  Tenth  French  Division  would  give  over 
to  the  Twenty-Sixth  the  region  known  as  "La  Wavrille," 
to  afford  more  room  for  the  maneuver. 

The  advance,  therefore,  was  undertaken.  A  fierce  en- 
filade fire  of  machine  guns  on  the  left  from  Ville-devant- 
Chaumont  checked  the  104th  Infantry;  on  the  right  the 
101st  Infantry  got  forward  some  small  elements  toward 
Saint-Andre  Farm,  but  could  not  make  good  its  initial 
gains.  In  the  center  the  102d  and  103d  Infantry  had  no 
better  success.  The  following  day,  November  10,  a  sec- 
ond push  accomplished  considerably  more,  for  the  103d 
Infantry,  with  a  fine  access  of  vigor,  took  Town  Wood, 
and  the  104th  Infantry  smartly  flanked  the  enemy  out  of 
Ville-devant-Chaumont,  as  the  Seventy-Ninth  Division, 
farther  to  the  left,  succeeded  in  getting  a  firm  hold  on 
Hill  324,  a  commanding  height  from  which  the  line  of 
the  Twenty-Sixth  could  be  enfiladed.  On  the  right,  how- 
ever, the  101st  Infantry  accomplished  little;  and  a  wide 
gap  was  opened  during  the  afternoon  between  this  flank 
and  the  French  in  the  region  of  La  Wavrille,  of  which 
the  enemy  was  too  weak  to  take  advantage  before  it 
was  closed  by  the  dispatch  of  machine  guns  and  a  platoon 
of  infantry,  as  a  connecting  group,  posted  just  west  of 
Bezonvaux.  Between  the  inner  flank  of  the  102d  and 
101st  Infantry,  where  connection  was  also  lost  for  a 
while,  another  dangerous  gap  was  opened  up.  It  was  a 
disquieting  day.  As  a  result  of  honest  effort  there  was 
little  to  show  in  the  way  of  ground  gained  save  in  the 
center  and  on  the  left.  Owing  to  its  complete  exhaustion 
the  101st  Infantry  was  withdrawn  to  Cote  de  Talou 
under  cover  of  darkness;  and  the  meager  ranks  of  the 
102d  Infantry  were  extended  to  the  right  to  take  over  the 
line  held  by  the  Boston  regiment. 


'  BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        267 

Reasons  why  the  results  of  these  two  daj's  were  not 
commensurate  with  the  dogged,  plucky  efforts  of  the 
troops,  are  not  far  to  seek.  They  are  curiously  intertwined 
with  questions  of  infantry  psychology.  A  compelling  rea- 
son is  to  be  found  in  the  shocking  depletion  in  the  nu- 
merical strength  of  the  infantry.  Battalions,  ordered  to 
extend  over  a  normal  width  of  front,  did  not  have  men 
enough  to  cover  half  that  line.  Intervals  between  flanks 
became  unduly  wide  for  the  same  reason,  which  also 
made  exceedingly  difficult  the  organization  of  proper- 
sized  patrols,  connecting  groups,  and  similar  tactical  de- 
tachments. The  ranks  of  headquarters  runners,  signal- 
men, automatic  rifle  teams,  non-commissioned  officers, 
as  well  as  company  and  battalion  officers,  were  so 
thiimed  that  the  usual  machinery  by  which  any  given 
unit  functioned  was  in  many  cases  vastly  reduced  in  value 
when  it  was  not  crippled  or  missing  altogether.  In  several 
cases  lieutenants  came  away  from  Verdun  in  command  of 
battalions,  or  sergeants  leading  their  companies.  The 
strongest  representations  were  continually  made  by  the 
infantry  commanders,  especially  with  respect  to  the  short- 
age of  officers.  But  no  replacements  were  received  by  the 
Division  while  in  this  sector  until  November  8  or  9;  and 
the  draft  which  then  arrived  —  about  one  thousand  en- 
listed men  —  came  too  late  to  contribute  anything  ma- 
terial to  the  fighting  strength  of  the  51st  Infantry  Brigade, 
to  which  the  new  men  were  assigned.^ 

*  In  any  consideration  of  a  combat  unit's  numerical  strength  one  must  include 
its  animal  transport.  The  following  extracts  from  the  report  of  the  Division 
Remount  Officer  are  not  without  interest  as  showing,  from  another  angle,  the 
reduced  condition  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  at  this  period: 

"  The  plan  of  keeping  animals  in  forward  echelons  was  again  tried  in  the  Ver- 
dun Sector,  hut  was  met  witii  the  severest  kind  of  animal  losses  from  exposure, 
shell-fire,  and  gas.  As  a  result  the  greater  part  of  the  artillery  animals  were  taken 
back  to  the  more  or  less  sheltered  rear  echelons,  while  the  animals  of  the  infan- 
try and  other  divisional  units  were  stabled  in  the  somewhat  demolished  but 
nevertheless  sheltered  caacrncs  of  Verdun.  Mules  for  the  rolling  kitchens,  ration 
carts,  water  carts,  and  a  numl)er  of  mules  for  machine  guns,  had  necessarily  to 
t>e  kept  up  fairly  close  to  the  liues,  aud  it  was  these  auimals  that  shared  the 


268  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Not  only  were  the  regiments  weak  in  numerical  strength, 
but  the  troops  were  also  weak  physically.  The  long  period 
of  exposure,  little  sleep,  and  continual  rain;  the  ravages 
of  influenza  and  bronchial  disorders;  the  daily  exposure 

brunt  of  shelling  and  exposure.  The  plan,  however,  was  adopted  to  alternate 
these  animals,  so  that  after  one  had  served  several  days  at  the  front  it  was 
brought  back  to  a  rear  echelon,  rested  and  cared  for,  while  another  took  its 
place. 

"  Up  behind  the  lines  picketing  of  animals  in  small  groups  of  three,  four,  and  six 
was  employed  as  protection  from  shell-fire.  There  was  an  instance,  however,  in 
a  certain  machine-gun  company,  where  this  was  not  done,  and  twelve  fine  mules 
tied  together  on  one  picket  line  were  completely  wiped  out  by  a  shell  landing 
directly  beside  them.  .  .  . 

"  The  situation  now  became  extremely  grave.  No  stone  was  left  unturned  in  an 
endeavor  to  procure  animal  replacements  at  this  time,  but  the  demand  was  so 
far  greater  than  the  supply  that  the  task  was  well-nigh  hopeless.  The  fact  that 
was  always  brought  forward,  when  a  desperate  appeal  was  made  for  animals, 
was  that  there  were  twelve  or  more  divisions  who  were  even  worse  off  than  the 
Twenty-Sixth,  certain  artillery  brigades  not  being  able  to  move  at  all.  Conse- 
quently what  animals  were  being  received  at  the  army  depots  were  being  sent  to 
them. 

"  At  last,  about  October  17,  a  shipment  of  French  stock  en  route  from  Bordeaux 
was  switched  at  Saint  Dizier  to  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  to  be  unloaded  at 
Baleycourt.  This  shipment  of  144  animals  left  Bordeaux  made  up  of  90  artillery 
horses,  32  cavalry  horses,  and  16  mules.  One  of  the  horses  died  en  route,  and  38 
horses  and  4  mules  were  evacuated  at  the  veterinary  hospital  at  Treveray,  being 
in  far  too  poor  condition  for  service  at  the  front.  Out  of  the  101  animals  that 
arrived  at  Baleycourt,  48  had  to  be  evacuated  immediately  for  debilitation  and 
mange,  so  that  only  44  horses  and  9  mules  were  left  to  be  issued  to  the  Division. 
From  this  number  only  10  of  the  horses  could  be  considered  draft  animals,  while 
only  5  of  the  mules  could  be  considered  for  heavy  draft  purposes.  The  little  light- 
boned  horses  and  mules,  the  latter  doubtless  Spanish,  were  issued  to  the  machine- 
gun  battalions  for  use  in  the  machine-gun  carts.  Later  the  majority  of  these 
horses  broke  down  on  the  march  back  from  the  front.  The  little  mules,  on  the 
other  hand,  as  usual  went  through  everything,  and  at  the  end  were  still  ready  for 
more. 

"  The  above  shipment  is  just  one  illustration  of  the  difBculties  of  securing  ani- 
mals at  this  time  for  a  division  at  the  front.  In  defense  of  this"  shipment  it  must 
be  said  that  just  previous,  on  account  of  the  desperate  animal  situation,  tele- 
graphic instructions  had  been  issued  to  all  remount  depots  to  send  forward  all 
animals  that  were  even  in  fair  condition. 

"  Another  order,  issued  from  General  Headquarters  at  this  time,  stripped  all 
wagon  companies  attached  to  depots  in  the  S.O.S.  to  half  strength.  As  a  result 
of  this  the  Division  was  fortunate  to  receive  200  draft  mules  from  one  of  these 
companies.  These  were  all  excellent  animals  of  American  stock,  and  literally 
saved  the  day  for  the  infantry  supply  companies.  Shortly  afterwards  there  was 
one  other  shipment  from  Bordeaux,  mostly  horses  in  poor  shape,  besides  one  or 
two  small  or  miscellaneous  issues  of  animals,  obtained  only  after  the  greatest 
effort." 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        269 

to  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire,  and  to  gas  concentra- 
tion —  all  contributed  to  sap  the  men's  vitality.  Their 
appearance  was  eloquent  of  their  wretchedness  —  gaunt, 
with  faces  heavily  shadowed,  the  eyes  sunk  or  gleaming 
with  fever,  the  figure  bent,  the  mentahty  dulled.  One  can 
fancy  the  concern  of  the  infantry  commanders  on  the 
spot,  who  knew  the  character  of  the  tasks  required,  and 
the  difficulties  of  the  terrain. 

But  it  is  possible  to  assign  a  reason,  other  and  more  com- 
pelling than  physical  exhaustion,  in  accounting  for  the 
infantry's  momentary  depression.  It  is  a  truism  in  the 
art  of  handling  troops  in  the  field  that  the  loss  of  leaders 
trusted  by  their  men  implies  inevitably  the  loss  of  some- 
thing beside.  It  will  be  recalled  that  General  Edwards 
was  relieved  from  command  October  22,  his  successor 
arriving  on  October  24.  The  very  day  after  the  command 
passed,  on  October  25,  the  new  general  relieved  Colonel 
E.  L.  Logan,  101st  Infantry,  of  whom  he  had  no  personal 
knowledge,  on  the  charge  of  inertia.  On  November  6  he 
relieved  Colonel  F.  M.  Hume,  103d  Infantry,  on  the 
charge  of  allowing  his  men  to  fraternize  with  the  enemy. 
On  November  9  Brigadier-General  C.  H.  Cole  was  re- 
lieved of  the  command  of  the  52d  Infantry  Brigade,  on 
similar  charges.  Viewing  this  action  solely  from  the  angle 
of  its  effect  on  the  troops,  it  should  be  understood  that 
these  officers  had  earned  the  loyalty  of  both  officers  and 
men.  They  had  led  their  men  in  action;  they  had  shared 
every  hardship;  they  were  depended  upon  by  hundreds; 
they  were  obeyed  without  question.  They  were  of  great 
value  in  the  places  they  occupied.  All  three  had  been 
privates,  sergeants,  and  junior  officers  in  the  original  units 
composing  their  commands.  Secondly,  the  men  who  had 
followed  Cole,  Logan,  and  Hume  in  action  believed  that 
charges  reflecting  on  tlieir  soldierly  behavior  were  base- 
less. And  l)e  it  said  that  none  of  the  charges  against 
Cole,  Logan,  and  Hume  were  sustained.  Cole's  case  did 


270  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

not  even  go  to  a  board  of  inquiry,  though  he  at  once  de- 
manded one.  ^  Reinstated  with  their  regiments  in  February, 
after  sojourns  at  the  "reclassification"  centers  of  Blois 
and  Gondrecourt,  where  Logan  acted  as  successful  counsel 
for  manj^  officers  under  charges  affecting  their  efficiency, 
both  Hume  and  Logan,  like  Cole  (who  returned  to  his 
command  early  in  December),  appeared  at  the  time  to 
many  to  have  been  objects  of  a  clumsily  conducted,  per- 
sonal spite  campaign.  One  hesitates  to  give  credence  to 
such  reports;  but  one  is  constrained  to  tell  all  the  parts  of 
any  story  should  one  undertake  to  tell  the  whole  of  it. 

What  of  the  general  situation,  as  the  Division,  with  its 
companions  of  the  Corps,  ^  struggles  to  shake  the  hold  of 
the  enemy  on  the  hills  of  Verdun  .f* 

The  length  of  the  Western  Front  the  Allies  are  victori- 
ous; every  day,  whether  in  Flanders,  Picardy,  or  in  Cham- 
pagne, they  send  the  German  reeling  back  in  confusion. 
Tlie  First  American  Army,  west  of  the  Meuse,  is  also 
winning  its  objectives.  Emerging  at  last  from  the  Argonne 
W^oods,  rolling  over  the  greatly  reduced  enemy  by  sheer 
weight  of  numbers,  securing  local  successes  more  through 
the  inherent  fighting  quality  of  the  individual  soldier  than 
by  skill  in  troop  leadership  on  the  part  of  the  higher  com- 
mand,  the  Americans  had   begun  that  race  northward 

1  The  order  reinstating  Brigadier-General  Cole  is  here  appended: 

France,  November  30,  1918 
From:      Adjutant-General,  American  Expeditionary  Forces. 
To:  Brigadier-General  Charles  H.  Cole,  Center  of  Information,  A.P.O.  714, 

American  Expeditionary  Forces. 
Subject:  Relief  from  Fifty-Second  Infantry  Brigade. 

1.  I  am  directed  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  inform  yoti  that  upon  his 
personal  examination  of  the  papers  reporting  the  facts  incident  to  your  relief 
from  command  of  the  Fifty -Second  Brigade,  he  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  facts  did 
not  warrant  your  relief,  and  he  has  therefore  directed  that  you  be  reinstated  to 
your  former  brigade. 

2.  Accordingly,  orders  will  be  issued  in  the  near  future. 

By  command  of  General  Pershing 

Robert  C.  Davis 

Adjutant-General 

2  The  Second  Colonial  Corps  had  taken  over  the  Verdun  front  from  the  Seven- 
teenth Corps;  but  General  Claudel  remained  in  command. 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        271 

which  was  to  end  -in  the  vicinity  of  Sedan.  Slowed  for  a 
while  by  grave  deficiencies  in  the  operation  of  supply  and 
transport  services,  and  by  an  overtaxing  of  the  capabilities 
of  the  road  system;  checked  now  and  again,  though  green 
infantry,  called  by  necessity  to  do  the  work  of  veterans, 
handsomely  responded;  suffering,  furthermore,  from  the 
lack  of  initiative  of  certain  infantry  units,  and  from  faulty 
employment  of  the  artillery's  resources,  still  the  army 
surged  ahead.  Escaping  disaster,  it  obtained  a  victory. 

For  days  —  ever  since  the  first  of  November,  and  even 
earlier  —  the  end  was  felt  to  be  near  by  friend  and  foe 
alike.  Knowing  themselves  beaten,  there  was  nothing  the 
German  soldiers  so  ardently  desired  as  to  cease  fighting. 
Superior  Headquarters  very  properly  forbade  the  troops 
to  believe  that  peace  was  in  the  air;  officers  and  men  must 
continue  their  efforts,  must  employ  every  ounce  of  energy, 
must  fight  their  hardest,  for  war  continues  until  hostil- 
ities cease  officially.  Down  to  the  smallest  units  stringent 
orders  were  enforced  against  fraternization ;  detailed  warn- 
ings were  sent  out  that  any  rumor  of  an  armistice  was 
nothing  but  German  trickery.  The  following  radio  mes- 
sage was  picked  up  by  the  Division's  wireless  operator  at 
Headquarters  early  in  the  morning  of  November  7: 

From  Eiffel  Tower  Radio  Station 
Translation  November  7,  1918,  2.35  o'clock 

To  the  German  High  Command  from  Marshal  Focli : 

If  the  German  plenipotentiaries  desire  to  meet  Marshal  Foch 
for  the  purpose  of  requesting  from  him  an  armistice,  they  will 
present  themselves  to  the  French  outposts  following  the  Chimay- 
Fournies-La  Capelle-Guise  road.  Orders  will  be  issued  to  receive 
them,  and  to  conduct  them  to  the  place  designated  for  the  meet- 
ing. 

The  message  was  sent  from  the  French  official  station 
on  the  Eiffel  Tower;  it  had  every  mark  of  authenticity. 
But  —  no,  the  message  was  not  to  be  credited;  it  was 
probably  a  German  forgery;  there  must  be  no  relaxation 
of  vigilance,  effort,  or  of  the  will  to  fight.  Prisoners  came 


272  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

in  daily,  all  with  the  same  tale  of  weariness,  disorganiza- 
tion, disintegration.  All  the  more  reason  for  dealing  blows 
such  as  would  complete  the  German  disaster;  and  the 
huge  naval  fourteen-inch  guns,  pushed  up  on  the  railway 
behind  Charny  close  to  Division  Headquarters,  roared  out 
destruction  in  voices  that  shook  the  countryside. 

A  fine  object  lesson  was  set  in  the  last  four  days  of  the 
war.  One  must  understand  that  in  war  there  are  no  com- 
promises. Either  one  fights  or  one  is  at  peace;  either  one 
obeys  or  one  disobeys.  The  soldier  is  given  a  course  to  fol- 
low; he  pursues  it  till  ordered  to  stop  by  proper  authority. 
Very  hard  for  new  troops  to  grasp  —  that  idea.  Impossible 
for  any  one  to  understand  the  necessity  of  its  unvarying, 
absolute  enforcement  until  one  has  been  in  action.  The 
German  had  asked  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities;  he  had 
sent  his  representatives  to  receive  the  victors'  terms. 
Beaten  to  his  knees,  he  had  no  choice  but  to  accept  those 
terms.  His  troops  asked  nothing  more  than  to  be  allowed 
to  lay  down  their  arms  at  once.  These  facts  were  evident; 
the  world  was  aware  of  them;  not  a  soldier  but  knew  that 
the  fighting  was  practically  over.  But  military  good  sense 
and  military  habit  only  know  that  one  fights  or  that  one 
does  not;  they  know  that  no  change  can  come  to  pass  in 
the  world  where  soldiers  dwell  save  that  which  is  ordered 
by  proper  authority.  And,  therefore,  implacable  as  a  ma- 
chine, the  Allied  forces,  unmoved  by  fact  as  by  rumor, 
continued  its  hammer-blows  on  the  beaten,  retiring  enemy. 
Not  till  Foch  spoke  could  the  armies  pause ;  not  till  Claudel 
spoke,  echoing  his  master,  could  the  troops  at  Verdun 
slow  down  by  an  ounce  of  strength  or  an  inch  of  stride.  It 
was  splendid,  that  lesson. 

The  Division  played  the  game  through  to  the  very  end. 
We  have  seen  how  the  infantry  struggled  forward  on  No- 
vember 10.  Keen  to  follow  to  the  limit  all  the  possibilities 
of  the  military  situation,  just  as  if  the  campaign  was  in 
full  swing  instead  of  at  its  conclusion,  the  Chief  of  Staff  in 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        273 

his  field  order  for  operations  on  that  date  named  points 
far  within  the  enemy  lines  as  sites  for  a  new  divisional 
Headquarters  and  other  administrative  centers,  the  ob- 
jectives being  farther  distant  still.  On  'November  10,  at 
21  o'clock  (9  P.M.),  was  published  Field  Order  No.  105, 
which,  oblivious  of  all  rumor  that  the  armistice  would  be 
signed  on  the  11th,  directed  a  new  attack  in  the  direction 
of  Les  Jumelles  d'Ornes,  Hill  265,  and  Maucourt,  all  de- 
tails of  the  advance  being  as  methodically  worked  out 
and  carefully  prescribed  as  though  a  Leavenworth  map 
problem  was  being  solved.  Should  one  wonder  at  the 
necessity  for  thus  playing  the  game  to  the  extreme  of  the 
Umit,  that  will  betray  mere  ignorance  of  military  meth- 
ods, mihtary  necessity,  and  the  mihtary  mind.  Hostilities 
were  not  to  cease  till  word  came  from  Marshal  Foch  him- 
self. But  that  message  could  not  be  taken  to  mean  that, 
the  cessation  of  hostilities  being  imminent,  efforts  could 
be  relaxed;  and,  therefore,  late  on  the  night  of  Novem- 
ber 10  the  orders  went  forward  for  an  attack  on  the  11th. 
\^^lat  followed  is  of  interest.  One  must  not  beheve  that 
Division  Headquarters  pubHshed  the  order  for  the  attack 
on  Armistice  Day  in  any  spirit  of  light-heartedness.  It  was 
with  a  secret  hope  that  the  order  might  be  modified  that 
it  was  sent  forward;  the  thought  of  the  infantry  deploy- 
ing and  advancing  under  fire,  on  what  would  probably  be 
the  last  morning  of  the  war,  was  not  easy  to  bear.  How 
greatly  this  feeling  was  intensified  can  be  imagined  when 
the  radio  received  the  following  message  at  5.45  o'clock 
November  11: 

From  F  L  (Eiffel  Tower) 

Marshal  Foch  to  Commander-in-Chief. 

1.  Hostilities  will  stoj)  on  the  entire  front  beginning  Novem- 
ber 11,  at  11  o'clock,  French  time. 

2.  The  Allied  troops  shall  not  pass  the  line  reached  upon  that 
date  and  at  that  hour  until  further  orders. 

(Signed)  Marshal  Focn. 


274  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

At  once  the  order  directing  tlie  cessation  of  hostilities  on 
the  Division's  front  ^  was  written  and  hurried  out.  But 
the  order  for  the  attack  to  continue  up  to  the  designated 
hour  stood  unchanged.  Still  must  the  artillery  send  over 
its  fire  of  destruction  and  preparation  on  Les  Jumelles 
d'Ornes,  Gremilly,  Hill  Q65,  and  Maucourt;  still  must  it 
drop  its  rolhng  barrage  in  advance  of  the  infantry  at  "H" 
hour;  still  must  the  meager  battalions  advance  on  the 
skirts  of  the  curtain  of  fire  to  meet  the  usual  resistance  of 
the  enemy's  artillery  and  machine  guns. 

But  very  soon  after  came  news  which  changed  the  whole 
complexion  of  affairs.  By  motor  from  Corps  Headquarters 
there  arrived  the  Division's  information  officer,  post- 
haste, with  word  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Corps  Com- 
mander, the  attack  order  of  the  morning  could  be  modified. 
Pressed  to  state  whether  this  modification  meant  that  the 
infantry  need  not  advance,  the  officer  gave  it  as  the  Corps 
Commander's  express  wish  that  only  artillery  fire  should 
be  sent  over  and  the  advance  of  the  infantry  suspended. 

Instantly  then,  by  every  available  resource  of  the  mes- 
sage center,  word  was  hurried  to  the  brigadiers  to  hold  up 
their  infantry,  in  the  following  message  written  by  the 
Chief  of  Staff: 

From:  Chief  of  Staff 

To:       C.  G.  51st  and  52d  Inf.  Brig,  and  CO.  51st  Art.  Brig. 

The  operations  set  for  9.30  o'clock  are  modified  as  follows: 
The  artillery  preparation  will  be  carried  out  as  per  schedule 
stopping  promptly  at  11  o'clock. 

The  infantry  will  not  advance  to  the  attack. 

D.  K.  Major,  Jr. 

A  sigh  of  relief  went  the  rounds  of  Headquarters.  One 
would  play  the  game  through  to  the  bitter  limit  —  yes ; 
but  it  was  permitted  to  be  happy  that  the  rigor  of  the  game 
had  been  a  little  modified. 

1  Field  Order  lOG,  November  11,  1918. 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        275 

The  information  oflScer,  his  message  delivered,  returns 
to  Corps  Headquarters  and  reports.  The  trip  required  a 
short  half-hour  by  motor-car.  He  says  that  he  has  trans- 
mitted in  person  to  the  Division's  Chief  of  Staff  the  in- 
structions of  the  Corps  Commander  that  the  attack  order 
might  be  modified  to  the  extent  of  withholding  the  ad- 
vance of  the  infantry. 

And  upon  that,  to  his  amazement,  the  Corps  Staff  in- 
forms him  that  there  has  been  another  change  —  that, 
after  all,  the  original  attack  order  should  stand,  that  the 
infantry  should  participate. 

What  was  the  reason  for  this  volte-face?  From  what 
source  was  derived  the  reason  for  the  Corps'  last-minute 
change  of  plan.^  There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  up  to  seven 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  November  11,  the  Corps  in- 
tended to  avoid  casualties  to  the  infantry  of  its  divisions 
by  authorizing  their  remaining  in  place.  But,  less  than  one 
hour  later,  one  finds  that,  for  some  reason,  the  Corps  com- 
pletely reversed  itself,  and  in  a  matter  of  the  first  impor- 
tance. 

It  will  be  an  interesting  task  for  a  commentator  on 
the  conduct  of  the  First  American  Armv  on  November 
11  to  determine  the  authority  under  which  the  Second 
Colonial  Corps  ^  enforced  the  order,  which  an  hour  before 
it  had  suspended,  for  the  attack  by  the  infantry  between 
the  hours  of  9  and  11  which  was  like  to  cost  America  the 
fives  of  many,  with  the  attainment  of  no  corresponding 
military  advantage. 

Immediately  after  the  news  of  this  change  was  tele- 
phoned to  Division  Headquarters  a  second  message  ^  was 
sent  forward  to  the  brigade  commanders  at  the  hours 
indicated : 

^  The  Staff  of  the  Second  Colonial  Corps  replaced  that  of  the  XVII  Corps 
(French)  about  November  C;  but  General  Claude!  retained  command  through- 
out the  operations. 

*  Written  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  telephoned  by  officer  in  charge  of  message 
center. 


276  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

November  11,  1918  Rush 

Priority 
51st  Inf.  Brig.  9.15 
52d  Inf.   Brig.  9.16 
51st  F.A.  Brig.  9.18 
From:  Chief  of  Staff 
To:       C.G.'s  51st  and  52d  Inf.  Brig,  and  51st  Art.  Brig. 

Orders  from  Regret  Corps  direct  that  the  infantry  will  advance 
to  the  attack  as  per  F.O.  105,  26th  Div.,  at  9.30.  The  attack  will 
stop  at  11,  when  hostilities  will  cease. 

Relayed  to  the  battalion  commanders,  it  found  some 
of  the  forward  elements  already  under  w^ay,  while  others 
(who  had  received  the  order  to  stand  fast)  were  under  the 
necessity  of  assembling  and  forming  up  for  the  advance. 
The  hue  which  finally  moved  out,  therefore,  was  an  irreg- 
ular one,  the  coordination  of  the  advance  by  all  elements 
being  impossible  under  the  circumstances.  And  by  this 
time  also  w^ord  had  flashed  forward  that  eleven  o'clock  was 
to  see  the  end  of  all  things. 

But  full  results  were  attained.  On  the  left  the  104th  In- 
fantry completed  the  capture  of  Ville-devant-Chaumont; 
in  the  center  the  front  was  advanced  to  the  railroad ;  a  line 
from  Saint-Andre  Farm  to  a  point  just  west  of  Bezonvaux 
marked  the  limit  of  attainment  of  the  right  of  the  Division 
(102d  Infantry). 

Eleven  o'clock!  For  two  hours  past  the  artillery  had 
been  endeavoring  to  loose  off  all  its  ammunition  in  the 
general  direction  of  Metz.  As  the  time  to  cease  firing 
approached,  battery  commanders  contrived  all  manner  of 
devices  by  which  every  officer  and  man  should  share  in 
firing  the  last  shots  of  the  war  —  they  fastened  lengths  of 
wire  to  the  lanyards  so  that  whole  gun  crews  could  lay 
hold  together;  they  fired  with  their  watches  in  hand,  so 
as  not  to  overpass  the  hour,  but  to  give  full  measure  till 
the  moment  struck.  Eleven  o'clock,  and  the  sodden  in- 
fantry halted,  dumbly,  as  if  in  a  dream.  There  was  no 
rejoicing,  no  noisy  jubilation;  the  men  were  stupid  with 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        277 

fatigue  and  the  reaction  which  follows  a  too  prolonged 
tension  of  the  nerves.  Eleven  o'clock  —  an  end  of  being 
killed !  That  was  the  thought  in  the  hearts  of  the  men  up 
front,  however  vocable  might  be  the  generals  in  their 
professional  regret,  at  luncheon,  that  the  punishment  of 
the  enemy  could  not  continue  a  week  longer.  In  Verdun 
a  colorful,  frantic  parade  of  poilus,  British  engineers,  and 
Americans,  headed  by  the  101st  Engineer  band  —  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  flung  to  the  breeze  by  the  French 
from  the  cathedral  towers  —  a  vivid  speech  by  the  heroic 
General  Marchand.  At  Division  Headquarters  every- 
thing oddly  quiet,  the  officers  and  men  coming,  as  it  were, 
out  of  a  curious  dream,  incapable  of  rejoicing,  perhaps  with 
hearts  so  full  they  dared  not  trust  themselves  to  speak. 
At  evening  bonfires  all  along  the  line  —  big,  roaring  blazes, 
fit  to  warm  the  bones  of  whole  companies;  a  dazzling  dis- 
play, both  in  Boche-land  and  for  miles  along  our  side,  of 
flares,  rockets,  artillery  charges.  Very  lights,  everything 
that  would  burn.  Sentinels  patrol  the  front  to  prevent  any 
fraternization,  for  which  the  treacherous  enemy  appears 
only  to6  eager.  Boche  oflScers  appear  with  a  white  flag  — 
a  parlementaire,  to  show,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  armistice,  where  their  mine-fields  are  located,  and  to 
render  them  harmless.  The  front  line  is  accurately  marked 
on  the  maps ;  measures  of  security  are  retained  in  full  oper- 
ation; organization  commanders  see  to  it  that  their  men 
are  kept  strictly  in  hand.  Immediate  measures  are  taken 
to  warm,  feed,  and  shelter  the  men  and  horses. 

For  a  day  or  two  the  Division  waited  for  orders.  It  was 
designated  at  once  as  one  of  the  first  American  organiza- 
tions to  receive  the  honor  of  going  to  the  Rhine  as  part  of 
the  Army  of  Occupation.  Orders  were  in  preparation;  but 
presently,  following  the  reports  of  inspectors,  and  the  re- 
gretful acknowledgment  of  the  Division  Commander  that 
the  reduced  physical  condition  of  both  troops  and  animals 
made  a  march  to  the  German  area  impracticable,  the  des- 


278  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

tination  was  changed,  and  the  opportunity  of  sharing  the 
honors  of  the  Army  of  Occupation  passed  forever. 

The  Corps  Commander  called,  on  the  day  after  the 
armistice  was  signed,  to  express  his  appreciation  of  the 
Division's  loyal  efforts  to  carry  out  his  orders  —  orders 
imposed  on  him  by  the  authorities  of  the  First  American 
Army.^  Now,  regretting  the  necessity  of  attempting  opera- 
tions on  the  Verdun  front  of  the  sort  which  had  been  as- 
signed to  his  command,  aware  of  the  futility  of  attacking 
fortresses  like  Hill  360  with  any  forces  other  than  very 
large  ones,  the  Corps  Commander  desired  to  condole 
with  the  Division  Commander  on  the  losses  he  had  in- 
curred, by  emphasizing  the  enormous  difficulties,  the  su- 
preme importance  to  the  enemy  of  the  Verdun  front.  Com- 
pared with  the  tasks  set  for  the  Seventeenth  and  Second 
Colonial  Corps,  those  assigned  to  the  units  west  of  the 
Meuse  were  simple.  And  sincere  was  his  regret  that  he 
had  been  obliged  to  fritter  away,  in  small  operations,  the 
Thirty-Third,  Twenty-Ninth,  Seventy-Ninth,  and  Twenty- 
Sixth  Divisions,  as  well  as  the  Eighteenth,  Twenty-Sixth, 
and  Tenth  French.  With  the  weight  of  all  seven,  he  was 
confident  that  he  could  have  rolled  the  Germans  off  the 
Verdun  hills  in  a  single  powerful  stroke. 

^  Already,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  first  Verdun  operation.  General  Claudel 
had  voiced  his  thanks  and  encouragement,  as  follows : 

Headquarters,  Seventeenth  Army  Corps 
Staff,  1st  Bureau 

October  24,  1918 
From:  General  Claudel,  commanding  the  Seventeenth  Army  Corps. 
To:       The  Commanding  General,  Tn'enty-Sixth  Division. 

General:  The  reputation  of  your  division  preceded  it  here  far  ahead. 

To  all  its  titles  of  glory  gained  in  fierce  struggles,  and  only  recently  at  the  signal 
of  Hattonchatel,  it  has  added  on  the  23d  of  October  a  page  which  perhaps  is  more 
modest,  but  still  does  it  great  honor. 

In  a  few  hours,  as  at  a  maneuver,  it  has  gained  all  the  objectives  assigned  it  in 
the  difficult  sector  of  the  Woods  of  Houppy,  Etrayes  and  Belleau. 

This  operation  is  evidence,  indeed,  of  superior  instruction,  mobility  and  will. 

I  do  not  know  how  to  thank  you  sufficiently  for  your  assistance,  dear  General, 
and  it  is  my  great  desire  to  express  to  you  all  our  grateful  admiration  for  your 
splendid  division  which  thus  has  added  its  name  to  all  of  those  who  have  fought 
to  hurl  the  enemy  back  from  the  outskirts  of  Verdun. 


BEFORE  THE  ARMISTICE  AND  AFTER        279 

A  leave  party  of  six  hundred  was  made  up  immediately 
from  the  infantry  battalions  most  in  need  of  refreshment. 
Brought  out  of  the  Hue  half  dazed,  filthy,  ragged,  wet,  and 
exhausted,  the  men  were  bathed,  reclothed,  and  rested  for 
a  day  before  sending  them  along  to  the  Grenoble  area  — 
the  first  men  of  the  Division  to  receive  a  surcease  from 
duty,  drill,  and  the  front  line  since  February  8  on  the 
Chemin  des  Dames. 

But  soon  came  the  end  of  work  and  fife  on  the  line  for 
all  the  rest.  By  November  14  there  had  straggled  into  the 
area  another  division.  This  was  the  Sixth  —  a  division 
which  had  been  for  weeks  past  continually  in  reserve  or 
support,  making  long  marches  day  after  day,  with  so  lit- 
tle transport  that,  lacking  mules,  the  men  were  between 
the  shafts  dragging  the  machine-gun  carts.  To  these  new- 
comers, therefore,  the  New  Englanders  gave  place.  On  that 
day  the  command  passed.  For  twenty-six  days  the  Divi- 
sion had  occupied  the  Neptune  Sector  and  fought  to  en- 
large its  bounds,  the  longest  period  of  service,  be  it  said, 
which  any  division  rendered  during  the  Meuse-Argonne 
offensive  of  the  First  American  Army.  Only  five  and  one 
half  kilometers  of  ground  were  gained;  but  what  that 
ground  was,  let  any  testify  who  fought  before  Verdun, 
the  historic  field  of  blood,  and  tears,  and  imperishable 
glory,  where,  with  every  task  accomplished,  in  the  face 
of  supreme  difficiilty,  the  Twenty-Sixth  ended  an  incom- 
parable fighting  career. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

RECONSTRUCTION  —  THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI 

AREA 

BY  comfortable  marches,  arranged  with  the  intention 
that  no  unit  should  be  required  to  cover  more  than 
twenty  kilometers  in  one  day,  the  Division  moved  along 
southward.  For  two  or  three  nights  it  billeted  in  the  region 
it  had  traversed  on  the  way  up  to  the  Saint-Mihiel  action; 
it  crossed  the  Bar-le-Duc-Commercy  line,  entered  the  area 
between  Gondrecourt  and  Neufchateau,  and  thence  moved 
southward  again  until,  on  November  23,  Division  Head- 
quarters was  opened  in  Montigny-le-Roi,  a  village  north 
of  Langres  between  Chaumont  and  Bourbonne-les-Bains. 
Some  difficulty  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  Twenty-Ninth 
and  Eighty-First  Divisions  were  also  moving  south  at  the 
same  time  as  the  Twenty-Sixth,  while  other  troops,  both 
French  and  American,  were  crossing  the  line  of  march  of 
the  Division  to  join  the  Armies  of  Occupation  on  the  Rhine. 
It  happened  occasionally,  therefore,  that  more  than  one 
unit  would  arrive  in  a  town  on  the  same  afternoon,  each 
expecting  to  be  billeted  there  and  possessing  competent 
authority  to  do  so  —  a  confusion  which  required  much 
telephoning  to  the  troop  movement  bureau  at  Army  Head- 
quarters in  Souilly  with  requests  for  an  immediate  solution 
of  the  difficulties;  sometimes  also  the  bureau  adjusted  mat- 
ters. More  often  the  unit  commanders  concerned  made 
haste  to  occupy  the  nearest  village  which  at  the  moment 
stood  vacant  —  being  more  solicitous  to  shelter  and  rest 
their  men  than  to  abide  by  march  tables,  graphs,  and 
billeting  assignments  which,  as  a  result  of  the  unforeseen 
chances  of  every  march,  had  not  worked  out  according 
to  the  Staff's  calculations.  On  the  whole,  however,  the 


THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI  AREA  281 

troops  came  along  without  undue  discomfort,  while  the 
daily  "hike"  over  good  roads,  under  a  bright  wintry  sky, 
acted  as  a  veritable  tonic.  The  march  was  mostly  hard 
on  the  supply  departments  and  the  couriers,  who  had  to 
travel  long  distances  to  connect  up  with  the  various  or- 
ganization Headquarters  for  the  delivery  of  rations  and 
orders. 

Two  incidents  principally  marked  the  week's  journey. 
The  first  was  the  transfer  of  some  forty  battalion  and 
company  officers  to  the  Thirty-Second  Division  for  duty 
in  the  Coblenz  area.  These  were  picked  out  from  regiments 
on  the  march,  incontinently,  and  sent  off  much  bewildered 
at  their  involuntary  change  of  allegiance. 

The  second  incident  occurred  November  18,  when  Head- 
quarters was  at  Benoite-Vaux.  On  this  date  Brigadier- 
General  Bamford  was  relieved,  after  a  command  lasting 
less  than  a  month.  One  looks  for  traces  of  this  officer's 
personal  influence  and  direction  on  the  Division's  actions, 
movements,  or  fife,  but  finds  little  or  nothing  to  record 
except  his  orders  relieving  the  brigade  and  regimental 
commanders,  to  which  allusion  has  already  been  made. 
General  Bamford  kept  touch  with  conditions  "up  front," 
^oing  in  person  to  the  forward  lines  very  frequently,  and 
set  an  excellent  example  of  military  bearing.  But,  gen- 
erally speaking,  his  exercise  of  command  was  merely  that 
of  a  titular  head,  of  an  interim  executive.  In  no  sense  did 
he  ever  lead,  inspire,  or  guide  the  men  under  liim.  By 
the  oflScers  he  was  regarded  as, the  commander  who  gave 
his  authorization  to  whatever  the  Chief  of  Staff  suggested 
as  being  desirable  or  necessary.  It  was  to  the  latter,  all 
through  the  Bamford  regime,  that  officers  looked  for  or- 
ders; anything  resembling  a  personal  touch  between  the 
Division  Commander  and  his  brigade  or  regimental  com- 
manders was  far  to  seek. 

In  his  stead  there  came  to  the  Division  a  commanding 
general  who,  within  an  hour  of  his  assumption  of  command. 


282  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

made  his  presence,  authority,  good-will,  and  ideals  of  dis- 
cipline plainly  felt.  This  was  Major-General  Harry  C.  Hale. 
Graduated  from  West  Point  in  1883,  a  colonel  of  infantry 
in  the  Regular  establishment  in  1915,  General  Hale  had 
enjoyed  a  more  than  usually  varied  duty  —  against  the 
Indians,  with  volunteer  troops,  in  the  Phihppines,  in 
China,  as  aide-de-camp  to  General  Wesley  Merritt,  and 
as  adjutant-general  of  two  important  departments.  Ap- 
pointed Brigadier  and  Major-General  in  1917,  General 
Hale  was  placed  in  command  of  Camp  Zachary  Taylor  at 
Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  subsequently  commanded  the 
Eighty-Fourth  Division.  This  command  he  had  all  through 
the  period  of  training  and  also  in  France,  until  the  Eighty- 
Fourth  was  broken  up  to  furnish  replacements,  army 
troops,  and  various  detachments;  upon  which,  after  a 
brief  stay  at  Langres,  he  was  assigned  to  the  Twenty- 
Sixth.  His  position  was  for  the  moment  a  httle  difficult. 
Himself  without  experience  as  a  field  commander  in  France, 
he  had  veteran  fighting  troops  under  him;  he  was  an  entire 
stranger  to  his  Staff.  And  how  General  Hale,  by  energy, 
kindliness,  the  exaction  of  a  firm  discipline  on  every  officer 
and  man,  and  by  "playing  the  game"  hard  and  squarely, 
put  new  interest,  vigor,  and  spirit  into  weary  troops, 
would  furnish  interesting  material  to  any  student  of  the 
psychology  both  of  armies  and  of  individual  soldiers. 

In  the  Montigny  area  the  Division  came  under  the  orders 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  (Major-General  C.  P.  Summerall).  At 
once  was  begun  a  course  of  training  "for  eventuahties." 
Officers  and  men  were  impressed  with  the  fact  that  an 
armistice  does  not  mean  a  peace  —  that  hostilities  might 
recommence  —  that  the  Division  might  be  called  upon  to 
perform  duty  in  Germany.  There  was  to  be  no  assumption 
on  the  part  of  anybody  that  its  work  was  over.  This  was 
healthy.  It  is  not  quite  sure  that  everybody  believed  it; 
but  at  any  rate,  proceeding  on  the  principle  that  "next 
to  making  war,  there  was  no  occupation  for  the  soldier 


MAJOR-GENERAL  HARRY  C.  HALE 


THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI  AREA  283 

better  than  preparing  for  war,"  the  days  were  quickly 
filled  with  drills,  brisk  physical  exercise,  and  military 
study  for  all  ranks  —  with  the  result  that,  sooner  than 
one  could  dream,  every  regiment  recovered  tone  and 
spirits.  It  was  the  old  story  of  work's  tonic  effect.  It  made 
no  difference  that  there  seemed  to  be  no  definite  object 
in  the  work.  That  oflficers  and  men  were  kept  busy  at 
something,  all  day,  every  day,  was  enough  to  accomplish 
the  desired  result. 

To  his  Staff,  as  to  every  battalion,  the  new  Division 
Commander  reiterated  the  one  thought:  That  the  one 
purpose  he  desired  to  accompHsh  was  to  restore  the  whole 
Division  to  its  old-time  snap,  smartness,  and  contentment, 
to  recover  its  health  and  spirits,  to  bring  it  home  —  when 
the  time  came  —  in  perfect  condition. 

To  this  end  other  factors  were  soon  to  contribute  very 
materially.  Leaves  for  officers  and  men  were  now  ar- 
•ranged  by  regular  schedule,  it  being  intended  that  every- 
body should  receive  ten  days'  permission.  This  could 
be  spent  by  the  enlisted  men  in  the  area  in  the  south  of 
France,  not  far  from  Aix-les-Bains,  set  aside  and  care- 
fully organized  for  the  purpose  —  the  hotels,  theaters, 
and  all  other  tourist  accommodations  being  leased  by  the 
American  authorities  for  the  benefit  of  troops  on  leave, 
while  their  entertainment  was  confided  to  a  large  ex- 
tent to  the  Y.M.C.A.  and  other  welfare  associations. 
Officers  went  very  generally  to  points  on  the  Riviera,  Nice 
and  Cannes  being  the  principal  centers.  Paris  at  this 
time  was  universally  barred  as  a  place  in  which  to  spend 
one's  leave,  the  public  misbehavior  of  a  few  having  sufficed 
to  exclude  all  others;  but  other  interesting  cities  were 
available  beside  the  Nice  area,  and  some  officers  took  this 
opportunity  to  get  to  such  famous  scenes  of  the  war  as 
Rhcims,  or  even  to  revisit  Verdun.  And  leave  worked 
wonders.  The  men,  who  went  on  permission  in  parties 
of  six  hundred  at  a  time,  made  excellent  records  for  good 


284  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

behavior;  tliey  all  came  back  freshened  and  brightened 
—  after  scores  of  the  quaintest  adventures.^ 

Another  very  important  feature  in  the  rejuvenation  of 
the  Division  at  this  time  was  the  return  to  its  embrace 
of  many  of  its  sons  from  hospital  or  from  service  with 
other  units.  No  longer  were  these  soldiers  tossed  about 
from  replacement  battalion  to  casual  camp  and  back 
again,  heartsick  and  lonely.  It  was  to  their  home  that 
they  were  sent  now  —  back  to  their  "buddies,"  back  to 
their  company  and  kin.  And  their  happiness  was  touching; 
and  the  satisfaction  of  the  typical  worried  unit  commander 
over  the  return  of  his  lads  to  his  care  was  boundless. 
The  rejoicing  in  all  ranks  gave  an  indication  clear  enough 
that  finally,  after  months  of  following  a  wrong  trail,  the 
powers  had  hit  on  the  proper  method  of  handling  men 
released  from  hospital. 

Early  in  December  the  prisoners  lost  at  Seicheprey, 
in  Epieds,  and  elsewhere  were  returned  to  the  Division. 
They  had  no  particular  complaint  of  harsh  treatment  by 
their  German  captors;  but  they  all  agreed  in  deploring 
the  wretched  lot  of  the  British,  and  especially  that  of  the 
Russians,  in  the  various  camps. 

A  change  appeared  to  come  into  the  attitude  of  higher 
authority  toward  the  Division.  Comphments  from  the 
Corps  Commander  were  frequent  on  various  points  in 
the  discipline,  appearance,  and  condition  of  regiments  or 
trains.  And  at  Christmas  time,  the  Twenty-Sixth  was 
honored  by  being  designated  both  as  the  Division  with 
whom  President  Wilson  should  eat   Christmas  dinner, 

*  The  Corps  Commander  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
Division,  in  which  he  comments  on  the  "high  standards  of  conduct  and  soldierly 
pride  manifested  by  members  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Division  during  their  pres- 
ence in  the  Auvergne  leave  area.  Their  behavior  was  such  as  to  attract  the  favor- 
able notice  of  the  commanding  officer  of  that  area,  and  he  was  so  highly  im- 
pressed that  he  has  communicated  his  sentiments  in  a  complimentary  letter  with 
reference  thereto.  The  members  of  this  leave  detachment  reflected  credit  upon 
the  Division,  the  Corps,  and  the  American  Army,  and  have  established  a  stand- 
ard worthy  of  emulation  by  all  who  succeed  them." 


THE  MONTIGXY-LE-ROI  AREA  285 

and  as  that  which  should  furnish  the  Presidential  guard 
of  honor  when  Mr.  Wilson  visited  General  Headquarters 
at  Chaumont.^  It  had  been  intimated  at  an  earlier  date 
that  the  presidential  party  would  review  the  Division 
by  driving  through  the  area  over  a  designated  route 
along  which  the  various  regiments  should  be  drawn  up. 
Full  preparations  were  made  for  this  ceremony,  and 
also  for  a  more  conventional  division  review;  positions 
were  staked  out;  units  were  practiced  in  the  required  for- 
mations; preliminary  march  orders  were  issued.  But  this 
plan  was  changed  later  to  a  review  by  the  President  of 
detachments  from  all  near-by  divisions  at  Humes,  north 
of  Langres,  to  be  held  on  the  morning  of  December  25. 
To  this  review  the  Twenty-Sixth  sent  a  provisional  bat- 

1  The  2d  Battalion,  102d  Infantry;  and  band,  101st  Infantry.  The  orders 
were  as  follows: 

Headquarters  First  Army 
American  Expeditionary  Forces,  France 
20  Dec.  18 
From:      Chief  of  Staff,  1st  Army,  A.E.F. 
To:  Commanding  General,  26th  Division,  A.E.F. 

Subject :  Visit  of  President  of  the  United  States. 

1.  The  Army  Commander  desires  me  to  inform  you  that,  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  President  has  selected  the  26th  Division 
as  being  the  division  he  will  visit  on  Christmas  Day.  This  selection  was  made 
on  the  ground  that  the  26th  Division  had  the  longest  period  of  service  in  France. 

2.  The  Army  Commander  desires  that  you  be  present  at  the  Presidential  review 
at  Humes,  which  is  to  start  at  10.30  a.m.  on  December  25,  1918,  so  that  you  may 
conduct  the  President  from  the  review  ground  to  such  town  or  towns  in  your  area 
as  he  may  desire  to  visit.  The  Army  Commander  desires  me  to  say  that  all  organ- 
izations in  the  area  should  be  prepared  for  this  visit,  billets  properly  policed  and 
men  lined  up  outside  of  same  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  President.  He  also  desires 
that  the  non-commissioned  officers  in  charge  of  quarters  be  ready  and  on  the 
alert  to  precede  the  President  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  into  such  billets  as 
they  may  desire  to  inspect. 

3.  The  President  has  expressed  a  desire  to  eat  Christmas  dinner  with  the  men, 
and  to  that  end  it  is  directed  that  j  ou  select  some  organization  which  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  party  can  visit  at  dinner  time  and  eat  the  soldiers'  dinner  with  the 
men.  In  the  party  it  is  estimated  that  there  will  be  somewhere  in  the  neighborhood 
of  40  persons. 

H.  A.  Drum 
Official:  Chief  oj  Staff 

L.\UREXCE  HaLSTEAD 
Colonel,  General  Staff 
A.C.  of  S.,  G-3 


286  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

talion  of  infantry,  composed  of  what  were  deemed  the 
four  best-drilled  companies  of  the  four  regiments  — 
"B,"  101st;  "K,"  102d;  "F,"  103d;  "L,"  104th.  From  the 
101st  Field  Signal  Battalion  was  sent  one  company;  from 
the  101st  Engineers  went  Company  "F";  from  the  102d 
Machine-Gun  Battahon  went  Companies  "A,"  "B," 
*'C,"  "D,"  the  troops  being  transported  in  trucks  to  and 
from  the  reviewing  field.  Immediately  after  this  ceremony 
the  President  drove  to  Montigny-le-Roi,  inspected  some 
billets,  and  later  took  Christmas  dinner  with  officers  from 
Division  Headquarters  and  all  units  of  the  Division,  in  a 
hospital  building  on  the  edge  of  the  village,  where  great 
efforts  had  been  made  to  receive  the  Division's  distin- 
guished guest  with  full  honor.  The  general  impression 
made  by  the  troops  on  this  occasion  may  best  be  sum- 
marized by  the  telegram  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  to 
General  Hale: 

G.H.Q.,  Dec.  26,  1918 
C.G,,  Twenty-Sixth  Division 

I  desire  to  congratulate  the  Division  on  the  excellent  work  of 
the  battalion  which  represented  it  as  the  guard  of  honor  at  Chau- 
mont,  on  the  fine  appearance  and  discipline  manifested  by  the 
men  during  the  visit  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  the 
billets  of  the  Division,  and  on  the  splendid  appearance  made  by 
the  detachments  representing  the  Division  in  the  review  for  the 
President  at  Humes,  France,  December  25,  1918. 

Pershing 

By  the  first  of  January,  rumors  as  to  the  early  return 
of  the  Division  to  the  United  States  became  rife.  A 
searching  inspection  by  fifteen  officers  from  General 
Headquarters,  which  occurred  just  after  New  Year's, 
gave  point  to  the  gossip;  the  fact  that  the  Division  was 
known  to  have  won  a  very  high  rating  on  this  occasion 
did  not  dim  the  general  hope  and  expectation.  Nothing 
oflBcial,  however,  was  allowed  to  leak  out  in  the  line  of 
positive  information.  January  schedules  for  drill  in- 
spections, terrain  exercises  and  maneuvers  were  prepared 


THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI  AREA  287 

with  the  usual  painstaking  care;  the  daily  routine  was  not 
changed  by  a  hair's  breadth;  the  attention  to  duty  was 
not  relaxed.  Not  a  hint  was  let  fall,  officially,  of  what 
was  actually  in  store.  The  news,  when  it  did  arrive, 
came  as  a  complete  surprise. 

Division  Headquarters  was  profoundly  quiet  one  after- 
noon. In  the  entrance  hall  of  the  narrow  house  an  officer 
cautioned  silence  to  all  who  came  and  went;  in  the  upper 
rooms  the  typewriters  had  ceased  their  chatter;  outside 
the  couriers  had  coaxed  their  roaring  motor-cycles  to 
something  like  decency.  For  in  the  office  of  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  the  Corps  Commander  was  lecturing  on  the 
tactics  of  the  Meuse-Argonne  advance.  And  when  General 
C.  P.  Summerall  talks  of  war,  not  a  soul  but  cranes  to 
hear  every  word.  Intent,  eagerly  interested,  a  tightly 
wedged  crowd  of  field  and  staff  officers,  just  in  from  a 
divisional  terrain  exercise,  was  learning  anew  some  price- 
less lessons.  And  suddenly  a  curious  rustle,  a  flutter,  a 
quietly  suppressed  exclamation,  broke  the  silence  from 
the  upper  regions.  A  wide-eyed  sergeant  from  the  mes- 
sage center  clattered  halfway  down  the  stairs  —  remem- 
bered his  drill  —  and,  finishing  on  tiptoes,  whispered 
with  respectful  violence  to  the  sentinel  captain  in  the  hall, 
who  stifled  a  hallelujah.  From  the  telegraph  office  came  a 
slip,  and  the  captain  pondered  whether  he  would  risk 
having  charges  preferred  and  shout  the  news  it  contained 
through  the  door  to  the  Corps  Commander's  audience. 
Two  days  before  all  officers  had  been  charged  explicitly 
that  they  were  not  to  accept  or  discuss  any  rumor  of  a 
homeward  move  at  all  —  they  were  to  bend  all  their  en- 
ergies on  preparing  for  warhke  eventualities.  But  now! 
The  message  center  had  received  the  glad  tidings;  in  a 
moment  the  couriers  and  orderlies  would  know  it ;  already 
it  was  hard  to  suppress  the  cheers  that  rose  unbidden 
from  the  upstairs  region;  yet  one  must  wait,  before  get- 
ting the  news  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  until  the  Corps  Com- 


288  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

mander  had  finished  his  exposition  of  the  accepted  theory 
of  the  employment  of  machine  guns  during  the  initial 
stages  of  the  infantry  attack! 

One  may  be  permitted  to  guess  that  perhaps  the  sen- 
tinel captain  did  whisper  the  tidings  to  one  or  two  of  his 
associates  near  the  door.  It  is  possible  that  the  audience 
picked  echoes  of  the  news  out  of  the  very  air,  with  nothing 
said  at  all.  But  certain  it  is  that  not  for  an  instant  did  the 
attention  relax  even  by  a  hair;  not  an  eye  wavered  in  its 
stony  glare  at  the  distinguished  lecturer;  not  an  ear  but 
remained  pricked  in  proper  deference.  One  fancies  that 
it  was  the  demeanor  of  those  oflScers  during  that  hour 
of  schooling  which  led  the  Corps  Commander  to  extol 
the  surpassing  discipline  of  the  Twenty-Sixth. 

This  was  the  bit  of  news  that  chcked  in  over  the  wire 
January  8,  1919: 

Bar-sur-Aube,  Jan.  8,  1919 

C.G.  26th  Div. 

Following  telegram  from  G.H.Q.  is  repeated  for  your  informa- 
tion and  necessary  action  quote  no  3048  G-3  commanding 
general  S.O.S.  has  been  directed  this  date  to  prepare  26th  Divi- 
sion for  return  to  United  States  and  orders  will  issue  from  Com- 
manding General  S.O.S.  for  the  movement  of  Division  by  rail 
to  the  Le  Mans  area  for  preparation  period  all  orders  for  disposi- 
tion of  material  animals  and  surplus  equipment  will  issue  from 
Commanding  General  S.O.S.  period  first  elements  will  arrive  in 
Le  Mans  area  January  20th  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable 
end  quote  acknowledge. 

Drum 

Busy,  indeed,  were  the  days  that  followed.  To  go  back 
a  little,  we  should  recall  that  the  artillery  did  not  ac- 
company the  Division  on  its  march  down  from  Verdun 
to  the  Montigny  area.  Barely  capable  of  fetching  its 
guns  along,  owing  to  the  depleted  state  of  its  animal 
transport,  the  brigade  halted  in  the  vicinity  of  Ligny-en- 
Barrois  to  take  account  of  stock.  Here  it  remained  for 
some  three  weeks,  turned  in  all  its  animals  save  those 
required  for  the  ration  and  baggage  wagons,  as  well  as  a 


THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI  AREA  289 

great  part  of  its  general  artillery  equipment.  Toward  the 
end  of  December  it  rejoined  the  Division;  but  parked 
its  guns  under  guard  at  the  detraining  point  (La  Ferte- 
sur-Amance),  and  ceased  to  exist  as  a  brigade  equipped 
for  field  service.  It  is  a  curious  illustration  of  how  things 
are  and  must  be  done  in  an  army,  that,  because  a  con- 
signment of  tractors  for  the  howitzers  had  arrived  for  the 
51st  F.A.  Brigade  at  Marseilles,  a  detail  was  required 
to  go  and  fetch  them  to  where  the  brigade  was  stationed, 
even  though  the  Fifty-First  would  never  use  them. 

A  colorful  interlude  in  the  preparations  for  the  home- 
ward movement  occurred  on  January  15,  a  brief  and 
briUiant  half-hour,  when  the  French  bestowed,  as  it  were, 
a  final  Godspeed  on  the  Division  which  for  so  many 
months  had  ranked  high  in  their  affections.  With  only 
the  briefest  warning  arrangements  were  made  to  receive 
at  Mandres-les-Nogent  both  the  American  Commander- 
in-Chief  and  the  famous  defender  of  Verdun,  the  second 
soldier  in  France  after  the  peerless  Foch,  Marshal  Petain, 
who  was  to  decorate  with  the  Croix  de  Guerre  the  colors 
of  the  regiment  and  the  battalion  which  had  done  so 
valiantly  at  Marcheville  on  September  26,  the  102d 
Infantry.  On  a  gray,  misty  afternoon  the  battalion  was 
paraded,  the  cross  was  aflBxed  to  the  colors  by  the  Mar- 
shal in  person  with  all  the  appropriate  and  stirring  cere- 
mony prescribed  for  that  occasion;  and  then,  turning  to 
General  Pershing,  Petain  afiixed  to  his  breast  also  the 
little  bronze  cross  with  its  green  and  red  ribbon.  It  was  a 
brief  affair;  but  how  deeply  the  honor  and  its  method  of 
presentation  touched  the  hearts  of  the  regiment  and  of 
the  whole  Division,  all  those  can  testify  who  shared  in  the 
emotions  of  the  moment. 

One  should  record  also,  at  this  place,  before  the  Divi- 
sion boards  the  trains  for  the  west,  that  changes  in  com- 
mand continued  all  through  the  months  of  November 
and  December.  To  the  command  of  the  52d  Infantry 


290  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

Brigade,  following  General  Cole's  relief,  there  was  as- 
signed General  Shelton,  whose  place  (in  the  51st  In- 
fantry Brigade)  was  taken  by  Brigadier-General  L.  L. 
Durfee  on  November  23.  As  Cole  returned,  however, 
early  in  December,  General  Durfee  was  transferred 
away  again,  almost  before  he  had  settled  into  his  new 
command.  Major  P.  W.  Loughridge  was  assigned  to  the 
Staff  as  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3,  in  place  of  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel J.  L.  Howard,  formerly  Divisional  Ma- 
chine-Gun  Officer,  who  had  been  doing  duty  as  G-3,  but 
who  now  returned  to  the  United  States.  A  large  number 
of  other  officers  came  at  this  time  from  replacement  cen- 
ters, to  fill  vacancies  in  command.  The  ruling  then  in 
force,  that  no  promotions  could  be  made  or  approved  sub- 
sequent to  the  armistice,  had  summarily  ended  the  hopes 
of  many  field  and  company  officers  who  had  brought  their 
units  through  all  the  fighting.  Colonel  H.  I.  Bearss,  102d 
Infantry,  was  relieved  for  physical  disability  and  succeeded 
by  Colonel  D.  Potts:  Colonel  F.  M.  Hume's  place  with 
the  103d  Infantry  was  taken  by  Colonel  P.  W.  Arnold, 
whose  death  by  accident,  as  the  Division  was  moving 
toward  the  embarkation  area,  was  much  lamented.  Com- 
mand of  the  101st  Machine-Gun  Battahon  fell  to  Major 
L.  H.  Watres  on  December  27;  the  Division  Surgeon, 
Colonel  R.  S.  Porter,  was  transferred  at  his  own  request, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  L.  Jenkins. 
In  the  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion,  Major  W.  R.  Car- 
penter took  command  on  December  20;  Major  A.  R. 
Crafts  took  over  the  101st  Field  Signal  Battalion  on 
January  11;  Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  E.  Jones  assumed 
command  of  the  101st  Sanitary  Train  on  December  10; 
Lieutenant  T.  J.  Byrne  was  assigned  to  take  the  Head- 
quarters Troop  on  January  5. 

There  was  great  activity  in  cleaning  all  ordnance 
equipment,  counting  and  sorting  ammunition,  applying 
cosmoline  and  the  like  to  pistols,  machine  guns,  and 


THE  MONTIGNY-LE-ROI  AREA  291 

other  metal  liable  to  rust.  Harness,  saddles,  instruments 
—  every  bit  of  armament,  in  short,  save  the  rifles  and  the 
men's  own  packs  and  helmets  —  were  turned  in.  It  was  a 
Di\'ision  lightly  equipped,  indeed,  but  rated  high  for  the 
good  condition  of  the  equipment  it  got  rid  of,  which  got 
orders  to  move  on  January  17,  and  took  up  its  march 
to  the  troop  trains  January  21,  this  time  headed  definitely 
toward  home. 

The  movement  to  the  embarkation  area,  which  lay 
between  Le  Mans  and  Tours,  in  the  Department  of  Le 
Sarthe,  was  made,  uneventfully,  in  a  leisurely  manner, 
under  the  direction  of  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
Service  of  Supply,  the  last  units  arriving  in  the  spacious 
new  area  on  February  4,  where  Headquarters  had  been 
opened  in  the  trim  Httle  town  of  Ecommoy. 


CHAPTER  XX 

HOMEW.\RD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS 

THERE  were  two  problems  which  immediately  pre- 
sented themselves  to  the  Division  Commander,  once 
the  troops  were  settled  down  in  the  Le  Mans  area.  The 
first  was :  How  shall  we  keep  the  men  well  in  hand  and  en- 
tirely contented?  The  second  problem,  really  a  corollary 
of  the  first,  had  to  do  with  the  profitable  occupation  of  the 
soldier's  leisure  hours  —  hours  no  longer  required  for  the 
military  drill  and  exercise  which  fit  men  for  combat. 

Home  was  almost  in  sight;  but  unavoidable  delays  in 
operating  the  ocean  transport  schedule  would  have  the  ef- 
fect of  making  the  men  restless.  With  all  the  pressure  of 
actual  war-time  necessity  relaxed,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
maintain  good  habits  of  military  bearing  and  discipline, 
these  would  tend  inevitably  to  decline  from  the  Division's 
high  standards.  The  restless  and  unruly  would  get  to 
straying  —  falling  into  the  prevalent  vice  of  the  whole 
Expeditionary  Force;  the  good  men  would  get  rusty  from 
lack  of  employment. 

Some  wise  and  far-seeing  orders  framed  at  General  Head- 
quarters took  care  of  part  of  the  problem.  Under  their 
provisions  there  were  granted  generous  leaves  to  large 
contingents  of  good-conduct  men,  to  visit  Paris,  London, 
and  other  historic  cities  or  centers  which  it  was  most  de- 
sirable American  soldiers  should  see.  Here  the  leave  par- 
ties were  admirably  handled,  being  provided  with  capable 
guides  from  the  welfare  agencies;  and  everything  possible 
was  done  to  insure  that  the  men  should  derive  lasting 
benefit  from  their  experience.  To  other  regular  leave  areas, 
such  as  those  established  on  the  slopes  of  the  Pyrenees, 
in  Savoy,  or  near  Saint-Malo,  many  more  enlisted  men 
were  sent  for  ten-day  periods. 


HOMEWARD  — THE  LAST  DAYS  293 

But  what  deserves  special  mention  is  the  grandiose 
scheme  for  the  education  of  American  troops  in  France, 
which,  originated  largely  by  civilian  leaders  of  one  of  the 
welfare  societies,  was  pushed  vigorously,  beginning  in  De- 
cember, 1918,  by  the  army  authorities.  It  was  a  scheme 
so  typically  American  as  to  be  a  classic  of  its  kind.  And 
that  it  was  diverted  from  the  rocks  of  disaster,  that  what 
one  may  venture  to  term  its  delightful  madness  produced 
tangible  results  of  any  kind,  is  largely  due  to  the  good 
faith  with  which  the  recipients  of  its  benefits  went  in  to 
claim  them.  The  plan  was  partly  based  on  the  army  regu- 
lation prescribing  the  establishment  of  post  schools  wher- 
ever practicable,  supervised  by  the  chaplains,  where  the 
men  could  be  taught  the  various  elementary  grammar- 
school  subjects.  This  was  the  excellently  solid  foundation; 
but  on  it  was  reared  a  superstructure  with  pinnacles  which 
towered  high  and  glittered  gayly,  but  which  (in  the  ej^es 
of  the  bilious)  appeared  not  a  little  flimsy.  Before  the 
Division  came  to  the  embarkation  area  a  beginning  was 
made.  In  all  units  classes  were  organized  in  reading,  writ- 
ing, arithmetic,  and  history.  For  the  illiterate,  the  for- 
eigner whose  English  was  imperfect,  and  for  the  man  of 
little  schooling,  a  great  deal  of  advantageous  work  was 
planned;  and  so  far  a  considerable  good  was  undoubtedly 
accomplished.  The  Division  Commander  inclined  wisely 
to  have  special  stress  laid  on  teaching  the  illiterates;  there 
were  marked  degrees  of  difference  in  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  unit  commanders  embraced  the  plan;  and  great 
divergences  existed  in  the  relative  skill  and  enterprise 
of  the  school  officers  in  charge  of  the  teaching.  It  was  ex- 
ceedingly difficult  to  get  proper  school  supplies,  textbooks, 
and  the  simplest  apparatus.  The  men  detailed  to  attend 
school  did  not  exhibit  an  absolutelj^  uniform  joy  upon  re- 
ceipt of  their  orders;  there  were  some  who  reincarnated 
the  cheerful  dunces  of  all  the  schoolrooms  of  history.  The 
expenditure  of  effort  was  enormous;  but  perhaps,  when 


294  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

one  hears  of  a  half-dozen  men  who  were  taught  to  write  a 
letter  home  for  the  first  time  in  their  Hves,  the  time,  cost, 
and  final  inevitable  scrapping  of  the  whole  elementary- 
school  machinery  were  justified. 

This  is  less  easy  of  proof  when  one  considers  the  loftier 
reaches  of  the  A.E.F,  educational  plans.  It  was  proposed 
that  selected  officers  and  men,  of  at  least  high-school 
training,  should  be  given  the  advantages  of  short  courses 
at  certain  French  centers  of  learning  like  Rennes,  Lyons, 
Montpellier,  Toulouse,  Grenoble,  and  the  Sorbonne;  or 
of  similar  courses  at  the  English  universities.  Another 
group,  in  furtherance  of  still  another  splendid  scheme, 
were  to  be  sent  to  Beaune,  where  the  widely  heralded 
A.E.F.  "University"  was  inaugurated  in  February.  Ex- 
actly what  it  was  proposed  to  accomplish  by  these  plans 
for  attendance  at  advanced  university  courses,  with  no 
preparation,  with  most  vaguely  defined  objectives,  is  a 
little  difiicult  to  tell.  One  may  presume  that  the  origina- 
tors of  the  plan  had  in  mind  the  idea  that  our  men  would 
get  a  taste  of  foreign  culture,  a  look  through  foreign  eyes, 
an  echo  of  foreign  languages,  an  impression  of  foreign 
civilization.  It  was  doubtless  hoped  that  some  would  be 
enough  attracted  to  commence  serious  study  and  longer 
courses  instead  of  hurrying  home.  Here  was  apparently 
a  way,  moreover,  by  which  a  large  number  of  good  officers 
and  men  could  be  kept  profitably  occupied  and  interested 
during  the  time  of  waiting  for  their  ship  to  sail;  and  per- 
haps it  was  this  very  practical  if  unofficial  consideration 
which  gave  ballast  to  that  which,  considered  as  anything 
remotely  resembling  a  real  educational  plan,  appeared 
merel}'  fantastic.  In  elaborating  and  carrying  out  this  plan, 
the  Young  Men 's  Christian  Association  was  very  active.  To 
the  Beaune  center  of  scholastic  contemplation  and  aca- 
demic research  not  a  great  many  students  apphed  from  the 
Twenty-Sixth  Division.  Inaugurated  only  a  short  time 
prior  to  the  departure  of  the  New  Englanders  for  home, 


HOMEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  295 

its  advantages  did  not  seem  to  outweigh  those  of  the  Divi- 
sion's various  home  towns;  the  few  "YD"  men  who  sought 
culture  in  the  heart  of  Burgundy  were  mainly  those  not 
closely  identified  with  the  Division's  original  membership. 

Another  means  of  keeping  the  men  contented  had  its 
origin  outside  of  the  Division,  and  was  applied  with  that 
singular  earnestness  and  elaboration  of  machinery  which 
marked  so  many  aspects  of  the  American  adventure  in 
army-making.  One  began  to  receive,  about  this  time,  im- 
passioned circulars  from  General  Headquarters  on  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  morale  of  our  troops;  their 
recreations,  amusements,  and  sports  must  be  carefully 
supervised,  made  very  real  and  helpful,  adding  (when  pos- 
sible) that  touch  of  refinement  and  home  culture  which 
only  carefully  chosen  feminine  society  can  impart.  One 
must  devise  all  sorts  of  games,' establish  circulating  li- 
braries, moving-picture  shows,  dances,  concerts,  vaude- 
ville entertainments;  there  must  be  "morale  officers"  as 
already  there  were  "school  ofiicers."  Battery  commanders 
and  platoon  leaders  who  once  had  been  leaders  in  battle 
should  now  become  football  coaches  or  leaders  of  com- 
munity singing.  There  were  not  any  more  soldiers  to  be 
made,  no  more  martial  spirit  to  inculcate,  no  more  need 
of  whetting  the  fighting  edge  of  the  human  material ;  there 
were  only  some  thousands  of  hearty,  well-fed  youths  to 
keep  happy  —  so  that  their  last  memories  of  amij^  life 
would  be  haloed  in  a  rosy,  golden  glow.  "Welfare  work" 
was  to  be  made  the  be-all  and  end-all  of  life  in  the  embar- 
kation area. 

To  these  orders  of  higher  authority,  therefore,  the  Di- 
\'ision  officers  applied  themselves.  The  Division  Machine- 
Gun  Officer's  duties  now  were  limited  to  arranging  with 
the  authorities  of  the  Embarkation  Area  *  and  with  the 
Y.M.C.A.  headquarters  in  Le  Mans  for  suitable  apparatus 

•  TIic  former  Commanding  General  and  Staff  of  the  3(1  Corps,  with  the  Staff, 
mihtary  police,  and  detachments  of  the  former  83d  Division. 


296  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

for  athletic  contests  and  moving-picture  shows;  the  Mu- 
nitions Officer  had  the  task  of  escorting  sixteen  young  ladies 
from  the  Y.M.C.A.  about  the  area  every  afternoon  and 
evening,  to  dances  arranged  for  the  enhsted  men,  a  staff 
reconnaissance  car  and  an  artillery  staff  car  being  assigned 
for  the  use  of  these  welfare  workers.  Officers  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  sections  were  given  all  sorts  of  odd  details,  from 
supervising  the  official  photographing  of  localities  where 
the  Division  was  in  action,  to  checking  up  citations  for 
decorations;  at  Headquarters  only  the  office  of  the  Di- 
vision Adjutant  continued  to  function  as  usual  and  with 
unabated  speed  —  and  here  was  much  work  to  do,  for 
tlie  final  records  of  each  man  in  the  Division  were  now  by 
way  of  being  completed.  It  really  was  difficult  to  find  work 
enough  for  all  hands.  One  should  remember  that  the  ar- 
tillery had  no  guns,  gear,  or  horses;  the  three  battalions 
of  machine-gunners  had  no  machine  guns;  the  splendid 
mihtary  police  were  superseded  in  their  duties  by  the  area 
police;  services  such  as  the  ammunition,  sanitary  and  sup- 
ply trains,  ordnance,  gas,  or  remount,  all  were  left  with 
no  employment  at  all,  or  at  least  found  their  daily  duties 
enormously  reduced.  The  101st  Engineers,  however,  that 
ever-ready  outfit  which  represented  the  very  best  of  the 
Division,  were  working  as  usual.  Attached  to  the  Embar- 
kation Area  temporarily,  they  cheerfully  hammered  away 
on  the  roads,  filling  in  the  holes  and  renewing  the  surface 
which  the  heavy  trucks  continually  wore  away.  The  In- 
spector and  the  Judge-Advocate  were  also  occupied;  but 
there  were  scores  of  officers  and  hundreds  of  enlisted  men 
whose  daily  tasks  were  few  and  light  enough.  There  was 
ingenuity  required  not  only  to  keep  them  happy,  but  also 
to  keep  them  out  of  mischief. 

It  was  proposed  at  first  by  the  Area  Headquarters  to 
give  the  men  a  course  of  target  practice,  going  to  the  ranges 
at  Mayet  and  near  Saint-Biez  by  battalions.  But  this 
order  was  very  soon  rescinded.  It  was  found  really  im- 


HOMEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  297 

practicable  to  carry  it  out  in  the  time  allowed.  The  ranges 
were  in  need  of  extensive  repairs;  materials  for  targets 
and  target  apparatus  were  all  lacking;  the  continuous 
winter  rains  had  turned  the  ground  of  the  ranges  into  cold 
marshes,  where  it  would  be  most  undesirable  for  the  men 
to  camp  out,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  must  now  be 
kept  in  good  physical  condition.  And  so,  once  again,  re- 
course must  be  had  to  methods  and  schemes  not  exactly 
mihtary  to  insure  that  the  troops  remain  hardy  and  hearty. 
One  potent  contribution  to  this  end  —  and  a  means 
refreshingly  soldierly  —  was  the  review  of  the  Division 
which  was  made  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  February 
19,  on  a  field  near  Mayet.  For  days  there  were  held  a  series 
of  preparatory  drills  and  rehearsals,  for  the  limited  area 
of  the  reviewing  field  made  accuracy  of  formation  and 
smoothness  of  movement  indispensable;  elaborate  prepar- 
ation had  to  be  worked  out  for  the  transportation  to  and 
from  the  field  of  distant  units  and  for  their  subsistence; 
the  organization  of  the  ground  itself,  which  was  a  shallow 
hollow  set  about  with  pine  woods,  required  tlie  greatest 
care  of  the  staff  officers  concerned.  But,  as  matters  turned 
out,  all  went  well.  In  a  drizzle  of  misty  rain  the  great  array 
of  troops  was  curiously  somber  and  impressive,  the  bright 
color  of  the  flags,  the  bluish  sheen  of  the  oiled  steel  helmets, 
and  the  gleam  of  the  bayonets  topping  the  mass,  being  in  high 
and  picturesque  relief.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  mounted 
on  a  white  horse,  was  not  content  with  the  usual  formal 
ride  around  the  troops;  he  threaded  his  way  in  and  out,  be- 
tween the  platoons,  asking  questions,  making  comments, 
his  eye  everywhere.  And  the  summary  of  his  impressions 
of  the  Division  is  best  conveyed  in  the  following  letter: 

American  Expeditionary  Forces 
Office  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 

March  il,  1919 

My  dear  General  Hale  : 

It  gives  me  a  great  deal  of  pleasure  to  congratulate  you,  and 
through  you  all  the  oflScers  and  men  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  Divi- 


298  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

sion,  on  their  splendid  appearance  at  the  inspection  and  review 
which  was  held  near  Ecommoy  on  February  19.  The  spirit  and 
soldierly  bearing  of  all  ranks  pleased  me  very  much,  and  was  what 
one  would  have  expected  of  a  division  with  such  a  long  and  excel- 
lent record  in  France. 

Arriving  in  the  autumn  of  1917,  the  division  went  through 
the  prescribed  course  of  instruction  until  early  in  1918,  when, 
brigaded  with  the  French,  it  entered  the  line  for  a  month  and  a 
half's  further  training  north  of  Soissons,  in  the  Chemin  des  Dames 
Sector.  It  was  withdrawn  for  rest  when  the  German  offensive  of 
March  21  necessitated  its  immediate  return  to  the  line  in  the 
La  Reine  and  Boucq  Sectors,  north  of  Toul.  Here  it  had  two 
important  engagements  —  one  in  the  Apremont  Forest,  where 
it  repulsed  with  loss  a  heavy  German  raid,  and  at  Seicheprey, 
where  casualties  on  both  sides  amounted  to  approximately  2000 
men. 

On  July  18  the  Division  was  thrown  into  the  battle  between 
the  Aisne  and  the  Marne,  advancing  in  seven  days  more  than 
17  kilometers  against  determined  enemy  opposition,  and  captur- 
ing the  towns  of  Epieds,  Trugny,  Torcy,  Belleau  and  Givry. 

It  next  took  part  in  the  American  offensive  of  September  at 
Saint-Mihiel.  Operating  under  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  Rupt  and 
Troyon  Sectors,  north  of  Saint-Mihiel,  it  captured  Bois-des- 
Eparges,  Hattonchatel,  and  Vigneulles. 

Later,  during  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  it  attacked  north- 
east of  Verdun,  and  aided  in  the  storming  of  Etrayes  Ridge,  cap- 
turing Bois  de  Belleu  and  the  Bois  d'Ormont,  one  of  the  most 
formidable  heights  in  that  region.  The  Division  was  in  this 
sector  when  the  armistice  called  a  halt  to  active  operations. 

Each  soldier  should  be  proud  of  the  share  which  the  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division  has  had  in  adding  glory  to  the  fighting  record  of 
our  armies,  and  I  want  every  man  to  know  of  my  own  apprecia- 
tion, and  that  of  his  fellows  throughout  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces,  for  the  splendid  work  which  has  been  done. 

Very  sincerely  yours 

John  J.  Pershing 

The  general  impression  which  the  Division  made  during 
its  stay  in  the  Le  Mans  area  was  exceedingly  good.  From 
Embarkation  Headquarters  came  nothing  but  expressions 
of  pleasure  at  the  workmanlike,  self-sufficient  manner  in 
which  the  troops  took  care  of  themselves.  Here  was  eflS.- 


HOMEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  299 

cient  staff  work,  which  required  no  guidance  or  assist- 
ance; here  was  a  strict  discipHne;  here  was  a  notable  spirit 
of  pride  and  the  desire  to  play  the  game  handsomely. 
From  the  leave  areas,  from  Paris,  from  General  Head- 
quarters, came  varied  bits  of  testimony  reflecting  satis- 
faction —  now  with  the  behavior  of  the  men,  now  with 
the  efficient  work  of  the  adjutants  or  the  inspectors.  It 
was  "a  good  war,"  just  then  —  a  time  when  the  Division 
felt  a  contentment  which  came  not  so  much  from  wel- 
fare work  as  from  the  consciousness  that  it  was  made  up 
of  good  and  well-tried  soldiers. 

Within  the  Division  was  originated  an  activity  which 
bad  a  very  definite  bearing  on  the  continuation  of  this 
spirit  of  contentment.  The  Division  Commander,  be- 
lieving firmly  in  the  value  of  competitive  sports,  organized 
on  March  10-12  a  divisional  tournament,  held  at  Ecom- 
moy,  to  which  all  units  sent  entries. 

There  was  a  series  of  military  events  —  such  as  platoon 
and  company  drills,  a  road  march  of  ten  kilometers,  gas 
mask  races,  tent  pitching,  and  rifle  sighting;  while  to  these 
contests  were  added  field  and  track  events  including  tug- 
of-war,  short  distance  dashes,  jumping,  soccer,  football, 
and  boxing.  The  final  meet  had  been  preceded  by  a  long 
series  of  elimination  contests  in  each  battalion,  so  that 
the  teams  and  indi\'iduals  who  met  at  Ecommoy  repre- 
sented the  best  that  the  Division  had  to  offer,  and  a  great 
success  this  meet  surely  was.  Blessed  with  beautiful 
weather,  favored  by  the  attendance  of  General  Sum- 
merall  and  other  high  ranking  officers,  the  competitions 
were  keenly  contested  and  in  a  good  sporting  spirit. 
Without  a  delay  or  hitch  in  the  management  throughout, 
the  tournament  accomplished  its  purpose  exactly.  To  the 
104th  Infantry  was  awarded  the  great  silver  challenge 
cup  which  the  Division  Commander  had  presented  as 
the  prize  for  the  organization  winning  the  most  points; 
and  fairly,  indeed,  as  the  result  of  hard  training  and  game 


800  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

fighting,  did  Colonel  Cheatham's  boys  win  the  coveted 
trophy. 

By  now  the  end  was  close  at  hand.  In  all  units  there  had 
been  made  a  careful  check  of  the  personnel;  embarkation 
passenger  lists  were  compiled;  the  inspectors  made  a  final 
round.  It  was  ordered  that  no  unit  could  proceed  until 
every  trace  of  vermin  was  gone,  so  the  greatest  efforts  were 
made  to  eliminate  from  person,  clothing,  and  blankets 
every  trace  of  the  head  or  body  louse  which  was  such  a  tor- 
ment to  the  soldier;  no  venereal  case  could  go  home;  no 
unit  could  be  given  a  clearance  from  its  billets  until  every- 
thing was  policed  and  left  in  an  absolutely  clean  and  or- 
derlj^  condition.  It  should  be  noted  that,  under  the  above 
provisions,  not  a  single  man  was  left  behind,  and  only  one 
company  was  held  back  for  one  day  to  complete  putting 
its  house  in  order. 

For  a  moment  a  pause  was  made  while  the  Division 
presented  to  the  Embarkation  Area  the  recreation  hut,  in 
the  city  of  Le  Mans,  which  bore  its  name  and  insignia. 
Erected  through  contributions  of  residents  of  York  Har- 
bor, Maine,  who  sent  Miss  Grace  Thompson  to  France  to 
arrange  for  its  building,  the  "York  Harbor  YD  Hut"  was 
built  by  details  from  the  101st  Engineers  in  some  thirty 
working  hours.  Consisting  of  a  canteen,  recreation  and 
assembly  room  with  a  stage  and  big  fireplace,  kitchen, 
five  sleeping-rooms,  officers',  and  women's  quarters,  the 
*'Hut"  was  tastefully  designed  and  painted  to  suggest  an 
old-fashioned  New  England  dwelling.  And  the  dedication 
ceremonies,  held  on  March  17,  made  a  graceful  good-bye 
from  the  Division  to  the  Americans  still  to  go  home. 

There  had  been  changes  of  command  up  to  a  very 
few  weeks  before  leaving  France.  On  February  7,  Brig- 
adier-General Sherburne  returned  to  his  well-beloved  ar- 
tillerymen, relieving  General  Glassford  who  had  done  so 
finely  with  them;  February  22,  Major  John  R.  Sanborn 
took  command  of  the  102d  Machine-Gun  Battalion,  sue- 


HOMEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  301 

ceeding  Major  W.  R.  Carpenter;  February  28,  Major 
S.  F.  Westbrook  took  command  of  the  101st  Maehine-Gun 
Battalion.  And  other  changes  were  made,  springing  from 
their  return  to  duty  with  the  Division  of  Colonel  Edward 
L.  Logan  and  Colonel  Frank  M.  Hume  (February  11). 
Another  hearty  welcome  met  Colonel  R.  K.  Hale,  formerly 
second  in  command  of  the  101st  Artillery,  who  returned 
to  the  Division,  on  the  eve  of  sailing,  as  Chief  of  Staff.  He 
succeeded  Colonel  D.  K.  Major,  Jr.,  transferred  to  duty 
with  the  Service  of  Supply.  Colonel  J.  H.  Allen,  M.C., 
was  assigned  to  the  Division  at  this  time  as  Surgeon. 

Of  the  actual  voyage  home  there  are  no  incidents  to 
record  which  have  a  permanent  interest.  Proceeding  to 
Brest,  where  the  troops  were  passed  rapidly  through  final 
inspections,  the  transports  were  boarded  in  good  order. 
Conditions  at  the  camp  in  Brest,  which  had  caused  a  great 
uproar  to  be  raised  in  the  American  newspapers,  were  found 
to  be  actually  very  good.  The  men  were  not  too  crowded, 
and  were  comfortable.  Here  were  issued  new  shoes,  cloth- 
ing, and  blankets  to  those  requiring  them;  minute  exami- 
nations were  made  to  ascertain  the  presence  of  any  com- 
municable disease;  but  the  delays  were  exceedingly  brief. 
The  first  contingents,  embarking  on  the  Mount  Vernon, 
Agamemnon,  and  America,  got  off  within  only  a  few  hours 
of  each  other ;  the  rest  followed  at  the  briefest  possible  in- 
tervals. Sailing  on  the  afternoon  of  March  26,  the  first 
homeward-bound  transport,  the  Mount  Vernon,^  arrived 
in  Boston  on  the  morning  of  April  4,  to  meet  the  vociferous, 
moving  welcome  of  all  New  England.  And  every  day,  for 
a  week  or  more,  succeeding  transports  brought  home  in 
safety  the  various  regiments,  trains,  and  battalions,  until 
the  whole  Division  was  again  concentrated  at  Camp 
Devens,  Massachusetts.  The  101st  Trench  Mortar  Bat- 

'  On  board  the  Mount  Vernon  were  Division  Commander,  Staff,  Di\asion 
Headquarters;  Military  Police;  Headquarters  Troop;  Headquarters  5ii\  In- 
fantry Brigade;  101st  Engineers  (less  Co.  C);  101st  Engineers  Train;  104tli 
Infantry. 

i/ 


802  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

tery  (3  officers,  184  enlisted  men)  had  preceded  the  rest 
of  the  Division  toward  the  ports  of  embarkation  by  some 
weeks.  Together  with  other  similar  units  it  was  designated 
as  part  of  one  of  the  earliest  contingents  of  combat  troops 
to  return  to  the  United  States;  but  it  embarked  at  Saint- 
Nazaire  on  March  30  and  arrived  in  Hoboken,  New  Jersey, 
on  April  12,  immediately  proceeding  to  Camp  Devens.^ 

The  events  of  the  days  which  followed  the  Division's 
arrival  can  all  be  grouped  around  three  principal  happen- 
ings: the  review  at  Camp  Devens  on  April  22,  the  parade 
in  Boston  on  April  25,  and  the  discharge  of  the  officers  and 
men  on  April  28-30. 

One  could  not  chronicle,  in  twice  these  pages,  all  the 
manifestations  of  joy,  of  loving  pride,  and  of  affection, 
which  were  planned  by  the  New  England  towns  for  their 
"boys."  2  Touching  as  were  the  eager  desires  of  the  fam- 
ihes,  friends,  and  homes  of  the  men  to  give  them  an  im- 
mediate welcome,  they  could  not  for  the  moment  be  satis- 
fied. Of  first  importance  it  was  to  keep  the  men  at  hand, 
ready  for  discharge;  it  was  only  as  the  result  of  the  most 
urgent  representations  by  the  most  important  persons  in 
New  England  that  the  War  Department  was  brought  to 
sanction  even  the  divisional  parade  in  Boston.  Necessarily 
insensible  to  any  call  but  that  of  utility,  the  Department 
was  obliged  to  ignore  the  sentiments  which  filled  the  hearts 
both  of  the  returned  soldiers  and  the  communities;  the 
strictest  orders  forbade  the  participation  in  local  parades, 
welcoming  receptions,  or  any  similar  demonstration,  of 
any  officer  or  man  in  the  Division.^  Daily  there  came  to 
Headquarters  committees  from  cities  and  civic  organiza- 

^  General  C.  H.  Cole  and  a  small  party  had  been  sent  ahead  of  the  Division 
to  assist  in  preparations  for  homecoming. 

^  Approximately  57  per  cent  of  the  officers  and  men  who  went  overseas  with 
the  Division  returned  with  it.  Battle  casualties  totaled  as  follows:  Killed,  2168; 
wounded,  13,000;  prisoners  of  war,  451.  Replacements  furnished  to  the  Division 
numbered  14,411. 

^  Individual  passes,  good  for  forty-eight  hours,  were  issued;  but  on  condition 
that  the  soldier  should  not  join  any  public  or  official  demonstration. 


HOMEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  803 

tions,  seeking  to  arrange  some  such  celebration,  liappy  in 
representing  the  happiness  of  their  community;  but  each 
time  they  had  to  be  refused.  Not  till  the  men  were  dis- 
charged from  the  service  could  they  receive  the  welcome 
of  their  home  to%vns;  and  with  this  answer  the  delegations 
had  to  be  content. 

It  was  partly  with  the  purpose  of  meeting  this  desire  of 
all  New  England  to  welcome  its  own,  that  the  Division 
Commander  extended  his  invitation  to  the  Governors  of 
the  New  England  States  to  review  the  Division  on  the 
afternoon  of  April  22  at  Camp  Devens.  And  a  notable 
event  in  the  varied  history  of  the  Twenty-Sixth  this  review 
did,  indeed,  prove  to  be.  On  an  afternoon  of  flawless  spring 
weather,  in  the  presence  of  a  crowd  which  was  estimated 
to  include  not  less  than  300,000  persons,  the  troops,  in  full 
field  equipment,  to  the  music  of  a  massed  band  of  300 
pieces,  behind  their  regimental  colors  which  that  day  were 
decorated  with  the  battle  streamers  bearing  the  names  of 
major  engagements,  swept  down  the  Camp  Devens  parade 
ground  in  perfect  order,  faultless  rhythm,  and  steady 
cadence,  which  thrilled  the  vast  crowd  to  the  very  marrow. 
Before  the  review  there  was  held  the  ceremony  of  award- 
ing decorations  —  Medal  of  Honor,  Distinguished  Service 
Cross,  and  Croix  de  Guerre  —  to  some  forty-five  officers 
and  men;  and  in  this  ceremony  the  Division's  former 
commander,  Major-General  Edwards,  was  called  upon  by 
Major-General  Hale  to  award  the  crosses  to  those  whose 
gallant  deeds  had  been  performed  while  General  Edwards 
was  still  in  command. 

Three  days  later  came  the  long-anticipated  street  parade 
of  the  Division  in  Boston.  And  for  the  last  time  it  was  pos- 
sible to  demonstrate  the  workmanhke  methods  of  those 
officers  who  had,  for  many  months,  been  charged  with  the 
duty  of  moving,  subsisting,  equipping,  and  billeting  the 
troops.  With  no  confusion  the  various  units  were  l^rought 
into  town,  lodged,  fed,  formed  for  the  parade,  and  returned 


304  NEW  ENGLAND  IN  FRANCE 

to  camp.  In  a  fine  spirit  of  cooperation  every  officer  and 
man  of  the  whole  Division  worked  to  show  himself  and  his 
unit,  from  squad  to  regiment,  to  the  best  advantage.  And 
Boston,  who  seemed  that  day  to  have  taken  to  herself  the 
whole  population  of  New  England,  roared  an  approval  and 
a  welcome  from  the  miles  of  towering  reviewing-stands, 
from  windows,  curbstones,  from  every  vantage-point, 
which  never  can  be  forgotten  by  those  present.  It  should 
be  remarked  that  the  people  did  not  view  the  Boston  parade 
of  the  Twenty-Sixth  as  a  spectacle,  as  an  interesting,  pic- 
turesque march  of  veteran  troops.  It  was  in  a  far  different 
spirit  that  the  crowds  were  cheering.  They  were  welcoming 
home  their  own  boys  —  their  own  blood,  their  kinsmen. 
They  hailed  the  return  not  only  of  the  soldiers  of  the 
United  States,  but  also  —  and  with  shriller  joy  —  the 
soldiers  of  their  own  home  regiments.  This  is  worth  record- 
ing, one  believes,  on  the  last  pages,  as  on  the  first,  of  this 
history  of  American  citizen-soldiers  in  the  European  War. 
It  is  a  record  of  the  expression  of  that  love  for  its  own  ter- 
ritorial, localized  mihtary  unit  which  has  always  linked 
closely  together  the  American  community  and  the  Ajneri- 
can  soldier. 

Last  of  all  came  the  days  of  actual  discharge  from  service. 
Again  the  patient  personnel  adjutants  made  out  their  end- 
less rolls  and  records;  again  the  officers  and  men  were 
physically  examined;  on  the  28th  and  29th  of  the  month, 
they  received  their  pay  and  their  papers,  and  moved  away 
—  once  more  civilians. 

"SECURE  FROM  CHANGE" 

Virtue  treads  paths  that  end  not  in  the  grave; 
No  bar  of  endless  night  exiles  the  brave; 

And  to  the  saner  mind 
We  rather  seem  the  dead  that  stayed  behind. 
Blow,  trumpets,  all  your  exultations  blow! 
For  never  shall  their  aureoled  presence  lack: 
I  see  them  muster  in  a  gleaming  row, 
With  ever  youthful  brows  that  nobler  show; 


HO^NIEWARD  —  THE  LAST  DAYS  305 

"We  find  in  our  dull  road  the  shming  track; 

In  every  nobler  mood 
We  feel  the  orient  of  their  spirit  glow. 
Part  of  our  life's  unalterable  good. 
Of  all  our  saintlier  aspiration; 

They  come  transfigured  back 
Secure  from  change  in  their  high-hearted  ways. 
Beautiful  evermore,  and  with  the  rays 
Of  morn  on  their  white  shields  of  expectation! 

So  sang  a  New  England  poet  of  the  returned  soldiers 
from  another  war.  One  deprecates,  in  our  American 
fashion,  the  tendency  to  catch  and  reflect  the  luster  of 
exalted  emotion  in  our  own  prosaic  daily  lives;  one  can 
vision  the  embarrassment  of  the  average  Yankee  Division 
soldier,  should  he  be  told  that  he  was  a  hero  and  must 
act  accordingly.  But  true  it  is  that  these  lads  brought  home 
with  them,  all  unawares,  perhaps,  from  months  in  the 
front  line  of  battle,  from  suffering  as  from  honorable 
achievement,  from  their  plain  duties  conscientiously  per- 
formed, a  certain  new  value,  a  quickened  sense  of  a  man's 
responsibility  to  and  for  his  fellows,  which  the  years  to 
come  will  see  worked  deeply  into  the  very  pattern  and  web 
of  the  fabric  of  our  national  ideals  and  life. 


THE  END 


INDEX 


Absence  without  leave,  from  training 
camp,  57;  from  Embarkation  Area, 
293. 

Accommodations.   See  Billet. 

Administration,  General  Staff  section 
in  Division  Staff,  64. 

Adrian  barracks,  41. 

Agamemnon,  return  on,  301. 

Aisne-Marne  offensive,  order  of  battle 
on  western  side  of  salient,  188;  in- 
terdivisional  communication,  169; 
preparation,  170;  enemy's  exposed 
position,  170;  plan  of  attack  on 
western  side  of  salient,  divisional 
orders,  171-75,  179;  order  of  battle 
of  52d  Brigade,  175;  field  of  Divi- 
sion's advance,  175;  first  day  (July 
18),  advance  of  52d  Brigade,  175-78, 
183;  check  to  French  on  Division's 
left,  178-81, 183;  evidence  of  enemy's 
retirement,  180;  artillery  support, 
181;  third  day,  advance  of  51st 
Brigade,  181-84;  comment  of  Army 
Commander,  183;  general  results  of 
western  offensive  (20th),  185;  ene- 
my's retirement  on  southern  front, 
186;  advance  from  western  front 
(21st)  to  intercept  line  of  retreat, 
186-88;  check  at  Epieds-Trugny 
lines,  188,  189;  plan  of  attack  on 
Epieds-Trugny,  contradictory  or- 
ders, 190,  191 ;  failure  of  attack  (22d), 
191-95;  casualties,  195  n.,  208,  209; 
attempt  to  flank  the  line  (23d),  195- 
98 ;  withdrawal  of  enemy  from  Epieds- 
Trugny,  pursuit,  198,  199;  relief  of 
infantry  of  Division,  199,  200,  202, 
203;  orders  for  impossible  further 
pursuit,  how  avoided,  200,  201 ;  serv- 
ices of  Division,  202,  208,  298;  serv- 
ice of  Division's  artillery  after 
relief  of  infantry,  203-OG;  attack 
around  Sergy,  204,  205;  movement 
of  infantry  after  relief,  recuperation, 
207;  captures  by  Division,  208  n.; 
movement  to  rest  area,  209.  »See 
also  Champagne-Marne. 

Aix-les-Bains,  as  leave  area,  283. 

Aizy,  Headquarters  of  102d  Infantry, 
73. 


Albright,  Major  0.  S.,  command,  60. 

Alfonte,  Lt.-Col.  W.  A.,  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  227. 

Allen,  Col.  J.  H.,  Division  Surgeon,  301. 

Amaranthe  Hill,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 219,  223. 

Amaury  du  Boisrouvray,  Major,  serv- 
ices at  training  camp,  48  n. 

Amblonville  Wood,  on  Saint-Mihiel 
front,  217. 

Am.erica,  return  on,  301. 

Amiens,  German  drive  for,  98. 

Ammunition  Train.  See  One-Hundred- 
First. 

Amusements.   See  Recreation. 

Anglemont  Farm,  in  Verdun  lines,  247. 

Animal  transport.   See  Transport. 

Apremont,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  101, 
110. 

Armistice,  approach,  measures  to  pre- 
vent forestalling,  271,  272;  advance 
on  day,  272-74;  final  artillery  shots, 
276;  celebration  on  Verdun  front, 
276 ;  first  leave,  279 ;  relief  of  Di\-ision, 
279. 

Army  of  Occupation,  Division  loses 
opportunity,  277;  transfer  of  ofl^cers 
to,  281. 

Arnold,  Capt.  D.  G.,  command,  18. 

Arnold,  Col.  P.  W.,  command,  death, 
290. 

Artillery,  strength  of  Di\'ision,  15; 
schools,  55 ;  counter-preparation  fire, 
146;  German  M-aste,  151,  153;  roving 
guns,  155.  See  also  Fifty-First  Field 
Artillery;  Ordnance. 

Ashby,  Capt.  B.  L.,  command,  60; 
transferred,  212. 

Ashworth,  Major  A,  command,  60. 

Aultman,  Brig.-Gen.  D.  W.,  com- 
mands artillery,  154;  report  on 
artillery  in  Marne  offensive,  203-06; 
transferred,  212;  career,  decorations, 
212  n.  See  also  Fifty-First  Field 
Artillery, 

Baccarat  Rector,  Forty-Second  Divi- 
sion at,  99. 

Bacquencourt,  Major  de,  as  instructor, 
71. 


308 


INDEX 


Bailey,  Capt.  K.  B.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Baker,  N.  D.,  visit  to  the  Division,  102. 

Baker,  Major  T.  C,  command,  60; 
transferred,  241. 

Bamford,  Brig.-Gen.  F.  E.,  com- 
mands Division,  262;  relieves  offi- 
cers, 269;  relieved,  281;  character  as 
Division  Commander,  281. 

Barbillon  Forest,  in  Marne  offensive, 
198,  201. 

Barrage,  first  American,  79;  plan  on 
Marne  front,  162. 

Baj'onet,  school  for  teaching,  51. 

Bazoilles,  billet,  34  n.;  hospital,  42; 
ofiicers'  school,  51. 

Beacham,  Lt.-Col.  (Col.)  J.  W.,  Jr., 
Quartermaster,  16  n.;  transferred,  61. 

Bearss,  Col.  H.  I.,  commands  102d 
Infantry,  209;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 227;  Marcheville  attack,  235-38; 
commendation,  239;  commands  bri- 
gade, order  for  Belleu  fight,  252-55; 
relieved,  290. 

Beaumont,  on  La  Reine  Sector,  101 ;  in 
Seicheprey  fight,  119.  120.  122,  129. 

Beaune,  A.E.F.  University,  294. 

Belieu  Wood.   See  Belleu. 

Belleau  in  Marne  offensive,  174-76, 
177  n. 

Belleau  Wood,  Marines'  fight,  159;  in 
lines  of  Twenty-Sixth.  160,  162; 
sinister  aspect,  164;  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 176. 

Belleu  Wood,  on  Verdun  front,  251; 
orders  for  operation  against,  252-55; 
attacks  and  counter-attacks  (Oct. 
23-26),  255-57;  Shelton's  report 
(27th).  258-60;  effective  strength  of 
brigade  after.  259;  Corps  Command- 
er's appreciation,  278  n. 

Below,  Gen.  von,  Picardy  drive,  87, 
96  n. ;  before  Rheims,  161. 

Benoist  d'Azy,  Lt.  C.  de,  services  at 
training  camp,  48  n. 

Benoite-Vaux,  Division  Headquarters, 
relief  of  Bamford,  281. 

Bernecourt,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  245; 
German  bombardment,  153. 

Bertrand,  Col.  (Gen.),  services  at 
training  camp.  48-50;  battle  record 
of  regiment,  49  n. ;  and  Seicheprey 
fight,  127. 

Berzy-le-Sec.  in  Marne  offensive,  185. 

Beuvardes,  in  Marne  offensive.  201. 

Bevans,  Lt.-Col.  J.  L.,  Surgeon,  16  n., 
18. 

Bezonvaux.  on  Verdun  front.  266.  276. 

Bezu  Woods,  in  Marne  salient  lines, 
XC2. 


Big  Berthas,  97. 

Billets,  at  Lorraine  training  camp,  34 
n.;  problems,  41;  after  La  Reine 
tour,  157;  on  Marne  front,  159; 
problem  on  march  after  armistice, 
280. 

Billy-sous-les-Cotes,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  217,  219. 

Bishop,  Col.  A.  T.,  command,  210. 

Bishop,  Lt.  R.,  and  German  raid,  79, 
80. 

Bissell,  Capt.  H.  B.,  in  Marne  offensive, 
191,  192. 

Blanchard  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
189. 

Blondat,  Gen.,  corps  command  on 
Meuse  front,  232;  and  plans  for 
Mouse- Argonne  offensive,  233;  com- 
mendation of  Marcheville  demon- 
stration. 238.  239. 

Boehn.  Gen.  von.  Picardy  drive,  96  n. ; 
on  Marne  front,  159,  161;  Marne 
offensive,  166,  170;  Foch's  attack 
on,  186. 

Booth,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  E.,  in  Marne 
offensive,  205. 

Borne  Agron  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive, 
182. 

Boston,  Division  Headquarters,  12  n.; 
reception  of  returning  troops,  301; 
parade,  303. 

Bouconville.  in  La  Reine  Sector,  146. 

Boucq,  headquarters  at  La  Reine  Sec- 
tor,]105;  bombarded,  153. 

Boucq  Sector.   See  La  Reine  Sector. 

Bouresches,  Second  Division  at,  159; 
in  Marne  salient  lines,  160,  164;  in 
Marne  offensive.  173,  175,  177,  178. 

Bowen,  Major  H.  L.,  command,  241. 

Bowen,  Lt.-Col.  W.  S.,  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff,  141;  transferred.  241. 

Boxford,  Mass.,  training  camp,  12  n. 

Brabant-Samogneux  Area,  on  Verdun 
front,  245. 

Brabant  Wood,  in  Verdun  lines,  247. 

Braisne,  entraining  at.  86. 

Bras,  divisional  post  of  command  on 
Verdun  front.  247,  265. 

Brechaincourt,  billet,  34  n. 

Brest,  Division  at,  condition,  301. 

Breteuil  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive,  187. 

Breteuil  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive, 
188,  189,  191. 

Brigades.  See  Fifty-First  Field  Artil- 
lery; Fifty-First  Infantry;  Second 
Infantry. 

Brittany,  artillery  training  camp,  35. 

Broussey-Vargevaux  Pond,  and  La 
Reine  Sector,  137. 


INDEX 


309 


Brown,  Lt.  (Major),  J.  W.,  first  patrol, 
75,  76;  decorated,  76. 

Brown,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  A.,  in  Marne 
offensive,  203. 

Brule,  Bois.   See  Burned  Wood. 

Bulkeley,  Major  M.  G.,  command,  169. 

Bunnell,  Col.  G.  W.,  commands  en- 
gineers, 16  n.,  17,  22.  See  also  One- 
Hundred-First  Engineers. 

Bar-sur-Seine,  Division's  rest  area, 
209. 

Burned  Wood  (Bois  Brule),  in  La 
Reine  Sector,  101 ;  104th  Infantry  in, 
105;  position,  110;  first  German 
raid.  111;  second  fight,  112-15;  pur- 
pose of  attack,  113;  results,  115; 
commendation  by  Corps  Comman- 
der, 115  n.;  decoration  of  colors,  116; 
troops  engaged,  116  n. 

Bushy,  Lt.,  in  Marne  offensive,  194  n. 

Bussiares,  in  Marne  salient  lines,  160. 

Butgneville,  on  Meuse  front,  233. 

Byrne,  Lt.  T.  J.,  command,  290. 

Cameron,  Major-General,  citation  of 
102d  Infantry,  227. 

Camiers,  machine-gun  school,  55. 

Camp  des  Romans,  Germans  at,  100. 

Camp  Devens,  Division  at,  301;  ban 
on  celebrations,  302;  review,  303; 
discharge,  304. 

Camps,  state  training,  12  n.;  in  Eng- 
land, 32-33;  Neuf chateau,  34.  iSee 
also  Training. 

Cantigny,  fight,  159. 

Carlowitz,  Gen.  von,  at  Soissons,  161. 

Carpenter,  Major  W.  R.,  command, 
290;  transferred,  301. 

Cass,  Major  L.  W.,  of  Staff,  25  n.; 
transferred,  61. 

Casualties,  first  death  from  hostile  fire, 
74;  at  Chemin  des  Dames,  84;  at 
Seicheprey  fight,  131;  at  La  Reine 
Sector,  144;  in  Marne  offensive, 
195  n.,  207,  208;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  230;  in  Belleu  Wood  fight, 
259;  of  Division,  302  ?i. 

Caures  Wood,  Verdun  lines,  246,  247. 

Cavalry.   See  under  names  of  states. 

Certilleux,  billet,  .34  n. 

Chaillon,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
226. 

Chamigny,  Division  Headquarters, 
160. 

Champagne-Marne  defensive,  move- 
ment of  Division  to  front,  158,  159; 
prospect,  other  American  divisions 
on  front,  159;  relief  of  Second  Divi- 
sion, line  held,  160,  164;  situation  at 


time  of  Division's  arrival,  Pas  Fini 
Sector,  160;  German  plans,  161; 
aspect  of  Division's  lines,  161; 
artillery  concentration,  162;  enemy 
artillery  activity,  162,  163;  infantry 
defensive-offensive  plan,  162;  hard- 
ships, horrors,  163,  164;  patrol 
clashes,  164;  Vaux  fight,  165,  166; 
final  German  offensive,  166;  corps 
and  army  relations  of  Division,  168. 
See  also  Aisne-Marne. 

Changes  in  personnel.   See  Officers. 

Character,  record  of  volunteer  soldiers, 
1;  of  National  Guard,  3-6;  spirit  of 
volunteers,  6;  local  pride,  7,  8,  304; 
of  elected  militia  officers,  9;  basic 
conditions  on  organization  of  Divi- 
sion, 10;  unity  of  Division,  18,  53, 
58,  211;  and  regulars,  36;  impres- 
sions on  the  French,  37-39;  military 
faults,  40;  impressions  on  and  of 
French  troops,  71,  72;  individual  ac- 
tion, dangers,  89;  results  of  service, 
305.   <See  aZso  Discipline;  Morale. 

Charny,  in  Verdun  lines,  265. 

Chartreuve  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
205. 

Chase,  Major  H.  G.,  Signal  Oflicer, 
16  n.,  17;  transferred,  60. 

Chateau-Thierry,  Third  Di\asion  at, 
159, 166;  evacuated  by  Germans,  186. 

Chatillon-sur-Seine,  Division's  rest 
area,  209;  school,  209. 

Chaudneney,  billet,  157. 

Chaudon,  Col.,  battle  record  of  regi- 
ment, 50  n. 

Chauffour  Wood,  in  Meuse-Argonne 
offensive,  233. 

Cheatham,  Col.  B.  F.,  command,  241. 

Cheippe,  Lt.  L.,  services  at  training 
camp,  48  n. 

Chemin  des  Dames,  Division  trans- 
ferred to,  for  front-line  training,  63, 
67;  terrain,  65-67;  as  quiet  sector, 
67;  entraining  for,  67-69;  experience 
of  first  relief,  69;  gradual  enlarging 
of  responsibility,  70;  practical  in- 
struction by  French,  70,  71;  mutual 
impressions,  71,  72;  extent  of  line 
held,  72;  initial  dates,  73,  74;  prog- 
ress, 74;  first  patrol,  74-76;  first 
German  raid,  76,  77;  first  raid  on 
enemy,  78;  second  German  raid,  pris- 
oners lost,  79,  80;  unsuccessful  raid 
on  enemy,  SO;  first  German  gas  at- 
tack, 81-83;  relief,  results  of  tour, 
83,  85;  casualties,  87;  compliments 
of  French  commander,  84  n. ;  depar- 
ture, entraining  under  fire,  86,  87. 


310 


INDEX 


Ch&nes,  Bois  des,  on  Verdun  front, 
attack,  247,  256. 

Cherv-Chartreuve,  in  Marne  offensive, 
205. 

Christmas,  Pres.  Wilson's  visit,  284-86. 

Circourt,  billet,  34  n. 

Claudel,  Gen.,  command  on  Verdun 
front,  245,  270  n.,  275  n.;  and  kind  of 
combat  prescribed,  246,  260,  278;  ap- 
preciation of  Division's  work,  278; 
on  Belleu  Wood  fight,  278  n. 

Clothing,  search  for,  before  sailing,  25; 
deficiency  in  French  training  camp, 
42.   See  also  Supply. 

Coetquidan,  artillery  training  camp, 
35. 

Cole,  Brig.-Gen.  C.  H.,  commands 
brigade,  17;  career  and  personality, 
21;  and  Xivray-Marvoisin  raid,  153; 
preparation  for  Marne  offensive, 
172,  175;  in  Marne  offensive,  177  n., 
190,  195  n.;  effort  to  relief  of  com- 
mand, 210;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
229;  relieved  and  reinstated,  269; 
return,  302  n.  See  also  Fifty-Second 
Infantry  Brigade. 

Cole,  Major  G.  E.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Colonel's  position  and  personal  respon- 
sibility, 22-24. 

Combres,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
219,  229. 

Commander-in-Chief.   See  Pershing. 

Communication,  telephone  system  of 
training  camp,  41;  at  La  Reine  Sec- 
tor, 107,  120;  during  Seicheprey 
fight,  123,  126,  129,  131;  interdivi- 
sional,  in  Marne  offensive,  169;  need 
of  training,  210.  See  also  Intelli- 
gence ;  Liaison ;  One-Hundred-First 
Field  Signal  Battalion. 

Connecticut  Ambulance  Company,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  18. 

Connecticut  Cavalry,  in  Twenty-Sixth 
Division,  17. 

Connecticut  Field  Artillery,  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  17. 

Connecticut  Field  Hospital,  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  18. 

Connecticut  Field  Signal  Troops,  in 
Depot  Brigade,  13  n. 

Connecticut  troops.  See  preceding 
titles,  and  First;  Second. 

Counter-preparation  fire,  146. 

Coupru,  in  Marne  salient  lines,  162. 

Courchamps,  in  Marne  offensive,  179, 
180. 

Couvrelles,  Division  Headquarters, 
67,  69. 

Crafts,  Major  A.  R.,  command,  290. 


Creue,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  219, 
226,  227. 

Creue  Wood,  in  German  Saint-Mihiel 
lines,  102. 

Croissant  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive, 
173. 

Croix  de  Guerre.     See  Decorations. 

Croix  Rouge  Farm,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 204. 

Cumieres,  Brigade  Headquarters,  245. 

Damages,  at  training  camp,  38;  on  the 
march,  90. 

Damvillers,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
229. 

Danker,  Chaplain  W.,  killed,  153. 

Davis,  Lt.  G.  IL,  first  raid,  78. 

Decorations,  first,  76;  after  entraining 
under  fire,  87;  of  colors  of  104th 
Infantry,  116;  of  colors  of  102d  In- 
fantry, 289;  after  review  at  Camp 
Devens,  303. 

Defense  plan  on  Champagne-Marne 
front,  162. 

Degoutte,  Gen.,  command  on  Marne 
salient,  168;  on  Division  in  Marne 
offensive,  183,  202. 

Denton,  Major  William,  command, 
241. 

Depot  Brigade,  13. 

Details,  interference  with  training,  42. 

Detraining.    See  Transport. 

Deuxnouds,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
219. 

Discipline,  training,  40;  absence  with- 
out leave,  57,  293;  on  march,  strag- 
gling, 89.  See  also  Character; 
Morale. 

Division  Commander.  See  Bamford; 
Edwards;  Hale,  H.  C. 

Division  Headquarters,  at  Boston,  12 
n. ;  at  Lorraine  training  camp,  34  n. ; 
overseas,  30  n.;  at  Chemin  des 
Dames,  67,  69;  at  Reynel,  93;  at  La 
Reine  Sector,  105;  bombarded,  153; 
at  Toul,  157;  on  Marne  salient 
front,  159,  160;  during  Marne  offen- 
sive, 188;  casualties  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 208;  in  rest  area,  209;  during 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  214,  217; 
during  Meuse-Argonne  operations, 
240,  244;  at  Montigny-le-Roi,  280; 
in  Embarkation  Area,  291;  return, 
301  n.  jSeeaZso  Division  Commander; 
Division  Staff;  Post  of  command. 

Division  Staff,  as  organized,  16  n.; 
additions  before  overseas,  25  n.; 
character,  25  n.;  changes,  61,  138, 
141,   169,  212,  220,  241,  290,  301; 


INDEX 


311 


reorganization,  General  Staff  sec- 
tions, results,  64,  139-41;  and  line 
officers,  91;  illustration  of  need  of 
trained,  104;  improvements,  13s, 
141;  and  line  command,  209;  un- 
usual duties  at  Embarkation  Area, 
296.     See  also  General  Staff. 

Di\asions  of  A.E.F.,  numerical  designa- 
tion, 2  n. ;  territorial  basis,  3.  See  also 
divisions  by  number. 

Dole,  in  Marne  offensive,  205. 

Dommartin,  in  Saint-Mibiel  offensive, 
223. 

Dompierre-au-Bois,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  219. 

Domptin,  Brigade  Headquarters,  160. 

Dowell,  Lt.-Col.  C.  M.,  Judge  Advo- 
cate, 16  n.;  Chief  of  Staff,  61;  trans- 
ferred, 138;  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 
241. 

Drum,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  A.,  instructions 
on  visit  of  Pres.  Wilson,  285  n. 

Durfee,  Brig.-Gen.  L.  L.,  command, 
290. 

Ecommoy,  Division  Headquarters,  291. 

Education,  grandiose  scheme,  293; 
elementar>',  for  illiterates,  293; 
higher,  294. 

Edwards,  Major-Gen.  C.  R.,  assumes 
command  of  Division,  16;  relation- 
ship with  troops,  16;  career  and  per- 
sonality, 19;  measures  to  increase 
strength  of  Division,  26;  teaching 
and  example  at  training  camp,  52, 
58;  tour  of  instruction,  55;  and  repul- 
sion of  first  German  raid,  admonished 
by  General  Headquarters,  78;  during 
training  road-march,  90;  commands 
La  Reine  Sector,  105,  142;  and 
Seicheprey  fight,  129;  relations  with 
General  Headquarters,  136,  209,  250; 
orders  for  Marne  offensive,  173- 
75,  200;  and  check  before  Trugny, 
195;  and  line  command  for  Staff, 
209;  and  change  in  plan  of  Saint- 
Mihiel  attack,  223,  224;  post  of 
command  on  Verdun  front,  247; 
relieved  of  command,  249-51;  fare- 
well general  orders,  262;  takes  leave, 
263;  farewell  to  artillery,  263  n.; 
awards  decorations,  303.  See  also 
Division  Headcjuarters;  Division 
Staff;  and  references  under  Twenty- 
Sixth  American  Division. 

Eighteenth  French  Division,  on  Ver- 
dun front,  245,  278;  relieved,  246, 
247. 

Eighth    Massachusetts    Infantry,    in 


Depot  Brigade,  13  n.;  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  17,  18. 

Eighty-First  American  Division,  move- 
ment to  rest  area,  280. 

Eighty-Second  American  Division,  oc- 
cupies La  Reine  Sector,  156. 

Eighty-Third  American  Division,  in 
charge  of  Embarkation  Area,  295  n. 

Einem,  Gen.  von,  attack  at  Rheims, 
166. 

Eleventh  French  Corps,  at  Chemin  des 
Dames,  67. 

Elves,  Wood  of  the,  in  La  Reine  Sector, 
144. 

Embarkation  Area,  movement  to,  291 ; 
problem  of  morale  at,  292;  leaves, 
292;  educational  scheme,  293-95; 
recreation,  295,  297;  review  by  Per- 
shing, 297;  character  of  Division's 
stay,  298;  tournament,  299;  final  in- 
spection, clean  bill,  300;  YD  Hut, 
300. 

Engineer  Train.  See  One-Hundred- 
First. 

Engineers,  American,  in  Picardy  drive, 
98.    See  also  One-Hundred-First. 

England,  Division  in,  31-33. 

Entraining.    See  Transport. 

Epaux  Bezu,  in  Marne  offensive,  179. 

Epieds,  in  Marne  offensive,  188-98. 

Equipment,  search  for,  before  sailing, 
25.     See  also  Supply. 

Esperance  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
204. 

Esprit  de  corps.   See  Character. 

Essen  Trench,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 222. 

Estey,  Major  H.  B.,  transferred,  60; 
decorated,  87. 

Etrepilly  Plateau,  in  Marne  offensive, 
174,  183,  184. 

Evans,  Major  P.  W.,  command,  156. 

Farr,  Col.  O.  W.  B.,  command,  212; 

relieved,  241. 
Fary  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive,  202. 
Feeley,  Capt.,  in  Bellcu  Wood  fight, 

253. 
Ferme  de  Camp,  in  Marne  offensive, 

204. 
Fifteenth  French  Colonial  Division,  in 

Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  216,  219,  222, 

223;  on  Meuse  front,  232. 
Fifth  French  Reserve  Army,  in  Marne 

offensive,  186. 
Fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  in  De- 
pot Brigade,  13  n. ;  in  Twenty-Sixth 

Division,  16. 
Fifty-First    Field    Artillery     Brigade, 


812 


INDEX 


state  training  camp,  12  n. ;  composi- 
tion, 17;  commanders,  17,  22,  154, 
212,  241,  300;  overseas,  30  n.;  train- 
ing camp  in  France,  35;  programme 
of  training,  40;  supplies,  44;  trans- 
port problem,  45,  46;  French  Mili- 
tary Mission  with,  48  n. ;  loses  offi- 
cers transferred  as  instructors,  61 ; 
transfer  to  Chemin  des  Dames  Sec- 
tor, 63,  64,  68,  69;  instruction  at 
Chemin  des  Dames,  71;  position 
there,  73;  first  barrage,  79;  position 
in  La  Reine  Sector,  105;  in  Burned 
Wood  fight.  111;  general  character, 
services  at  La  Reine  Sector,  154-56; 
gj-psy  pieces,  155;  position  on  Marne 
salient  front,  160;  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 174,  175,  181,  182,  187,  190, 
191;  services  in  offensive  after  relief 
of  Division's  infantry,  203-06;  casu- 
alties in  offensive,  208;  on  Saint- 
Mihiel  line,  218;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  221,  225,  226,  230;  in 
Riaville-Marcheville  demonstration, 
235,  240;  on  Verdun  front,  247;  in 
Belleu  Wood  fight,  253;  Edwards's 
parting  message,  263  n.;  final  shots 
of  the  War,  276;  rejoins  Division  in 
Montigny  Area,  288.  See  also  refer- 
ences under  Twenty-Sixth  American 
Division. 

Fifty-First  Infantry  Brigade,  State 
Headquarters,  12  n.;  composition, 
16;  commanders,  16,  21,  169,  249, 
290;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at  Lor- 
raine training  camp,  34  n.;  position 
on  Marne  salient  front,  160,  162;  in 
plan  of  Marne  offensive,  172-74;  in 
the  offensive,  181,  182;  advance 
against  enemy's  line  of  retreat  (July 
21),  187,  188;  check  before  Trugny, 
188,  189;  attack  on  Epieds-Trugny 
(22-23)  190-97;  in  pursuit,  198,199; 
and  orders  for  further  impossible 
pursuit,  200,  201 ;  position  on  Verdun 
front,  247;  in  Belleu  Wood  fight, 
251-60;  effective  strength  after  at- 
tack, 259.  See  also  One-Hundred- 
First  Infantry;  One-Hundred-Second 
Infantry;  Shelton;  Traub;  and  refer- 
ences under  Twenty-Sixth  American 
Division. 

Fifty-Second  Infantry  Brigade,  state 
training  camp,  12  n.;  composition, 
17;  commanders,  17,  21,  269,  290; 
billet  at  Lorraine  training  camp, 
34  71.;  Headquarters  at  Chemin  des 
Dames,  73;  position  on  Marne 
salient  front,  160;  in  plan  of  Marne 


offensive,  172-74;  order  of  battle; 
175;  first  and  second  days  of  attack 
(July  18-19),  175-81;  third  day,  182; 
in  advance  against  enemy's  line  of 
retreat,  187;  attack  on  Epieds  (22), 
190,  191,  194,  197;  relieved,  199;  in 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  222,  229;  on 
Verdun  front,  245,  247;  in  pursuit 
265.  .See  also  Cole,  C.  H. ;  One-Hun- 
dred Third  Infantry;  One-Hundred- 
Fourth  Infantry;  and  references 
under  Twenty-Sixth  American  Di- 
vision. 

Fifty-Sixth  Infantry  Brigade,  in  Marne 
offensive,  196-99.  See  also  Twenty- 
Eighth  American  Division. 

First  American  Army,  organized,  213; 
tactics  on  Verdun  front  criticized, 
245,  246,  258,  260-62,  278;  character 
of  success  west  of  the  Meuse,  270; 
and  attack  on  Armistice  Day,  275. 
See  also  Meuse- Argonne ;  Saint- 
Mihiel. 

First  American  Corps,  original  units, 
36;  position  on  Alarne  salient,  168; 
orders  for  Marne  offensive,  171  n.; 
Twenty-Sixth  a  later  unit,  213,  282. 

First  American  Division,  overseas,  30; 
as  pioneer,  36;  transfer  to,  from  101st 
Supply  Train,  45;  sector  on  Saint- 
Mihiel  salient,  99,  101  n.;  and  Pi- 
cardy  drive,  99;  relief  by  Twenty- 
Sixth,  102-05;  Cantigny,  159;  in 
Marne  offensive,  185  n.;  in  Saint- 
Mihiel  offensive,  224,  227.  <See  also 
Regulars. 

First  Connecticut  Infantry,  in  Depot 
Brigade,  13  n.;  in  Twenty-Sixth 
Division,  16. 

First  events,  overseas  as  a  division,  29 ; 
shot  against  enemy  by  militia  divi- 
sion, 73;  position  in  front  line  of 
militia  troops,  73 ;  death  from  hostile 
fire,  74;  prisoner,  74;  patrol  and  en- 
counter, 74-76;  decoration,  76;  Ger- 
man raid,  76,  77;  barrage,  79;  com- 
plete control  of  sector,  102;  decora- 
tion of  American  colors,  116. 

First  Gas  Regiment,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  220;  in  Belleu  Wood  fight, 
253. 

First  Maine  Heavy  Field  Artillery  in 
Depot  Brigade,  13  n. ;  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  17. 

First  Massachusetts  Engineers,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

First  Massachusetts  Field  Artillery, 
in  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

First  Massachusetts  Field  Signal  Bat- 


INDEX 


313 


talion,  in  Twenty-Sixth  Division, 
17. 

First  New  Hampshire  Infantry,  in 
Depot  Brigade,  13  n.;  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  17. 

First  Separate  Company  Connecticut 
Infantry,  in  Depot  Brigade,  13  n. 

First  Separate  Company  Massachu- 
setts Infantry,  in  Depot  Brigade, 
13  n. 

First  Vermont  Infantry,  in  Depot 
Brigade,  13  n.;  in  Twenty-Sixth  Di- 
vision, 16-18. 

Fitzgerald,  Lt.  W.,  Vaux  fight,  165. 

Flabas,  on  Verdun  front,  264. 

Fhinders,  German  drive,  113. 

Flirey,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  101. 

Foch,  Marshal,  generalissimo,  98;  mass 
of  maneuver,  99. 

Fontainebleau,  artillery  school,  55. 

Food,  on  march  to  occupy  La  Reine 
Sector,  104;  conditions  on  Marne 
salient  front,    163.   See  also  Supply. 

Forde,  Capt.  A.  L.,  YD  Show,  143; 
command,  212. 

Forty-Second  (Rainbow)  American 
Division,  origin,  3;  race  to  get  over- 
seas, 25,  28;  as  pioneer,  36;  artillery 
training  camp,  36;  transport  trou- 
bles at  training  camp,  45;  proposed 
maneuver  with  Twenty-Sixth,  93; 
at  Baccarat  Sector,  99;  on  Rheims 
front,  160;  relief  of  Twenty-Sixth 
in  Marne  offensive,  199-203;  attack 
on  Sergy,  204,  205;  relief,  205.  See 
also  National  Guard. 

Foug,  billet,  157. 

Four-a-Verre,  in  Marne  offensive,  204. 

Fourth  American  Division,  in  Marne 
offensive,  205;  artillery  in  Saint- 
Mihiel  offensive,  218.  See  also  Regu- 
lars. 

Framingham,  Mass.,  training  camp, 
12  n. 

Francheville,  billet,  157. 

French  Military  Mission,  at  training 
camp,  47;  members,  48  n. 

French  people,  impression  of  American 
troops  on,  36-39. 

French  troops,  and  Americans,  mutual 
impressions,  39,  71,  72,  84  n. 

Fresnes,  in  Meuse  front  lines,  232,  235. 

Friedensturm,  161. 

Frothingham,  Louis,  in -France,  103  n. 

Fuel,  at  training  camp,  38,  41. 

CJallup,  Capt.  D.  T.,  command,  trans- 
ferred, 156. 
Gas,  first  attack  on  Division,  81-83; 


in  Richecourt  raid,  149;  attack  on 
Sonnard  AVood,  150;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  220;  on  Meuse  front,  240. 

Gatchell,  Major  W.  G.,  command,  17; 
transferred,  60. 

General  Headquarters,  admonishments 
of  Edwards,  77,  209;  and  National 
Guard  divisions,  53,  54,  136,  250; 
and  the  Division,  250,  270,  284. 

General  Staff,  sections  in  Division 
Staff,  64,  139-41;  CoUege,  55-57. 

Genevrois  Farm,  Division  Headquar- 
ters, 160;  in  Marne  offensive,  174. 

Genicourt,  Division  Headciuarters,  217. 

Givry,  in  Marne  offensive,  173,  175, 
176,  177  n. 

Glass,  Capt.  J.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Glassford,  Col.  (Brig.-Gen.)  P.  D-, 
commands,  154,  241 ;  relieved,  300. 

Gondrecourt,  schools,  52,  54. 

Gonetrie  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive,  184^ 

Goodwin,  Col.  R.  E.,  as  artillery  com' 
mander,  155. 

Goose  Hill,  on  Verdun  front,  245. 

Gouraud,  Gen.,  Rheims  front,  attack 
on,  160,  166. 

Goutterie  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
188. 

Grand,  Division  in  camp  near,  93. 

Grand  Ru  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
188. 

Grande  Picardie  Farm,  in  Marne 
offensive,  179. 

Grande  Tranchee  de  Colonne,  in 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  219,  224. 

Grange  Marie  Farm,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 199. 

Greene,  Capt.  R.  A.,  command,  17. 

Greenlaw,  Brig.-Gen.  Albert,  and  active 
service,  22  n. 

Grenoble  Area,  leave  at,  279. 

Gypsy  pieces,  155. 

H  in  Houppy,  battle    of.    See   Belleu 

Wood. 
Haig,     Sir     Douglas,     and     German 

Flanders  drive,  113. 
Hale,    Major-Gen.   H.   C,   commands 

Twenty-Sixth,     282;     career,     282; 

character  as   Division   Commander, 

282,   283;   and   educational   scheme, 

293;  return,  301  n. 
Hale,    Lt.-Col.  R.  K.,  transferred,  60; 

Chief  of  Staff,  301. 
Halloudray  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 

181. 
Hidniardierc,  in  Marne  offensive,  184. 
Haniiigan,     Capt.     Judsou,     Brigade 

Adjutant,  255. 


314 


INDEX 


Hannonville,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
217,  223,  229,  233. 

Hanson,  Major  R.  L.,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 182  n. 

Harbold,  Major  R.  P.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Harreville,  billet,  34  n. 

Hattonchatel,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 217,  219,  224,  226,  227,  229. 

Haudinot  Trench,  attack  on,  234. 

Haumont  Ravine,  in  Verdun  lines, 
265. 

Haumont  Wood,  in  Verdun  lines,  246, 
247;  attack,  246. 

Haute  Vesne,  in  Marne  offensive,  173. 

Hants  Epiues  Wood,  raid  on,  240. 

Hayes,  Col.  W.  C,  command,  17; 
transferred,  60. 

Hazelle  Wood,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  151. 

Headquarters.    See  Division;  General. 

Headquarters  Troop,  composition,  16; 
commanders,  16,  60,  212,  241,  290; 
return,  301  n. 

Health.   See  Physical  condition. 

Hennocque,  Gen.,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  223. 

Herbert,  Lt.-Col.  (Col.)  J.  F.  J.,  as 
artillery  commander,  155;  in  Marne 
offensive,  190,  191. 

Herbeuville,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
219;  in  Meuse  front  lines,  233. 

Heudicourt,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
227. 

Hill  190,  in  Marne  offensive,  175. 

Hill  193,  in  Marne  offensive,  175,  178, 
179,  180,  182. 

Hill  204,  in  Marne  offensive,  162,  182. 

Hill  204.8,  in  Marne  offensive,  205. 

Hill  210,  in  Marne  offensive,  205. 

Hill  230,  in  Meuse  front  lines,  235. 

Hill  324,  on  Verdun  front,  occupied, 
266. 

Hill  346,  on  Verdun  front,  attack,  252. 

Hill  360,  on  Verdun  front,  attack,  252, 
256,  257. 

Hobbs,  Lt.-Col.  (Col.)  H.  P.,  Inspec- 
tor, 16  n. ;  and  line  command,  209. 

Hopkins,  Lt.  E.  G.,  decorated,  87. 

Horsey,  Capt.  (Lt.-Col.)  H.  R.,  as  in- 
telligence officer,  220. 

Hosford,  Major  E.  A.,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 177  n. 

Hospital,  at  Bazoilles,  42. 

Houppy  Wood,  on  Verdun  front,  251. 
See  also  Belleu  Wood. 

Hours,  military  SJ^stem,  171  n. 

Howard,  Major  (Lt.-Col.)  J.  L.J  com- 
mand, 17;  transfers,  169,  290. 

Howe,  Lt.-Col.  T.,  transferred,  60. 

Hume,    Col.    F.    M.,    command,    17; 


relieved   and   reinstated,    269,   270, 

301. 
Hutier,  Gen.  von,  Picardy  drive,  96  n., 

98;  on  Amiens-Montdidier  front,  161. 
Hyatt,  Capt.  J.  W.,  of  Staff,  16  n. 

Impressions  created  in  France  by  first 
American  troops,  36-39,  72. 

Infantry,  strength  in  Division,  15. 
iSee  also  Fifty-First  Infantry  Brig- 
ade; Fifty-Second  Infantry  Brigade; 
and  references  under  them. 

Infiltration,  method  of  attack,  97. 

Influenza,  epidemic,  232,  249. 

Insignia,  of  officers  of  National  Guard 
antecedence,  14;  adoption  of,  by 
Division,  248. 

Inspection,  Pershing's,  of  training 
camp,  54;  by  Pres.  Wilson,  286;  on 
leaving  Embarkation  Area,  300. 

Inspector-Instructors  of  National 
Guard,  4. 

Instructors,  transfers  as,  effect  on 
Division,  61,  93,  170,  212. 

Intelligence,  General  Staff  section  in 
Division  Staff,  64;  German,  of  La 
Reine  Sector,  107-09,  132;  improve- 
ment, 141;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive. 
220.  See  also  Communication;  Liai- 
son. 

Isbell,  Col.  E.  L.,  command,  16;  trans- 
ferred, 60. 

Jenkins,  Lt.-Col.,  T.  L.,  Division  Sur- 
geon, 290. 

Jewell,  Lt.  W.  A.,  in  Marne  offensive, 
194  n. 

Jones,  Lt.-Col.  F.  E.,  command,  290.  ' 

Jury  Wood,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  101; 
gas  attack  on  enemy  from,  150. 

Ju\'igny,  Headquarters  of  52d  Infantry 
Brigade,  73. 

Keville,  Lt.-Col.  W.  J.,  command,  18; 

as  commander,  155. 
Kiel  Trench,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 

222. 
King,  Lt.  J.  P.,  of  Staff,  25  n.;  YD 

Show,  143;  liaison  officer,  169  n. 
Koechlin-Schwartz,  Col.,    at    General 

Staff  College,  56. 
Koob,  Lt.  W.  L.,  first  raid,  78. 
Kruegcr,    Major  W.,   Assistant  Chief 

of  Staff,  transferred,  141. 

La    Croix    Blanche   Farm,    in    Marne 

offensive,  204. 
La   Crosse,   Major  F.   B.,   command, 

241. 


INDEX 


315 


La  Fere  Forest,  in  Marne  offensive,  199. 

Lagerquist,  Capt.  O.  G.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Lahayville,  in  German  Saint-Mihiel 
lines,  101. 

La  Lege  Farm,  Brigade  Headquarters, 
160;  in  Marne  offensive,  179. 

La  Logette  Pond,  in  Marne  offensive, 
199. 

Lamb,  Lt.-Col.  E.  E.,  transferred,  60. 

Lamorv'ille,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
226. 

Landaville,  billet,  34  n. 

Langres,  General  Staff  College,  55-57. 

La  Penonerie  Farm,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 174. 

La  Reine  Sector,  reason  for  Di^dsion 
taking  over,  99;  history  of  Saint- 
Mihiel  salient,  99-101 ;  character, 
opjxjsing  lines,  101,  102;  length  of 
Division's  front,  102;  occupation, 
problem  of  relieving  First  Division, 
102-05;  French  corps  command  over, 
103,  105;  command  assumed,  Head- 
quarters and  position  of  units,  105; 
stores  and  equipment,  105 ;  American 
prisoners,  106,  125;  activity,  106, 
144,  145,  151;  communication, 
enemy's  knowledge,  107-09,  132; 
Burned  Wood  position,  110;  Burned 
Wood  (Bois  Brul6)  fight,  111-15; 
German  preparations  before  Seiche- 
prey,  116-19;  American  position 
there,  119-22;  enemy's  capture  of 
mail,  131;  Seicheprey  fight,  122-30; 
results  of  fight,  130-33;  enlarged, 
137,  145;  new  construction,  137; 
improved  tactical  dispositions,  138; 
system  of  front-line  reliefs,  138;  im- 
provements in  Di^•ision  during  tour, 
138-13;  casualties,  144,  153  »i.;  Ger- 
man raid  on  new  sub-sector,  146; 
plan  and  training  to  attack  at  Riche- 
court,  147;  publicity  of  plan,  148; 
Richecourt  raid,  149;  surprise  gas 
attack  on  Sonnard  Wood,  150;  Ger- 
man raid  on  Remieres  Wood,  150; 
Gt"man  policy  of  bombardment, 
151,  153;  enemy's  raid  on  Xivray- 
Marvo.'sin,  152;  enemy's  general 
bom  bara  ""lent,  153;  evidences  of 
approachiri.T  relief,  154;  artillery  at, 
155;  results  of  tour,  156;  relief,  156, 
157. 

Lassitcr,  Brig. -Gen.  William,  com- 
mands artillery  brigade,  16  n.,  17; 
career,  22;  joins  Division,  22  n.,  at 
Chemin  des  Dames,  64;  transferred, 
1.54;  as  oommandor,  155.  Hre  also 
Fifty-First  Field  Artillery  Brigade. 


Lauconnois  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
189. 

La  Wavrille,  on  Verdun  front,  266. 

Leaves,  none  during  La  Reine  tour, 
156;  none  after  Marne  offensive, 
211;  first,  after  armistice,  279;  gen- 
eral, conduct  during,  283,  284  n.; 
from  Embarkation  Area,  292. 

Le  Chanot  Wood,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  222. 

Le  Channel,  in  Marne  offensive,  201. 

Leclerc,  Cure  A.,  letter  to  the  Division, 
231. 

Le  Mans,  YD  recreation  hut,  300. 

Le  Mans  Area.  See  Embarkation  Area. 

Le  Meitour,  Capt.,  services  at  train- 
ing camp,  48  n. 

Lenihan,  Brig.-Gen.  M.  J.,  in  Marne 
offensive,  203. 

Les  Brusses  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive, 
173,  175,  177,  181. 

Les  Chesneaux,  in  Marne  offensive,  173. 

Les  Eparges,  in  Saint-Mihiel  line,  216. 

Letzing,  Serg.  John,  first  patrol,  76; 
decorated,  76. 

Lewas,  Major  E.  E.,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 176. 

Liaison,  in  Marne  offensive,  174;  in 
Belleu  Wood  fight,  254. 

Liberty  Loan,  Seicheprey  fight  and 
third,  132. 

Liffol-le-Grand,  billet,  34  n. 

Liggett,  Major-Gen.  Hunter,  orders 
for  Marne  offensive,  171  n.;  in  the 
offensive,  179. 

Locke,  Col.  M.  E.,  command,  17,  22 
n.\  transferred,  210. 

Loclont  Wood,on  Saint-Mihiel  line, 216. 

Logan,  Col.  E.  L.,  command,  16;  in 
Marne  offensive,  190,  193;  effort 
to  relieve  of  command,  210;  in 
Belleu  Wood  fight,  258;  relieved  and 
reinstated,  269,  270,  301.  See  also 
One-Hundred-First  Infantry. 

Loge  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive,  179. 

Longeau  Farm,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 220,  223. 

Lorraine,  training  camp,  34. 

Loughridge,  Major  P.  W.,  Assistant 
Chief  of  Staff,  290. 

Lucy-le-Bocage,  in  Marne  salient 
lines,  162;  in  Marne  offensive,  188. 

Ludendorff,  Gen.  von,  Picardy  drive, 
97. 

McCain,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  P.,  on  transfer 
of  coast  artillery  men,  26  n. 

McCaskey,  Col.  G.,  command,  trans- 
ferred, 209.  241. 


316 


INDEX 


McDade,  Capt.  W.  A.,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 176  n.,  177  71. 

Machine  guns,  strength  of  Division, 
15;  training  school,  55;  change  in 
Division's  organization,  105.  See 
also  One-Hundred-First;  One-Hun- 
dred-Second; One-Hundred-Third. 

Mack,  Col.  J.  A.,  command,  240. 

Mackall,  Major  W.  K.,  transferred, 
212. 

Mail,  capture  by  enemy,  121. 

Maine  troops.    iSee  First;  Second. 

Maison  Blanche,  inMarne  offensive,  175. 

Maison  des  Cotelettes,  Brigade  Head- 
quarters, 247  n. 

Major,  Lt.-Col.  (Col.)  D.  K.,  Jr.,  Chief 
of  Staff,  character,  138;  and  impos- 
sible orders  in  Marne  offensive,  200, 
201;  and  line  command,  209;  trans- 
ferred, 301. 

Malick,  Capt.,  ser^nces  at  training 
camp,  48  n. 

Mandres-les-Nogent,  ceremony  at,  289. 

Mange,  fight  with,  142. 

Mangin,  Gen.,  in  Marne  offensive,  185. 

March.  .See  Road  march;  Transport. 

Marchand,  Gen.,  division  at  Saint- 
Mihiel  salient,  110;  speech  on  armis- 
tice, 277. 

Marcheville,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
229;  in  German  lines,  233;  plan  to 
attack,  234;  troops  sent  against,  235; 
occupation,  retirement  of  French 
support,  236;  counter-attacks,  237; 
retirement,  237;  success  of  demon- 
stration, 238;  citation  and  decora- 
tions, 238,  239,  2S9;  intensity,  240. 

Mareuil-les-Meaux,  billet,  159. 

Marines,  Belleau  Wood  fight,  159,  164; 
on  Marne  front,  160  n.;  relief,  160. 
See  also  Second  American  Division. 

Mar  mites,  163. 

Marne  River.  See  Aisne-Marne ;  Cham- 
pagne-Marne. 

Marvoisin.  <See  Xivray-Marvoisin. 

Marwitz,  Gen.  von  der,  Picardy  drive, 
96  n. ;  at  Amiens-Montdidier  front, 
161;  on  importance  of  Verdun  front, 
243. 

Mass  of  maneuver,  Foch's  tactics,  99. 

Massachusetts,  legislative  commis- 
sion's visit,  102;  club-room  at  Paris, 
103. 

Massachusetts  Ambulance  Companies, 
in  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  18. 

Massachusetts  Cavalry,  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  16,  17. 

Massachusetts  Coast  Artillery,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  18. 


Massachusetts  Field  Hospitals,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  18. 

Massachusetts  troops.  See  preceding 
titles  and  by  numbers  from  First  to 
Ninth. 

Mattarel,  Col.  de,  battle  record  of 
regiment,  50  n. 

Maud'huy,  Gen.,  tactical  command  of 
Twenty-Sixth,  67;  general  orders  on 
departure  of  Division,  84  n. 

Maybach,  Major  A.  A.,  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff,  16  n.;  transferred,  141. 

Menil-la-Tour,  railhead  of  La  Reine 
Sector,  105. 

Mery,  in  Marne  offensive,  174. 

Mesnil,  in  Meuse-Argonne  offensive, 
233. 

Messelin,  Lt.,  services  at  training 
camp,  48  n. 

Meuse-Argonne  offensive.  Division's 
sector  (Troyon)  after  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  232;  weather  and  sickness, 
232,  240,  249;  first  raids,  233;  plan 
purpose,  and  character  of  east-tide 
operation,  233,  239;  troops  for  Ria- 
ville-Marcheville  demonstration,  234, 
235;  plan  for  this  demonstration 
(Sept.  26),  235;  carried  out,  counter 
attacks,  235-37;  success  in  deceiv- 
ing enemy,  234,  238;  commendations, 
decorations,  238,  239,  289;  intensity 
of  operation,  240;  minor  raids,  240; 
period  of  quiet  on  sector,  barrage 
zone,  240;  general  situation  on  Divi- 
sion's return  to  front,  242;  task  on 
Verdun  front,  importance,  242,  243, 
278;  aspect  of  Verdun  front,  244; 
Division's  withdrawal  from  Troyon 
Sector,  as  army  reserve,  244;  situa- 
tion on  Verdun  front,  enemy's  lines, 
244-46;  prescribed  character  of 
combat,  futility.  Corps  Commander 
on,  245,  246,  258,  260-62,  278;  Divi- 
sion on  Verdun  front  lines  (Neptune 
Sector),  245,  247,  264;  corps  com- 
mand, 245,  270  n.,  275  n. ;  attack  on 
Hauniont  Wood  (Oct.  16),  246; 
divisional  post  of  command,  247; 
Edwards  relieved  of  command,  249- 
51;  orders  for  Belleu  Wood  fight, 
252-55;  results  of  attack,  255-57; 
Shelton's  report,  258-60;  watch  to 
prevent  enemy's  withdrawal,  264; 
raids  for  prisoners,  enemy's  loss  of 
morale,  264;  enemy's  retirement 
(Nov.  8),  265;  pursuit,  checks,  266; 
weakness  and  depression  of  Division, 
267-70;  condition  of  animal  trans- 
port, 267  n.,  268  n.;   character  of 


INDEX 


317 


American  success  west  of  the  Meuse, 
270;  attack  on  day  of  armistice, 
change  in  orders,  273-76;  front  after 
armistice,  276;  relief  of  Division,  279; 
its  services,  279,  298. 

Meuse  Heights,  character,  216;  plan 
of  attack  on,  219;  occupation,  229; 
Division's  sector  on,  232. 

Mexican  Border  ser\-ice,  effect  on 
National  Guard,  5,  9. 

Military  police.  See  One-Hundred- 
First  Train  Headquarters. 

Militia.    See  National  Guard. 

Milspaugh,  Lt.,  in  Rlarne  offensive, 
194  71. 

Missy,  Headquarters  of  101st  Engi- 
neers, 73. 

MoUeville,  Ravine  de,  in  Verdun  lines, 
252,  2.53. 

MoUeville  Farm  Wood,  in  Verdun 
lines,  246,  251;  attack,  252,  254. 

Montague  de  Paris,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 1S5. 

Montdidier,  importance  in  German 
Picardj^  drive,  98. 

Montgivrault,  in  Marne  offensive, 
174. 

Montiers,  in  Marne  offensive,  179,  180, 
182,  183. 

Montigny-le-Roi  Area,  movement  to, 
280.   See  also  Reconstruction. 

Mont-les-Neuf chateau,  billet,  34  n. 

Morale,  in  camp  in  England,  33;  in 
French  training  camp,  46;  influence 
of  wrong  system  of  promotions,  134; 
influence  of  loss  of  old  men,  136; 
rumored  antipathy  of  General  Head- 
quarters, 136;  effect  of  relief  of 
Edwards,  250;  failing  of  enemy's, 
264;  loss  during  Verdun  operations, 
269;  recovery,  282,  283;  conduct 
during  leave,  284  n. ;  at  Embarkation 
Area,  292.  ^See  also  Character;  Dis- 
cipline; Physical  condition;  Recrea- 
tion. 

Morgan,  Capt.  W.  B.,  transferred,  212. 

Morrison,  Capt.  W.  L.,  command,  241. 

Mort  Mare  Wood,  in  German  Saint- 
Mihiel  lines,  102. 

Mouilly,  on  Saint-Mihiel  front,  210-18. 

Mount  Vernon,  return  on,  301. 

Mudra,  Gen.  von,  attack  at  Rheims, 
166. 

Munitions.   See  Ordnance;  Supply. 

Murphy,  Major  (Lt.-C'ol.)  J.  D.,  com- 
mand, 150;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
228;  transferred,  241. 

Mussy-sur-Seine,  Division  Headquar- 
ters, 209. 


Nanteuil-les-Meaux,  Division  Head- 
quarters, 159. 

National  Guard,  divisions  of  A.E.F. 
from,  3  n.;  character  as  organization, 
3-6;  effect  of  Mexican  Border  serv- 
ice, 5,  9;  spirit,  6;  local  support  and 
pride,  7,  8,  302,  304;  military  knowl- 
edge, 8;  call  into  federal  service,  9; 
results  of  elected  officers,  9;  status 
as,  lost,  14;  retention  of  origin  desig- 
nation, 14;  breaking  up  of  units,  15, 
18,  26  n.;  units  in  Twenty-Sixth, 
16-18;  stamp  on  Twenty-Sixth,  24; 
divisions  and  regulars,  36,  37;  atti- 
tude of  regular  officers,  rumor  of 
side-tracking  of  divisions  in  France, 
53,  54;  conspicuous  divisions,  54  n.; 
rumors  of  antagonism  of  General 
Headquarters,  136,  270,  284. 

Needham,  Lt.-Col.,  at  General  Staff 
College,  56. 

Neptune  Sector,  247.  See  also  Meuse- 
Argonne. 

Nesle,  in  Marne  offensive,  204. 

Neuf chateau,  training  camp  at,  34: 
signal  school,  55. 

New  England  Coast  Artillery,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17,  26. 

New  England  troops.  See  National 
Guard,  and  references  under  Twenty- 
Sixth  American  Division. 

New  Hampshire  Field  Artillery,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

New  Hampshire  Field  Hospital,  in 
Twent5'-Sixth  Division,  18. 

New  Hampshire  Field  Signal  Troops, 
in  Depot  Brigade,  13  n. 

New  Hampshire  Machine-Gun  Troop, 
in  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

New  Hampshire  troops.  See  preceding 
titles,  and  First. 

New  Haven,  Conn.,  training  camp,  12  n. 

Ney,  Capt.  L.  E.,  services  at  training 
camp,  48  n. 

Niantic,  Conn.,  training  camp,  12  n. 

Ninth  French  Army,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 186. 

Ninth  Infantry,  on  Marne  salient  front, 
1,59,  IGO  71.;  relief,  160. 

Ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  16. 

Noncourt,  billet,  34  n. 

Nonsard  Wood,  in  German  Saint- 
Mihiel  lines,  102. 

Noviant-Limey  road,  in  La  Reine 
Sector,  137. 

Oak  Wood,  in  Verdun  lines,  247. 
Gates,  Lt.,  in  Marne  offensive,  194  n. 


318 


INDEX 


O'Connor,  Rev.'  M.  J.,  Division 
Chaplain,  141. 

Officers  of  Division,  character  of 
elected  militia,  9;  insignia  of  those  of 
militia  antecedence,  14 ;  original  com- 
manders in  Division,  16-18;  career 
and  personality  of  higher,  18-22; 
position  of  colonels,  22-24;  schools, 
51-57;  development,  58;  changes, 
69-62,  138,  141,  154,  156,  169,  209, 
212,  241,  249,  289,  300;  transfer  as 
instructors,  effect  on  Division,  61, 
93,  170,  212;  bad  system  of  promo- 
tions, 134;  character  of  replacement, 
135;  relieved  by  Bamford,  rein- 
stated, 269,  270;  transfer  to  Army 
of  Occupation,  281;  no  promotions 
after  armistice,  290.  See  also  Divi- 
sion Commander;  Division  Staff. 

Officers'  Reserve  Corps,  officers  for 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  27. 

Oie,  Cote  d',  on  Meuse  front,  245. 

One-Hundred-Eleventh  Infantry,  in 
Marne  offensive,  196,  197.  See  also 
Twenty-Eighth  American  Division. 

One-Hundred-Fifty-Fourth  French  Di- 
■^asion,  at  La  Reine  Sector,  157. 

One-Hundred-First  Ammunition  Train, 
state  training  camp,  12  n. ;  comman- 
der and  composition,  18;  overseas, 
30  n.;  in  Marne  offensive,  203,  206; 
casualties  in  offensives,  208. 

One-Hundred-First  Engineer  Train, 
composition  and  commander,  18; 
return,  301  n. 

One-Hundred-First  Engineers,  state 
training  camp,  12  n.;  commander 
and  composition,  17,  22;  overseas, 
30  n. ;  billet  at  Lorraine  training 
camp,  34  n. ;  Headquarters  at  Chemin 
des  Dames,  73;  at  La  Reine  Sector, 
105,  122,  127;  in  Marne  offensive, 
174,  196,  203,  206;  casualties  in  the 
offensive,  208;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 220,  230;  in  Riaville-Marche- 
ville  attack,  234,  235;  company  in 
re\aew  by  Pres.  Wilson,  286;  at  Em- 
barkation Area,  296;  build  YD  Hut, 
300;  return,  .301  n. 

One-Hundred-First  Field  Artillery, 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
210;  overseas,  30  n.;  first  shot  against 
enemy,  73;  in  Bois  Brul6  fight.  111  «., 
116  n.  See  ako  Fifty-First  Field  Ar- 
tillery Brigade. 

One-Hundred-First  Field  Signal  Bat- 
talion, state  training  camp,  12  n., 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
60,  156,  241,  290;  overseas,  30  n.; 


at  La  Reine  Sector,  105;  in  Marne 
offensive,  174,  203,  206;  casualties  in 
offensive,  208;  in  Riavillc-Marche- 
ville  attack,  234,  235;  in  Belleu  Wood 
fight,  253;  company  in  review  by 
Pres.  Wilson,  286.  See  also  Commu- 
nication. 

One-Hundred-First  Infantry,  state 
training  camp,  12  n.;  composition, 
16;  commander,  16,  269,  270,  301; 
overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at  Lorraine 
training  camp,  34  n. ;  line  at  Chemin 
des  Dames,  73;  first  militia  regiment 
on  front  line,  73;  first  raid  on  Ger- 
mans, 78,  first  German  gas  attack, 
81;  position  at  La  Reine  Sector,  105, 
145;  in  Seicheprey  fight,  127;  Ger- 
man raid  on,  146;  Vaux  fight,  165, 
166;  in  Marne  offensive,  181,  182, 
187,  189,  190;  Epieds-Trugny  at- 
tack, 190-97;  casualties  in  Marne 
offensive,  208;  in  movement  to  Saint- 
Mihiel  front,  214  n.;  position  at 
Rupt  Sector,  217;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  219,  222,  225,  229;  raid  on 
Warville  Wood,  240;  Belleu  Wood 
fight,  253-60;  in  pursuit,  withdrawn, 
266;  company  in  review  by  Pres. 
Wilson,  286.  See  also  Fifty-First 
Infantry  Brigade. 

One-Hundred-First  Machine-Gun  Bat- 
talion, state  training  camp,  12  n.; 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
169,  290,  301;  overseas,  30  n.;  posts 
at  Chemin  des  Dames,  73;  first  box 
barrage,  79;  change  in  organization, 
105;  in  Marne  offensive,  174,  192, 
198,  199;  casualties  in  offensive,  208; 
in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  220,  225; 
in  Belleu  Wood  fight,  253. 

One-Hundred-First  Sanitary  Train, 
composition,  18;  commanders,  18, 
241,  290;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at 
Lorraine  training  camp,  34  n. ;  cas- 
ualties in  Marne  offensive,  208;  in 
Riaville-Marcheville  attack,  234, 
235;  in  Belleu  Wood  fight,  253. 

One-Hundred-First  Supply  Train,  com- 
position, 18;  commanders,  18,  60, 
241;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at  Lor- 
raine training  camp,  34  n. ;  problems 
at  training  camp,  45;  transfers  to 
First  Division,  45.  *See  also  Supply; 
Transport. 

One-Hundred-First  Train  Headquar- 
ters and  Military  Police,  composi- 
tion, 17;  commander,  17;  overseas, 
30n.;  bilbt  at  Lorraine  training 
camp,  34  n.;  efficiency,  74,   212  n.; 


INDEX 


319 


return,  301  n.   See  also  Transport. 

One-Hundred-First  Trench  Mortar 
Battery,  commander  and  composi- 
tion, 17;  in  Bois  Brul6  fight,  116  n. ; 
in  Marne  offensive,  206;  casualties 
in  offensive,  208;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  221;  return,  301. 

One-Hundred-Fourth  Infantry,  com- 
position, 17;  commanders,  17,  60, 
209,  241;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at 
Lorraine  training  camp,  34  n.;  line 
at  Chemin  des  Dames,  73;  position 
in  La  Reine  Sector,  205,  210;  Bois 
Brule  fights,  111-15;  commendation, 
115  n.,  116  n.;  colors  decorated,  116; 
troops  in  fight,  116  n.;  in  Seicheprey 
fight,  127;  in  Marne  offensive,  175, 
176,  180;  casualties  in  offensive,  208; 
position  at  Rupt  Sector,  217;  in 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  223;  position 
on  Meuse  front,  245;  attack  on 
Haumont  Wood,  246;  in  final  pursuit, 
266;  in  final  attack,  276;  company  in 
re'vaew  by  Pres.  Wilson,  286;  wins 
prize  in  tournament,  299;  return, 
301  n.  See  also  Fifty-Second  Infan- 
try Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Second  Field  Artillery, 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
241;  overseas,  30  n.  See  also  Fifty- 
First  Field  Artillery  Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Second  Infantry,  state 
training  camp,  12  n.;  composition,  16; 
commanders,  16,  60,  209,  290;  over- 
seas, 30  n. ;  billet  at  Lorraine  train- 
ing camp,  34  n.;  line  at  Chemin  des 
Dames,  73;  first  German  raid  on,  79, 
80;  first  raid  on  enemy,  80;  gas  at- 
tack on,  81;  position  at  La  Reine 
Sector,  105;  enemy's  preparations  on 
Seicheprey  front,  116-19;  position 
there,  119-22;  enemy's  ambush  and 
capture  of  mail,  121;  Seicheprey 
fight,  122-32;  raided  in  Rcmieres 
Wood,  150;  in  Marne  offensive,  181, 
187,  189,  190;  Epieds-Trugny  at- 
tack, 190-95;  in  pursuit,  199; 
casualties  in  Marne  offensive,  208; 
position  at  Rupt  Sector,  217;  in 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  220,  222, 
224-28;  raids  on  Meuse  front,  233; 
in  Marcheville  attack.  235-37,  240; 
commendations,  238,  239;  Belleu 
Wood  fight,  253,  256,  257,  259;  in 
final  pursuit,  266;  in  final  attack, 
276;  company  in  review  by  Pres. 
Wilson,  286;  colors  decorated,  289. 
See  also  Fifty-First  Infantry  Bri- 
gade. 


One-Hundred-Second  Machine-Gun 
Battalion,  state  training  camp,  12  n. ; 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
156,  241,  290,  300;  overseas,  30  n.; 
billet  at  Lorraine  training  camp,  34 
n.;  in  Marne  offensive,  187;  casual- 
ties in  offensive,  208;  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  225,  228;  in  Belleu  Wood 
fight,  253;  companies  in  review  by 
Pres.  Wilson,  286. 

One-Hundred-Seventy-Sixth  Field  Ar- 
tillery, in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  218. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Fourth  French  Di- 
vision, position  on  Marne  salient, 
168;  in  Marne  offensive,  179,  180. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Second  Infantry 
(French),  services  at  training  camp 
of  Division,  48-50;  battle  record, 
49  n. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Seventh  Field  Ar- 
tillery Brigade,  commander,  169. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Seventh  French 
Division,  position  on  Marne  salient, 
168;  in  plan  of  Marne  offensive, 
173;  in  the  offensive,  176,  178-82, 
188,  190,  197,  201;  relieved,  203. 

One-Hundred-Third  Field  ArtOlery, 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
154,  241;  in  Bois  Brule  fight.  111  n., 
116  n.  See  also  Fifty-First  Field  Ar- 
tillery Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Third  Infantry,  com- 
position, 17;  commanders,  17,  269, 
270,  290;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at 
Lorraine  training  camp,  34  n. ;  line  at 
Chemin  des  Dames,  73;  position  at 
La  Reine  Sector,  105;  in  Bois  Brule 
fight,  114,  116  n.;  raided  at  Xivray- 
Marvoisin,  152;  in  Marne  offensive, 
175,  177,  178,  187,  189;  casualties  in 
offensive,  208;  position  at  Rupt  Sec- 
tor, 217;  in  vSaint-Mihiel  offensive, 
223;  in  Riaville  attack,  234,  236;  in 
final  pursuit,  266;  conii)any  in  re- 
view by  Pres.  Wilson,  2^6.  See  also 
Fifty-Second  Infantry  Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Third  Machine-Gun  Bat- 
talion, state  training  camp,  12  n.; 
composition,  17;  commanders,  17, 
60,  241;  overseas,  30  n.;  billet  at 
Lorraine  training  camp,  34  n.;  in 
Bois  Brul6  fight,  114,  116  n.;  raided 
at  Xivray-Marvoisin,  152;  casual- 
ties in  Marne  offensive,  208. 

One-Hundred-Twelfth  Infantry,  in 
Marne  offensive,  197,  198.  See  also 
Twenty-Eighth  American  Division. 

Operations,  General  Staff  section  in 
Division  Stuff,  04. 


320 


INDEX 


\  Ordnance  and  munitions,  problem  at 
French  training  camp,  43;  the  "75," 
44  n.     Sec  also  Artillery;  Supply. 

Organization  of  Division,  important 
elements,  2;  condition  of  National 
Guard  units,  3-6;  spirit  of  men,  6; 
local  pride  and  support,  7,  8;  mili- 
tary knowledge  of  units,  8 ;  character 
of  militia  officers,  9;  basic  conditions 
of  the  raw  material,  10;  beginning 
of  training,  12;  physical  tests,  12; 
location  of  camps,  12  n.;  Depot 
Brigade,  13;  period  of  anxiety,  13; 
formal  drafting  into  federal  serv-ice, 
14;  schemes  of  strength  of  Division, 
14;  fitting  of  militia  units  into 
scheme,  15,  18,  26  n.;  Commanding 
General,  16;  units  and  first  command- 
ers, 16-18;  Staff  as  organized,  16  n. ; 
unity,  18;  career  and  personality  of 
higher  officers,  18-22;  position  of 
colonels,  22-24;  militia  stamp,  24; 
measures  to  reach  prescribed 
strength,  26;  effort  for  clothing  and 
equipment,  shortage  before  sailing, 
25,  28.    See  also  Overseas;  Training. 

Origin  of  Twenty-Sixth  Division.  <See 
Organization. 

Ormont  Wood,  in  Verdun  lines,  attack, 
247,  252,  264. 

Ornes  Twins,  hills,  265. 

Oulchy-la-Ville,  in  Marne  offensive, 
185. 

Ourcq  River,  51st  F.A.  Brigade  at, 
205. 

Outposts,  tactics,  119,  163. 

Overseas,  contest  with  Rainbow  Divi- 
sion, 26,  28;  secret  departure,  27; 
securing  of  means,  29;  priority,  29; 
schedule  of  sailings  and  arrivals, 
30  n.;  incident  of  voyage,  31;  im- 
pressions and  lessons  in  England, 
31-33. 

Paper  work,  problem  in  training  camp, 
42. 

Parade  at  Boston,  303. 

Paris,  Massachusetts  club-room,  103; 
no  leave  to,  283. 

Paris  Farm,  in  Marne  salient  lines, 
162;  in  Marne  offensive,  174,  175. 

Parker,  Col.  J.  H.,  command,  60;  in 
Marne  offensive,  193;  transferred, 
209. 

Pas  Fini  Sector.  See  Champagne- 
Mame. 

Passaga,  Gen.,  command  over  the  Divi- 
sion, 105;  general  orders  on  Bois 
Brul6  fight,  115  ».,  116  n.;  decorates 


colors  of  104th  Infantry,  116;  cita- 
tions, 116  n. 

Passes,  at  Camp  Devens,  302  n.  See 
also  Leaves. 

Patrol,  first,  74-76. 

Pelger  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive,  204. 

Pendleton,  Capt.  (Major,  Lt.-Col.)  A. 
L.,  Jr.,  of  Staff,  25  n.,  61;  and  secur- 
ing of  transportation  for  overseas,  28; 
as  Staff  officer,  138. 

Pepper  Hill,  in  Verdun  lines,  247. 

Perrins,  Major  John,  Jr.,  command, 
17;  transferred,  156. 

Pershing,  Gen.  J.  J.,  inspection  of  train- 
ing camp,  54;  on  American  troops 
and  Picardy  drive,  99  7i.;  commu- 
niques on  Division  at  La  Reine  Sec- 
tor, 145;  and  Marne  offensive,  185, 
202;  commands  First  American 
Army,  213;  reinstatement  of  Cole, 
270  n. ;  on  visit  of  Pres.  Wilson,  286; 
decorated,  289;  review  of  Division, 
297;  commendation  of  Division's 
services,  297,  298.  <See  also  General 
Headquarters. 

Retain,  Marshal,  decorates  colors  of 
102d  Infantry,  289. 

Peters,  Capt.  R.,  as  liaison  officer,  169. 

Petret  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive,  179, 
180,  182,  183. 

Phillips,  Major  E.  E.,  Ordnance  Officer, 
16  n. 

Physical  condition,  of  raw  material, 
10;  tests  at  state  training  camp,  12; 
condition  at  French  training  camp, 
38,  42;  after  Marne  offensive,  201, 
207;  influenza,  232,  249;  weakness 
during  Verdun  operations,  268;  final 
inspection  at  Embarkation  Area, 
300.   See  also  Morale. 

Picardy,  German  offensive,  87,  96-99. 

Pilon  d'Etrayes,  on  Verdun  front,  at- 
tack, 253. 

Planchette,  Bois  de  la,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 204. 

Poivre,  Cote  de,  in  Verdun  lines,  247. 

Porter,  Col.  R.  S.,  transferred,  290. 

Post  of  command,  divisional,  in  Marne 
offensive,  174;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 220;  at  Verdun  front,  247.  See 
also  Division  Headquarters. 

Potts,  Col.  D.,  command,  290. 

Price,  Lt.  E.  J.,  Vaux  fight,  165. 

Prince,  Morton,  in  France,  103  n. 

Prisoners,  first  Germans  taken,  74: 
first  loss  to  enemy,  80;  American 
culprits  at  La  Reine  Sector,  106, 
125;  efforts  to  secure,  144;  taken  in 
Marne  offensive,  208  n.;  in  Saint- 


mDEX 


321 


Mihiel    offensive,    230;    return    to 

Dmsion,  284. 
Promotions,    bad    system,    134;    none 

after  armistice,  290. 
Propaganda,  enemy's,  144. 

Quast,  Gen.  von,  Flanders  drive,  113. 
Quincy,  billet,  159. 

Quonset  Point,  R.I.,  training  camp, 
12  n. 

Raids,  first  German,  on  Di^■ision's 
line,  76,  77;  first,  on  Germans,  78. 

Railhead,  of  Lorraine  training  camp, 
34  n.,  41 ;  for  Chemin  des  Dames,  67; 
of  La  Reine  Sector,  105;  of  Verdun 
front,  248. 

Railroads,  decauvilles,  157.  See  also 
Railhead;  Transport. 

Rainbow  Di^■ision.   See  Forty-Second. 

Rambucourt,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  101, 
105. 

Rations.   See  Food. 

Rau,  Major  G.  J.,  in  Seicheprey  fight, 
121,  125;  in  Marne  offensive,  191, 
192,  195  n. 

Ra^^n  de  France,  on  Saint-Mihiel 
front,  216. 

Rebeuville,  billet,  34  n. 

Reconstruction,  relief  on  Verdun  front, 
279;  movement  to  Montigny-le-Roi 
Area,  280;  Hale  succeeds  as  Division 
Commander,  281,  282;  training, 
physical  and  spiritual  recoverj--,  282, 
283;  leaves,  283;  return  of  casuals 
and  other  replaced  men,  284;  return 
of  prisoners,  284;  Pres.  Wilson's 
visit,  284-86 ;  order  to  return  home, 
286-88 ;  arrival  of  Artillery  Brigade 
at  area,  288;  decoration  of  colors 
of  102d  Infantry,  289;  departure  for 
Embarkation  Area,  291. 

Recreation,  lack  in  training  camp,  43; 
YD  Show,  142;  at  Embarkation 
Area,  295;  tournament,  295;  YD 
Hut,  300.    See  also  Leaves;  Welfare. 

Red  Cross,  begins  to  function.  57. 

Regiments,  system  of  numbering,  3  n. ; 
Ix)sition  of  commanders,  22-24. 

Regret,  Corps  Headquarters,  248. 

Regulars,  characteristics,  and  those  of 
militia  di\'i.sions,  36;  relations  with 
them,  37;  officers  and  militia  troops, 
53.  See  also  American  divisions  by 
numbers  First  to  Sixth. 

Relief,  problems,  103-05;  of  front-line 
battalions,  system  on  La  Reine  Sec- 
tor, 138;  at  La  Reine  Sector,  156, 
157;  in   Marne  offensive,  199,  201, 


205;  at  Troyon  Sector,  244;  after 
armistice,  279. 

Remieres  Wood,  in  La  Reine  Sector, 
101,  105;  raided,  150.  See  also 
Seicheprey. 

Replacements,  lack  of  early,  62;  for 
transfers  as  instructors,  94,  170,  212; 
character  of  officers,  135;  inadequate, 
136,  170;  wounded  men  not  returned 
to  Division,  136;  after  Marne  offen- 
sive, 211;  return  of  replaced  men  of 
Division,  284. 

Rest  area,  after  Marne  offensive,  209; 
training  there,  210-12.  See  also 
Reconstruction. 

Return,  rumors,  286;  arrival  of  or- 
ders, 287,  288;  turning-in  of  equip- 
ment, 290;  movement  to  Embarka- 
tion Area,  291 ;  at  Brest,  301 ;  voyage, 
301;  at  Camp  Devens,  301;  ban  on 
celebrations,  302;  percentage  of 
those  who  went  overseas  mth  Divi- 
sion, 302  n. ;  passes,  302  n. ;  review  at 
Camp,  303;  parade  at  Boston,  303; 
discharge,  303;  effect  of  service  on 
men,  305.  See  also  Embarkation 
Area. 

Re\-iew,  by  Pres.  Wilson,  285;  by 
Pershing,  297;  at  Camp  Devens, 
303. 

Reynel,  Division  Headquarters,  93. 

Rhode  Island  Ambulance  Company,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  18. 

Rhode  Island  Cavalrj',  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Division,  17,  18. 

Rhode  Island  Field  Artillery ,  inTwenty- 
Sixth  Di\asion,  17. 

Riaville,  on  Meuse  front,  233;  attack, 
234,  236. 

Richecourt,  in  German  Saint-Mihiel 
lines,  101;  plan  and  training  to  at- 
tack, 147;  publicity  of  plan,  148; 
artillery  preparation,  148;  attack, 
effect  of  gas  on  attackers,  149. 

Rifle,  as  chief  weapon,  39,  51. 

Rimaucourt,  training  area,  96. 

Riviera,  as  officers'  leave  area,  283. 

Road  march,  after  Chemin  dos  Dames, 
86;  intended  maneuver,  abandoned, 
86,  93,  detraining,  88;  ofllicers  on 
foot,  88;  straggling,  89;  problems,  90; 
Division  Commander  during,  90; 
and  staff-line  differences,  91;  end, 
93;  expected  rest,  disappointment, 
93,  96. 

Roads.    See  Transport. 

Rochet  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive, 
1.S2. 

Rolampont,  billet,  34  a. 


322 


INDEX 


Rose,  Lt.  J.,  Vaux  fight,  165. 

Ross,  D.,  exploit  at  Vaux,  165. 

Rouccux,  billet,  34  n. 

Rouvres-le-Chetive,  billet,  34  n. 

Royaumeix,  German  bombardment, 
153. 

Rupt  de  Mad,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  101. 

Rupt-en-Woevre,  Division  Headquar- 
ters, 217,  220;  concentration  at,  218. 

Rupt  Sector,  217. 

Sacerie  Farm,  in  Marne  offensive,  179, 
187. 

Sacerie  Wood,  in  Marne  offensive,  187. 

Saint-Andre  Farm,  on  Verdun  front, 
266;  occupation,  276. 

Saint-Baussant,  in  German  Saint- 
Mihiel  lines,  101. 

St.-Croix,  Capt.  de,  services  at  train- 
ing camp,  48  n. 

Saint-Hilaire,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 229;  in  German  lines,  233;  raid, 
233. 

Saint-Malo,  leave  area,  292. 

Saint-Maurice,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 217,  219. 

Saint-Mihiel  salient,  origin  and  im- 
portance, 99;  early  efforts  to  reduce, 
100;  as  quiet  sector,  100;  movement 
of  Di^asion  to  front,  213-15;  Divi- 
sion's corps,  213;  Division's  orig- 
inal sector,  215;  preparations,  215; 
change  in  plan  of  attack,  216;  Divi- 
sion's second  (Rupt)  sector,  aspect, 
216;  enemy's  lines  and  back  area, 
216;  Division  Headquarters,  217; 
position  of  Division's  units,  217; 
artillery  concentration,  217;  charac- 
ter of  operation,  218;  plan  for  north- 
western front  attack.  Division's  at- 
tack order,  219;  first  objective,  220; 
readiness  for  attack,  intelligence, 
220;  enemy's  uncertainty  and  feeble 
reaction,  220;  artillery  preparation, 
221;  advance  to  first  objective,  222, 
223;  proposed  movement  to  left, 
223;  night  advance  to  Hattonchatel- 
Vigneulles,  224-29;  results  of  Divi- 
sion's advance,  229;  work  of  en- 
gineers, 230;  prisoners  and  salvage, 
230 ;  casualties,  230 ;  gratitude  of  civil- 
ians, 231 ;  Division's  sector  after  oper- 
ation, 232;  services  of  Division,  298. 
See  also  Meuse-Argonne. 

Saint-Remy  Wood,  on  Saint-Mihiel 
line,  216,  219;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 222. 

Saint-Robert  Farm,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 173. 


Sanborn,  Capt.  (Major)  J.  R.;  com- 
mands, 241,  300. 

Sanitary  Train.  See  One-Hundred- 
First. 

Saulx,  in  Meuse  front  lines,  232,  233. 

Saumur,  artillery  school,  55. 

Schools,  for  officers  during  training, 
51,  52,  54;  Army  General  Staff  Col- 
lege, 55-57;  Second  Corps,  209,  211. 
ASee  also  Education. 

Scorer,  Capt.  C.  E.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Sec,  Mont,  in  German  Saint-Mihiel 
lines,  102. 

Second  American  Division,  as  pioneer, 
26;  sector  on  Saint-Mihiel  salient, 
101  n.;  relief  on  Marne  salient  front 
by  Twenty-Sixth,  160;  in  Marne 
offensive,  185  n.  See  also  Marines; 
Regulars. 

Second  Connecticut  Infantry,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  16. 

Second  Corps  Schools,  209,  211. 

Second  French  Colonial  Corps,  Twenty- 
Sixth  in,  232 ;  on  Verdun  front,  270  n., 
275  n.   See  also  Meuse-Argonne. 

Second  French  Dismovmted  Cavalry 
Division,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
216,  219,  224,  226;  in  corps  with 
Twenty-Sixth,  on  Meuse  front,  232, 
244. 

Second  Maine  Infantry,  in  Twenty* 
Sixth  Division,  17. 

Second  Massachusetts  Field  Artillery, 
in  Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  in 
Twenty-Sixth  Division,  17. 

Seicheprey,  in  La  Reine  Sector,  posi- 
tion of  troops,  101,  106,  119-22;  Ger- 
man preparations  to  attack,  116-19; 
artillery  preparation  effect,  122-24; 
attack  and  counter-attack,  124-26; 
lack  of  communication,  123,  126, 
129,  131;  conditions  in  afternoon, 
American  preparation  for  counter- 
advance,  127-29;  failure  of  patrol 
reports,  129;  breakdown  of  counter- 
advance,  court-martial  of  command- 
er, 130;  results  of  fight,  weaknesses 
developed,  130-33;  effect  on  Lib- 
erty Loan,  132.  5 

Senoux,  Cote  de,  on  Saint-Mihiel 
front.  217. 

Sergy,  in  Marne  offensive,  200,  204, 
205. 

Seventeenth  French  Corps,  on  Verdun 
front,  244;  Divisions  attached  to, 
245;  Headquarters,  248;  relieved, 
270  n.,  275  n.  See  also  Meuse-Ar- 
gonne. 


INDEX 


323 


"Seventy-five"  French  gun,  described, 
44  n. 

Seventy-Ninth  American  Division, 
on  Meuse  front,  244;  on  Verdun 
front,  261,  262,  264,  278;  in  pursuit, 
266. 

Seventy-Seventh  Field  Artillery,  in 
Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  218. 

Seventy-Sixth  American  Division,  early 
transfers  to  Twenty-Sixth,  26. 

Seventy-Third  Field  Artillery,  in  Saint- 
Mihiel  offensive,  218. 

Shelton,  Lt.-Col.  (Col.,  Brig.-Gen.) 
G.  H.,  Chief  of  Staff,  16  n.\  career 
and  personality,  20;  commands 
104th  Infantry,  60;  wounded,  153; 
commands  51st  Brigade,  169;  in 
Marne  offensive,  190,  193;  in  pur- 
suit, 198-201;  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 224,  225;  on  the  night  advance 
to  Vigneulles,  228;  relinquishes 
command,  249;  return  to  duty,  258; 
report  on  Beileu  Wood  fight,  258-60; 
commands  52d  Brigade,  290. 

Sherburne,  Col.  (Brig.-Gen.)  J.  H.,  com- 
mand, 17;  as  artillery  commander, 
155;  transferred,  169;  return  to 
artillery  command,  300. 

Sibille  Trench,  in  Seicheprey  fight, 
124,  125,  127. 

Signalmen,  School,  55.  See  also  One- 
Hundred-First  Field  Signal  Battal- 
ion. 

Simonds,  Lt.-Col.  (Brig.-Gen.)  G.  S., 
Adjutant,  16  n. ;  transferred,  61. 

Simons,  Capt.  Aiken,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Simpkins,  Lt.  (Capt.)  N.  S.,  of  Staff, 
16  n.;  death,  249. 

Sivry,  in  Verdun  lines,  246. 

Sixt  von  Arnim,  Gen.,  Flanders  drive, 
113. 

Sixth  American  Division,  relieves 
Twenty-Sixth,  279.  See  also  Regu- 
lars. 

Sixth  French  Army,  position  and  units 
on  Marne  salient,  168. 

Sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  in 
Depot  Brigade,  13  n. ;  in  Twenty- 
Sixth  Divi-sion,  16-18. 

Sixty-Seventh  Field  Artillery  Brigade, 
training  camp,  36. 

Smith,  Col.  E.  T.,  command,  17;  trans- 
ferred, 154. 

Soff  Wood,  on  Saint-Mihiel  front,  217. 

Soissons,  railhead  for  Chemin  des 
Dames  Sector,  67. 

Sommedieue,  Division  Headquarters, 
214. 

Sonuard    Wood,   in    German    Saint- 


Mihiel  lines,  101;  gas  attack  on, 
150. 

Souilly,  Army  Headquarters,  214. 

Spada,  Second  Division  near,  101  n. 

Spaulding,  R.  R.,  first  man  killed,  74. 

Sports.   See  Recreation. 

Staff.  See  Division  Staff;  General 
Staff. 

Stettin  Trench,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offen- 
sive, 222. 

Stevens,  Major  (Lt.-Col.)  C.  A.,  of 
Staff,  25  71.;  Adjutant,  61. 

Straggling  on  march,  89,  92. 

Strength  of  Division,  scheme,  14; 
measures  to  reach  prescribed,  26. 
See  also    Casualties;    Replacements. 

Strickland,  Capt.  D.  W.,  in  Marne 
offensive,  194  n. 

Sturmhataillon,  elements,  118  n. 

Summerall,  Major-Gen.  C.  P.,  and 
Twenty-Sixth,  282,  284,  288,  299; 
on  conduct  during  leave,  284  n. 

Supply,  effort  for,  before  sailing,  25, 
27 ;  problem  in  French  training  camp, 
41,  43;  problem  of  organization,  43; 
General  Staff  section  in  Division 
Staff,  64.  See  also  Food;  One-Hun- 
dred-First Supply  Train;  Transport. 

Sweetser,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  L.,  Depot 
Brigade,  13. 

Sweetser,  Col.  W.  M.,  command,  17, 
18. 

Tactics,  officers'  school,  52. 

Talou,  Cote  de,  on  Verdun  front,  266. 

Tancrou-Germigny,  billet,  159. 

Tandy,  Capt.  E.  H.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Telephone.   See  Communication. 

Tenth  French  Army,  position  on 
Marne  salient,  168;  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 185. 

Tenth  French  Colonial  Di\'ision,  posi- 
tion adjoining  La  Reine  Sector,  110, 
145  n.;  Bois  Brul6  fight,  112;  on 
Verdun  front,  278. 

Thillot-sous-les-Cotes,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  217,  224;  in  Meuse  front 
linos,  232. 

Thiolet  Farm,  on  Marne  salient  lines, 
162. 

Third  American  Division,  Chateau- 
Thierry  fight,  159;  in  Marne  salient 
lines,  166,  168;  in  Marne  offensive, 
204.   See  also  Regulars. 

Thirteenth  Field  Artillery,  in  Saint- 
Mihiol  offensive,  218. 

Thirty-Eighth  French  Corps,  position 
on  Marne  salient,  168. 

Thirty-Ninth   French   Division,    posi- 


324 


INDEX 


tion  on  Maine  salient,  168;  in  Marne 
offensive,  201,  204;  in  corps  with 
Twenty-Sixth,  232. 

Thirty-Second  American  Di\nsion,  in 
Marne  offensive,  205.  See  also 
National  Guard. 

Thirty-Second  French  Corps,  Division 
in,  103,  105. 

Thirty-Third  American  Division,  on 
Verdun  front,  245,  278.  ^ee  also 
National  Guard. 

Thompson,  Capt.  C.  M.,  in  Seicheprey 
fight,  122;  in  Marne  offensive,  191, 
192. 

Torcy,  on  Marne  salient  front,  160;  in 
Marne  offensive,  173,  175,  176,  176  n. 

Toul,  Division  Headquarters,  157. 

Toulouse,  Capt.  J.,  services  at  training 
camp,  48  n. 

Tournament,  at  Embarkation  Area, 
299. 

Town  Wood,  on  Verdun  front,  264; 
captured,  266. 

Training,  first  state  camps,  process 
there,  12;  rumor  of  southern  camp, 
27;  English  camps,  32-33;  camp  in 
Lorraine,  34;  problems  in  France, 
35;  artillery  camp  in  Brittany,  35; 
impressions  on  French,  36-39,  72; 
damages,  38;  basis,  trench  and  open 
warfare,  39;  rifle  as  weapon,  39,  51; 
correction  of  faults  of  character, 
40;  programme,  40;  programme  for 
artillery,  40;  pioneer  problems  of  sup- 
ply, sanitation,  and  billeting,  41-46; 
interference  of  details,  42;  problems 
of  health  and  weather,  42;  prol:)lem 
of  transport,  43-46;  effect  of  diffi- 
culties on  morale,  46;  work  of  French 
Military  Mission,  47;  services  of  Col. 
Bertrand's  regiment,  48-50;  general 
sersMs  specialist,  50;  officers'  schools, 
51,  52,  54;  teaching  and  example  of 
Di\^sion  Commander,  52,  58;  and 
rumor  of  side-tracking  of  militia 
divisions,  53-54;  inspection  by 
Pershing,  54;  officers'  tour  of  instruc- 
tion, 55,  57;  General  Staff  College, 
55-57;  progress,  57;  absence  without 
leave,  57;  spirit  and  improvement  of 
officers,  58;  divisional  conscious- 
ness, 58;  model  trenches,  58; 
changes  among  officers  during,  59- 
62;  General  Staff  sections  in  Di\'i- 
sion  Staff,  64;  in  rest  area  after 
Marne  offensive,  210,  211;  after 
armistice,  282.  See  also  Chemin  des 
Dames;  Organization;  Road  march. 

Transport,  problem  of  French  training 


camp,  41,  43-46;  entraining  for 
Chemin  des  Dames,  67-69;  develop- 
ment of  ability  to  entrain,  68;  en- 
training under  fire  behind  Chemin 
des  Dames,  86,  87;  detraining  as  an 
experience,  88;  conditions  during 
occupation  of  La  Reine  Sector,  142; 
travel  in  decaudilles,  157;  problem 
after  Marne  offensive,  211;  reduced 
condition  of  animal,  during  Meuse- 
Argonne  offensive,  267  n.,  268  n. 
See  also  Supply;  Railhead;  and  trains 
under  One-Hundred-First. 

Traub,  Brig-Gen.  (Major-Gen.)  P.  E., 
commands  brigade,  16;  career  and 
personality,  21;  and  movement  to 
Chemin  des  Dames,  64;  in  road 
march  on  foot,  88  n. ;  and  Seicheprey 
fight,  128;  transferred,  169. 

Trench  mortars  in  Division  15.  See 
also  One-Hundred-First. 

Trenches,  model,  system  at  training 
camp,  58. 

Triangle  Farm,  in  Marne  salient  lines, 
162. 

Trondes,  Division  Headquarters,  153. 

Trouchand,  Col.,  battle  record  of 
regiment,  50  n. 

Troyon,  Division  Headquarters,  240. 

Troyon  Sector,  232;  withdrawal  from, 
244.  See  also  Meuse-Argonne. 

Trugny,  in  Marne  offensive,  187-98. 

Twachtman,  Major  (Col.)  J.  A.,  as  ar- 
tillery commander,  155;  commands 
regiment,  241. 

Twelfth  Aero  Squadron,  in  Marne 
offensive,  174. 

Twenty-Eighth  American  Division, 
on  Marne  front,  160;  brigade  in 
Marne  offensive,  196-99.  See  also 
National  Guard. 

Twenty-Ninth  American  Division,  on 
Verdun  front,  248,  278;  relief,  262; 
movement  to  rest  area,  280.  See  also 
National  Guard. 

Twenty-Sixth  American  Division,  val- 
ue of  contemporaneous  account,  1: 
interesting  record:  1.  See  also  Aisne- 
Marne;  Armistice;  Army  of  Occupa- 
tion;  Billets ;  Casualties;  Champagne- 
Marne;  Character;  Chemin  des 
Dames ;  Communication ;  Decora- 
tions, Division  Commander;  Division 
Headquarters;  Division  Staff;  Em- 
barkation Area;  First  events;  Insig- 
nia; La  Reine  Sector;  Meuse-Ar- 
gonne; Morale;  National  Guard;  Offi- 
cers; Organization;  Overseas;  Physi- 
cal condition;  Prisoners;  Recoijistruo- 


INDEX 


825 


tion;  Recreation;  Replacements;  Re- 
turn; Road  march;  Saint-Mihiel ; 
Supply;  Training;  Transport. 

Twentv-Sixth  French  Division,  on 
Verdun  front,  245,  261,  278. 

Twenty-Third  Infantry,  on  Marne 
front,  159,  160  n.;  relief,  160. 

Two  -  Hundred  -  Eighty  -  First  Aero 
Squadron,  in  Belleu  Wood  fight,  253. 

Two-Hundred-Third  French  Artillery, 
in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  218. 

Vacherauville,  in  Verdun  lines,  247, 
248. 

Vailly,  Headquarters  of  101st  Infantry, 
73. 

Vaudesson,  Headquarters  of  103d  In- 
fantry, 73. 

Vaux,  on  Marne  salient  front,  160; 
fight,  164-66;  in  Marne  offensive, 
173. 

Vaux-les-Palameix,  in  Saint-Mihiel 
offensive,  220,  222. 

Vauxaillon,  Headquarters  of  104th 
Infantry,  73. 

Velaine-en-Haye,  billet,  157. 

Verdun, highway  from  Bar-le-Duc,  214; 
Division  on  front,  242;  aspect  of 
front,  243;  as  railhead,  248;  cele- 
bration of  armistice,  277.  See  also 
Meuse-Argonne. 

Vermont  troops.   See  First. 

VievUle,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive,  217, 
229. 

Vigneulles,  in  Saint-Mihiel  offensive, 
217,  219,  224.  227. 

Villars,  billet,  34  n. 

Ville-devant-Chaumont,  on  Verdun 
front,  264,  266;  occupied,  266,  276. 

Villemareuil-Changis,  billet,  159. 

Villey-Saint-Etienne,  billet,  157. 

Villouxel,  billet,  34  »i. 

Vincelles,  in  Marne  offensive,  173. 

Voisogne  Wood,  and  La  Reine  Sector, 
137. 


Voletchy,  Gen.,  on  Marche%'ille  attack, 

238. 
Volunteer     soldiers,     character.      See 

National  Guard. 

Wadonville,  in  Meuse  front  lines,  232, 
235. 

Walker,  Lt.  William,  in  Marne  offen- 
sive, 192. 

Waller,  Lt.  S.  R.,  command,  18. 

Walmsley,  Major  S.  W.,  command, 
transferred,  156. 

Warville  Wood,  raid,  233,  240. 

Watres,  Major  L.  H.,  command,  290. 

Weigel,  Brig.-Gen.  William,  in  Marne 
offensive,  198. 

Weisel,  Major  E.  T.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Welfare  work,  beginning,  57;  Massa- 
chusetts club-room  at  Paris,  103 ;  See 
also  Education;  Recreation. 

Westbrook,  Major  S.  F.,  command,  301. 

Westfield,  Mass.,  training  camp,  12  n. 

Westphalen  Le  Maitre,  Capt.,  services 
at  training  camp,  48  n. 

Wheelock,  Capt.  (Major)  H.  H.,  of 
Staff,  25  n.;  line  command,  241. 

Wmiams,  Lt.-Col.  F.  P.,  of  Staff,  25  n. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  visit  to  Division, 
284-86. 

Wolcott,  Capt.  Oliver,  command,  16; 
of  Staff,  60. 

Woods,  Lt.,  in  Marne  offensive,  176  n. 

Xivray-Marvoisin,  villages  in  La  Reine 
Sector,  101,  105;  raid,  152. 

YD  Show,  142. 

Yankee  Division  insignia,  248. 

York  Harbor  YD  Hut,  300. 

Young    Men's   Christian   Association, 

and  educational   scheme,   294;  and 

amusements,  295. 

Zone  of  action,  in  Marne  offensive, 
173. 


Slbe  Rilicrsi&E  pit^^ 

CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
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